Pentagon update on the Chinese military

This month (December 2024) the Pentagon released its 2024 Annual Report on Chinese Military and Security Developments Pentagon Annual Report on Chinese Military and Security Developments. The key points from 182 page report are detailed below.

Understanding People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) Strategy

• The PRC’s National Strategy. The PRC’s longstanding national strategy is to achieve “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” by 2049. This strategy determinedly pursues political, social, economic, technological, and military development to increase the PRC’s national power and revise the international order in support of the PRC’s system of governance and national interests.
• The PRC’s Foreign Policy. The PRC’s stated foreign policy seeks to reshape the international order into what it calls a “community of common destiny” to support its strategy to realize “rejuvenation.” PRC leaders claim their power to shape world events continues to grow, presenting “new strategic opportunities” to create an environment favourable for PRC interests and national rejuvenation.
• The PRC’s Economic Policy. The PRC acknowledges that internal and external challenges complicated its economic recovery and growth in 2023. For 2024, the PRC plans to leverage perceived favourable factors in the PRC’s long-term growth trajectory while mitigating risks to economic stability. The PRC’s ongoing military modernization objectives are commensurate with and part of its broader national development aspirations to invest heavily in technological self-sufficiency and concentrate on advanced manufacturing.
• The PRC’s Defence Policy and Military Strategy. In 2023, the PRC’s stated defence policy remained oriented toward advancing its sovereignty, security, and development interests while emphasizing a greater global role for itself. Beijing has demonstrated an increasing willingness to use military coercion and inducements to achieve these aims.
• The PRC’s Military Leadership. The Central Military Commission (CMC), the PRC’s top military decision-making body, consists of a civilian chair (Xi Jinping), two vice chairs, the chiefs of the Joint Staff and Political Work Departments, and the head of the Discipline Inspection Commission. For most of 2023, Li Shangfu served as the PRC’s minster of National Defence before his removal in October 2023 for corruption-related offences. In December 2023, President Xi Jinping selected Adm. Dong Jun as the PRC’s new Minister of National Defence.

PLA Forces and Capabilities

• The PLA’s Modernisation and Reform. The PLA has sought to modernise its capabilities and improve its proficiencies across all warfare domains to become a joint force capable of the full range of land, air, and maritime as well as nuclear, space, counter-space, electronic warfare, and cyberspace operations. Despite its progress, the force still has significant deficiencies including in commander proficiency, long-distance logistics, and urban warfare. In 2023, the PLA continued to adjust its military structures, field modern indigenous systems, build readiness, and strengthen its competency to conduct joint operations.
• PLA Army (PLAA). The PLA-A continues its decades-long effort to modernize equipment and focus on combined arms and joint training to become a world-class military by 2049. The PLA-A continued to demonstrate long-range joint fires capabilities during the April 2023 JOINT SWORD exercise.
• PLA Navy (PLA-N). Numerically, the PRC has the largest navy in the world, with a battle force of over 370 ships and submarines, including more than 140 major surface combatants. The PLA-N is largely composed of modern multi-mission ships and submarines. In 2023, the PLA-N continued to grow its ability to perform missions beyond the First Island Chain (FIC) by conducting the first extended area deployment of its new Yushen class amphibious assault ship and three deployments with CV-17 Shandong to the Philippine Sea, a record number for any PLA-N carrier in a calendar year.
• PLA Air Force (PLA-AF). The PLA-AF is modernizing and indigenising its aircraft and unmanned aerial systems rapidly, matching US standards. In 2023, the PLA transferred significant portions of PLA-N shore-based, fixed-wing combat aviation units, facilities, air defence, and radar units to the PLA-AF. Given time, this shift will probably enable better command and control over the PRC’s integrated air defence systems as well as the network of ground-based air domain awareness radars supporting the PRC’s national integrated air defence system network.
• PLA Rocket Force (PLA-RF). The PLA-RF is advancing its long-term modernization plans to enhance its “strategic deterrence” capabilities. The PRC is developing new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that will significantly improve its nuclear-capable missile forces and will require increased nuclear warhead production. The PRC may also be exploring development of conventionally-armed intercontinental range missile systems. If developed and fielded, such capabilities would enable the PRC to threaten conventional strikes against targets in the continental United States, Hawaii, and Alaska.
• The Former Strategic Support Force (SSF). On 19 April 2024, Beijing announced the dissolution of the SSF, and the alignment of its subordinate forces—Aerospace Force (ASF) and Cyberspace Force (CSF)—directly under the CMC. Beijing established a new Information Support Force (ISF), under the CMC, to coordinate the management of military’s networks and communications systems. The updated PLA organizational structure features four theatre-grade services—the PLA-A, PLA-N, PLA-AF, and PLA-RF—and four deputy-theatre-grade forces or service arms: the ASF, CSF, ISF, and the Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF).
• The Joint Logistic Support Force. The JLSF is concentrating its efforts on improving joint strategic and campaign-level logistic efficiencies through training and integrating civilian products and services. The JLSF supports multimodal transportation methods to facilitate the movement of PLA forces and equipment for training. During wartime or mobilisation, the JLSF probably will rely on its military representative offices and dispatch centres to route military traffic.
• PLA Reserves, Paramilitary, and Militia Forces. Interoperability and integration between the PLA, its reserve components, and the PRC’s paramilitary forces continue to grow in scale and sophistication, including the coordination between the PLA-N, the China Coast Guard (CCG), and the China Maritime Militia (CMM). The PRC primarily relies on its CCG and CMM for maritime coercion while selectively using the PLA-N to provide overwatch to deter rival claimants and quickly respond with force, if necessary. The People’s Armed Police (PAP) is an additional paramilitary component of the PRC’s armed forces. Its primary missions include internal security, maritime security, and augmentation to the PLA during conflict.
• Special Operations Forces (SOF). Despite unilateral and multilateral training, all PRC SOF units lack real-world combat experience. PRC SOF do not have a national-level special operations command to oversee all SOF activities. Despite an emphasis on joint training, theatre commanders have no authority over PAP units, making it difficult to incorporate PAP SOF into PLA training exercises.
• PLA Capabilities in Development. The PLA remains focused on developing capabilities to provide options for the PRC to dissuade, deter, or, if ordered, defeat third-party intervention in the Indo-Pacific region. The PLA continues developing the capabilities to conduct military operations deeper into the Indo-Pacific region and globally. The PLA has undertaken important structural reforms and introduced new military doctrine to strengthen joint operations and is testing joint capabilities in and beyond the FIC.
• Joint Capabilities for Power Projection. The PLA continues to increase its military capabilities to achieve the PRC’s regional and global security objectives beyond its immediate periphery. The PLA has primarily emphasized power projection capabilities in the maritime domain while its joint operational capabilities beyond the FIC remain limited. Improvements in PLA air and naval systems enable PLA forces to operate further from the PRC for longer.
• Advancements Toward an ‘Informatised and Intelligentised’ Military. The PLA considers information operations (IO) as a means of achieving information superiority early in a conflict, which it considers a critical requirement for the success of any military campaign, and continues to expand the scope and frequency of IO in military exercises. The PRC presents a significant, persistent cyber-enabled espionage and attack threat to an adversary’s military and critical infrastructure systems. The PLA is pursuing next-generation combat capabilities based on its vision of future conflict, which it calls ‘intelligentised warfare,’ defined by the expanded use of AI, quantum computing, big data, and other advanced technologies at every level of warfare.
• Nuclear Capabilities. Over the next decade, the PRC probably will continue to modernize, diversify, and expand its nuclear forces rapidly. The PLA seeks a larger and more diverse nuclear force, comprised of systems ranging from low-yield precision strike missiles to ICBMs with multi-megaton yields to provide it multiple options on the escalation ladder. In 2023, Beijing continued its rapid nuclear expansion. DoD estimates the PRC has surpassed 600 operational nuclear warheads in its stockpile as of mid-2024 and will have over 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030, much of which will be deployed at higher readiness levels. The PRC will continue growing its force through at least 2035.

Operational Structure And Activities On The PRC’s Periphery

• Theatre Commands. The PRC continues to refine military reforms associated with the establishment of the Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern, and Central Theatre Commands, which are organized based on the PRC’s revisionist ambitions and perception of peripheral threats. Under the direction of the CMC, each Theatre Command has operational authority over conventional forces within the theatre. ‒ The Eastern Theatre Command (ETC) is oriented toward Taiwan and the East China Sea and would likely oversee a Taiwan campaign. The ETC executed exercise JOINT SWORD, aimed at pressure Taiwan in April 2023. ‒ The Southern Theatre Command (STC) is oriented toward the South China Sea (SCS) and Southeast Asia border security. It responds to U.S. freedom of navigation operations in the SCS and can assume command, as needed, over all CCG and CMM ships enforcing the PRC’s claimed sovereignty and supporting PLA operations. In 2023, STC units conducted multiple live-fire drills and amphibious training events near PRC occupied features in the SCS and led live-fire drills, including the deployment of howitzers and counter-battery radars at the PRC-Burma border. ‒ The Western Theatre Command (WTC) is oriented toward India and counterterrorism missions along the PRC’s Central Asia borders. The WTC focuses on Xinjiang and Tibet Autonomous Regions, where the CCP perceives a high threat of what it defines as the “three evils” of “separatism, terrorism, and extremism.” ‒ The Northern Theatre Command (NTC) is oriented toward the Korean Peninsula and Russian border security. ‒ The Central Theatre Command’s (CTC’s) mission is the defence of Beijing while providing support to other theatre commands.
• Developments in the Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait. In 2023, the PRC amplified diplomatic, political, and military pressure against Taiwan. Throughout 2023, Beijing continued to erode longstanding norms in and around Taiwan by employing a range of pressure tactics against Taiwan: maintaining a naval presence around Taiwan, increasing crossings into Taiwan’s self-declared centre-line and air defence identification zone (ADIZ), and conducting highly publicized major military exercises near Taiwan.
• Developments in Taiwan’s Ability to Deter the Mainland. Geopolitical events in 2023 continued to accelerate Taiwan’s development of asymmetric concepts and capabilities to counter the PRC’s improving capabilities. Taiwan seeks to balance these asymmetric capabilities with conventional ones useful for defending against PRC grey-zone operations in and around its airspace and waters. In 2023, Taiwan continued to improve defensive resilience through a whole-of-society approach.
• Developments in the Security Situation in the South China Sea. Throughout 2023, tensions between the PRC and the Philippines were notably higher, with the PRC maritime forces ramming and boarding Philippine vessels en route to resupply the Second Thomas Shoal. The PRC has deployed PLA-N, CCG, CMM, and civilian ships to advance its illegal maritime claims, such as around the Second Thomas Shoal, Scarborough Reef, Sabina Shoal, and Sandy Cay/Thitu Island, as well as in response to oil and gas exploration operations by rival claimants in the PRC’s unlawful dashed-line claim.
• PLA Coercive and Risky Operational Behaviour. Since late 2023, the PLA has reduced the number of coercive and risky air intercepts of US platforms compared to the previous two years, when the PLA engaged in notably increased aggressive activity, particularly in the East and South China Seas. However, the PLA continues to conduct unsafe manoeuvres in the vicinity of allied forces operating in the region.

The PLA’s Growing Global Presence

• The PLA’s Evolving Mission and Tasks. PLA concepts and capabilities focus on projecting power far from China’s shores. The PLA-N’s evolving focus from “offshore defence” to “open seas protection” and the PLA-AF’s interest in becoming a “strategic” air force reflect the PLA’s interest in conducting operations beyond the PRC and its immediate periphery. The PLA has embraced its concept of non-war military activities (NWMA) as an effective way to secure the PRC’s global interests with military force while gaining valuable operational experience.
• PLA Overseas Military Activities. Beijing implements its global counterterrorism strategy to develop the PLA’s operational experience, secure greater access to overseas theatres, and prevent terrorist attacks in China and against PRC citizens and economic projects abroad. Citing its counterterrorism mission, since 2008, the PLA has dispatched more than 40 naval escort task forces (NETFs) to the Gulf of Aden, granting PLAN sailors important experience in overseas operations. In 2017, the PLA established an overseas base in Djibouti. The PRC is the largest contributor of peacekeepers among the five UN Security Council permanent members, having deployed about 50,000 personnel over the last 31 years. The PRC uses international outreach to garner the assistance of partner governments, routinely lobbies foreign partners to extradite alleged Uyghur extremists, and seeks public endorsement of its counterterrorism efforts in multilateral forums.
• Military Cooperation. The PRC uses bilateral and multilateral exercises to normalise its overseas presence and deepen defence ties. Beginning in 2014, the PRC has markedly increased participation in bilateral and multilateral exercises. Since then, Beijing has held recurring exercises, including the FALCON STRIKE air exercise with Thailand (2015), MARITIME SECURITY BELT naval exercise with Russia and Iran (2019), and BLUE SWORD with Saudi Arabia (2019). The PRC has expanded combined exercises with Russia, especially since 2018, when Beijing first participated in Russia’s VOSTOK capstone exercise.
• Overseas Basing and Access. The PRC is seeking to expand its overseas logistics and basing infrastructure to allow the PLA to project and sustain military power at greater distances. A global PLA logistics network could disrupt US military operations as the PRC’s global military objectives evolve. Beyond the PLA support base in Djibouti, the PRC is very likely already considering and planning for additional military logistics facilities to support naval, air, and ground forces projection.

Resources and Technology For Force Modernisation

• PRC Defence Spending. A survey of multiple models of the PRC’s defence budget estimates that Beijing spends 40% to 90% more than it announces in its public defence budget, which equates to approximately $330 billion–$450 billion in total defence spending for 2024. The consensus among experts is that the PRC’s publicly announced defence spending figure does not contain the entirety of PRC investment in its defence, so alternative approaches are used to assess the total value of this spending. • Developments in Defence Industry. The PRC’s hypersonic missile technologies have greatly advanced during the past 20 years. Many PRC missile programs are comparable to other international top-tier producers. The PRC is the world’s top ship-producing nation by tonnage and is capable of producing a wide range of naval combatants, gas turbine and diesel engines, and shipboard weapons and electronic systems, making it nearly self-sufficient for all shipbuilding needs.
• Arms Transfers. The PRC uses foreign suppliers to overcome limitations in its domestic production capabilities, particularly for helicopters and aircraft engines. As its aerospace industry improves over the next decade, the PRC very likely will decrease its foreign acquisitions to maintain only an import relationship with foreign suppliers positioned to quickly fill niche gaps in the PRC’s inventory. As of 2023, the PRC is the fourth-largest arms supplier in the world and sells nearly every category of conventional military equipment including unmanned aerial vehicles, man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADS), submarines, naval surface vessels, surface-to-air missile systems, and fighter aircraft to customers worldwide.

US-PRC Military-to-Military Contacts and Exchanges

• In 2023, the PLA largely denied, cancelled, and ignored recurring bilateral engagements and DoD requests for communication until weeks before President Biden and PRC leader Xi Jinping met in November 2023. Following the Woodside Summit, where the two leaders agreed to resume military-to-military communication at all levels, DoD and the PLA conducted several exchanges and working groups at the end of 2023 and through the end of 2024, including senior leader discussions, defence policy talks, operational safety talks, and calls between theatre commanders.
• DoD remains committed to maintaining open lines of communication with the PRC to ensure competition does not veer into conflict. DoD objectives in maintaining military-to-military channels are to help prevent crisis, reduce strategic and operational risk, and clarify misperceptions.

The full report can be dowloaded at:

https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2024.PDF

Source: Pentagon