Until recently, the RN maintained a meaningful force of at least 6 ships based in Bahrain. For a variety of reasons, this force may soon just comprise of two ships, Navy Look-Out reports.
There are a wide variety of UK interests in the region, but most important is ensuring the freedom of maritime trade.
The UK Maritime Component Command (UKMCC) is responsible for Royal Navy warships, aircraft and personnel deployed in the Middle East maritime theatre. The approximately 2.5M sq miles of international waters stretch from the Suez Canal to the Red Sea, across the northern Indian Ocean, the Gulf of Oman and up into the Persian Gulf.
The presence of a frigate in the region can trace its roots back to the Armilla Patrol began in 1980 to protect merchant shipping from being targeted deliberately or accidentally during the Iran-Iraq war. With an escort fleet numbering more than 75 ships, the RN had 3 frigates or destroyers in the Gulf (a commitment that actually required 9 ships, counting those in transit, maintenance or being prepared to deploy). Apart from the major participation in the Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003, this presence has been on a generally downward trajectory although at least one warship or RFA has been rotated in and out of the region on Operation Kipion almost continuously.
In 2018 the RN decided to forward base a frigate permanently in Bahrain, starting with HMS Montrose, later replaced by HMS Lancaster in 2022. The policy has been broadly successful with the ships achieving high availability, maintained in Bahrain at local facilities with support from contractors flown out from the UK. It is also popular with sailors who have predictability about when they will be at home or deployed. The Kipion frigate has been mostly been under the command of CFT150 and mounted very successful counter-narcotics and anti-piracy operations, providing reassurance to mariners and making defence diplomacy visits to Gulf states, India and the Seychelles.
The UK Maritime Component Command (UKMCC) based at the Naval Support Facility (NSF) in Bahrain is responsible for Royal Navy warships, aircraft and personnel deployed in the Middle East maritime theatre. The UKNSF is a bespoke facility built at Mina Salman port with accommodation and welfare facilities for up to 500 RN personnel. (Initially to be called HMS Juffair, resurrecting the name of the base in Bahrain closed in the 1970s – but the name was never used.) Construction cost around £27M with the government of Bahrain believed to have contributed about 60% of the cost. In 2020 the adjacent quay was also refurbished allowing the frigate or vessels up to destroyer size to come alongside, close to the UKNSF.
In 2023 the UKMCC was responsible for about 700 personnel and the force comprised of HMS Lancaster (GP frigate), HMS Chiddingfold, HMS Middleton, HMS Bangor (MCMVs) and RFA Cardigan Bay (employed as the afloat MCM support base). For over 15 years the main focus of the group deployed in Bahrain and the RN mine warfare battle staff has been to counter mines that could be laid by Iran in an attempt to disrupt shipping in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. RFA Cardigan Bay provided logistical support and a command platform for the force of 4 RN MCMVs, (reduced to 3 in 2023) and the small number of USN minehunters in the region.
No Bay out
Reflecting the wider struggles of the RN, the footprint in Bahrain has been fast reducing. RFA Cardigan Bay was withdrawn to the Mediterranean theatre in April 2024 to join the US-led humanitarian aid operation to Gaza. She was subsequently relieved by RFA Mounts Bay in August as the mission focus shifted towards possible evacuation operations. Cardigan Bay eventually made it to Falmouth in October and was to have a major overhaul but it has been determined she will be laid up and the refit deferred to 2026, mainly due to the shortage of people.
There is no hope of either of the other two Bay-class replacing her in Bahrain. There is something of a maintenance backlog in Falmouth as RFA Argus was supposed to complete her Assisted Maintenance Period in December but emerging defects have delayed this until March. Work on Argus (and ensuring she has a crew) is the priority as it is intended she will participate in at least some of the CSG25 deployment. RFA Mounts Bay has just returned from the Mediterranean and will enter refit in Falmouth in January. At this point, RFA Lyme Bay will be the sole active amphibious vessel in UK service. Besides the problems of ageing ships being run hard, the dismal failure of Ministers to address the problems of the RFA is now having a strategic impact out of all proportion to the tiny costs involved in paying its staff properly.
MCMV to MAS
The unfortunate accident in January that seriously damaged HMS Bangor has accelerated the demise of the crewed minehunter fleet in Bahrain. Bangor began repair in dry dock in the summer but even when the damage is rectified she will be out of date for mandatory Lloyd’s inspections which are due every 5 years. Her withdrawal had been planned for 2025 anyway and she will not return to operations in Bahrain. Whether she will return to the UK under her own power or be carried back on a heavy-lift ship has yet to be decided. HMS Chiddingfold is also close to her 5-year inspection date and will soon have to return to the UK for maintenance, having last been refitted in 2018. This will leave HMS Middleton as the sole MCMV in Bahrain.
Mine warfare in the Royal Navy is in the middle of a complex transition from crewed MCMVs to Maritime Autonomous Systems (MAS). As we have observed before, this method keeps people out of harm’s way and has proven to be more efficient at the core mine hunting and disposal task and has significant advantages. Earlier this year, the RN provided feedback on initial trials with autonomous mine hunting in the Gulf. The range, reach and resolution of sonars deployed from the boats is much superior to sonars mounted MCMVs. The increased clarity of new sensor systems is so much better that it is pushing doctrinal norms of object classification. The UUVs in the new toolkit can also go deeper, search faster and provide much better imagery of mine-like objects. The new Saab MuMNS mine disposal ROV is also far more capable than the one-shot Sea Fox systems used by the MCMVs. Overall the successful operational evaluation of the USVs, TSSS and ROVs has given the RN confidence to begin procuring the next block of the MHC programme.
However MAS is not a panacea and as we previously predicted, the RN found that “recovery and launching and sense of packages from USVs is exceptionally complex, especially in the interaction between the platform, the sea and seabed”. Unless there is a larger supporting platform nearby or air assets available, “the attrition rate of USVs must be assumed to be higher in a contested environment, because we won’t have that oceanic understanding outside of short-range detection of potential adversaries.” Problems cannot be rectified quickly without sailors on board and “Sailor-driven success is not an option for successful MAS, systems complexity implies a continued reliance on crewed operations”. MAS also still have to overcome challenges in operating in EM-denied environments, generating SQEP to operate and maintain the specialist equipment, limitations imposed by weather and data bandwidth issues.
In summary, MAS offers huge opportunities in mine warfare with some important caveats but is far from proven and a long way from being able to provide an operational capability to fully replace the MCMVs in the Persian Gulf. The need for motherships is foundational to deploying MHC beyond UK waters and with deep irony, uncrewed mine-hunting development is currently hamstrung by a lack of crews. Shortage of personnel is the main reason RFA Stirling Castle is laid up and there will be no Bay-class RFA in the Gulf for a while at least.
No Bay out
Reflecting the wider struggles of the RN, the footprint in Bahrain has been fast reducing. RFA Cardigan Bay was withdrawn to the Mediterranean theatre in April 2024 to join the US-led humanitarian aid operation to Gaza. She was subsequently relieved by RFA Mounts Bay in August as the mission focus shifted towards possible evacuation operations. Cardigan Bay eventually made it to Falmouth in October and was to have a major overhaul but it has been determined she will be laid up and the refit deferred to 2026, mainly due to the shortage of people.
There is no hope of either of the other two Bay-class replacing her in Bahrain. There is something of a maintenance backlog in Falmouth as RFA Argus was supposed to complete her Assisted Maintenance Period in December but emerging defects have delayed this until March. Work on Argus (and ensuring she has a crew) is the priority as it is intended she will participate in at least some of the CSG25 deployment. RFA Mounts Bay has just returned from the Mediterranean and will enter refit in Falmouth in January. At this point, RFA Lyme Bay will be the sole active amphibious vessel in UK service. Besides the problems of ageing ships being run hard, the dismal failure of Ministers to address the problems of the RFA is now having a strategic impact out of all proportion to the tiny costs involved in paying its staff properly.
MCMV to MAS
The unfortunate accident in January that seriously damaged HMS Bangor has accelerated the demise of the crewed minehunter fleet in Bahrain. Bangor began repair in dry dock in the summer but even when the damage is rectified she will be out of date for mandatory Lloyd’s inspections which are due every 5 years. Her withdrawal had been planned for 2025 anyway and she will not return to operations in Bahrain. Whether she will return to the UK under her own power or be carried back on a heavy-lift ship has yet to be decided. HMS Chiddingfold is also close to her 5-year inspection date and will soon have to return to the UK for maintenance, having last been refitted in 2018. This will leave HMS Middleton as the sole MCMV in Bahrain.
Mine warfare in the Royal Navy is in the middle of a complex transition from crewed MCMVs to Maritime Autonomous Systems (MAS). As we have observed before, this method keeps people out of harm’s way and has proven to be more efficient at the core mine hunting and disposal task and has significant advantages. Earlier this year, the RN provided feedback on initial trials with autonomous mine hunting in the Gulf. The range, reach and resolution of sonars deployed from the boats is much superior to sonars mounted MCMVs. The increased clarity of new sensor systems is so much better that it is pushing doctrinal norms of object classification. The UUVs in the new toolkit can also go deeper, search faster and provide much better imagery of mine-like objects. The new Saab MuMNS mine disposal ROV is also far more capable than the one-shot Sea Fox systems used by the MCMVs. Overall the successful operational evaluation of the USVs, TSSS and ROVs has given the RN confidence to begin procuring the next block of the MHC programme.
However MAS is not a panacea and as we previously predicted, the RN found that “recovery and launching and sense of packages from USVs is exceptionally complex, especially in the interaction between the platform, the sea and seabed”. Unless there is a larger supporting platform nearby or air assets available, “the attrition rate of USVs must be assumed to be higher in a contested environment, because we won’t have that oceanic understanding outside of short-range detection of potential adversaries.” Problems cannot be rectified quickly without sailors on board and “Sailor-driven success is not an option for successful MAS, systems complexity implies a continued reliance on crewed operations”. MAS also still have to overcome challenges in operating in EM-denied environments, generating SQEP to operate and maintain the specialist equipment, limitations imposed by weather and data bandwidth issues.
In summary, MAS offers huge opportunities in mine warfare with some important caveats but is far from proven and a long way from being able to provide an operational capability to fully replace the MCMVs in the Persian Gulf. The need for motherships is foundational to deploying MHC beyond UK waters and with deep irony, uncrewed mine-hunting development is currently hamstrung by a lack of crews. Shortage of personnel is the main reason RFA Stirling Castle is laid up and there will be no Bay-class RFA in the Gulf for a while at least.
