Interoperability, South Pacific Burden-Sharing, and Trans-Tasman Relations

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Interoperability, South Pacific Burden-Sharing, and Trans-Tasman Relations

By David M Andrews

This year, 2021, marks several notable anniversaries in the history of trans-Tasman relations: the 70th anniversary of the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty, the 50th anniversary of the Five Power Defence Arrangements, and the 30th anniversary of the Closer Defence Relations Agreement. In the spirit of this confluence of anniversaries, 2021 also presents a unique opportunity to reinvigorate and strengthen the Australia-New Zealand alliance – one that has lately come to be ‘symbolised by public disagreement rather than concord’.[1]

While the respective governments will inevitably differ on some issues, the guiding principles of Closer Defence Relations and strategic planning documents from both sides of the Tasman make it clear that greater levels of interoperability are a common interest for Australia and New Zealand. Additionally, there is a shared understanding that the international security environment is becoming more dynamic, complex and challenging, necessitating an increased emphasis on contributions to regional security throughout the South Pacific as well as in support of the international rules-based order.[2]

Not only has Australia’s and New Zealand’s immediate region taken on greater importance but also the maritime domain in particular has returned to the forefront of strategic competition. The Indo-Pacific construction of Australia’s immediate region is implicitly maritime by nature, drawing together the Indian and Pacific Ocean regions, and the ongoing tensions in the South China Sea and East China Sea reinforce the idea that the maritime domain is ‘the new epicentre of superpower confrontation and international tension’.[3]

Mindful of these strategic circumstances, both Australia and New Zealand are in the midst of extensive capability acquisition programs. The New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) in particular is undergoing a widespread, once-in-a-generation revitalisation of its combat capability. The acquisitions of Bushmaster protected mobility vehicles, C-130J Super Hercules transport aircraft, and P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft have been announced since 2018, and the entire Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) – bar HMNZS Aotearoa – is due to be replaced between 2032 and 2035.[4] The added significance of this is that with Australia’s construction of the Arafura-class offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) underway, and with the Hunter-class frigates and Attack-class submarines in development, for the first time since the Anzac-class frigate program commenced in the 1980s the RAN and RNZN are undertaking a comprehensive fleet recapitalisation process simultaneously.

This is a moment in defence planning where circumstances, interests and requirements align; there is an important opportunity for Australia and New Zealand to seize upon and set about reframing the alliance for the Indo-Pacific era. One opportunity to do so would be to pursue a coordinated and consolidated approach to maritime capability acquisition over the next decade, not only to enhance interoperability between the ADF and NZDF but also to reinforce a sense of shared purpose and direction between the allies – something that has seemingly slipped away amidst the ongoing diplomatic tensions.

Interoperability as a Strategic Requirement

While Australia and New Zealand possess ‘deep mutual security interests, shared values and long-standing people-to-people linkages’,[5] in recent decades a significant divergence has emerged between the ADF and NZDF in terms of defence capability and investment, which has impacted on the level of interoperability between the forces.

While Australia has historically spent more on defence than New Zealand – appreciative that New Zealand ‘will make its own judgements on its national interests, and that New Zealand’s military capability choices may not always reflect Australia’s’[6] – commonality between ADF and NZDF platforms is an important aspect of interoperability between the forces. This was emphasised in New Zealand’s Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018 (SDPS), which notes that ‘interoperability with [New Zealand’s] traditional partners is a critical strategic imperative for the [NZDF]’[7] and is ‘key to New Zealand’s strong international reputation as a valued and credible ally’.[8] The NZDF ‘must therefore maintain capabilities that enable it to work effectively with others, notably Australia and the other Five Eyes nations [Canada, UK, USA]’.[9]

This presents a particular challenge for a small military like the NZDF, as the ‘advances in technology and the military capabilities being brought into service’ by New Zealand’s close partners ‘will increasingly require more sophisticated platforms and enabling infrastructure’,[10] which will come with significant cost premiums that are potentially beyond the approximately 1 per cent of gross domestic product that New Zealand spends on defence. While building an NZDF which is interoperable with the ADF is of first importance for New Zealand, this will continue to present difficulties at current funding levels. In part this is because the higher levels of Australian defence capability reflect a requirement to ‘maintain a high degree of interoperability with the sophisticated capabilities which the United States deploys when it leads international coalitions to address global security challenges’,[11] with a particular emphasis on ‘maritime sub-surface and surface and air environments, as well as across the electro-magnetic spectrum’.[12]

Many of those technologies, platforms and skill sets are not part of the NZDF portfolio of capabilities, which raises the question of to what degree, or in which ways, Australia and New Zealand can improve their interoperability. As noted above, since 2018 the New Zealand government has taken some important steps in this regard with the acquisition of several new platforms also in use by the ADF, including Bushmaster protected mobility vehicles, C-130J Super Hercules transport aircraft, and P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft. Of these, the P-8A decision in particular has been singled out not only as an example of deft coalition government negotiation but also, more importantly, as a major investment in deployable combat capability which can operate seamlessly alongside the ADF and other security partners.[13] Furthermore, upgrading to the P-8A is an important step in ensuring that New Zealand ‘retain[s] some influence among its allies and partners’ with ‘an asset that can “plug in” alongside Australian, US, and other coalition operators’ and thereby seeks to dispel perceptions that it is ‘free riding on its presumed geographical isolation’.[14]

Having addressed their major land and aviation platform requirements, the naval dimension of New Zealand’s capability renewal program is the NZDF’s next key priority, especially given the increasing emphasis on the maritime domain as an area for regional competition and contestation.

Strategy, Cost and Structure Questions for the RNZN

Of the major investment decisions listed in the New Zealand Defence Capability Plan 2019, the largest and most pressing projects are in relation to the RNZN. In terms of new platforms, a dedicated Southern Ocean patrol vessel is scheduled for acquisition in the mid-2020s, and an enhanced multi-role sealift vessel is planned for the end of the decade, to complement HMNZS Canterbury, which is already in operation. The RNZN fleet of four patrol vessels are scheduled for replacement in the early 2030s, and the Canterbury, the dive and hydrographic support vessel HMNZS Manawanui, and the two Anzac-class frigates HMNZ Ships Te Kaha and Te Mana are all due to be replaced by the mid-2030s.[15]

The question is, however, what the RNZN is expected to do and whether those objectives would be better served by a significant readjustment in mission-sets and capabilities reflecting the emerging strategic circumstances in the South Pacific and beyond. Dr Lance Beath of the Victoria University of Wellington has argued that to take New Zealand’s defence policy settings seriously would mean ‘look[ing] more closely at the force options New Zealand needs to conduct, as well as to lead, operations in its own maritime environment’, where ‘the need is much more existential, may be much more immediate, and is almost certainly more demanding’.[16]

This planned recapitalisation of the RNZN force structure presents an opportunity not only to modernise but also to consolidate the fleet.[17] At present the RNZN possesses 10 ships in six different classes, with two more vessels of distinct types due to enter service this decade – a situation which has been described as ‘diverse beyond the point of sustainability’.[18] One potential solution is to opt for a single, modular class of vessel to perform patrol, combatant, expeditionary reconnaissance, and mine countermeasures duties to replace the existing frigates, patrol vessels and hydrography vessels, thereby reducing the number of platform types from six to four and ‘dramatically improving long-term sustainability’.[19]

Another option is to build a force structured to address transnational maritime security threats in the South Pacific, given the emphasis in the SDPS on the ‘disproportionate impact’ issues such as ‘transnational crime, illegal fishing and the adverse impact of climate change’ are having on small island states in the Pacific.[20]While this may be unpopular in some quarters, this proposal raises the important question of how and where the NZDF can have the greatest impact relative to the pressing strategic challenges and ongoing budgetary constraints. A more focused RNZN, equipped for maritime security and constabulary operations, could still make an important and valuable contribution to alliance efforts and regional security, by ‘complement[ing] partner capabilities and potentially free[ing] up their resources to be deployed elsewhere’.[21]

Potential Areas for Australia-New Zealand Coordination

Though the sustainability challenge faced by the RNZN is not quite as acute for Australia, there is considerable overlap between the RNZN’s requirements and those of the RAN. In addition to the 12 Arafura-class OPVs currently under construction, the government decided in January 2021 to proceed with developing the RAN’s future mine countermeasures and hydrography vessels as a variant of the Arafura class.[22] As ASPI Senior Analyst Marcus Hellyer has explained, while there are no plans for the RAN to do so at this stage, the OPV design also has the potential to be upgraded with features including an advanced electronically scanned array radar, anti-ship missile launchers, modular towed array sonars, and anti-air missile launchers, which would provide a substantial (and relatively inexpensive) boost in combat power while being able to operate closely alongside the RAN’s dedicated surface warfare platforms, thanks to its common combat system and advanced communications suite.[23]

In terms of amphibious capabilities, Australia’s 2020 Force Structure Plan includes the intention to design, develop, and acquire two multi-role sealift and replenishment vessels to replace the current landing ship dock HMAS Choules, as well as an additional vessel specifically to support the Pacific Step-up.[24] The New Zealand sealift requirement indicates that a landing platform dock (or similar) is an option to partner the Canterbury, and though both navies’ programs are at an early stage, this is another potential area for collaboration.

Looking forward to the furthest horizon in the Defence Capability Plan, and mindful of New Zealand’s historically constrained defence budgets, at this stage it is difficult to imagine the replacement of Te Kaha and Te Mana in a like-for-like manner. For example, the estimated cost for the Hunter-class frigate in development for the RAN is approximately A$3.9 billion per unit, and given that the entire New Zealand 2020 defence budget was NZ$5 billion, it seems unwise to hold too tightly to the expectation that the frigates will be replaced by vessels of the same class or capability – an argument also advanced by Professor Rob Ayson of the Victoria University of Wellington.[25] While there are less expensive frigates available, it may be more economical and practical to opt for a larger number of smaller, more affordable vessels designed for maritime security and constabulary operations, as noted above. To complement a larger, constabulary-focused fleet, additional resources could be invested in expanding the P-8A fleet, which would still contribute to maritime domain awareness and to anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare tasks, as well as being valuable assets suitable to be deployed in support of coalition operations.

Burden-Sharing and Interoperability for the Indo-Pacific Era

Returning to where we began, 2021 also marks the 110th anniversary of the RAN and the 80th anniversary of the RNZN. Mindful of the complex, evolving strategic environment and the renewed focus on maritime competition across the region, the two forces are entering an era when cooperation, interoperability and the shared responsibility for regional security will be of paramount importance. The maritime domain has returned to the fore as the key focus of great power competition, and the challenges presented by resource exploitation and climate change are poised to have a disproportionate impact on the South Pacific, where Australia and New Zealand ‘have special responsibilities as part of a Pacific family – our Vuvale, our wantok, our Whānau’.[26]

That both navies are undergoing a process of fleet renewal concurrently presents a timely opportunity to examine current levels of maritime burden-sharing and platform interoperability, and to determine whether current arrangements are fit for purpose to meet the challenges laid out in both nations’ strategic policy documents. By looking to our responsibilities and interests in the Pacific and identifying areas in which to work together, this may present an opportunity to move beyond the recent bilateral tensions, build a shared sense of purpose and direction, and focus on reinvigorating and reshaping the alliance to best suit the decades ahead.

 

*David Andrews is a PhD candidate in International Relations at the School of Politics, Media, and Philosophy at La Trobe University. He holds a Master of Arts (Strategic Studies) with Honours from the Australian National University, a Master of Arts (Ancient History) from Macquarie University, and a Bachelor of Social Science with Honours from the University of New South Wales. He previously held roles in military strategy, strategic policy, and export control in the Department of Defence, and currently resides in Kuwait.

 

[1] Robert Ayson, ‘Allies but not friends? New Zealand and Australia’, The Interpreter (Lowy Institute), 17 February 2021, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/allies-not-friends-new-zealand-and-australia>.

[2] Department of Defence, 2020 Defence Strategic Update, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2020, pp. 5–7, <https://www1.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-11/2020_Defence_Strategic_Update.pdf>;

Ministry of Defence, Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018, New Zealand Government, Wellington, 2018, pp. 5–7, <https://www.defence.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/8958486b29/Strategic-Defence-Policy-Statement-2018.pdf>.

[3] Rouben Azizian, ‘Between Cold Wars: old mistakes and new realities’, Professional Journal of the Royal New Zealand Navy, vol. 1(1), 2020, p. 78.

[4] Andrew Watts, ‘Designing the next fleet’, Professional Journal of the Royal New Zealand Navy, vol. 1(1), 2020, p. 25.

[5] Department of Defence, 2016 Defence White Paper, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2016, p. 124, <https://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/docs/2016-defence-white-paper.pdf>.

[6] 2016 Defence White Paper, p. 125.

[7] Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018, p. 37.

[8] Ibid., p. 7.

[9] Ibid., p. 37.

[10] Ibid., p. 37.

[11] 2016 Defence White Paper, p. 77.

[12] Ibid., p. 122.

[13] Robert Ayson, ‘The domestic politics of New Zealand’s defence’, The Interpreter, 9 July 2018, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/domestic-politics-new-zealand-defence>.

[14] Euan Graham, ‘New Zealand’s P-8 purchase: straddling the gap’, The Interpreter, 10 July 2018, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/new-zealands-p8-purchase-straddling-gap>.

[15] Ministry of Defence, Defence Capability Plan 2019, New Zealand Government, Wellington, 2019, pp. 32–34, <https://www.defence.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/03acb8c6aa/Defence-Capability-Plan-2019.pdf>.

[16] Lance Beath, ‘Editorial’, Professional Journal of the Royal New Zealand Navy, vol. 1(1), 2020, p. 57.

[17] Watts, p. 25.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid, p. 42.

[20] Timothy Portland, ‘A maritime security reset for the Royal New Zealand Navy’, Professional Journal of the Royal New Zealand Navy, vol. 1(1), 2020, pp. 108–109.

[21] Ibid., p. 121.

[22] Minister for Defence Senator the Hon Linda Reynolds CSC, ‘Henderson Shipyard becomes sovereign capability powerhouse’, Department of Defence [website], 25 January 2021, <https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/lreynolds/media-releases/henderson-shipyard-becomes-sovereign-capability-powerhouse>.

[23] Marcus Hellyer, Special report: From concentrated vulnerability to distributed lethality – or how to get more maritime bang for the buck with our offshore patrol vessels, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra, 2020, pp. 13–22.

[24] Department of Defence, 2020 Force Structure Plan, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2020, p. 41, <https://www.defence.gov.au/StrategicUpdate-2020/docs/2020_Force_Structure_Plan.pdf>.

[25] Robert Ayson, ‘Frigates after 2030? I’m still uncertain’, Incline, 3 September 2019, <http://www.incline.org.nz/home/frigates-after-2030-im-still-uncertain>.

[26] Prime Minister the Hon Scott Morrison MP, ‘Address to Asialink: “Where we live”’, Asialink, 26 June 2019, <https://asialink.unimelb.edu.au/stories/australia-and-the-indo-pacific-an-address-by-prime-minister-scott-morrison>.

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