By Paul Pelczar*
For a moment on Saturday afternoon, among 100,023 people packed into the MCG (Opens in new window), it appeared our wait was finally over. Fremantle led by 17 points with four minutes and 18 seconds remaining in the game. Then the bells tolled. (From: The Interpreter. The Lowy Institute.)
The club – much as any organisation made up of people had before, whether a military, government or business – assumed an effect that had worked in one environment would do so again, without sufficient consideration of changed circumstances.
The location, the scenario, the opposition.
Left profoundly disappointed among the sea of purple walking back toward Melbourne’s CBD, I couldn’t but think on the likely causations of the missed opportunity, and the parallels for those working on questions of strategy. I did so earlier this year (Opens in new window) in The Interpreter when Freo was dominating the home and away season, and those lessons feel sharper now.
At the risk of labouring comparison, states across the Indo-Pacific confront versions of the same problem: assumptions can harden into strategic error when circumstances change.
Leading up to the weekend’s 2026 AFL Grand Final, the deep, reverberating chimes heralding Wharfie Time (Opens in new window) – Fremantle’s use of AC/DC’s Hells Bells, purple lighting and crowd noise to energise the team and the Docker faithful late in close games – had been a powerful weapon. Its intended use was well advertised.
Then, distinctly off script, Brisbane kicked four goals and the game was gone.
The opposition had watched, considered and strategised a response (Opens in new window), including what the bells would mean and how they would counterpunch.
At the Dockers’ home ground in Perth, the setting was part of the effect. Earlier in the season, players from opposition teams had acknowledged they did not initially know what was happening (Opens in new window) when Wharfie Time was used against them.
The day before the Grand Final, Brisbane’s coach Chris Fagan played the bells to his players. They discussed what Fremantle intended and how Brisbane would respond. A tactic that had worked in one setting did not transfer readily to another.
China offers the same caution (Opens in new window). Its coercive maritime tactics have generated leverage in Southeast Asia, particularly the South China Sea. That does not mean it transfers to the Southwest Pacific. Geography, relationships, local populations and willingness to respond differ (Opens in new window).
Scarborough Shoal demonstrates that repetition does not leave the other side standing still.Philippine responses have changed as Chinese activity has increased (Opens in new window).
Russia adds another consideration (Opens in new window). Its military activity in Asia is increasingly conducted alongside China. Combined maritime patrols and long-range bomber activity complicate regional signalling and response. Activity once considered Chinese or Russian in isolation increasingly needs to be viewed against the possibility of coordination.
The war in Ukraine has generated extensive experience in drones, electronic warfare, targeting, logistics and information activity. Much is enlightening (Opens in new window). But Ukraine cannot simply be superimposed onto the Indo-Pacific, where distance, basing, sustainment and a predominantly maritime theatre differ. Even Black Sea lessons become less straightforward across the Pacific.
Back at the weekend’s game, the pangs of my anxiety at the MCG had, however, started earlier. Fremantle’s ever-reliable captain and full-back Alex Pearce had ruptured his Achilles in the third quarter. Until then he had been an assured presence behind the ball. Brisbane forward Logan Morris had been held to only four disposals and no score deep into the third term (Opens in new window).
Fremantle adjusted and, for a while, little changed. But Morris had not stopped being dangerous. He had simply been contained. In the final two minutes, he kicked the goals that put Brisbane ahead and the result beyond Fremantle. He finished the day with three goals.
Deterrence can present the same picture as Pearce’s afternoon. The absence of adversary action does not mean capability or intent has disappeared. Presence, surveillance, denial or response may be keeping it in abeyance.
It meant that when Wharfie Time came, the coaching staff were managing a changed game.
Fremantle has never made clear (Opens in new window) who decides when the button for Wharfie Time is pressed. Following the Grand Final that remains no clearer. That may reduce public pressure beforehand. Conversely, it also reduces accountability afterwards. Pearce was gone. Brisbane was still coming and had prepared for Fremantle’s intended effect.
Some military effects require authority above the tactical level because their consequences extend further. But separating employment decisions from those with the best appreciation of the situation can reduce utility.
Wharfie Time did not cost Fremantle the premiership, nor did Pearce’s injury decide it. Brisbane were too good and too prepared for an explanation that simple.
But both events offer a strategic reminder. A contained threat has not necessarily gone away and what has worked before might not again.
Pearce had held a threat in abeyance well before Morris appeared on the scoreboard. Brisbane had decided what Wharfie Time meant before Fremantle pressed the button.
The same applies across the Indo-Pacific. Presence, signalling, deterrence and coercion are rarely judged only when visible. Their effect is shaped earlier by preparation, positioning, adaptation and assumptions about the other side.
For long-suffering Fremantle supporters, the immediate consequence is rather less strategic. Those of us from the beginning have waited for more than 30 years for a first premiership with no easy handouts or shortcuts. We had lived false dawns, near misses and seasons when September seemed distant. The anxiety starts again, along with the wait for the next season.
*Paul Pelczar OAM has broad experience in intelligence, cyber and information operations across joint and maritime environments.
