How to Grow a Navy; The Development of Maritime Power. By Geoffrey Till. Routledge, Oxford, 2023.
Reviewed by Tim Coyle PhD
Navies are back as priority considerations in strategic planning in most countries with some level of maritime investment. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the decline of its maritime capability in the reconstituted form of the Russian Federation navy, much Western attention was diverted to land-centric wars in Iraq and the ‘War of Terror’. However, the prodigious growth of Chinese sea power from the 1990s and consequent strategic shifts, has resurrected naval development to the first rank of national and international planning and alliances.
Learned works on maritime strategy, stimulated by the changed conditions in international relations, abound; however, few stand back to examine the fundamental elements of raising, training and sustaining a navy which all navies face – from the largest to the smallest and regardless of political oversight or place in the world.
Geoffrey Till, Emeritus Professor of Maritime Studies at King’s College, London, uses historic precedents in naval organisational and capability development from ancient Greece, through to the present and near future. Till explains part of the motivation for the book was his discovery of an obscure 1691 work by a Royal Navy warrant officer, Henry Maydman, entitled Naval Speculations. Maydman, concerned about the state of the navy and the risks to national security through its neglect, postulated that effective naval growth resided in the understanding and cooperation in the domestic and international context in which the navy seeks to operate; in other words, it requires a ‘national enterprise’. Till allocates a chapter to Maydman’s considerations which, although written in the context of the time, his overall rationale is recognisable and relevant today.
Of course, Till gives due regard to those eminences of sea power, Mahan and Corbett. Mahan’s constituents of maritime power can be distilled into Maritime Geography, the Maritime Economy, Governance, Society and Culture and Naval Forces and Corbett argued for the continued priority on naval power against the continental focus which merged in the early 20th century – an argument extant today as national resources must be shared between military forces (complicated now by space and cyber).
In ancient Greece, Themistocles successfully attracted resources to build an effective navy. Although Greece defeated the Persians in the 890 BC Battle of Marathon, Themistocles, a participant in the battle and an influential Athenian, realised the Persians would return. He encouraged investment in the port of Piraeus for strategic and economic reasons and expanded the fleet to 200 triremes. He met opposition from landed interests and Athenian society’s antipathy to sea faring, being more enamoured of the ‘sword and the spear’.
Personnel training and sustainment have been essential elements in naval capability since ancient times. Till describes the ‘conditions of service’ in Themistocles’ galleys and those of Spain in the 16th – 18th centuries. Despite execrable conditions, commanders had to adopt practical measures to maintain physical capabilities to effectively work the vessels. In the chapter Delivering a Navy’s People, Till discusses personnel numbers, their motivation, support, training and education – elements at their most basic levels common to all epochs.
Naval Power: The Administrative Angle is another chapter title integral to naval planning and governance. Operational and administrative success is grounded on system-wide information transparency flows to all levels and these principles are discussed in chapters on Delivering a Navy’s People, Designing the Fleet and Nothing is Forever: Maintaining the Fleet; common principles through the ages are transposed into the modern era.
Dockyards, naval construction, and maritime logistics are critical support functions; however national sea power also includes Coastguards and the Assertion of Maritime Authority. This chapter addresses sovereign maritime jurisdictions, marine resources, the maritime environment, and even recreational facilities. Commercial shipping is another formidable expression of maritime power; the precipitate decline in Western-flagged merchant ships in favour of flags of convenience and crews is contrasted by the vast Chinese merchant fleet and port management contracts as part of the Belt and Road Initiative.
Naval aviation – fixed and rotary wing – are components of sea power as are maritime patrol and surveillance aircraft – manned or unmanned. In some countries, these are components of the naval service, while in others – such as Australia – they are an air force function. Amphibious troops, such as marines or – as in the Australian case – marinized army units for expeditionary contingencies are all subsumed into sea power.
The book’s last chapter is A Conclusion with Chinese Characteristics as an exemplar of How to Grow a Navy principles set against evolved PRC sea power. The reader can compare China’s naval development against those of its peer, the United States Navy at the macro level. However, the true usefulness of How to Grow a Navy is to substitute one’s own navy into the equation and assess whether the book’s principles have been successfully addressed in naval planning.
Australia’s current position is particularly germane. The AUKUS SSN program has attracted criticism from some within the Defence establishment and strategic analysis communities. The future of Navy’s surface ships is currently under review with the speculation the nine ship Hunter class frigate program may be cut in favour of a larger number of smaller combatants. The traditional RAN surface order of battle since the 1950s has comprised of two aircraft carriers (now Landing Helicopter Docks deploying rotary wing), three destroyers and six to eight frigates. Now, with Navy’s radical restructuring of sub-surface capability, surface platform numbers and capabilities may be reordered. The RAN is not alone in these reappraisals – many navies are reconsidering surface ships’ vulnerabilities against missiles and are also mulling replacement of some surface warfare elements by unmanned systems.
How to Grow a Navy is a landmark work. Its principles are applicable to virtually all naval and related maritime capabilities set against national security priorities. Its readership should include navy, government, and industry practitioners. It is most highly recommended.
