Hormuz blockage likely to be permanent

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By Tom Sharpe*

Last week’s midterms were a damning indictment of the war in Iran. Republicans lost both houses of Congress by margins neither party has suffered in a midterm for 50 years. J D Vance put it in seven words on Wednesday: “The reason we lost is the war.” He has his own reasons for being this blunt, 2028 among them, but Trump himself called the verdict “largely true” before adding that he would do it all again. A third of voters told exit pollsters the war was crucial to their choice. “Gas” (petrol) prices did the rest.

So the question is not whether Trump wraps this war up but how, and the election has made extraction harder, not easier. Tehran reads the result as vindication: its chief negotiator says Americans “said no to war” and Iran endorses the message, and regional analysts expect its demands to harden. A Democratic Congress cannot stop a limited campaign before January, but Trump now needs a result he can sell at home, from a weaker position.

America is also weaker militarily than it looks, for two reasons of Trump’s own making. First, he will not send manned aircraft over Iran in any numbers, not since April, when an F-15E was shot down and the retrieval of its weapons officer became one of the largest combat rescues in American history: around a hundred special operators on the ground, two MC-130 transports stuck on a desert strip and destroyed in place, an A-10 lost. It was an extraordinary operation that did succeed in the end, but only just. Had it failed, American aircrew and special operators shown off on Iranian television would have been a colossal political problem back in the US. Trump has kept manned aircraft mostly well back from Iran since, and this week’s beating will not have increased his appetite for casualties.

A massive, hard-hitting conventional bombardment is therefore off the table. What remains is a performative one, or quite likely nothing at all – Trump seems to be inclined to the latter at the moment.

The probable follow-on is that America declares the nuclear threat eliminated and disengages with no attempt at further agreement, leaving Iran in charge of the Strait of Hormuz, charging for passage and periodically shooting at those who decline to pay. A Gulf-brokered regional arrangement, possibly with China, is a long shot; a real de-escalation deal after strikes longer still.

A negotiated deal without further strikes, I believe, would be the cleanest and safest exit, but US hawks would hate it – it would read as defeat – and the two sides remain far apart despite Qatari and other attempts at mediation. I don’t think it’s likely.

Another unlikely ploy for Trump is to maintain the status quo: a blockade that is unlikely to produce nuclear capitulation but could be maintained with “just” one carrier and so relatively sustainable. The hope, as it has been since this phase started, is that the economic strangulation in Iran becomes so severe that it provokes an internal uprising. However, those who understand how Iran is set up to prevent or crush this, or both, particularly after the January protests, are not optimistic. All the while, the Iranian people suffer even more.

Seizing Kharg Island or the small islands in the strait is theoretically a US option. It would mean a lot of Americans in body bags and would also be the surest sign that the midterm message has not been received. Use of nuclear weapons against Pickaxe Mountain or another nuclear site is, thank goodness, extremely unlikely whatever Tucker Carlson says. Apart from anything else there is a serious risk that it wouldn’t achieve a whole lot. Nukes aren’t magic and do not of themselves guarantee that a deeply buried facility will be knocked out. People don’t build nuclear bunkers, hardened silos etc for fun, after all.

Meanwhile the strait shows what “Iran in control” already means. On Nov 1 the tug Selat Storm was hit off Musandam and sank, the bulk carrier Era S was holed near Limah and the tanker Largo Atom was disabled by drones off Saudi Arabia. On Nov 2 the Indian dhow Al Jusufi was hit off Limah, killing one of its 14 crew. On Nov 3 the supertanker Grit, on Iran’s blacklist of “non-compliant” ships, took two projectiles into the engine room. On Nov 4 the IRGC claimed four tankers had hit mines and two more had been seized, a claim of a kind they have made repeatedly and US Central Command (Centcom, in charge of the Middle East for the US military) has consistently denied. However, a tanker was hit off Qatar that night. That was eight attacks in just four days, and many ships have stopped reporting when they get hit. Running the strait under US drone and helicopter cover, then transferring cargoes at sea, has worked in the last month, but it is not a sustainable business model and, if you were to ask some of the mariners who have been hit, not a particularly sensible one either.

Add it up and I’d say it’s better than even money that Iran will wind up still in control of the strait when the dust settles. The midterms did not change that.

China and Israel still have parts to play. China, the largest buyer of Iranian oil, wants the strait open but has so far shown little willingness to shape events. Netanyahu, stripped of his majority on Oct 27 but still caretaker prime minister, has every incentive to push for more than symbolic strikes – or to act alone.

*Tom Sharpe served for 27 years as a Royal Navy officer, commanding four different warships.

This article first appeared in The Telegraph and is printed with the author’s permission.

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