The following is the executive summary of the submission by Professor John Blaxland* to the non-government AUKUS Public Inquiry.
AUKUS – A Controversial & Consequential Choice. Five years after its announcement, the decision ranks among Australia’s most consequential since the ANZUS Treaty in September 1951. Debate has been animated by its surprise spawning in 2021 and has since focused on critiques of acquisition of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs). Australians deserve clarity on cost, feasibility, workforce outcomes, sovereignty, nuclear stewardship and risk. Those questions are central to credibly assessing the partnership, but the scope is broader.
Changed Strategic Environment. Australia’s security environment has deteriorated markedly in recent years, contributing to a broader poly-crisis characterised by coercive great-power competition, technological disruption, environmental stress and wider governance challenges. Assumptions supporting Australian defence policy since the 1990s—extended warning times, relatively uncontested maritime approaches and a stable regional balance of power—can no longer be relied upon.
Retaining capability settings designed for an earlier strategic period also carries risk.
Technology & Geography Imperatives. Activities on or above the ocean’s surface today are observable, and targetable. Beneath it, the picture is different. Advances in distributed sensing, autonomous systems and data fusion erode submarine stealth, but detection and concealment co-evolve. What remains is an asymmetry: a submarine that surfaces to snort is now exposed; one remaining submerged is not.
Australia’s geography meanwhile has not changed. As an island continent dependent on secure maritime access, Australia must operate across vast distances and contribute to a favourable regional balance of power. So, long-range, persistent and survivable undersea capability is important. Nuclear propulsion is costly, but it offers speed, endurance, stealth, reach and sustained presence that conventional submarines cannot match across distances Australia requires – even to operate around its shores. Accepting less capability imposes its own constraints and risks.
Bolstered Undersea Power is key. Changed conditions place greater weight on Undersea Power— the capacity to understand, protect and, if necessary, contest under the sea. It encompasses submarines, autonomous systems, seabed sensing, infrastructure protection, science and industry. That is the framework used here.
Institutionalising Cooperation. AUKUS reflects a continuation of Australia’s established strategic trajectory, not a sudden departure from it. Cooperation with the UK and US extends over a century, spanning wartime operations, signals intelligence, joint operational planning and defence-technology collaboration. AUKUS institutionalises and extends accumulated trust; it did not invent allied integration.
Broader Capability Outcomes. Success should be measured by more than submarine delivery schedules. It should include development of a qualified workforce, sovereign sustainment, advanced manufacturing, participation in allied supply chains, expanded research cooperation and greater resilience. Where parts Undersea Power: AUKUS Submission – John Blaxland – 28/08/2026P a g e | 8 of the program face delay, progress still portends significant gains. Without such development, Australia would remain more reliant on external industrial capacity, specialist expertise and supply chains over which it has limited, if any, control.
Regional Engagement. Australia must also deepen ties with Southeast Asian and Pacific neighbours. AUKUS must be accompanied by political transparency, compliance with non-proliferation obligations, and greater practical regional cooperation in maritime security and capacity-building. Australia is a middle power with an important regional role. AUKUS is best presented as a component of its commitment to a stable, open and largely rules-based order. Recent security pacts and deeper regional engagement suggest neighbours understand this.
Managing Risks. AUKUS is not without implementation and strategic risks. These must be weighed against risks of delay, capability loss, industrial dependence and reduced freedom of action. The submission recognises concerns about AUKUS.
Implementation risks are real, but they do not demonstrate that abandoning AUKUS would produce a better outcome. Sustained public confidence can be strengthened by enhanced transparency, realistic contingency planning, sustained investment in Australian industrial capacity and measurable implementation benchmarks.
Strategic Agency. AUKUS should ultimately be judged by whether it strengthens Australian strategic agency – that is, Australia’s capacity to make independent decisions with the industrial, technological, military and institutional capabilities to implement them. This is neither isolation nor complete self-sufficiency—both are unrealistic for a middle power like Australia. Nor is it unquestioning dependence on allies. It is prudent statecraft in pursuit of Australia’s own long-term interests.
Deterrence and Risk of Entrapment. Australia must balance competing concerns: the risk of entrapment in a conflict not of its choosing, the risk of abandonment by a major ally, and the pursuit of deterrence through stronger national capability. Deeper alliance integration may reduce abandonment risk while also increasing Australia’s exposure and challenge of avoiding a future regional conflict, the risk of which, it appears, reduces with greater deterrence. That integration also can enhance independent reach and regional influence. So, AUKUS involves accepting alliance entanglement in exchange for stronger deterrence, capability and strategic agency.
Commitment. Australia cannot afford another five lost years. Its commitment to AUKUS must be affirmed while bolstering workforce development, transparency, contingency planning and sovereign industrial planning. Its success depends on whether Australia emerges more capable and resilient. Australia should stick to AUKUS as it is a relatively coherent and achievable way to strengthen deterrence and sovereign defence capability in an age when Undersea Power is critical.
Abandoning AUKUS would not remove risk; it would leave Australia exposed, managing the deteriorating strategic environment with lesser capabilities, industrial pathways, and alliance mechanisms. On the available evidence, the case for abandoning AUKUS has not been established.
*John Blaxland is Professor of International Security & Intelligence Studies. Strategic and Defence Studies Centre. Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs. College of Asia and the Pacific. Australian National University.
The full submission is here: dd6658_41d4f8509df04d78af97fc83f93590fb.pdf
Australia is one of the ONLY countries to rely on the US for protection when we are actually more reliant on China for our economy. This impasse is ridiculous.
What AI prompt did you use?
I’m surprised an academic such as yourself is pro Aucus..
Aucus is an offensive weapon, not defensive, and arming it with conventional weapons is pointless.
If it is we are to have an offensive weapon , it should be noted the continental shelf along Chinas coast is shallow and laced with sonars detection devices, assuming China could be an adversary in the future.-And what are we going to do?-penetrate thier hostile waters, fire a few conventional weapons and scurry away. the concept is fanciful.
Australia should drop Aucus like a hot potatoe and develop a network of say 50 crew less submarines to defend our coast, with technology we already posesss with Andria. Crewless submarines are the way of the future -far cheaper, more versatile and doing the job of defending our shoreline, instead of the Aucus alternately which simply makes the Henderson base a nuclear target.
The article assumes the Americans will meet their AUKAS obligation on time and if at all.
With the current US Government’s performance on National and International commitment to national and international agreements with NATO, Canada, Ukraine and the seeming poor approach to the Iran war, this US leader has another 2 years to run. Who knows whats next
What else will they choose another tangent to follow. eg. the Arctic, Greenland, Venezuela, Planet Moon and Mars and last but not least CHINA!!!!!
The value of trust we need to have in their current and future leadership for our defence and military equipment is not guaranteed
Finally if we believe if China’s intents are in the Pacific, how many weapons (including) submarines will we need to defend and protect the great southern land.
Australian government think again.
Will AUKUS include undersea drone capability and protection. I am sure that future undersea warfare will include autonomous offensive drone vessels. Submarines will become like tanks on the Ukrainian battlefield …… expensive useless scrap metal and possible coffins for Australians. This secret non consultative AUKUS deal was made in the light of the cold war year thinking, but today’s technology has well and truly turned that strategy on it’s head. Please don’t act stubbornly and plunge headlong into a future disaster. Rethink this failed plan.
Please provide a terms glossary. So many phrases in this submission halt my progress in parsing the argument. Eg: Favourable Balance of Power. Interpretation of that term should be made explicit if it is being used as a supporting input. Cases against AUKUS are either clearly social loose expressions of desire for peace, or focused and cleanly structured to expose the core of the contest of ideas in a productive way. Please be scholarly and logically solid.
Why is the cost $378b?
When the US recently announced it issuing contract for building a similar number & classes of boats for itself at $80b?
Disagree with Prof John Blaxland , everyday Trump does something stupid, like offering $5k per voter, push’s us further from democracy and makes the case for AUKUS WEAKER
The last century has not been noble for America or Britain, and get less so every day – the case that China is our enemy is the case that has not been made, and we have significant challenges like Global Warming and pollution generally we need to focus on .
Looking at matters from the UK, one can’t avoid thinking that AUKUS has passed its sell-by date. The idea of shifting naval capabilities to the Indian and Pacific Oceans made sense before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but since then the European continent is not at peace and command of the North Atlantic is contested. Meeting those challenges means completely restructuring the UK military at speed. Whilst that is happening, the SSN are needed in the northern hemisphere, not south of the equator.