Understanding Australia’s Polar Attraction: Antarctic Grand Strategy 1900–1960
A 2021 Australian Naval Review Commentary Paper.
Commodore Andrew Willis, MVO, RAN*
Introduction
‘You have to know the past to understand the present’ – Dr Carl Sagan
Antarctica is the fifth-largest continent, holding more than 90 per cent of the world’s fresh water, considerable mineral reserves,[1] a rich and diverse marine ecosystem critical to the global food chain,[2] and potentially the world’s largest remaining oil, gas and mineral reserves.[3],[4] Australian interests in the Antarctic are substantial and include strategic, historical and territorial reasons. Many people do not appreciate the extent of Australia’s polar attraction, including the Australian Antarctic Territory, which covers around six million square kilometres, or approximately 42 per cent of the Antarctic continent.[5]
Populated regions with territorial and resource characteristics similar to Antarctica’s have seen competing power dynamics, with territorial disputes the major source of conflict leading to war. Historical analysis by Huth suggests that in 85 per cent of significant wars over the previous 300 years, the presence of territorial factors was central.[6] Although there has not been conflict in Antarctica, there has been and still is competition in and for the continent. Australia has been an active participant in this contest through the implementation of its ‘grand strategy’. The secret sailing orders of Australian Prime Minister Stanley Bruce to Sir Douglas Mawson are evidence of this historic contest:
You will work steadily westward around the Antarctic continent … you will plant the British flag wherever you find this practicable, and in doing so you will read the proclamation of annexation …[7]
This article seeks to provide the reader with an insight into Australia’s early engagement with Antarctica and its geopolitics. In doing so, it may inform present-day strategic thinking. The article argues that successive Australian Governments implemented and pursued a successful Antarctic grand strategy, and does this through an overview of the relevant issues and the political ends sought. The reader will understand that although a spectrum of Australian national power was used, two principal elements most contributed to the strategy’s success. These were the ideational aspects that inspired an Antarctic vision and the sustained and adaptive use of diplomatic power. The article argues that the Australian grand strategy was enabled through the coordination of these and other elements of national power, and that ultimately it was successful because it was able to adapt to geopolitical threats and opportunities. Through an ability to understand the past, the present-day strategist can perhaps consider current geopolitical challenges and opportunities and the available ways and means to respond to them.
Before we passage south into the Antarctic, some key terms should be defined to avoid misinterpretation of intent and commentary. A strategy is a plan of action that connects the available ways and means to achieve the desired ends. However, the Australian grand strategy is not a specific artefact or plan of action. Although definitions vary slightly, this paper uses one consistent with Defence’s current thinking, defining it as the intellectual framework guiding how a political community develops and applies diverse forms of power to achieve its political ends. Central to this definition is the concept of a political community using elements of power for its political ends. Within this, ‘power’ is interpreted as a transformative capacity, the ability to make a difference, advancing one’s interests and values.[8] As a framework of thinking about power components, the traditional diplomatic, informational, military and economic dimensions of national power are used. However, in the context of this commentary, Hatherell et al. make an important addition through the introduction of ideational power: how ideas form, and the influence ideas have on behaviours and beliefs.[9] Central to the definition of the grand strategy is the concept of a political community using elements of power for its political ends.
Australia’s Antarctica
Australian Governments between 1900 and 1960 form the political community in this analysis. This period encompassed 16 Prime Ministers and nine major political parties, which are considered to be successive in the context of the consistent pursuit of Antarctic political ends.[10] It covers the events surrounding Australia’s federation in 1901 and the emergence of cohesive Australian policy, through to the point at which the success of the grand strategy can be demonstrated by the signing of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, which entered into force in 1961. Although not formalised into a single public statement, the political ends being pursued remained consistent. These were significant territorial claims, national security through strategic denial, enhanced global influence, access to potential resources, and the pursuit of scientific knowledge. The treaty represents the success of the grand strategy, as Australia secured its national and territorial ambitions. Australia’s 42 per cent claim to the Antarctic was protected from dispute under international law; new or enlarged claims were prohibited; the Antarctic was designated as a non-military area exclusively for peaceful purposes; and scientific cooperation and international endeavour were encouraged.[11] In 2021, 60 years after the Antarctic Treaty entering into force, the political ends sought by the grand strategy in Antarctica remain remarkably consistent. What has changed between the past and present is the evolution of geopolitics and the underlying challenge to the status quo.
Influences of Ideational and Diplomatic Power
The Australian Antarctic grand strategy is significant because it offers an understanding of the achievement of political ends through non-military forms of power such as diplomacy and ideation. This outcome is noteworthy, given Huth’s analysis of the prevalence of conflict in which territorial ambition is a significant stimulus. In this respect, Australia’s past should inform the present and guide the future, because the use of non-peaceful military power in Antarctica should continue to be avoided by all.
Australian policies created at Federation in 1901 were shaped by ideas that some analysts describe as a sense of ‘manifest destiny’.[12] This destiny included a surging sense of nationalism, defence of Empire and a desire for identity and influence.[13] There was also a fear that foreign intrusion represented a threat to Australian security.[14] Australian proposals via the British in 1901 that the French should hand the Kerguelen Islands to Australia are evidence of this.[15],[16] The consequences of this sense of destiny and the domestic context led to a policy that came close to elaborating what Greenwood and Grimshaw describe as an ‘Australian Monroe Doctrine’,[17] where Australia sought to become the protector of a sphere of influence, particularly in the South Pacific. Contemporary analysts highlight that Australia’s ‘deepest, oldest instinct is strategic denial, striving to exclude other major powers from the region’.[18] While ideas and beliefs by themselves are not ideational power, they can be used to develop it. In early Australia, they did contribute to developing ideational power – a power that was used to shape the Australian public’s perceptions of Antarctica and thereby justify the Australian strategy and objectives.
With Antarctica out of sight to most Australians and therefore out of mind, ideas matter. Hatherell’s concept of ideational power is essential to understand. This is because ideational power matters to nations, as it helps maintain societies’ cohesion, including strengthening and renewing them.[19] This is a simple yet powerful concept – the ANI reader would be familiar with the power and influence of the ANZAC story in Australian society. When used effectively, ideational power can be employed by governments and their agencies to advance security interests and improve society’s conditions. Evidence of this ideational power in Antarctic strategy is seen in policy, Antarctic expeditions, speeches, and the heroic public narrative about explorers. Creating a heroic narrative is demonstrated in the Prime Minister’s directions to Mawson and in the public idealising of Antarctic explorers:
… in him, they had an Australian Nansen, a man of infinite resource, splendid spirit, marvellous physique, an indifference to frost and cold that was astonishing – all the attributes of a great explorer.[20]
Positive narratives like these formed an essential part of the use of ideational power to influence community cohesion and the support needed to fund, pursue and maintain territorial access in Antarctica. This influence also drew on the deep-seated human response to fear and anxiety. An example of this is found in the words of Australian External Affairs Minister RG Casey in 1957, when Cold War tensions formed the geopolitical backdrop to the Antarctic Treaty.
We do not want the Russians to mount installations in the Antarctic from which they can drop missiles on Melbourne or Sydney.[21]
The External Affairs Minister effectively used this idea to evoke security concerns that warranted the use of Australia’s diplomatic power to shape the Antarctic strategy, particularly in the Antarctic Treaty negotiations. Australia was particularly concerned about the potential for ‘nuclear testing and covert submarine activities’.[22]
The power of early Australian narratives and ideation was not just one way. In Australia, freedom of the press has always been an accepted part of democratic functions. Media and public perceptions can be powerful influences, shaping not only a wider audience’s views but also, in a targeted way, a specific leader’s perspective and actions. A glowing 1928 editorial ahead of critical Antarctic expedition decisions may well have had an enduring and motivating effect on the Prime Minister and the national diplomatic effort:
No Australian State administration has appropriated so much public funds to the pursuit and advancement of scientific research as the Bruce Government. This will stand to the credit of the Prime Minister, when all other actions accomplished by his office have faded from memory.[23]
Diplomacy is the ‘established method of influencing foreign governments and people’s decisions and behaviour through dialogue, negotiation, and other measures short of war or violence’.[24] For a young nation, Australia performed exceptionally well in the deft use of this national power component in the sustained pursuit of the Antarctic grand strategy. Pursuing the strategy for Antarctica in the context of competing powers and the international diplomatic environment needed careful consideration and agile application of policy. This context included Australia’s fledgling nation status and independence, six competing Antarctic claimant states and the interests of both Cold War superpowers.[25] The Australian Government relied on the diplomatic service and key leadership and personalities to communicate and influence in pursuit of the Antarctica strategy. Diplomacy was a sustained effort throughout 1900–1960, with significant milestones achieved. Highlights included foundational policy positions, Antarctic expeditions through the ‘Heroic Age’, territorial annexation, border negotiations, the first inhabited Antarctic station in 1954, and the 1959 Antarctic Treaty.
Diplomatic efforts to have territorial claims recognised achieved a significant breakthrough in 1936. Australian claims of sovereignty to 42 per cent of the Antarctic (including offshore waters) were passed from Britain to Australia via the Australian Antarctic Territory Acceptance Act 1933.[26] This transfer was consistent with an Empire-first approach but did prompt opposition – the French announcing a counterclaim and the United States emphasising an ‘open door approach for the Antarctic, unrestricted by the territorial claiming of others’.[27] With Britain’s support, Australia negotiated territorial boundaries with adjacent claimant states Norway, France and New Zealand. These negotiations resulted in a unique outcome whereby the Australian Antarctic Territory claim was not disputed and is not subject to counterclaims by other Antarctic territory claimants.[28]
Through its exploration and scientific engagement in Antarctica and its territorial claims, Australia had become a leading Antarctic nation. Consequently, this enabled Australia to be prominent in the Antarctic Treaty negotiations in 1958–1959. This influence is reflected in Canberra’s unanimous selection as the site for the first meeting of treaty members.[29] The treaty signature would have been partially motivated by the Australian Government seeking to consolidate its interests amongst rising Cold War tensions. As noted by Beck, both the Soviet Union and the United States were ‘increasingly interested in the geostrategic value of Antarctica’.[30]Through the Antarctic Treaty’s completion, the Australian Government demonstrated an ability to coordinate various elements of power and, where necessary, adapt them to achieve the political ends.
When we look to learn from the past, it is crucial to understand that this achievement by no means removes the potential for future territorial disputes in Antarctica, as other Antarctic Treaty signatory nations beyond the territorial claimants themselves do not recognise Australian claims. The treaty, negotiated and signed by 12 nations in 1959, now has 54 signatories. In the present and future world, Australian strategists need to understand that Australia’s principal security partner, the USA, does not recognise or share Australia’s Antarctic territorial interests. Nor do the other polar heavyweights, Russia and China. For now, Australia’s territorial interests remain protected through treaty Article IV, which states, ‘No acts shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica’.
Coordination of National Power in Pursuit of the Strategy
The effect of ideas on defining policy and the deliberate use of diplomatic influence to pursue political ends were significant contributing factors in Australia’s Antarctic strategy. However, these components by themselves are arguably insufficient, and therefore the coordination of other elements of national power was necessary to reinforce these two themes. Prime Minister Bruce’s correspondence to Sir Douglas Mawson clearly illustrates the existence of political ends and demonstrates a pragmatic, coordinated view of decisions to pursue this end state.
The fact that we are not pursuing a course independently of sending an expedition, to achieve our political ends, does not, of course, prejudice in any way the prosecution of future scientific work … On the political side we decided that it was essential that action should be taken without delay to give us the best title possible in the shortest time to the large parts of the Australian quadrant already known.[31]
The deliberate coordination of national power ensured the success of the grand strategy. Following a 1953 review of Australian history in Antarctica, Casey, the Minister for External Affairs, stated:
The Australian Antarctic is of vital importance to Australia. For strategic reasons, it is important that this area, lying so close to Australia’s back-door, shall remain under Australian control … in such a vast area, there must be great mineral wealth, including the possibility of finding uranium … Great food resources are awaiting exploitation … we cannot afford to neglect this region, for no one can predict what importance it will assume in the next fifty years.[32]
Casey’s statement effectively summarises the diversity of the Australian Government’s subordinate objectives to be achieved or secured in Antarctica and, by implication, the coordination of Australian power that was required. As previously demonstrated, the ideational effect created a vision of how Australia viewed the Antarctic and Australia’s international place. The ideational effect also created domestic unity in government to pursue a coordinated agenda, use national resources, and invest in future opportunities based on beliefs. These themes defined the political ends in Antarctica to which successive Australian governments committed themselves.
National security has been a coherent policy lens used by successive Australian Governments (either deliberately or coincidentally) to connect the ideational influences driving policy (the ends) and coordinate them with other elements of national power (the ways and means). While not explicit, the matching political, diplomatic and military effect of denying Antarctic sovereignty to others, although potentially contentious, is consistent with Australia’s historical approach to regional governance, ‘where strategic rivalries are insulated by denying exclusive territorial control’.[33] This ‘denial strategy’ required effective coordination of national power. As a result of the coordinating effects and the Australian Government’s deliberate Antarctic decisions, other aspects of national power such as military and economic capabilities could be integrated into supporting the ideational and diplomatic efforts. However, Beck argues that balancing this was a general acknowledgement of the inability of Australia, or any other nation, to exercise any effective military control in the Antarctic. This control factor became of increasing relevance in the Cold War period post-1945, with Antarctica holding geopolitical interest for the United States and the Soviet Union because of its ‘negative strategic utility’ – each denying a potential territorial advantage to the other.[34] With this past context, current strategists may wish to consider the future implications of China, a new polar heavyweight, and its perspectives on the strategic utility of the continent and the early governance structures created without it.[35]
Within the grand strategy and the historical context, it was reasonable that early Australian economic power was motivated by Antarctica’s potential for resource exploitation. Despite this, the economic difficulties of funding Antarctic activities are evident in the literature. For example, expeditions relied heavily on the extensive use of private donations to supplement costs. Elements of military capability and resourcing were evident in planning various Antarctic expeditions, as demonstrated by recommendations to use the Royal Australian Navy to supply significant personnel numbers.[36] Providing military support for Antarctic activities was consistent with international realities in the Antarctic until the 1950s.[37],[38] In doing so, Australia used its direct military and economic capabilities (albeit limited) to generate a positive influence and supporting effect in pursuit of its strategy. Alternatively, these supporting power elements might be viewed as the grand strategy’s logistical and financial resources. This use of military power for peaceful purposes is permitted under the Antarctic Treaty and continues in 2021 under the banner Operation SOUTHERN DISCOVERY.[39] The historic Antarctic strategy was successful because Australian Governments retained an ability to adjust their approach and adapt to the changing geopolitical threats and opportunities. In 2021, it is worth understanding what was important and which previous strategy elements worked in the past, because accelerating 21st century geopolitical challenges mean that a historical status quo approach to the future may be flawed and new resources needed.
Success through Adaptable Use of Power
The Australian Government’s ability to remain flexible with policy and adapt to geostrategic threats and opportunities was vital in achieving the strategy’s political ends. An opposing position to this thesis may suggest there was no coherent Antarctic grand strategy and the outcomes Australia achieved were merely coincidental. This may appear plausible given the lack of specific documents titled ‘Australian Grand Strategy’. However, this article contends that Australia’s Antarctic political objectives were deliberate and sustained over 60 years, thus being a grand strategy. It was the national ideation of Antarctica and the existence of an adaptive intellectual framework that enabled the consistent application of a strategy by successive governments.
Australia faced significant geopolitical and domestic challenges between 1900 and 1960. These included the effects of the wars in 1914–1918 and 1939–1945 and significant economic depressions in the 1890s and 1930s.[40] Despite these challenges and the numbers of Australian Prime Ministers and political parties involved, the intellectual framework underpinning the Antarctic strategy continued as a consistent theme.
Australian military forces as an instrument of national power were not used to achieve the Antarctic territorial outcomes through warfare or coercion. However, Australian Governments did use options such as diplomatic influence on foreign governments to achieve outcomes. Without an adaptive and consistent pursuit of the political ends, the geopolitical threats and economic impacts of world wars and depressions may have represented significant or insurmountable obstacles to implementing the strategy.
The Australian Government’s sense of strategic timing and the associated diplomatic agility regarding Antarctica can be seen in the interwar years. During this period, Australian diplomacy and policy development became more forthright, with a growing urgency to settle territorial claims. Despite this, archive records reveal that Australia had apparent interests in and disagreements with the proposed British models for the Antarctic. The Australian Government used sustained diplomatic means to influence the outcomes. One example is a bid to strengthen title claims, with Australia making clear that it had a specific view and urgency in the Antarctic, including an awareness of timing and discretion in international relations:
As far as is known to the Commonwealth, no power has raised protest against the assertion of right or counterclaims to the possession of these regions … it is considered therefore that the policy of caution which was recommended so as not to arouse the susceptibilities of other powers has been successfully followed …[41]
In response to changing geopolitical threats and opportunities, a notable demonstration of diplomatic pragmatism and agility was in the Antarctic Treaty’s negotiation process, during which Australian positions on the treaty were diverse. These positions varied from reluctant and sceptical, for fear of a requirement to give up sovereignty due to internationalism, to a point where Australia played a constructive role in embracing the treaty’s values and its finalisation.[42] An opposing perspective on the Antarctic Treaty’s stability may highlight that a state is not bound by treaties to which it is not part, and in 1959 only 12 nations signed the treaty.[43]
The Australian Government’s flexibility in its policy and diplomatic approach to the Antarctic Treaty supported the desired political ends. A counterargument to opposing perspectives of the treaty’s worth is that these outcomes also established a robust Australian baseline in Antarctica, as expressed by leading international relations scholar Robert Keohane:
The effects of these institutions will not be politically neutral: they can be expected to confer advantages on those to whom their rules grant access and a share in political authority … More generally, the rules of any institution will reflect the relative power positions of its actual and potential members.[44]
Australian Governments have also demonstrated a mature political understanding in developing other forms of power in Antarctica, primarily economic and ideational. Science and innovation have been persistent themes acknowledged as essential for the Australian economy. Insights from the 1911 Antarctic Committee highlight this:
[T]he most probable source of profit lies in the meteorological work, it is from the icy regions that we may look for an extension of our knowledge of Australia’s weather and our power of forecasting it; who shall estimate the value of such knowledge in a country like ours?[45]
This broader perspective on science’s economic value continued to influence the Antarctic program and subsequent treaty interaction. Science is now widely regarded as the ‘currency of influence’ (power) in the Antarctic Treaty System, and Australia as a leading contributor of scientific output.[46]
So what can we learn from this element of the past? Shaped by heroic narratives of early explorers and a pristine wilderness, Australia’s international influence in Antarctica has been sustained through continuing scientific presence and the adaptive use of diplomatic power. However, the contested 21st century geopolitical reality increasingly brings Australian Antarctic security into focus and challenges the assumptions of the Antarctic strategy status quo. Australia has used a spectrum of national ways and means in Antarctica; however, diplomatic influence and ideational power are the principal components. Yet according to the Lowy Institute’s Global Diplomacy Index,[47] Australia now ranks 27th, well below potential given its global economic ranking (12th) and military spending (12th).
Conclusion
This article has argued that between 1900 and 1960, Australian Governments had a grand strategy for the Antarctic. While it is not one specific artefact, there is evidence of a deliberate intellectual framework for the Antarctic, one that guided the development and application of various national power elements to pursue political ends. These outcomes were defined as significant territorial claims, national security through strategic denial, enhanced global influence, access to potential resources, and the pursuit of scientific knowledge.
Although the components of power used included elements of military and economic capabilities, the two principal elements of Australian power that contributed most to the grand strategy’s success were the ideational aspects that inspired and sustained an Australian Antarctic vision and the practical and adaptive use of diplomatic influence. Australian Governments had clear objectives and were then able to coordinate the national power elements to pursue the ends effectively. Notably, the historical record demonstrates that the strategy was successful because it enabled Australian Governments to retain the ability to adapt to various geopolitical threats and opportunities.
The signing of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959 is evidence of the success of the 1900–1960 Antarctic strategy. The treaty was an inflection point in how the international community approached Antarctica and, consequently, represented the Australian strategy’s success. Australia had secured its national and territorial ambitions: strategic denial was in place, global and Antarctic influence through science and diplomatic mechanisms had been achieved, and future economic opportunity was retained.
Antarctica matters to Australia. Australian interests in the region are significant, multidimensional, and enduring. As we navigate future geopolitical shoals, our 1900–1960 Antarctic strategy provides a helpful stern mark. We must learn from the past and understand that the historical strategy was successful because of an ability to adapt, integrate and resource all relevant forms of national power, particularly the diplomatic element. Understanding these lessons is critical to adapting to the present and planning for the future. To quote Sun Tzu, ‘plan for what is difficult while it is easy, do what is great while it is small’.
*In 2021 Captain Willis completed a Master of International Relations, focusing on Antarctica’s geopolitics. In a 30-year naval career, highlights include command of the Anzac frigates HMA Ships Warramunga and Parramatta, service as Equerry to Her Majesty the Queen and the opportunity to lead specialist capability and international engagement teams.
[1] The continent of Antarctica covers 13 661 000 km2 (twice the size of Australia). ‘The Antarctic ice sheet holds 90% of Earth’s fresh water in 30 million cubic kilometres of ice. Antarctica is the driest continent on earth’ (‘Antarctic geography and geology’, Australian Antarctic Division [website], <https://www.antarctica.gov.au/about-antarctica/geography-and-geology/>, accessed 22 February 2021).
[2] Antarctica is important for science because of its profound effect on the Earth’s climate and ocean systems. ‘Why Antarctica matters’, British Antarctic Survey [website], <https://www.bas.ac.uk/about/antarctica/why-antarctica-matters/>, accessed 4 March 2021.
[3] Fogarty points to research by Macdonald et al. predicting that oil reserves are 203 billion barrels with an additional 50 billion at sea (third-largest in the world). E Fogarty, Antarctica: assessing and protecting Australia’s national interests, Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2011, <http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep10200>; DIM Macdonald, PF Barker, SW Garrett, JR Ineson, D Pirrie, BC Storey, AG Whitham, RRF Kinghorn & JEA Marshall, ‘A preliminary assessment of the hydrocarbon potential of the Larsen Basin, Antarctica’, Marine and Petroleum Geology, vol. 5(1), 1988, pp. 34–53, <https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0264-8172(88)90038-4>.
[4] Environmental critics fear that resource misinformation creates the ‘El Dorado complex – the idea that unknown lands will be a treasure trove of resources’ (‘The Antarctic oil myth’, Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition [website], 20 April 2014, <https://www.asoc.org/explore/blog/1184-the-antarctic-oil-myth>, accessed 22 February 2021.
[5] ‘Australian Antarctic Territory’, Australian Antarctic Division [website], <https://www.antarctica.gov.au/about-antarctica/australia-in-antarctica/australian-antarctic-territory/>, accessed 5 April 2021.
[6] P Huth, Standing your ground: territorial disputes and international conflict, University of Michigan, 1998, p. 7.
[7] National Archives of Australia: A981, ANT 4 part 5, Prime Minister’s confidential letter to Sir Douglas Mawson, by Stanley Bruce, Canberra, 1928, p. 4.
[8] A Phillips, ‘The concept of power in world politics’, in Defence and Strategic Studies Course Module 1: Grand Strategy, Canberra, 2021.
[9] Michael Hatherell, Katherine Mansted & Jade Guan, ‘National security, information and ideas: time to think about ideational power’, Australian Journal of Defence and Strategic Studies, vol. 2(1), 2020, pp. 125–137, 126, <http://www.defence.gov.au/ADC/publications/AJDSS/volume2-Number1/national-security-information-and-ideas-think-about-ideational-power.asp>.
[10] ‘Australia’s Prime Ministers’, National Archives of Australia [website], <https://www.naa.gov.au/explore-collection/australias-prime-ministers>.
[11] Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway and the United Kingdom are the seven treaty signatories with territorial claims, sometimes overlapping. The US and Russia maintain a ‘basis of claim’, while other nations do not recognise any claim. The status quo is protected in Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty: ‘No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim to territory shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force’. ‘The Antarctic Treaty’, Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty[website], <https://www.ats.aq/e/antarctictreaty.html>, accessed 23 February 2021.
[12] Gordon Greenwood & Charles Grimshaw (eds), Documents on Australian international affairs 1901–1918, Thomas Nelson and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Melbourne, 1977, p. xci.
[13] ibid., p. 108.
[14] Marie Kawaja, ‘Australia in Antarctica: realising an ambition’, The Polar Journal, vol. 3(1), 2013, pp. 31–52, <https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/2154896x.2013.783275>.
[15] These islands in the southern Indian Ocean had been colonised by both Britain and France, and France had taken possession three times: in 1774, 1776 and 1893 (Kawaja, 2013). At 49 degrees south they are north of the Antarctic Circle and a part of the French Southern and Antarctic Lands. They are in the vicinity of Australia’s Heard Island and Macquarie Island. ‘Kerguelen Islands’, Encyclopedia Britannica [website], <https://www.britannica.com/place/Kerguelen-Islands>.
[16] Kawaja, 2013.
[17] In 1823, US President Monroe proclaimed the US as protector of the Western Hemisphere. This doctrine became a core component of US foreign policy and supported expansionist and interventionist practices. ‘Monroe Doctrine’, Encyclopedia Britannica [website], <https://www.britannica.com/event/Monroe-Doctrine>.
[18] Graeme Dobell, ‘Framing the islands: strategic denial and integration’, The Strategist (ASPI), 23 December 2019, p. 1, <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/framing-the-islands-strategic-denial-and-integration>.
[19] Hatherell et al., pp. 132–137.
[20] RA Swan, Australia in the Antarctic: interest, activity and endeavour, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1961, p. 121.
[21] Klaus Dodds, ‘Antarctic geopolitics’, in K Dodds, D Hemmings & P Roberts (eds), Handbook on the politics of Antarctica, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 2017. p. 207.
[22] ibid., p. 62.
[23] ‘The Antarctic: Quadrant Control’, The Brisbane Courier, 8 February 1928.
[24] Chas Freeman, ‘Diplomacy’, Encyclopedia Britannica [website], <https://www.britannica.com/topic/diplomacy>, accessed 24 February 2021.
[25] Twelve nations are original signatories to the Antarctic Treaty. Claimant nations are Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway and the United Kingdom. Non-claimants are Belgium, Japan, Russia, South Africa and the United States. Both Russia and the US have retained a right to make claims to any or all of Antarctica. Since 1959, 42 other nations have acceded to the treaty. ‘The Antarctic Treaty’, Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty [website], <https://www.ats.aq/e/antarctictreaty.html>, accessed 23 February 2021.
[26] Joint Standing Committee on the National Capital and External Territories, Maintaining Australia’s national interests in Antarctica: inquiry into Australia’s Antarctic Territory, Commonwealth of Australia, 2018, p. 9, <https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/National_Capital_and_External_Territories/AntarcticTerritory/Report>.
[27] Klaus Dodds, The Antarctic: a very short introduction, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, p. 52.
[28] Anthony Bergin, Marcus Haward, Andrew Jackson, Anthony Press, Sam Bateman, Peter Jennings, Julia Jabour, Stephen Nicol, Patrick G Quilty & Lyn Goldsworthy, Cold calculations: Australia’s Antarctic challenges, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2013, p. 7, <http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep04042>, accessed 1 February 2021.
[29] Swan, 1961, p. 325.
[30] Peter J Beck, ‘Fifty years on: putting the Antarctic Treaty into the history books’, Polar Record, vol. 46(1), 2010, pp. 4–7.
[31] National Archives of Australia: A981, ANT 4 part 5, Prime Minister’s confidential letter to Sir Douglas Mawson, by Stanley Bruce, Canberra, 1928, p. 12.
[32] Swan, 1961. pp. 264–265.
[33] Daniel Bray, ‘The geopolitics of Antarctic governance: sovereignty and strategic denial in Australia’s Antarctic policy’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 70(3), 2016, pp. 256–574, p. 257, <https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2015.1135871>.
[34] Beck, 2010, p. 5.
[35] As a non-claimant state, China acceded to the Antarctic Treaty in 1983. In 2021 China has the largest Antarctic science budget, ahead of the US. China maintains four stations (three in the Australian Antarctic Territory) and is building a fifth. For a deeper insight into China and Antarctica see A-M Brady, China’s expanding Antarctic interests: implications for Australia, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2017, p. 30, <https://www.aspi.org.au/report/chinas-expanding-interests-antarctica>.
[36] National Archives of Australia: A981, ANT 4 part 4, Australian National Research Council report to Secretary, Prime Minister’s Department, O Masson, 1927, p. 4, <https://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/ViewImage.aspx?B=172701>.
[37] Australia’s first Antarctic expedition was Shackleton’s Nimrod expedition to the Ross Sea in 1907. In 1912, Douglas Mawson and members of the Australian Antarctic Expedition raised the Australian flag and the Union Jack and ‘took possession of the Australian Quadrant for the Empire and for Australia more particularly’. The next major expedition was the Mawson-led British, Australian and New Zealand Antarctic Research Expedition 1929–1930, during which Mawson claimed full sovereignty.
[38] Thomas Lord, ‘The Antarctic Treaty System and the peaceful governance of Antarctica: the role of the ATS in promoting peace at the margins of the world’, The Polar Journal, vol. 10(1), 2020, pp. 3–21, p. 15, <https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/2154896x.2020.1757821>.
[39] Operation Southern Discovery is the Australian Defence Force’s enduring peacetime activity in support of the Australian Antarctic Division. It includes Air Force, Army and Navy personnel. Operations include logistics, geospatial awareness, meteorology and hydrographic support. ‘Operation Southern Discovery – Antarctic’, Department of Defence [website], <https://www1.defence.gov.au/operations/southern-discovery>.
[40] S Ville & G Withers, The Cambridge economic history of Australia, Cambridge University Press, Port Melbourne, 2015, p. 9.
[41] Governor-General’s dispatch to Secreterary of State for Dominion Affairs: Antarctic Policy, by Governor-General Stonehaven, Canberra, 1927, p. 3.
[42] Rob Hall & Marie Kawaja, ‘Australia and the negotiation of the Antarctic Treaty’, in Marcus Haward & Tom Griffiths (eds), Australia and the Antarctic Treaty System: 50 years of influence, University of New South Wales Press, Sydney, 2011, p. 69.
[43] Forty-two countries have acceded to the treaty since signature in 1959. According to Article IX.2, they are ‘entitled to participate in the Consultative Meetings during such times as they demonstrate their interest in Antarctica by conducting substantial research activity there’. Consequently there are now 29 consultative members. ‘The Antarctic Treaty’, Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty [website], <https://www.ats.aq/e/antarctictreaty.html>.
[44] Thomas Lord, ‘The Antarctic Treaty System and the peaceful governance of Antarctica: the role of the ATS in promoting peace at the margins of the world’, The Polar Journal, vol. 10(1), 2020, pp. 3–21, p. 14, <https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/2154896x.2020.1757821>.
[45] National Archives of Australia: A1, 1915/5159, O Masson, TW Edgeworth David & GC Henderson, ‘The Australasian Antarctic Expedition’, Reprint from Adelaide, Melbourne and Sydney Newspapers, 22 April 1911, <https://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/ViewImage.aspx?B=32554>.
[46] Bergin et al., 2013.
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