Abandon Ship – The real story of the sinkings in the Falklands War. By Paul Brown. Osprey Publishing, Oxford, 2021.
Reviewed by Greg Swinden
The Falklands War of 1982 was the first post-World War II conflict fought between near peer defence forces in the missile age. Casualties on both sides were high and the British task force commander Rear Admiral John ‘Sandy’ Woodward later stated it was ‘a lot closer run than many would care to believe’. Dr. Paul Brown has done an excellent job in describing just how close the British forces came to potential defeat in this war.
Abandon Ship does not cover the full details of the conflict but instead looks at the naval losses on both sides and particularly analyses the causes for the loss of several Royal Navy ships. Much of this analysis hinges on the release, under the British Freedom of Information Act 2000, of the transcripts of the Royal Navy post war Boards of Inquiry. These were held in late 1982 to ascertain what had gone wrong and why so many ships had been damaged or sunk. As these were conducted shortly after the conflict, and the findings were not meant to ever become public, the details are at time raw and confronting. Poor command and leadership, flawed decision making, sub-standard training and poor equipment are often spelt out as major contributing factors to ships being sunk. Equally bravery, in dire circumstances, and outstanding leadership and skill at all rank levels were also singled out.
The sinking of the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano opens the narrative with poor tactics displayed by the cruisers commanding officer (failing to zig-zag in a war zone, poor use of her escorts and the cruisers sonar) which made the ship an easy target for the submarine HMS Conqueror. The fighting at sea however was soon to show that the Argentine forces could fight and they fought well. While the Argentine surface fleet played a very minor part in the ensuing campaign the Argentine fleet air arm and air force soon proved they were well- trained and brave; consistently pressing home their attacks on British ships with skill and determination. British losses would have been catastrophic if the Argentines had access to more Exocet missiles and if many of the bombs dropped had actually detonated.
Britain lost six ships in the battle for the Falklands (HM Ships Sheffield, Ardent, Antelope, and Coventry, the civilian transport Atlantic Conveyer and the Royal Fleet Auxiliary Sir Galahad). Several other ships were damaged, but in the end it was the British ability to get enough troops and logistics support ashore and prevent Argentine forces being resupplied that tipped the scales in their favour – but it was a close run thing.
The following are the salient points.
The Royal Navy was being reduced in size and capability due to 1981 British Government budget cuts and struggled to put its South Atlantic task force together; that they did speaks volumes of the skill and determination at all rank levels.
The ships in many cases were not ready to deploy due to a distinct lack of training and their materiel state was in several cases quite poor. British radar and weapons systems were plagued with various problems and in some cases were useless, especially the Seacat missile system and 4.5 inch guns in the anti-air role. Much of this was due to poor design vice poor maintenance; although there were failures in keeping equipment well maintained in the South Atlantic.
Ship design was also a problem particularly with aluminum super-structures which burned more readily and with many ships built for ‘habitability and not survivability’. Some of the older ships that were deployed were of an all steel construction, or well-designed, and survived serious damage.
Failures of command and leadership, at all rank levels, led to the loss of some ships especially Sheffield whose command team were lucky to escape a court martial due to their poor decisions prior to being attacked. Additionally in other ships once damaged degraded communications led to poor decision making – particularly in the case of Ardent which might have been saved if the commanding officer had received sound advice (or sought out advice) regarding the ships actual damage.
The ‘fog of war’ and confusing higher level orders placed other ships in difficult positions. Equally some ships were damaged but were still in an area where enemy attack was expected so were still trying to ‘fight the ship’ while dealing with unexploded bombs onboard and many casualties. The Boards of Inquiry were conducted in quiet office spaces and well after the events. Many of the recommendations made regarding equipment and training were sound but they often failed to comprehend the time pressure that many of the ships command teams were under; where split second decisions made the difference between life and death or staying afloat or sinking. In other cases, such as the loss of Atlantic Conveyor, being in the wrong place at the wrong time and following orders played a major part in her loss.
Command and control at the staff level showed serious limitations due to the skill and stamina, or lack of it, amongst the various embarked headquarters staff. Poor decision making and lack of communication at the operational level had, in some cases, a disastrous flow on effect at the tactical level particularly at the landing of troops at Fitzroy from RFA Sir Galahad.
My only suggestion to improve this analysis would have been a little more on what kept other damaged ships afloat – what were the ship design and decision making aspects that enabled their survival vice that of their peers. It is easy to be critical, from our safe arm-chairs, of the failures of those in combat – but equally analysis of what went wrong, and why, should be investigated in order to try and prevent its repetition. Overall an excellent book and one that should be read by all naval personnel, regardless of nationality or rank, as it provides well-described cases studies on modern war at sea.
