Importance of information operations for RAN

By CMDR Paul D. Pelczar, RAN*

Australia’s Navy is in the midst of generational change – bringing online more capable platforms, expanding long-range strike, and preparing for nuclear-powered submarines. These efforts are rightly prioritised but they address only part of the threat picture that has emerged in recent years.

This has been shaped by rapid technological change and evolving strategic competition. In today’s geo-political environment, influence is contested as fiercely as sea control. Trust can be eroded before a vessel even departs port, and regional public perception can be shaped before a warship reaches its assigned station.

Cognitive warfare—used deliberately by various authoritarian states —seeks to influence perception and disrupt decision-making. This is a discrete and more insidious challenge than traditional Information Warfare. Operating in the grey zone, often below the threshold of armed conflict, it is a key feature of hybrid tactics designed to shape outcomes before conventional deterrence can respond. It targets not just our systems, but our thinking: how we interpret a situation, how others view our presence, and how domestic and regional audiences understand our purpose. The cognitive domain is not future-focused—it is present and active.

The 2024 National Defence Strategy (NDS) highlights the threat posed by disinformation and foreign interference, and the need to counter these with credible, coordinated national efforts. In this context, information is no longer just an enabler—it is a contested environment in its own right. Technology has effectively nullified Australia’s traditional geographic advantage; the NDS reaffirms that the Air-Sea Gap, once viewed as a natural strategic buffer in Australia’s defence posture, offers no protection against narratives, influence operations, or digital incursions. For Defence, and particularly for the RAN, this means evolving how we understand and plan operations.

Information manoeuvre—the deliberate use of all available military capabilities to gain decision advantage and influence target audience behaviour through generating effects within the Information Environment – draws from long-standing naval practice: demonstrating intent through signalling, maintaining readiness through forward presence, and applying influence beyond the immediate battlespace. But it also reflects the reality that adversaries today use narrative and influence in the same way they once relied on proximity or force. The operating environment is not just physical—it is psychological and informational.

The maritime dimensions of the Ukraine conflict offer a clear illustration of how information can be weaponised. Following the strike on a Russian cruiser in the Black Sea, Russian authorities initially denied the cause of the ship’s sinking, attributing it to an onboard fire rather than a Ukrainian missile strike. This deliberate narrative was designed to preserve domestic confidence, maintain naval prestige, and deny Ukraine the psychological advantage. The intent was not to mislead tactically—it was to control perception, suppress embarrassment, and limit the cognitive impact on both Russian and international audiences. In this sense, the sinking became not just a military loss, but a contested narrative space.

Closer to our shoreline, even well-intentioned operations can be similarly misinterpreted. During hydrographic surveys conducted near Bougainville under Operation Render Safe in 2014, elements of the local population misread the RAN’s presence—suspecting ulterior motives such as foreign interference or commercial exploitation. Despite the operation being humanitarian and at the request of local authorities, the absence of proactive narrative shaping created space for disinformation to take hold. Both cases reinforce the simple point: maritime operations, regardless of intent, exist within a contested information space—and must be planned accordingly.

Developing a credible ADF-wide capability to conduct operations in the Information Environment well beyond the Military Public Affairs role, is necessary. The RAN has a specific role to play in shaping this effort—by identifying where information and influence intersect with our missions, and by preparing a workforce able to navigate this within joint exercises and operations. The intent is about building awareness, ensuring commanders can understand the Information Environment they operate in, and making influence planning a standard part of maritime operations.

The risks of not doing so are real. In the absence of narrative clarity, ambiguity becomes a vulnerability. Without influence planning, an operation may achieve tactical effect but strategic doubt. Other navies understand this. They actively test narratives, target perceptions, and shape the operating space well before forces deploy—as demonstrated by the recent circumnavigation of Australia by PLA-N Task Group 107, where presence appeared deliberately coupled with messaging intended to normalise such activity and observe our public and strategic response.

The 2023 Defence Strategic Review makes clear that modern military power must extend beyond physical force—it must also shape perception, influence behaviour, and contribute to strategic outcomes through persistent presence and integrated engagement. Influence operations within the Information Environment does not displace traditional sea power—it complements it. Just as we refine how we operate and manoeuvre beneath the waves or within the electromagnetic spectrum, so too must we refine how we contest the cognitive domain.

The traditional traits of naval power endure: Presence still matters. So does posture. And projection is just as critical. However, without the ability to shape how our presence is understood, we risk being visible but misinterpreted. If sea power is to remain credible, then our message must travel as effectively as our platforms. Our compass must be steady—not only in direction, but in meaning. This effort must also be grounded in legitimacy and ethical conduct. The aim is not to deceive or manipulate indiscriminately, but to protect Australia’s interests while reinforcing the transparency and credibility that underpin our partnerships and alliances.

Importantly, the development of cognitive capabilities must align with those of our regional partners—in addition to Five Eyes and AUKUS—ensuring we can operate cohesively in the Information Environment. As a forward-deployed force, the RAN bears a unique responsibility in supporting these efforts—embedding influence considerations into maritime tasking and ensuring naval actions reinforce allied messaging and intent. Influence activities should not occur in isolation; they should complement shared strategic narratives and support broader coalition messaging, avoiding information fratricide.

For the RAN, leading in the cognitive domain is not optional—it is central to preserving our operational relevance. As we modernise the fleet, we must also modernise the mindset that shapes how, where, and why we operate. In this era of contested perception, our ability to navigate with purpose—in message as well as manoeuvre—will enable the integrated force in competition and conflict; and contribute to our strategic impact to deter, deny, and if required, defeat.

*Commander Paul Pelczar joined the RAN in 1986 as a Signalman, later becoming a Warrant Officer Cryptologic Linguist before commissioning. He has served in ships, submarines, and strategic roles, completed five Middle East deployments, is a triple graduate of Defence language training, and has undertaken postings in Hawaii, Thailand, and Japan.