By Mike Hughes and Justin Bassi*
The National Defence Strategy, announced on 16 April 2026 by Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles, correctly reasserts that Australia’s security interests lie in becoming more self-reliant, which requires an enhancement of our own national capabilities in combination with the US alliance. (From: The Strategist. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute.)
The National Defence Strategy thereby implicitly rebuts the growing chorus arguing that a less benign United States demands a fundamentally independent Australian foreign and defence policy. That argument misunderstands the nature of the strategic environment and the enduring logic of the alliance. Here we look at those factors, explaining why the National Defence Strategy’s self-reliance approach is right.
We need to talk about Washington
Just over a year into the second administration of President Donald Trump, the US is no longer the benign hegemon to which we’ve been accustomed. It now prefers the more transactional and coercive approaches to international relations traditionally associated with great powers. Recent US military operations, while tactically impressive – unsurpassed in precision, reach and execution – have starkly contrasted with the administration’s strategic incoherence. By depleting its munitions stocks, weakening its global standing and eroding its deterrence credibility, Washington is at risk of handing a strategic victory to Tehran, Beijing and Moscow.
Iran’s willingness to absorb punishment while the US appears focused on a quick exit reinforces a dangerous perception among authoritarian regimes: that democracies lack endurance. This perception is not new: it echoes the flawed assumptions that informed German and Japanese thinking in the 1930s, with disastrous consequences.
At the same time, US military operations are providing invaluable learning opportunities for adversaries. As it did after the 1991 Iraq War, China will closely study the Iran conflict for lessons for its own military modernisation. The current war is thereby contributing to a narrowing qualitative gap between Sino-US military capabilities.
The Trump Administration’s approach to its long-term allies and partners reveals underappreciation of a key part of US power in the post-1945 world. Chastising and threats to sovereignty of long-standing and loyal US allies have strengthened the hands of thosewho have long sought to do our liberal democracy and the global order harm. Last week, while Washington continued its threats of withdrawal from NATO, Vice President JD Vance shuttled into Budapest to give electoral support to Putin’s stooge in Hungary and, in doing so, undermined NATO and EU support for Ukraine. Altogether, these actions present the US as a weaker ally.
Logic, not emotion, sets strategy
As challenging as the Trump Administration has been, no alliance is defined by the moment. After 75 years, Australia’s alliance with the US has significant value for Canberra, giving access to unique intelligence, technology, industry and capability. These are vital inputs in our pursuit of self-reliance, giving life to our desire for greater autonomy while making us a more valuable partner to those middle powers with which we increasingly seek to align ourselves.
And recent international examples reinforce the idea that democratic systems, while imperfect, nevertheless provide mechanisms to constrain authoritarian drift and provide a course correction to harmful policies. This was clearly demonstrated in the Hungarian election on 12 April, in which Viktor Orban’s long reign came to an end, despite – or perhaps in part because of – support from his authoritarian friends.
The US is no different. In fact, it’s still better than most, given the independence of the judiciary and recent Supreme Court rulings checking presidential power. This means US democracy retains important sources of resilience. Across the country, courts, state-level institutions, and electoral processes continue to act as checks on executive overreach. Current predictions for the November mid-term elections are that the Democrats will gain a House of Representatives majority, continuing a historical trend of voters balancing executive power.
If the administration bucks that trend and amplifies foreign policies harmful to Australia’s (and other liberal democratic) interests, then the US’s allies will need to focus less on a short-term strategy of surviving Trump’s America and more on long-term management of a most intimate security ally that doesn’t share all of our dearest principles.
But our strategy in a more uncertain and dangerous world requires us, as Australian Foreign Affairs Minister Penny Wong often says, to see the world as it is, rather than as we want it to be. Our policy challenge is not whether to work with the US but how. A vital component of the democratic relationship is an ability to criticise US actions antithetical to our principles without upending the alliance. It is a false equivalency to compare the US with China and Russia, which are irretrievably authoritarian and hostile to free and open societies and liberal democracy.
European countries, having borne the brunt of Trump’s abuses, provide a useful example. NATO allies have been up front about how the US makes the collective stronger while simultaneously looking to enhance their self-reliance. Poland is emblematic, publicly disagreeing with US policy on issues such as tariffs, Iran or Greenland while maintaining the US as a key pillar of its security and also spending more on its own defence. Importantly, this formula answers US demands to reduce allied dependence while improving allied states’ value within a broader Western allied framework.
For allies in the Indo-Pacific such as Australia, this strategic logic is even more compelling. China remains the pacing threat, the only country with a recent history of seeking to subvert our political system and way of life. US absence would lead to a much worse regional order for us, since no other nation or group of nations would be inclined or able to balance China’s push for power. Japan understands this. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has enthusiastically embraced the alliance while significantly increasing Japan’s defence spending.
National interest requires Australia to hold two truths concurrently: that it must sustain the US alliance and American-led partnerships such as AUKUS as the central pillar of regional deterrence; and that it must strengthen its own capabilities and deepen partnerships with other democracies, such as Japan, South Korea, India and the European Union.
Much progress has been made in broadening relationships, as shown by the government’s increase in engagement with the EU (including the signing of a defence and security agreement), strengthening of ties with Canada in areas such as critical minerals, and the advance of the Japan relationship to the level of an all-but-formal alliance.
But there is still much to do. To be truly successful, the Australian system and political class will need to not only hold their noses in some situations but be more vocal to ensure our public understands why the US alliance and distant partners in Europe are in our national interest.
This self-reliance approach is pragmatic recognition that a strategy that shifts away from the US (and Europe) and prioritises only our immediate region will not keep us safe or deter adversaries. Southeast Asian countries can’t defend themselves from great powers militarily, let alone defend others. Manila’s experience with China’s territorial predations has been revelatory about the value of the oft-cited centrality of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in the face of great power threats: ASEAN has done little to help the Philippines.
We do need to keep building relationships with regional neighbours, particularly in Southeast Asia, a fulcrum of geostrategic competition and China’s gateway to broader regional dominance, but also with democratic heavyweights further afield.
The National Defence Strategy accurately assesses the strategic environment and need for a self-reliance strategy involving a two-track approach of strengthening the US alliance and national capabilities. There is no need to idolise America. But thinking we can have national security without the US would be putting faith in a false idol.
*Mike Hughes is director of ASPI’s Defence Strategy program. Justin Bassi is executive director of ASPI.
