RN’s first autonomous squadron

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By Tom Sharpe*

The Royal Navy commissioned a squadron last Thursday with no warships nor any aircraft in it. The first autonomous squadron, stood up at Portsmouth, has 180 sailors – about an old-school frigate’s worth – who will work in two watches around the clock when they are operational, just as a warship’s crew does.

For now, they operate two types of small unmanned boat: 7.2m Rattlers for training and swarm tactics, and 8.4m Kraken K3 Scouts, which can do 55 knots and have a range of 600 nautical miles at 25 knots. Vice-Adml Steve Moorhouse, the Fleet Commander, says the Navy is doing something it has never done before. Many will need to get onboard here as this is, without doubt, the direction of travel for modern maritime warfare.

What this step in the march to autonomy signifies to me is a shift from experiments and trials to operations, coherence and ownership. Project Beehive, which the squadron replaces, was set up to procure small drone boats quickly and then learn fast. It has done both: several dozen Scouts have been acquired since the first 20 were ordered in March. But a project belongs to the people running the trial, a squadron belongs to the fleet. It has a commanding officer – Cdr Helen Coxon in this case – a watch bill and someone to task the assets. In other words, this is a move from trials to operations.

 

The Navy, and everyone else involved, will need to adjust their appetite for risk because the speed at which this is happening brings risk in spades. In June, a Rattler on a training serial in Portsmouth Harbour hit Lutine, a 55ft racing yacht, and gouged her stern. In August, cameras on the Scouts were found to contain Chinese components sending a “heartbeat” to an address in China.

At some point, a boat will lose its link, or engines, and have to be recovered. Someone will post that and claim “disaster” with no reference to the thousands of times our existing small boats get beaten up and have had to be recovered. That is the whole point of trials and it is better to do it in the Solent than off Murmansk. The alternative is to gold-plate everything, which is one of the reasons crewed warships have historically taken 15 years to arrive and cost over £1bn. Besides, plenty of those have run aground, hit things, or both.

One of the key tasks of this squadron will be to determine what these small boats are to be used for, and it’s interesting to note that they were bought so fast that this isn’t yet clear. Most discussions so far have centred on “softer” tasks such as force protection, surveillance and reconnaissance. These are important and could be a good use for the kit, but more interesting to me is what comes next.

Trial firings of a British counter-drone interceptor are complete and the first launches from a Scout are expected shortly. The Navy Lookout website puts this interceptor weapon at £5,000 to £10,000 a shot, roughly the price of the drone at which it is aimed. This compares well to millions per shot for conventional surface-to-air missiles specified to take down much more difficult threats. One look at the rate of depletion – and associated costs – of all the US Patriot, THAAD and Standard missiles since March makes it clear why this imbalance is neither financially nor numerically sustainable. Small boats, sometimes with small weapons, address this balance as Ukraine has shown many times in the Black Sea.

You could put something heavier on a drone boat, for instance a simple but heavy ship-busting explosive charge for one-off use, as favoured by the Ukrainians. You could then put that in company with an almost unarmed offshore patrol vessel of the sort we increasingly use to shadow Russian warships through the Channel, and suddenly we have teeth and therefore credibility.

As ever, sea state would determine how and where these could be used: you wouldn’t want them in the outer ring of a carrier screen in rough weather up in the High North, but again, this would all need to be determined, trialled and tested (failures included). Before long, what the boats can tolerate will be informed by real-world data and not people saying “that won’t work”. Likewise, whether they are to be remotely operated or genuinely autonomous will affect how and where they are used. This is what the new squadron is set to figure out.

Above these small boats sit the unmanned sloops that will eventually form the backbone of a “hybrid navy”. The Ministry of Defence has been almost on contract since October for a large uncrewed vessel of more than 24m, set to be in the water next year for trials. The award was expected in September. It’s not clear why it was delayed. Nevertheless, the field is taking shape, with around 12 companies that initially showed interest being reduced to about four, mainly of their own accord.

Above the sloops sit “at least six” crewed Common Combat Vessels (CCVs) which, when built, will act as command ships for the sloops. Although, as we have already identified, being able to control the sloops from any existing vessel (and from ashore) will be important, partly because all signs suggest that they will be ready before the CCVs. No matter the sequencing, who can control what, from what and on what task will be another important chapter in the operating orders that the new squadron will need to write.

Overall, this new squadron is an important announcement, and a good one. The hybrid navy is not designed to save money or people, or replace crewed warships, whatever the Treasury hopes; it is there to add mass and lethality to a fleet short on both. The greatest risk to this programme is not technical – although there is significant risk there, too – it is that neither the culture or the finances are in place to support it properly.

At the first turn of the handle, the defence investment plan allocated roughly one quarter of what the Royal Navy asked for, which was already much less than the full-fat manned solution would have cost. This makes the role of this new squadron even more important, and I wish them all the best.

*Tom Sharpe OBE served for 27 years as a Royal Navy officer, commanding four different warships

This article was first published in The Telegraph and is republished with the author’s permission.

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