British Submarines in the Cold War Era. By Norman Friedman. Seaforth Publishing, Barnsley, 2021.
Reviewed by Dr Gregory P. Gilbert
ANYONE who has read one of Norman Friedman’s previous books knows they are in for a treat when they see his new book is on ‘British Submarines in the Cold War Era’. Once again they will not be disappointed.
Friedman is renowned for his high quality, thorough and detailed examination of naval technology. In 2018 I reviewed his revised version of ‘U.S. Submarines since 1945: An Illustrated Design History’ thinking that it could not get much better but, perhaps because of my bias to British submarine designs – having once worked on RAN Oberon class submarines, this latest offering has overtaken my previous expectations.
‘British Submarines in the Cold War Era’ is another tour de force. Largely by trawling through the extensive Admiralty and Ministry of Defence archives at The National Archives, London, as well as the Brass Foundry out-station of the National Maritime Museum, Friedman has uncovered a remarkable treasure of information covering the operational requirements, research & development, concept studies, design and procurement of British submarines since 1945. This book does also cover, despite the title, more recent submarine programmes and acquisitions however, as one would expect these later chapters are not as detailed as those which follow from the declassified and publically released archives of the earlier periods. That said this book does provide much more than the typical sanitised versions of submarine acquisition found in more simplified books on recent acquisitions.
With over 340 folio pages (size 11.33 x 9.5 inch) of detailed text and more than 300 illustrations, ‘British Submarines in the Cold War Era’ provides the only accurate source available to professionals of the submarine, underwater warfare and engineering community. Packed with operational, project development, systems, weapons and other technical details, reading this book is at times overwhelming, a bit like drinking from a firehose, however it is thought provoking and highly rewarding. No matter what one’s background ‘British Submarines’ will inform and inspire those who stick with it. Others who like to gloss over such things should not be working in submarine areas!
The high quality drawings, reproduced from the National Maritime Museum’s collection in London are one of my favourite features of this work. These mostly General Arrangement drawings would be worth buying the book alone. The coloured HMS Onyx as-fitted drawings following p. 80 stand out. I have not seen such detailed drawings of submarine arrangements anywhere else.
‘British Submarine in the Cold War Era’ starts with an overview of user requirements. After 1945 submarine warfare essentially entered a new era of technical innovation, adaptation and trial and error. Friedman discusses the developments in underwater sound, sonars and silencing – this is supplemented by an extensive discussion of British submarine sonars/asdics in Appendix A. Submarine performance was revolutionised by German U-boat developments during the last few years of World War II, and hence it is not surprising that much of the British submarine development work during the early Cold War was aimed at technologies such as snorting, the fast battery submarine and HTP (high-test [hydrogen] peroxide) propulsion. Practical experience suggested, not for the first time, that the German technical hype was just not all that simple after all. Extensive research, development, trials and testing was required in order to bring such technologies into service. The HTP submarine was a dead end; it was never used operationally. The fast battery submarine programme evolved into the Porpoise and Oberon class diesel-electric submarines. Later in the book Friedman discusses the British upgrades to the Oberon class submarines and the short-lived Upholder class SSK programme.
‘British Submarines’ then discusses going nuclear. The use of USN technology as part of a nation-to-nation exchange enterprise to develop, acquire, operate and support the British nuclear-powered submarine (SSN) program is a rewarding case study. It is one that should resonate with many interested Australians today. The introduction into service of HMS Dreadnought in 1963 was a difficult and essentially one-off process. The successor SSNs, the Valiant class (3-off), the Churchill class (3-off), the Swiftsure class (6-off), the Trafalgar class (7-off) and the Astute class (7-off), are all examined from an operational requirement, development and design viewpoint. Actual operational histories are only covered briefly within this book in one chapter ‘British Cold War Submarines in Action’. Although only one SSN has ever been used in action – HMS Conqueror’s sinking of the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano in 1982 – Friedman explains how British submarines contributed throughout the Cold War, the Indonesian Confrontation, in reconnaissance and deterrence operations, as well as other aspects of the Falklands War. As an aside anyone interested in the Canadian submarine experiences including their failure to introduce nuclear powered submarines in the 1980s should see Julie Ferguson’s book, ‘Through a Canadian Periscope: The Story of the Canadian Submarine Service’, Toronto, 1995.
The final chapter is titled ‘After the Cold War’. It discusses the development of the Astute class submarines by commercial entities. Not surprisingly, the UK Government decision to proceed with a detailed design without undertaking Admiralty or MoD conceptual design studies led to serious delays and cost over-runs. It would seem that many in the UK had forgotten how naval shipbuilding and the much more difficult and complex nuclear submarine construction activities were conducted. From late Victorian times operational requirements were tested against technological concepts before they were developed into preliminary designs by in-house Admiralty professionals (such as the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors and members of the Institute of Marine Engineers). These preliminary designs, after Admiralty Board, approval, included considerations of operational, personnel, training, facilities and other support aspects. The work was either awarded to a Naval Dockyard or a contracted shipbuilder for the development of detailed designs. Production, inspections tests and trials were conducted by the Dockyard or shipbuilder with guidance from Naval overseers who were intimately connected with the Admiralty professionals. Once the ships and/or submarines were in-service the same Admiralty professionals worked on upgrades, modifications and repairs, with the associated knowledge feeding into the Admiralty specifications and standards used for upkeep, maintenance as well as future designs. It was a proven system that worked very well in attaining World class results for many years.
Indeed as Norman Friedman points out in the 1980s the UK MoD with the concurrence of the RN ceased in-house warship and submarine design. What was left of the old Admiralty naval engineering design and technical services directorates were closed down and as such the MoD and RN lost much of its ability to act as an informed engineering customer. For many of the previous 100 years the holy trinity of the Admiralty had included a Third Sea Lord and Controller of the Navy (Chief of Engineering – Admiral) with highly professional civilian and service staff. There was a commonly held belief that ‘superior, even revolutionary, designs could be created by industry unfettered by the usual mass of specifications. (British Submarines p. 200). Some would say that this was all BS driven by those who had no knowledge of the industry but wielding a political agenda. Similar decisions were made around the same time in the USA, (the NAVSEA preliminary design group was abolished), and even within Navy Office here in Australia, (the Naval Engineering Division was disbanded). I would argue that none of these three Western Navies (RN, USN and RAN) have been able to make informed, sophisticated and cost-effective naval design decisions since that time. There are many reasons why this is so (many of which were identified within the RAN during the late 1980s in reviews such as the Hammond Report). Perhaps it is inevitable that naval technological expertise should reside with the major naval powers – all the cost-cutting and end of Cold War dividends probably reflect larger national issues of declining revenues and declining world power. On the other hand it is clear the Chinese have an extensive in-house naval design capability.
Getting off my hobby-horse and returning to my review of ‘British Submarines’, the book includes four Appendices. I have mentioned the one on British submarine sonars/asdics, however there are also Appendices on command and control systems, submarine weapons, as well as midget submarines. These each provide extensive knowledge not readily found anywhere else, but which also open up many more areas for further study. For example the short appendix on submarine weapons includes many examples of weapon development which together would form their own book. As with the complete submarines many of these submarine weapons have gone through numerous ups, downs and learning experiences. This brings me to one of the hidden gems in ‘British Submarines’ the appendix on midget submarines. Whereas many might see this as a dead-end technologically I would prefer to see the development of new technologies to attack an enemy fleet at its source as one of great opportunity especially for UUV and AI technologies. I don’t think we would be interested in dropping nuclear mines in foreign harbours any time soon but as Friedman’s book often highlights much of our need for submarine technology has been to prepare ourselves to act against an enemy who wishes to use such weapons against up.
Before completing this somewhat long review I need to mention a few minor concerns. For some reason the drawings on pp. 56 & 57 are of a lower resolution than those in the rest of the book. As I have said previously, over 300 drawings and photographs are excellent. The caption on the photograph on p. 96 is in error. From memory this is the air control station in the control room of HMAS Otama – an ex-Oberon submariner could confirm this. The tables of submarine data and the submarine list at the end of the book are appreciated and very useful although they could be better presented. The quality of the production is excellent despite these few concerns.
‘British Submarines in the Cold War Era’ by Norman Friedman is a remarkable achievement and is especially good value for the price. I suspect that it is subsidised by Seaforth or perhaps they rightly predict relatively high sales. This book is a must read for all professionals, designers and scholars of modern submarines. Once again it should be recommended reading for all Australian submarine design courses. It is particularly relevant for the Australian readers in 2021.
