Mr Gonzalo Vazquez*
From Issue 2, 2022, Australian Naval Review
The importance of ensuring a stable East-Asian region for the US has been manifested by many and very noteworthy scholars during the last century. Since the US established its global maritime hegemony with the Monroe Doctrine, it has had to deal with numerous challenges aside from the two World Wars. Japan was the first, with the attack on Pearl Harbor and during World War II. Then, throughout the second half of the 20thcentury, wars in Korea and Vietnam followed. Yet, the one power which always remained in the picture in spite of not posing a threat at the time, was China.
For the last seven decades, the People´s Republic of China (PRC) has risen to become the main target of US´ Foreign Action in the Asia-Pacific Region. One of the first to foresee the future struggle that the US and China would have over what he called the “Asian Rimland”, was Nicholas Spykman. His works exploring the underlying geopolitical features of East Asia and their implications for US national security remain essential to understand modern US-China relations and US Foreign Strategy over the past decades. Following on him just a few years after, General MacArthur complemented pointed at the high geostrategic value of the little island of Formosa –Taiwan— and the need for the US to keeping it under his watch.
Between both, they provide the core geopolitical explanation supporting US involvement in Asia Pacific and its incessant efforts to ensure military stability in the region since the end of World War II.
Spykman Got It Right
When Nicholas Spykman, an International Relations professor at Yale, wrote his two most famous works (“America´s Strategy in World Politics” and “The Geography of Peace”) in the midst of World War II, the situation in East Asia was quite different to the present one. Japan, not China, was the dominant power in the region, and the main threat to the US´ domain. Yet, he predicted that both would change their respective positions vis-à-vis the US, and thus China would become the real challenge for the Americans.
In his first work, he predicted the importance of the Asian Mediterranean (referring to the region comprising today´s East China Sea, South China Sea and Philippine Sea in the Western Pacific) and the role it would play in the future of US foreign action, arguing China would end up being the real threat to the US. As he put it, “a modern, vitalized, and militarized China of 400 million people is going to be a threat not only to Japan, but also to the position of the Western Powers in the Asiatic Mediterranean. China will be a continental power of huge dimensions in control of a large section of the littoral of that middle sea […] It is quite possible to envisage one day when this body of water will be controlled not by British, American or Japanese sea power, but by Chinese air power.”[1] Several decades later, China and its A2/AD have completely brought to reality Spykman´s vision in a way which would have been hard to imagine back then.
Even though Chinese population has tripled his prediction, the Asia-Pacific region has indeed adopted a central position in modern geopolitical though, and China has grown to be the dominant power in the East Asia region. And it has managed to do so, among other things, by getting rid of one of the weaknesses Spykman identified in the 1930s China: “the non-existence of Chinese naval power”.[2] Today, China is not the most powerful navy in the world, at least not yet, but it is surely on track to surpass the US. In late August 2022, a photo of five Type 052D Destroyers under construction was published, confirming Chinese shipbuilding efforts are bound to remain quite strong.[3]
Two years after, Spykman coined in his second work the famous Rimland Theory, refuting Mackinder´s Heartland Theory (by which whoever controlled Eurasia would control the world). According to Spykman, the key was not Eurasia, but the coastal regions encircling it. For him, “who controls the rimland, controls Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world.”[4] In other words, the key to domain the world is not to control Eurasia, but to have a naval force capable enough to project its power from the adjacent seas into the mainland (see Figure 1 below). This way, the US could ensure its naval hegemony remains uncontested by preventing any other nation from growing.
** Photo – Geopolitcs_1.jpg ** [5]
Additionally, he also made three particular predictions concerning the future of China and the United States, all of which we can say have been fulfilled.
Firstly, he reaffirmed his forecast about China, arguing back then “the dominant power in the Far East will undoubtedly be China”,[6] at the same time he underlined its power “lies mostly in coastal regions.”[7] Today, China is not only the dominant power in the region; it is also on track to become the dominant naval power of the world (something estimated to happen by mid-century given the current pace at which China is expanding its naval capabilities). Its shipbuilding activity keeps outpacing the rest big navies in the world.
Secondly, he further reaffirmed the “Asiatic Mediterranean” would “continue to have great significance for the independent Asiatic world.”[8] As of 2022, the Chinese Navy controls the South China Sea and the entirety of its littoral waters with its fishing fleet and Coast Guard, and the Asia-Pacific region has turned into the world´s center of gravity, host to the busiest commercial activity in the world.
Lastly, Spykman advised the US should “recognize once again, and permanently […] Asia is of everlasting concern to her, both in times of war and in time of peace.”[9] As it turns out, the US has followed this advice (whether liking it or not) and like the US National Defense Strategy Factsheet of 2022 established, its number one priority is “Defending the homeland, paced to the growing multi-domain threat posed by the PRC.”[10]
Spykman´s work has remained intrinsically linked to the US Foreign Policy in the Western Pacific, having influenced the containment policy applied to the Soviet Union in the Pacific during the 1950s and geopolitical though of most administrations to this day, while also describing the modern-day geopolitical reality in the South and East China Seas. But just like Roosevelt´s corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, Spykman´s corollary is, as professor Holmes says, “that any naval power hoping to shape events in the rimlands must be able to get to the rimlands”[11] [11] To be able to contest China in the South and East China Seas, the US Navy must be there, and must have enough strength to retain command of the seas.
General MacArthur´s Unsinkable Carrier
In spite of his accurate predictions with China and the imperative necessity for the US to control the rimlands, Spykman missed a key strategic outpost off the coast of China. Taiwan has been linked to US geostrategic thought towards Chinese expansionism in the Asia Pacific region for decades. As Richard C. Bush describes it, “in the United States’ relations with both China and Taiwan, the verbal formulations used to describe policy are more important than perhaps in any other foreign policy relationship. Indeed, words themselves become policy.”[12]
The historical roots of US´ push for Taiwan (formerly called Formosa) against Chinese expansion lies in a brief and once top-secret memorandum written to President Truman by General Douglas MacArthur, Commander of the US Army Forces in the Far East during World War II. In it, he detailed the high strategic value the little island provided, and the negative consequences that would derive should China establish control over it.[13]
MacArthur, a highly decorated general who participated in the Philippines Campaign, wrote in 1950 a memorandum in which he described how allowing the island to fall in the hands of either the Chinese or the Soviet Union would most likely have disastrous consequences for the US Navy and its control of the Western Pacific. In sum, MacArthur´s provided with several geostrategic implications of the island of Taiwan, all of which compelled the US to make sure Taiwan was in hands of a friendly regime, or under their control in any way possible.
First and foremost, the island was, in his view, “an integral part of this offshore position which in the event of hostilities can exercise a decisive degree of control of military operations along the periphery of Eastern Asia.”[14] It would allow whoever controlled it the ability to deter any unfriendly and unwanted presence into the region by taking advantage of its location –further into the sea than any part of the continental mainland—and the numerous military bases spread across the whole island.
The geographical implications of its position were also a vital instrument to control the communication lanes which Mahan strongly advocated for. Thus, should it fail under control of a hostile power, it would have negative consequences for the US. “The geographic location of [Taiwan] is such that in the hands of a power unfriendly to the United States it constitutes an enemy salient in the very center of that portion of our position now keyed to Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines.”[15]
“As a result of its geographic location and base potential,” he continued, “utilization of Formosa by a military power hostile to the United States may either counterbalance or overshadow the strategic importance of the central and southern flank of the United States front line position. Formosa in the hands of the Communists can be compared to an unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender ideally located to accomplish Soviet offensive strategy and at the same time checkmate counteroffensive operations by United States Forces based on Okinawa and the Philippines.”[16] For the American Army, Taiwan would serve as a blocking asset preventing the expansion of China towards the Indo-Pacific. Conversely, in the case of China, it serves as an ideal base, just as it served for Japanese offensives over the Indo-Pacific, from where to launch military aggressions.
In second place, he predicted the fate of the island would be inevitably linked to that of the United States. He insisted in that “there can be no doubt but that the eventual fate of Formosa largely rests with the United States.”[17] Just like with Spykman, seven decades later the fate of Taiwan is directly associated with the US. Although his most obvious motivation back then was avoiding the island fell under Communist hands, the urge is still observable in the US policy towards the island; this time to prevent China consolidates its position in the East China Sea.
Lastly, he underlined the crucial advantage the island provided to be able to keep an adequate level of control throughout the Western Pacific. “As a means of regaining a proper United States posture in the Orient it is apparent to me that the United States should initiate measures to prevent the domination of Formosa by a Communist power”,[18] he said. Should they fail to do so, by which China would finally manage to secure a position in the island, the US would inevitably see its control over the region significantly hampered, if not completely annulled. Today, the longstanding push between both nations for the control of the island and the escalation in tensions after US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited the island in August 2022, are beginning to prove MacArthur´s point.
The Challenges of Today
Today, the push for retaining control of the Asia Pacific region is a major concern for the US Foreign Policy. One the one hand, the PRC´s official position on Taiwan is that “there is only one China in the world, Taiwan is a part of China and the government of the PRC is the sole legal government representing the whole of China.”[19] [19] On the other, they have built an army that seriously threats their ability to sustain naval presence in the region, and will in a few decades challenge their global hegemony. As Spykman put it back then, “if the Western Powers are to retain any influence at all in the region [meaning the Western Pacific] they will have to establish island bases for their power.”[20] But he optimistically believed that would be enough for the US to keep things under control.
Now, eighty years later, prevailing over such a powerful rival in its own waters is a daunting task, and, especially with China, a costly challenge. Both Spykman and MacArthur made significant contributions to American geopolitical thinking, with some of their lessons being visible to this day, but neither of them could foresee today´s reality in East Asia. China, with its A2/AD defenses specifically designed to hinder US access to the region from their bases in the Pacific. Thus, the US Navy will need more than just their usual Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) to overcome the challenge posed by the Chinese Navy.
Without a doubt, Spykman and MacArthur remain essential to understand the US geopolitical drive in South-East Asia. And judging the situation as of September 2022, they will remain as such in the upcoming years. Now is time for the US Navy and its allies in the region to build a fleet that can fulfill their requirements and prevent China´s expansionism into the high seas. Geopolitics matter, but without a powerful navy capable to contest every region, the US will end up surrendering its geostrategic position in the Western Pacific. And that would bring far worse consequences.
Both Spykman and MacArthur did their job, it is over to the US Navy now.
*Gonzalo Vázquez is a Spanish student of International Relations at University of Navarra. He is a Junior Research Analyst at the Center for Global Affairs and Strategic Studies. His main areas of focus include maritime security, naval strategy and geopolitics.
[1] Nicholas Spykman (1942) “America´s Strategy in World Politics”, Yale Institute of International Studies, 469.
[2] Spykman, 1942: 133.
[3] Xavier Vavasseur (21 August 2022) “Five Type 052D Destroyers Under Construction in China”, Naval News, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/08/five-type-052d-destroyers-under-construction-in-china/
[4] Nicholas Spykman (1943) “The Geography of Peace”, Yale Institute of International Studies, 52.
[5] Spykman, 1943: 63.
[6] Ibid, 62
[7] Ibid, 60.
[8] Ibid, 49-50.
[9] Ibid, 69.
[10] US Department of Defense (2022) “Fact Sheet: 2022 National Defense Strategy”, 1, https://media.defense.gov/2022/
[11] James Holmes (February 2021) “Great responsibility demands a great navy”, US Naval Institute, Proceedings, Vol. 147/2/1,416, https://www.usni.org//great-responsibility-demands-great-navy.
[12] Richard Bush (March 2017) “A One-China Policy Primer”, Center for East Asia Policy Studies, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/one-china-policy-primer.pdf, 3.
[13] General Douglas MacArthur (14 June 1950) “Memorandum on the Island of Formosa”, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments
[14] MacArthur, 1950: 162.
[15] Ibid, 162.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid, 164.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Taiwan Affairs Office and The Information Office of the State Council, “White Paper—The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue,” (15 February 2000), http://www.taiwandocuments.org/white.
[20] Spykman, 1963: 62.
