Dr Jeffrey F Collins and Mr Matthew Bondy*
Introduction
In a country known for its foreign and defence policy-free elections, the September 2021 announcement of a new defence pact among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (AUKUS) put Canada’s place in the world squarely under the microscope. This came mere weeks after the rapid and haphazard US withdrawal from a 20-year war in Afghanistan – a conflict where Canada had one of the highest casualty rates among the Western allies. Both events landed like a thud for Ottawa foreign policy observers.[1]
The initial reaction by the government of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau was to downplay AUKUS. With the announcement coming amid the final days of a federal election campaign, Trudeau faced criticism from opposition parties over Canada’s notable absence from the new pact; parties on the left and right used AUKUS as proof of the two-term prime minister’s foreign policy failures in the Indo-Pacific, especially over the protracted hostage-taking of two Canadian citizens by Beijing that began in 2018. Although Trudeau’s comments contradicted the Biden administration’s praise of the arrangement,[2] official Ottawa remained mum on whether Canada was ever asked to join AUKUS. Trudeau attempted to frame AUKUS as purely a deal for a nuclear submarine which Canada had no interest in buying, but it soon became clear that Ottawa was given little advance warning of the pact.[3] This had to sting.
The three AUKUS members are arguably the closest and most like-minded of Canada’s allies. As well as sharing values and a century plus of military cooperation dating back to the world wars, they have been bound together (with New Zealand) in the ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence-sharing alliance since the 1940s. Therefore, Canada’s absence from AUKUS was and remains both symbolically and substantively important.[4] Unlike the narrow focus of Five Eyes, AUKUS represents a new defence and security partnership. That Canada joined New Zealand as one of the Anglosphere’s orphans in the new geopolitical alignment arguably speaks to the degree of unseriousness with which AUKUS members regard these two allies.[5]
In the case of Canada, inaction and underinvestment in defence would certainly give credence to this view. Governments of both main political parties, Liberal and Conservative, have not undertaken a foreign policy review since 2005. A more narrow-in-scope Indo-Pacific strategy – promised in 2019 – remains years behind schedule.[6] Although defence spending got a small boost (from 1.36 per cent to 1.4 per cent of GDP) in 2022, a response to Russia’s latest invasion of Ukraine, the increase still falls short of Canada’s 2 per cent GDP defence budget commitment to NATO, a fact likely not lost on any of the AUKUS members, each of which exceeds this target, including non-NATO Australia.[7] Debate can be had on whether one solitary metric is truly indicative of a country’s military capacity; however, it does reflect the political will and interest of what historically has been a key ally to each of the AUKUS members, especially in the search for able and necessary partners in a time of generational geopolitical shifts.
This article therefore positions the AUKUS pact as a revelatory moment for Canada. In contrast to Prime Minister Trudeau’s response, the pact’s focus on submarines, minilateral alignment, cyber and artificial intelligence (AI) collaboration shows key gaps in Canadian defence capabilities and outlook. From a Canadian long-term perspective, AUKUS highlights the types of arrangements needed to both protect and advance Canada’s national interests in the 21st century.
The Sub Dimension
Naturally, Canberra getting privileged access to US nuclear submarine technology in exchange for ditching the Attack-class diesel-electric French program garnered the most reaction in Canadian defence and political circles.[8] There are several reasons for this. First, Canada, like Australia, has exclusively used diesel-electric submarines. Moreover, the RAN and the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) share similar operational requirements: a long-range patrol submarine capable of interoperating with US and other Western allies and exercising sovereignty over some of the world’s largest maritime domains. That both countries contend with such demands while being resource-rich middle powers with uneven and mostly sparsely populated territory adds another common dimension.
Second, Canada has attempted twice to get nuclear attack submarines, only to have both efforts – in the early 1960s and again in 1987–89 – defeated, largely over domestic anti-nuclear sentiment, steep cost estimates, and disinterested political leadership.[9] The nuclear option only occasionally resurfaced over the last 30 years and, when it did, a media backlash quickly saw it recede.[10] The challenge, however, is that the RCN and the government admit that an under-ice submarine capability is necessary for Ottawa to exercise sovereignty in the country’s vast Arctic archipelago and exclusive economic zone.[11] Diesel-electric submarines, including Canada’s four existing Victoria-class boats purchased second-hand from the Royal Navy in 1998, lack the hull design and propulsion system to safely transit under ice – a significant limitation given existing Russian submarine activity and Chinese ambitions in the region. Absent improvements in hybrid ‘air independent propulsion’ submarines like Sweden’s planned A-26 class, nuclear submarines such as those used by the US and the UK are the only proven options for Canada to adopt an under-ice crewed submarine capability. That Canada’s last attempt to acquire nuclear attack submarines in part failed over an inability to secure US nuclear submarine technology – the same technology Australia is now getting access to – is something not lost in Canadian submarine discussions.[12]
Third, Australia’s rejection of the diesel-electric French Shortfin Barracuda comes right as the RCN and the Department of National Defence (DND) are examining a future submarine replacement. The Victoria class are due to be retired in 2036–42, at which point they will be nearly 50 years old. The boats, within the same generation of submarine technology as the RAN’s Collins class, are nevertheless due for an up to $5 billion upgrade program this decade to keep them operational until their retirement.[13] However, much uncertainty remains.
Submarine replacement was never identified as a procurement priority in the Trudeau government’s 2017 defence policy ‘Strong, Secure, Engaged’ and its 20-year funding framework or in the ongoing, multi-decade National Shipbuilding Strategy, and the DND only established a submarine project office in summer 2021.[14]A new defence policy update, promised ‘swiftly’ in this year’s federal budget, holds some promise on dollars and timelines but the Australian experience in attempting to replace the Collins boats over the past decade illustrates just how tight Canada’s window is to ensure a capability gap is plugged and new submarines are introduced before all of the old boats are retired.[15] Hanging over this replacement project are some glaring facts: the 2017 defence policy estimated that 70 per cent of Canadian defence procurement projects were routinely behind schedule, while a 2006 National Defence internal audit found that it took on average 15 years for a new capability to be delivered, a figure largely unchanged since.[16]
Finally, in abandoning the Shortfin Barracuda, Canberra has removed one of the few potential non-nuclear long-range submarines that Ottawa could have leveraged either in partnering with Australia for later builds and development costs or in acquiring the design for Canadian adaptation – akin to both countries using the British Type-26 design for their respective future surface combatant projects. There could also be an upside too; a scorned France will likely focus on competing in the future Canadian submarine project. Canada remains one of Paris’s few allies looking for relatively large non-nuclear submarines, thus presenting an opportunity to strengthen naval and national ties with a country that historically has turned to US and UK sources for naval capabilities.
Geopolitical Reawakening
As important as the submarine discussion is, the AUKUS pact’s implications for the Canadian defence industry is the proverbial tree within a much more meaningful forest. The establishment of AUKUS is symptomatic of the re-emergence of great power rivalry within the international system, something that decision-makers in Ottawa have not had to seriously consider in their foreign policy thinking since the early 1950s. In fact, the country’s geostrategic position can largely account for why Canadian governments have been so slow, if not outright reluctant, to engage with AUKUS or champion similar minilateral, like-minded arrangements.[17]
Since the Second World War, Canada has benefited from what one defence scholar terms the ‘[i]nvoluntary American security guarantee’.[18] Through a series of incremental defence and economic arrangements like the 1958 North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) agreement and the 1965 Auto Pact, Canada became tightly bound to the US while sitting atop the North American continent surrounded by three oceans and the longest undefended border on earth. Few countries anywhere have such an enviable geostrategic location.
In practical terms, Canadians got used to underspending on defence, operating on the presumption that the US would never leave its northern neighbour at the mercy of a foreign aggressor lest it leave its own homeland exposed. Canada did ‘just enough’ in equipping its armed forces and deploying them abroad to honour its NORAD and NATO alliance commitments.[19]
This scenario is no longer viable, though, as the geostrategic global environment has shifted dramatically in the last two decades.
America’s unipolar moment[20] was politically strained by the ‘global war on terror’, ideologically undermined in the eyes of many nations by the debt-driven global financial crisis of 2008, and ended by the re-emergence of major great power rivalry as China and Russia in particular have taken steps to assert great power prerogatives.
Russia’s neo-imperial pursuits in Georgia and Ukraine have alerted the world to the Putin regime’s willingness to boldly breach longstanding post-1945 norms of international peace and security. Likewise, China’s regional aggression, including breaching the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 by attacking Hong Kong’s liberal democratic institutions, has signalled that authoritarian great power military and political adventurism is not outlier activity heading into the third decade of the 21st century, but a trend.
Both China and Russia are inducing classic balancing behaviour amongst regional neighbours. The establishment of the Quad and AUKUS both represent balancing behaviour – the concept of smaller powers coming together to balance the weight of larger, threatening powers[21] – in East Asia. In the case of Europe, the intention of Sweden and Finland to join NATO[22] represents the same.
For its part, Canada has struggled to articulate a clear foreign policy vision as it pertains to both of these aggressive authoritarian powers, which is indicative of a lack of a coherent grand strategy to deal with this new era of multicolour rivalry.
Despite hostage-taking against innocent Canadians, threatening language from China about Communist Party backed Huawei’s role in the Canadian economy,[23] and reported Chinese efforts to undermine Canadian elections,[24] Canada remains conspicuously neutral in its tone as it pertains to Chinese aggression.
With the global-headline-grabbing case of Huawei executive Meng Whanzou being retained in Canada for judicial purposes now resolved, and both ‘Michaels’ (the two Canadians held hostage by Beijing in response to Ms Meng’s detention) having been returned home to Canada in 2021 after a multi-year standoff, there is an opening for Canada to stake out much stronger positions on both China and Russia. This is critical to the nation’s advocacy for inclusion in such bodies as AUKUS.
Two steps would be disproportionately effective in this regard.
First, in light of China enabling Russian war crimes in Ukraine through political cover at the United Nations and China’s closening ‘no limits’ geoeconomic partnership to fuel Russia’s otherwise heavily sanctioned economy,[25] Canada needs to declare that Huawei will no longer be permitted to operate in Canadian critical telecommunications infrastructure. This would align the country with its Five Eyes peers and show a long-sought clarity on the issue that would signal foreign policy seriousness while also providing clear policy guidance to domestic stakeholders in the Canadian economy.
Second, in light of Russian aggression within its so-called ‘near abroad’ region of former Soviet republics, and recognising that Canada shares a maritime border with Russia in the Arctic, Ottawa needs to make the case that Russian naval power and aggression constitute an appropriate additional organising principle for the AUKUS defence and security pact.[26] Simultaneously, Canada should petition to be admitted to membership on that basis and for the sake of developing nuclear-powered submarines for the RCN, for the same reason.
These two steps would, so to speak, catch Canada up to the new geopolitical reality of great power rivalry, clarify where the country stands with the liberal democratic community of states in both word and deed, and put Canada on a path to greater military and technological sophistication to drive wealth creation and national security for Canada in the 21st century.
Critically, as it pertains to wealth creation, it is important to recall that AUKUS is not only about nuclear submarines but also about technology sharing, adoption and commercialisation.[27] Australia has not only moved toward nuclear submarine adoption but, in light of the establishment of AUKUS, also undertaken efforts to demonstrate credible investments and leadership in key technology verticals, including a $73 million investment in quantum technology.[28] AUKUS, having a much broader mandate than the intelligence-focused Five Eyes arrangement, represents a seminal opportunity for Canada to retain technological prowess in key areas, such as AI, where Canada is recognised as a global leader. Pacts like AUKUS are therefore key for both national security and long-term prosperity.
Conclusion
When Ottawa first reacted to the news about AUKUS, ministerial and prime ministerial comments indicated a relative indifference to what seemed like a straightforward (albeit involving complex technology) defence procurement adjustment amongst allied capitals. What is clear now, however, is that AUKUS represents much more than a submarine deal: it represents the future of allied defence arrangements, where national security and economic opportunity are conjoined and are enjoyed by those nations that are prepared to take sides in an era of resurgent great power rivalry and meaningfully invest in the defence of their nation and allies.
Canada has every opportunity to adopt a more assertive foreign and defence policy posture moving forward. Incremental investments in national defence included in Canada’s 2022 federal budget represent a positive start. The same applies to the defence policy update. Yet, to earn the opportunity to participate in leading security and defence collaborations such as AUKUS with key allies, Canada needs to take decisive steps on its foreign policy posture as it pertains to both China and Russia, and put innovation, including AI, at the heart of its national security strategy and international value proposition. Should the country muster the political will to make these decisions, it should seek membership at the tables where the future of allied defence and security arrangements is being charted.
Dr Jeffrey F. Collins teaches international relations at the University of Prince Edward Island and is a Fellow with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute.
Matthew Bondy, MA, is vice-president of external relations at Communitech Corporation, a leading Canadian innovation hub that serves more than 1200 founders.
[1] M Blanchfield, ‘Canada’s last military flight leaves Kabul before deadly twin bombings rock airport’, CP24 [website], 26 August 2021, <https://www.cp24.com/news/canada-s-last-military-flight-leaves-kabul-before-deadly-twin-bombings-rock-airport-1.5561993>; ‘Canada and the war in Afghanistan’, Canadian War Museum [website], <https://www.warmuseum.ca/learn/canada-and-the-afghanistan-war/#:~:text=More%20than%2040%2C000%20members%20of,to%20additional%20deaths%20by%20suicide>.
[2] Reuters, ‘Canada left out of security deal between U.S., Australia and U.K. Trudeau unconcerned’, National Post, 16 September 2021, <https://nationalpost.com/news/world/china-fumes-over-australias-nuclear-sub-pact-with-u-s-britain-2>.
[3] A Connolly, ‘Was Canada invited to join AUKUS? Officials mum but stress no interest in subs’, Global News, 16 September 2021, <https://globalnews.ca/news/8196164/aukus-defence-deal-canada-china-relations/>; R Fife & S Chase, ‘Canada caught off guard by new security pact between U.S., Australia and Britain’, The Globe and Mail, 17 September 2021, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-canadian-government-surprised-by-new-indo-pacific-security-pact/>.
[4] JC Blaxland, Strategic cousins: Australian and Canadian expeditionary forces and the British and American empires, McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal-Kingston, 2006.
[5] T McClure, ‘Aukus submarines banned from New Zealand as pact exposes divide with western allies’, The Guardian, 16 September 2021, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/16/aukus-submarines-banned-as-pact-exposes-divide-between-new-zealand-and-western-allies>.
[6] R Fife & S Chase, ‘Ottawa eyes Indo-Pacific plan to shift trade away from China’, The Globe and Mail, 12 January 2022, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-trudeau-government-advised-to-spend-big-to-diversify-trade-away-from/>.
[7] J Collins, ‘Budget 2022 comes “nowhere close” the Liberals’ lofty rhetoric on defence spending, Global News [website], 8 April 2022, <https://globalnews.ca/news/8745571/budget-2022-canada-defence-spending/>.
[8] <https://www.cigionline.org/articles/beyond-aukus-canada-may-not-need-nuclear-subs-but-it-is-in-dire-need-of-a-strategy/>.
[9] M Milner, Canada’s Navy: the first century, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2010; WL Dowdy, ‘The Canadian Navy: torpedoed again’, Armed Forces & Society, vol. 16(1), 1989, pp. 99–115.
[10] L Payton, ‘No nuclear sub buy planned, MacKay affirms’, CBC News [website], 28 October 2011, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/no-nuclear-sub-buy-planned-mackay-affirms-1.1043181>.
[11] Department of National Defence, Canada in a new maritime world: Leadmark 2050, DND, Ottawa, 2016, <http://navy-marine.forces.gc.ca/assets/NAVY_Internet/docs/en/rcn_leadmark-2050.pdf>.
[12] JF Collins, Deadline 2036: assessing the requirements and options for Canada’s future submarine force, Macdonald-Laurier Institute, Ottawa, 2021.
[13] Department of National Defence, ‘Victoria-class Modernization (VCM)’, Defence Capabilities Blueprint, National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, Ottawa, 2018, <http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/defence-capabilities-blueprint/project-details.asp?id=943>.
[14] JF Collins, Overcoming ‘boom and bust’? Analyzing national shipbuilding plans in Canada and Australia, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, Calgary, 2019.
[15] Department of Finance, Budget 2022, Finance Canada, Ottawa, 2022, <https://budget.gc.ca/2022/report-rapport/chap5-en.html>.
[16] Department of National Defence, Strong, secure, engaged: Canada’s defence policy, DND, Ottawa, 2017; Department of National Defence, Perspectives on the capital equipment acquisition process – final report, DND, Chief Review Services, Ottawa, 2006.
[17] A Pickford & JF Collins, Reconsidering Canada’s strategic geography: lessons from history and the Australian experience for Canada’s strategic outlook, Macdonald-Laurier Institute, Ottawa, 2018.
[18] RJ Sutherland, ‘Canada’s long term strategic situation’, International Journal, vol. 17(3), 1962, pp. 199–223.
[19] C Leuprecht & JJ Sokolsky, ‘Defense policy ‘Walmart style’: Canadian lessons in “not-so-grand” grand strategy’, Armed Forces & Society, vol. 41(3), 2015, pp. 541–562.
[20] C Krauthammer, ‘The unipolar moment’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 70(1), 1990, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1990-01-01/unipolar-moment>.
[21] SM Walt, ‘The AUKUS dominoes are just starting to fall’, Foreign Policy, 18 September 2021, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/18/aukus-australia-united-states-submarines-china-really-means/>.
[22] ‘U.S. offers assurances to Sweden, Finland over NATO application’, Reuters [website], 6 May 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/us-offers-assurances-sweden-finland-over-nato-application-2022-05-05/>.
[23] J Bronskill, ‘Canada has no choice but to bar Huawei from 5G mobile networks, security experts say’, National Post, 14 November 2021, <https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/canada-has-no-choice-but-to-bar-huawei-from-5g-mobile-networks-security-experts-say>.
[24] T Glavin, ‘Glavin: evidence abounds of China’s interference in Canada’s elections’, Ottawa Citizen, 1 December 2021, <https://ottawacitizen.com/opinion/glavin-evidence-abounds-of-chinas-interference-in-canadas-elections>.
[25] M Nichols & H Pamuk, ‘Russia vetoes U.N. Security action on Ukraine as China abstains’, Reuters [website], 26 February 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-vetoes-un-security-action-ukraine-china-abstains-2022-02-25/>.
[26] M Bondy, ‘Excluded from AUKUS? Canada should seek to invite itself aboard’, Centre for International Governance Innovation[website], 30 September 2021, <https://www.cigionline.org/articles/excluded-from-aukus-canada-should-invite-itself-aboard/>.
[27] A Deitz, ‘AUKUS: more than just defence’, Norton Rose Fulbright [website], September 2021, <https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en/knowledge/publications/82bebc0d/aukus—more-than-just-defence>.
[28] C Packham, ‘Australia to invest $73 mln in quantum science as critical technology’, Financial Post, 16 November 2021,<https://financialpost.com/pmn/business-pmn/australia-to-invest-73-mln-in-quantum-science-as-critical-technology>.
