A subject that was periodically raised through ANI journals was whether warfare officer training was appropriate for the evolving nature of operations at sea in peace and war. Rear Admiral James Goldrick wrote this article which was published in Headmark 140 (June 2011). Prior to publication he circulated to ‘experienced hands’ and some of their commentary was also published. Here is the original article and the insightful commentary by the late Commodore Tim Cox.
Beyond the Principal Warfare Officer
This article argues that we need to move beyond the current paradigm of the Principal Warfare Officer (PWO) in order to allow the production of a warfare officer development continuum which meets the needs of 21st century maritime warfare. In particular, the core of expertise in our future warfare officers must be centred much more on the set up and operation of sensor, battle management, weapon and communication systems than in the mastery of pre-planned responses, many of which can best be handled by appropriately directed automated systems.
Why the PWO? The 60s Threat Environment
It is important here to understand some critical assumptions which justified the PWO concept when it was implemented at the beginning of the 1970s. The motivations behind the creation of the PWO derived from an increasing recognition in the mid-1960s that maritime warfare was a 24 hour, seven day a week challenge and that threats could arise with little or no notice from any environment. This situation had in fact been the case since the start of the Second World War and, within the Commonwealth navies, the Principal Control Officer (PCO), delegated authority by the Commanding Officer to fire the ship’s armament had been the result. But the PCO concept in the 1960s was itself felt to be insufficient because it only applied to first contact and immediate engagement, with specialist personnel closing up to take over as soon as possible.
The advent of the anti-ship missile (highlighted by the sinking of the Israeli destroyer Eilat in 1967) added a new urgency to the problem because initial responses to even the least sophisticated of such weapons were not simple, while the Soviets and satellite nations were investing heavily in anti-ship missile technology which was evolving rapidly. Furthermore, aircraft carriers were becoming fewer in numbers (and for the Royal Navy an endangered species with the 1966 decision to abandon construction of a conventional take off and landing carrier and phase out the existing force).
It was accepted that warships would have little or no beyond horizon range warning of attack unless they were under the umbrella of aerial early warning aircraft – which were not going to be available in many situations. Similarly, in ASW scenarios, their first indication of an underwater threat was likely to be an attack from a covertly positioned submarine rather than its detection at long range, unless air assets were available. Thus, the personnel on watch would have to respond instantly and correctly to a detection which would come only a few minutes (if that) before weapon impact. British flag officers in the 1960s, most notably the then Vice Admiral (later Admiral of the Fleet Sir) Edward Ashmore became increasingly concerned that the sub-specialist training system (which produced, amongst other categories, specialist ASW, Gunnery, Direction, Communications and Navigating specialists) did not provide the necessary expertise to its graduates in areas other than their own and that the concept of going to action stations to bring in the ‘first eleven’ did not meet the response times required. After representations from the flag officers in the (then) Western and Eastern Fleets a working group was established in the Ministry of Defence to develop a single stream warfare officer model, while the concept was trialled in two Leander class general purpose frigates.
Western navies were also working hard at this time to establish preplanned responses and procedures which would allow rapid reaction without confusion. (The packages of pre-planned actions against anti-ship missiles were described under and initiated by what became designated the ‘Bingo’ and then ‘Zippo’ codenames.) In developing these procedures, it became apparent that they required a high degree of teamwork and considerable practice to execute effectively, as did equivalent anti-submarine measures, and the PWO concept was viewed as being central to achieving the necessary standards on a 24 hour basis. It was in fact acknowledged at the time that the only area in which real improvement could practically be achieved within a reasonable period was in personnel rather than weapons or sensors, bound as the latter were by increasingly lengthy acquisition cycles. The core of the PWO training program became mastery of the responses, albeit with a highly practical focus in terms of rote memorising of the various actions involved and then, in simulators and at sea, practising and proving the ability to carry them out within the required times and in the correct order.
The PWO Concept at Sea
The PWO concept was viewed, despite some misgivings, as being reasonably successful in service. It has faced only one real test of war since its introduction and that was the Falklands conflict of 1982. While there were some system and tactical failures, these were generally not ascribable to any fundamental deficiencies in PWO training but to wider issues of readiness, intelligence and equipment – and the misjudgements inevitable under the intense pressures of battle. Indeed, the result of the conflict was generally to increase confidence in the PWO system in the Navy as a whole and in individual PWOs as far as their COs and ships’ companies were concerned.
Implications of the PWO
There was, however, a price to be paid in the emphasis placed on equipping the PWOs to handle threats with a degree of confidence across all environments, one that has never been completely offset by the addition of sub-specialist training to the ‘common’ course described above, or in efforts to place greater reliance on the expertise of senior sailors, the latter being implicit in the original PWO concept. Indeed, the combination of the various warfare streams into a combat systems operator and manager category in more recent years may have partly undermined the latter effort within the RAN at least.
The truth is that the system knowledge of PWOs has never really matched that of their sub-specialist predecessors and it is arguable that this has become an increasing problem as the legacy of the old sub-specialisations and deep qualified senior sailors slowly leached out from fleet and training establishments. The Course itself has gone through a number of permutations, with associated or separated sub-specialist modules and additional qualifications (particularly focused on group or force as opposed to single ship warfare officer duties) at different times becoming part of the continuum. In recent times, the RAN has adopted a single common PWO Course with the intent that officers undertake further training after an initial sea posting – a construct not unlike the original RN PWO Course.
The Warfare Problem – Facing the Twenty First Century
In the light of experience, the RAN is now moving back towards equipping its warfare officers at the outset of their PWO careers with more sub-specialist knowledge by combining the initial course with a sub-specialist package and this is all to the good. We need, however, to ask whether we should go further. There is no doubt that an ability – and a readiness – to deal with rapidly emerging threats will remain essential. Surprise has always been and will remain an abiding feature of war at sea. But is thinking that derived from the problems of the 1960s wholly appropriate to the twenty first century?
Three tendencies are apparent in modern maritime operations. The first is that network enabled operation provide units with much greater access to a galaxy of remote sensors as well as the ability to share data (sometimes of targeting quality even in an air environment) to a degree that was only dreamt of 50 years ago. This means that units have a much greater ability to develop a degree of awareness of the battlespace and of the threats that they face than did their predecessors and at much longer ranges. All this suggests that the focus of warfare officers should be first on ensuring that the picture available to them is as comprehensive as possible and then on planning and operating accordingly.
The second is the increasing challenges that modern systems represent, not so much in terms of reliability, but in ensuring that they are appropriately tuned and configured to operate at the highest possible levels within given environments and situations. The SPY radar and the associated AEGIS weapon system require significant effort to ensure that they are properly set up and this set up is continually reassessed as conditions change. In a way, this is a reversion to the situation of the first half of the last century, when sub-specialist officers were highly expert in the engineering and operation of their systems and, gunnery officers in particular, devoted large amounts of time to the alignment and grooming of their systems – and not just when emerging from refit or deep maintenance but as part of the daily operating cycle.
It is arguable that the PWO concept was possible at all because it came at a time when system reliability and tuning became much less difficult to achieve than they had been since the start of the mechanical computer era in the first decade of the 20th century. The mature solid state systems which began to emerge in the mid-1960s were much easier to set up and maintain, particularly by comparison with the complex valve technology of the 1950s. In 2010, the problem now comes in the software, since increased computing power has allowed for much more sophisticated control systems directing much more capable systems than in the past – in the case of radars, for example, allowing a much greater chance of detection than before possible with an older set of the same power and bandwidth – but only if the settings are absolutely right.
The third effect is that command decision aids as well as the sensor and weapon systems themselves increasingly provide a greater capability to deal with complex and short notice threats than can humans, however expert. Many of the responses which had to be ordered by the PWO must now be managed automatically – and probably managed in a much more effective way and from a better analysis of the threat priority than even the best trained human being could consistently achieve. The RAN has something of a paradigm shift to achieve in this matter.
The Future Warfare Officer
All this is not to reject the idea of common warfare officer training, nor some degree of focus on and preparation for dealing with rapidly arising and unexpected threats. Surprise is and will remain a constant of war at sea and the defence, unlike on land, has no inherent advantage over offence, unless it is constant vigilance. Furthermore, the underlying concept that the PWO is ‘conductor’ of the entire warfare ‘orchestra’ is essential to retain in order to ensure against the stove-piping of information flows and processes. Indeed, it is strongly arguable that the longer range battle, involving the coordination of the force as a whole as well as associated units within what are likely to be complex rules of engagement demands more than ever the exercise of informed and expert human judgement.
But it does suggest that we need to restructure our approach so that our people develop a much deeper understanding of systems capabilities and limitations and of the ways in which those systems can be manipulated and managed to achieve best effect. It is not the expertise of the soldering iron that is required in our warfare officers, but understanding of the software and of its permutations, of the data flows and the factors acting on their rate and consistency and of the environment and its effect on sensor and communication propagation. It is not so much about getting the equipment serviceable or maintaining it in a serviceable state – that remains a maintainer function vital (and challenging) in itself – but in being able to wring every ounce of capability out of the equipment when it is being used by using it in absolutely the right way. In addition, a deep understanding of the remote sources of information now made available to the forces at sea and their strengths and potential weaknesses must be a fundamental part of our warfare officers’ skill sets, because without that no valid appreciation of the wide area picture can be made and no accurate threat evaluation achieved. All this, given the limits on time and resources, will require very great changes in the way that we produce our warfare officers.
This article will not attempt to propose a new training continuum for warfare officers in detail – that task is for others. But it does seek to start the debate about the philosophy that should underlie that continuum. Times have changed since the 1960s – it is time that the PWO changed as well.
Commentary by Commodore Tim Cox
The PWO concept from the outset recognised that there was a diminished system knowledge for PWO’s. This was hardly surprising when the previous Long Courses which had a duration of about 10 months were swept up into a single 40 week course which included modules on systems. I believe it did a reasonable job on gunnery (MRS3 fire control) and ASW (Type 184 and 170, Mortar Mk10 and nuclear depth-bomb); the weakness was on Radar EW and Comms from my memory of the RN PWO 1 course. AIO and Ops Room management was well covered but it is important to remember the strength and experience of Senior Sailors in the 1970’s in both the RAN and RN. ‘PWOmanship’ was about team work and the contribution of the skills of all members – not one person knowing everything. The system knowledge weakness was reflected by the introduction of the AWO course in the mid 70’s (about the time of PWO 4 if my memory is good).
I think the paper skirts the problem for the RAN circa 2010. There are three significant changes that need to be addressed. Firstly and most importantly is the loss of a Systems Centre namely the old NCDS focused Combat Data Systems Centre (CDSC) at Fyshwick. From that day forward our PWOs, COs, WEEOs and Senior Sailors have lost the opportunity to really understand systems and doctrine such as we had in FFGs and DDGs. For ANZAC system knowledge we did it on the cheap and the results are extant.
Secondly, I believe that our Senior Sailors are less knowledgeable than their 1970’s equivalents. Thirdly, the demands of a changing society mean that young RAN Officers spend less time at sea and do fewer PWO jobs and, as time passes, XOs and COs are finding their task more challenging. If the PWO course is the basis for future CO’s and Admirals there is a lot to take into account.
I believe that AEGIS brings challenges that most RAN Officers and Senior Sailors will find confronting; you should note the experience of Captain Rogers in the USS Vincennes to appreciate the importance of systems and doctrine knowledge in AEGIS capable ships. With the RAN family placing different demands on the system I believe that the Navy needs to adjust to officers and sailors in ships having less experience than the personnel who supported the command teams in the past. To maintain the RAN’s fighting edge there is a need for a tool set to compensate for experience. I believe that this should be in the form of an RAN doctrine and systems centre for AEGIS.
Re-vamping PWO training based on AEGIS and area warfare probably has merit. ADQUALS for Amphibious Operations may also be a useful concept. Additionally, I think that the Navy needs to make greater use of its retired community to train the new generation RAN. They would provide experience and knowledge in managing people and systems and offer the continuity that should not be dependent on the posting cycles of the front line teams but is essential to effective Warfare Training and System Centres. This is a concept the RN managed very well circa 1980 in my judgement.
In closing let me just remind you of the RN approach to ADAWS combat system in the 70’s where system knowledge was never addressed; too much “Vabology” in my opinion and this lack of systems knowledge was the most significant contributor to shortcomings in the South Atlantic – not the PWO concept.
All this not withstanding, the PWO system is probably due for an overhaul. It must reflect the contemporary standards and expectations of the practitioners – many of whom don’t see 30+ years in the RAN as a desirable or achievable goal.
About the Authors
The late Rear Admiral James Goldrick AO CSC RAN joined the RAN in 1974 and became an ASW specialist undertaking his PWO training in the UK (PWO class #57) and later was a PWO in HMS Liverpooland then in HMAS Darwin. He went on to instruct at the PWO faculty at HMAS Watson. His sea commands were the patrol boat HMAS Cessnock and the frigate HMAS Sydney (twice).
The late Commodore Tim Cox AM RAN joined the RAN in 1962 and was among the RAN officers to attend the inaugural RN PWO Course. As a junior officer he commanded a patrol boat and later the destroyer escort HMAS Derwent and the destroyer HMAS Perth. A ‘larger than life’ naval officer he most notably served as Chief Staff Officer (Operations) and Commodore Flotillas in the Fleet and Director General Maritime Development in Canberra. A keen sailor he was also Race Committee Chair for the Sydney to Hobart Yacht Race from 2002 until 2017.
