By Jakub Janda and James Corera*
Weak-kneed responses to attacks on Baltic cables risk allowing the Russia-China axis to conduct free target practice against NATO critical infrastructure, promoting the two countries’ proficiency, interoperability and lethality. (The Australian Strategic Policy Institute. The Strategist.)
The presence of China-flagged vessels near disruptions to undersea cable infrastructure in Europe in 2024 raises questions about whether Beijing’s involvement was accidental, surveillance-related or part of a coordinated effort. That Beijing calls itself Moscow’s ‘no-limits’ partner suggest its involvement in the suspected sabotage was plausible, if not probable. Even if China wasn’t involved, it will be eager and able to learn from Russia’s experience.
China has been the main enabler of Putin’s war of aggression against Ukraine, precisely because the conflict is in Beijing’s interests. It makes Moscow more reliant on China, normalises the use of might over right, and so undermines the liberal world order.
Undersea cables are crucial for internet connectivity and energy transmission. Attacking them is highly disruptive and has the potential to cripple societies and hobble economies. Russia has a history of threatening undersea infrastructure, such as monitoring or tampering with cables near the Arctic and Baltic seas. China’s involvement in the latest episodes need not have been direct; it could have been through providing logistics, technology or intelligence.
By attacking Baltic undersea infrastructure, Russia can hope to sow discord and create uncertainty within Europe, disrupting the cohesion of NATO and the European Union. This would suit China, too. The attacks are also testing and probing defences. Russia and China are noting European countries’ vulnerabilities, resilience and capacity for response.
By coordinating or supporting such actions, Beijing and Moscow can amplify their individual strategies, all while maintaining plausible deniability. Both are showing a growing inclination to challenge the West through unconventional means.
Indo-Pacific countries should take note. They should also bear in mind that Russia stepped up military activity in their part of the world in 2024, conducting a large Pacific naval exercise with China in October and simulating joint attacks with a Chinese destroyer near Taiwan in December. Also in December, Japan for the first time detected a Russian submarine just east of Taiwan.
Responses to attacks on Baltic subsea infrastructure seem so far to focus on mitigation rather than deterrence. NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte’s comments in early December reiterated this, mentioning preparedness measures, including intelligence sharing and protection of critical infrastructure.
But vessels should not be free to enter another country’s territorial waters, damage critical infrastructure, get caught and still face no consequences. Finland’s bold actions in boarding and seizing control of a Russia-operated (but not Russia-flagged) tanker on suspicion of it deliberately cutting undersea cables shows what countries can do if political will exists.
Finland’s responses pose a question: are other Western countries unable to hold malign actors accountable or just too timid to do so? Western politicians have sought to reduce threats to data security and privacy, but the greater threat is the physical disruption and sabotage which Russia is already carrying out and which China could do whenever it wanted.
A key problem is the right of a ship’s flag country to refuse cooperation with an investigation, which China has exploited in relation to one of the suspect ships. This should change. But while that obstacle remains, we should also be willing to use those political levers presently available to us, such as economic sanctions.
Unfortunately, the will to make Beijing accountable for its non-cooperation seems absent. Non-military deterrence is failing. We should change this, too. Too many governments are instead prioritising the promise of supposed stabilisation in relationships with China. They worry about Chinese influence and fear disruption to business with so large a trading partner, especially amid high inflation. It looks like a security strategy of buying time, hoping China will not deploy its disruptive capabilities anytime soon.
The cycle of words without consequences leaves us vulnerable. It tells Beijing and Moscow they can get away with anything.
We should see the recent cable-cutting incidents as an opportunity to do better, applying emerging political will to re-shape a strengthened response—in the Indo-Pacific just as much as in Europe. We should ensure such actions where they occur are called out and addressed transparently and consistently. Resolution should be prioritised as part of bilateral and multilateral agendas, with economic sanctions to be used as a means to secure full and genuine cooperation and deter recurrence. We should ensure malign actors like Beijing and Moscow face real and meaningful costs in attacking such critical infrastructure, otherwise neither will have reason to stop.
The recent incidents ultimately show why bold and direct action taken in concert, synchronised across NATO, European and frontline Indo-Pacific democracies, is vital to confronting malign behaviour.
