This article first appeared in The Australian Naval Review Issue 2 of2022.
By Commodore Brett Dowsing, RAN (Retired)*
“The attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 were audacious, cruel and hideously successful acts of calculated terrorism.” Prime Minister John Howard “Lazarus Rising” pg 382.
Introduction
The terrorist attacks that occurred on 11 September 2001 with the deliberate crashing of civilian airliners into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Centre in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington DC, were a monumental event that set off geo-strategic consequences that are arguably only just being superseded by the rise of China and reassertion of power by Russia.
Most of us can remember where we were and what we were doing on that fateful day when the four hijacked aircraft ended their journeys and changed the world as we knew it. Those of us who were in the Australian Embassy that day, lived it.
The Embassy
The Australian Embassy was located at 1601 Massachusetts Avenue in Washington DC. A seven storey and double below-ground building, it had a nondescript box-like concrete and glass facade and operated along functional lines. Geographically, the Embassy was only a little over three kilometres west of the Capitol Building and about one kilometre north of the White House. Some 250 personnel worked in the Australian Embassy in 2001 and nearly 360 ADF and Defence personnel were in Continental USA (CONUS) at that time.
The Embassy was headed by Ambassador Michael Thawley, a career Foreign Affairs official who was polished, engaging and straight-talking. Highly intelligent, energetic, inclusive and forward thinking, he was well respected and liked both internally within the Embassy and also externally within the Washington political and diplomatic communities.
Besides the normal engagement and relationship-building activities occupying the Ambassador leading up to 9/11, he and the senior staff of the Embassy were concentrating on a State visit by Prime Minister John Howard, MP and progressing Free Trade Agreement negotiations. Noting also that President George W Bush had only assumed office following inauguration on 20 January 2001, it was a busy period as the Embassy entered the second week of September that year.
Australian Defence Staff
Reflecting the centrality of Australia’s ANZUS security alliance with USA, the ADF and Defence civilian personnel on staff at the Embassy formed a major component its complement – upwards of 110 personnel representing nearly 40 percent. Essentially, the Head of Australian Defence Staff (HADS), Rear Admiral Simon Harrington, AM, RAN was responsible to the Chief of Defence Force (CDF) and Secretary (SECDEF) and responsive to the Ambassador for the outcomes of the Defence and Defence Materiel Sections. HADS continues as an ADF 2-Star position and had six 1-Star or SES1 reporting officers, including Counsellors for Policy and Intelligence, Materiel, Science and Technology, along with the Naval, Military and Air Force Attachés. Interestingly, in late 2001 all three Attachés were aviators.
The Naval Attaché was Commodore Jack McCaffrie, RAN, an Observer who had trained in the USN Flight Schools back in the mid-1960’s in preparation for the RAN’s first S-2E Tracker aircraft. He had extensive carrier-embarked aviation experience and was one of Navy’s foremost strategic thinkers.
Under the Naval Attaché was an Assistant Naval Attaché, who was usually a command qualified Principal Warfare Officer or Submariner – in September 2001, Commander Howard Furness, RAN held this position. Both the Naval Attaché and Assistant Naval Attaché occupied diplomatic positions with associated privileges including Diplomatic Passports.
The remainder of Naval Staff positions covered Aviation (Commander Brett Dowsing, RAN), Engineering (Mr Adrian Woodhouse), Supply (Lieutenant Commander Roger Jackson, RAN), Communications, Command and Control, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (Lieutenant Commander Brian Delamont, RAN) and Naval Combat Systems (Lieutenant Commander Michael Rossendell, RAN). The Executive Assistant was Mrs Fay Turner, wife of the Senior Australian Federal Police Agent who was also serving in the Embassy.
The Defence Staff occupied the Sixth Floor, and the Defence Materiel Staff and Personnel Management Support Staff were on the floor below. The Seventh Floor was largely unoccupied and provided an overflow capability. The Ambassador and his senior deputies were on the Fourth Floor while the remaining floors were filled with their staff or functional areas. The two underground floors provided vehicle parking, security compartments, maintenance offices and most importantly, the Booze Locker, which was largely run by the Naval Staff.
The Day Before 9/11
One of the first events of Prime Minister Howard’s visit to the USA was to receive in perpetuity the ship’s bell from the decommissioned cruiser USS Canberra. This ship was named in honour of HMAS Canberra, lost while engaged in the Battle of Savo Island 8-9 August 1942. Co-incidentally, three USN cruisers were also lost that night largely due to poor tactical intelligence, communications and co-ordination by the Allied forces and the superior night tactics and torpedo attacks by the opposing Japanese forces.
It was a beautiful autumn morning at the Washington Navy Yard on Monday 10 September 2001 and the ceremony was short and appropriate. The principal VIPs present were President Bush, Prime Minister Howard, Secretary of the US Navy Gordon England, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Vern Clark, USN and Chief of Navy Vice Admiral David Shackleton, AO, RAN. Of course, the Ambassador, HADS, NA and associated Naval Staff were also present.
Also attending the ceremony was Lieutenant Commander Mackenzie (Mac) Gregory, RAN ret’d who was Officer-of-the-Watch on the bridge of Canberra during the Battle of Savo Island. Mac was representing the HMAS CanberraAssociation and was accompanied by his second wife, Denise. Mac and Denise were honoured guests of whom special mention was made by both the President and Prime Minister.
On completion of the ceremony, the senior Embassy personnel resumed their VIP escort duties and program while the remaining personnel returned to the Embassy. In the afternoon, CN and CNO signed a Submarine Statement of Operating Principles at the Pentagon in the presence of PM Howard and US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld. That evening, HADS, NA and their wives hosted a dinner for CN and senior USN and Defence personnel at HADS’ residence.
9/11
Taking advantage of his time in Washington DC, CN had arranged a meeting in the Embassy to bring naval personnel up to speed on his ambitions to change the culture of the Navy to a more effective fighting force supported along functional lines. All RAN personnel in the Washington environs and from as far afield as Norfolk, Virginia, mustered at 0830 for introductions and an update by HADS before the scheduled arrival of CN.
At about 0847, one of HADS’ staff (thought to be Chief of Staff, Colonel Keith Schollum) interrupted the meeting to advise HADS that an aircraft had crashed into one of the World Trade Centre towers in New York City at 0845, and pictures were being live-streamed on television. HADS invited the NA and naval personnel present to observe the TV coverage in his office. There was a lot of speculation as to what had occurred.
CN and his Escort Officer, Commander Steve Woodall, arrived at the Embassy about 0900 having heard from their driver enroute from the Willard Hotel, that an aircraft had impacted one of the Twin Towers. Met by ANA, CN briefly discussed this occurrence and then met with HADS and NA prior to the start of his briefing. Having been told that a second aircraft had impacted the South Tower of the WTC at 0903, with every indication of a terrorist attack, CN postponed his briefing until about 0930. Joint staff and HADS’ personal staff were instructed to start ascertaining the circumstances of the small number of ADF/Defence personnel and their families in New York City. Satisfied all was in hand, CN, HADS and NA proceeded to the Defence Conference Room to join other naval personnel.
Shortly after CN’s briefing started, the NA’s EA, Mrs Fay Turner advised that a third airliner had impacted the Pentagon at 0943. Things then started happening very quickly. The meeting was terminated with HADS called into a Branch Heads meeting by the Ambassador, CN and his Escort Officer were hosted by NA in his office and the Naval staff commenced trying to get an overview of what was happening, ascertain a threat assessment and form an action plan. We learnt that at about 0940 the Federal Aviation Authority had shut down all civil aviation activities associated with further aircraft taking off and ordered all aircraft to land as soon as possible; inbound aircraft from outside CONUS were diverted from US airspace.
We could see the pall of smoke over the Pentagon from our office windows. The South Tower of the WTC collapsed at 1005 and a fourth hijacked aircraft, inbound for Washington, crashed into Pennsylvanian fields at 1010.
The Prime Minister was collected from his hotel and brought to safety in the Embassy. He was settled into the Maintainers and Driver’s Tearoom in the basement along with a good number of Embassy staff ordered below ground-level for initial safety. The PM’s wife and son, who were touring Washington at the time, were also brought to the Embassy. Other aircraft were thought to have been hijacked and inbound to Washington; a car-bomb was said to have exploded in the vicinity of the State Department Offices and there was fear of other attacks occurring by different means – the situation was not clear.
At 1028, the North Tower of the WTC collapsed and a little over 15 minutes later, all Federal buildings in Washington were ordered to be evacuated and non-essential personnel told to go home. Central Washington was gridlocked, phone systems were overloaded, shops were shutting and public transport ceased. The US Secret Service established a security cordon around the Embassy now housing the Australian PM.
The Embassy – Potential Collateral Damage
A quick look at a map of Washington DC with an aviator’s perspective of using features to hone last minute navigation to a target, reveals some interesting perspectives. Should the targets be relatively low-level, unlike the 110 storey towers of the WTC, and the need is to fly the aircraft to impact, then the use of lead-in features becomes important. In this case, the Potomac River and the Washington Memorial Tower in combination provide these features to target either of the US’s centres of power – the Capitol and the White House.
Flying up the Potomac from the South and leaving the Washington Monument to the left has you heading directly at the Capitol Building. Flying from the East towards the now westerly direction of the Potomac and leaving the Washington Monument on the right has the aircraft aiming directly at the White House. With the Australian Embassy about a kilometre North of the White House and a little further West of the Capitol, any miscalculation could easily see the risk of collateral damage for many other buildings in the vicinity, including the Embassy.
Initial Actions
The Embassy quickly swung into action. Consular Support teams were dispatched to help the Consul-General in New York City assist Australians in the Big Apple, including those posted to the United Nations Headquarters. This was where the largest number of casualties were likely to be located.
Identification of Australian casualties aboard any of the four hijacked aircraft or in the Pentagon attack, was also an early priority. For the remainder of the day, however, the focus of the NA and his staff revolved around supporting CN and, with other Defence Staff at the Embassy, ascertaining the safety or otherwise of all ADF and Defence personnel and accompanying families in CONUS, along with those visiting. This was no easy task as there were about 360 personnel (not including family members) across the USA at the time. This included those posted to the Embassy, serving on exchange, undergoing training, on Project teams acquiring US equipment and those visiting from Australia.
By late afternoon, we and other Embassy staff had ascertained that the ADF and Defence personnel and families were not among casualty figures. Some had experienced close shaves and there was an understandable degree of anxiety.
A permanent ADF presence was set up in the Embassy to cover the evening period and to act as a communications conduit for the PM and CN along with the Ambassador and HADS. Once the US airspace was cleared and any danger from further attacks ameliorated, the PM and CN parties were returned to the Willard Hotel. The PM and family then relocated to the Ambassador’s residence, which was clear of any perceived targets.
That evening, the Ambassador hosted an informal dinner at his house for the PM and his party, including US Ambassador to Australia, Tom Schieffer. CN and Commander Woodall also attended. This provided the opportunity to clarify a significant amount of the day’s events, which proved useful for Embassy planning and reporting over the following few days. Normal communications links were largely inoperable until things settled down over the following weeks. It also provided the opportunity for CN’s party to be included in any plans for the PM’s return to Australia.
The Next Few Days
At his first press conference on 11 September shortly after the New York attacks, the PM expressed Australia’s outrage and raised the commitment of forces in any action to prevent a recurrence of terrorism against the USA or other allies.
The PM’s 12 September program had him attending a joint sitting of Congress about 1100 to address both Houses. The PM did attend but without directly addressing Congress due to the Houses discussing actions emanating from the attacks. The PM’s presence was applauded as were his intentions to get back to Australia to develop and enact the necessary Parliamentary actions to support the USA in its subsequent aspirations. At about 1630 that afternoon, the PM’s and CN’s parties were flown out of Washington DC on Air Force 2 (the Vice President’s B757 aircraft) to Hawaii for return to Australia 13-14 September by a Qantas B747 aircraft stranded in Honolulu due to restrictions on flying in US airspace. Following a brief update from Admiral Dennis Blair, USN (CINCPAC), it flew out of Hawaii under special Federal Aviation Administration clearances.
Late in the afternoon of 14 September, PM Howard announced that Parliament had agreed that the attacks on New York City and Washington DC constituted the necessary provisions for implementing the ANZUS Treaty and that Australia would contribute militarily to any US-led actions. Interestingly, it was almost 50 years to the day of the original signing of the Treaty.
Many of the Federal institutions around Washington, remained closed or operated on a minimal staff basis for the few days following the attacks. This recognised compassionate as well as pragmatic circumstances because, while ameliorating, there was still concern that further terrorist land-based attacks could occur. The National Guard was deployed across the business districts of Washington with many of the major buildings and intersections guarded by these soldiers and their ubiquitous Humvees.
Vehicular traffic was minimal, public transport ran reduced services and the skies were largely clear of aircraft. Contrails across CONUS ceased. But the introduction of combat air patrols by USAF F-16 fighters and their occasional low sweep across the city, brought home the reality that the nation was on a war footing that few of us, if any, had experienced before. Certainly this pertained to our families and the civilian population of America, who remained anxious.
Gradually, the Embassy established and settled into a battle rhythm acting as a conduit between Australia and the USA, with security and associated international diplomacy taking precedence. Nearly all other aspects of duty across the gamut of Embassy life were placed in abeyance, at least until later in the year. Critically, visits from Australia virtually ceased and there were minimal departures from CONUS. Liaison was especially sought with the US Administration, State Department, Congress, Defense and Intelligence communities, and understandably, this took time to re-establish. However, it was achieved to the credit of those involved.
Initially, a 24-hour watch system was set up within HADS’ organisation. While useful in some ways to counter the 14-hour time differences with Canberra, most of the information exchanged did not require immediate action and the watch system reverted to an “as required” basis after the first week.
Settling into the Remainder of 2001
On Saturday 15, Ambassador Thawley hosted a casual barbecue lunch for Embassy staff and families at his house. This was an excellent initiative that, notwithstanding most Defence staff needed to return to the Embassy to complete reports back to Australia, placated many of our families as the US community environment still vented anger and retribution without a clear understanding of consequences.
American patriotism was on full show and, if there was a perceived deviation from this new norm, then it incited questioning and anger from the less-worldly Americans. Most diplomatic personnel in Washington, at the time, can recall having to explain to Americans, their countries’ position and why they weren’t flying the “Stars and Stripes” from their car or the front porch of their house. The smarter foreigners would fly both the American and their own country’s flag at home or, for the Australians, would ensure a kangaroo sticker was displayed on the back of their cars! The American attitudes to patriotism became even more strident and fraught for some once the attacks were launched against the Taliban in Afghanistan on 7 October 2001 and again when Operation Iraqi Freedom commenced on 20 March 2003.
Australia’s commitment to the war on terror and in Afghanistan certainly led to favoured status within Washington circles and was reinforced with entry into the Iraq campaign. Along with UK, Australia enjoyed access and privileges above most other representative missions in Washington and more broadly in the USA, officially and socially. For most occasions, our Australian accent was indeed useful, but most still recall issues trying to pass through security to board civilian aircraft or re-enter the USA from overseas as we were classified as “aliens” regardless of our passport status.
Back in Australia, the collapse of Ansett Airlines was being felt and the implications of 9/11 were impacting the remaining celebrations of the Centenary of Federation and of the Navy. CN was required to cancel a previously agreed circumnavigation of the globe by three HMA Ships and an International Naval Review due to be attended by about 22 countries’ naval vessels and the Duke of Edinburgh. Notwithstanding, and in a show of alliance, CN returned to the USA on a counterpart visit during October where he was roundly hosted by CNO Clark.
Larger Scale Projects
Leading up to 9/11, Defence was engaged in several large-scale projects and these continued after the attacks. As such, they added complexity in dealing with the demands associated with acquisitions resulting from commitment to the wars on terror in Afghanistan, and later in Iraq.
For Navy, the two major programs were associated with resolving noise and combat systems issues with the CollinsClass submarines, and the acquisition of Kaman SH-2G (A) Super Sea Sprite helicopters for the Anzac Class frigates and potential Offshore Patrol Vessels, although the latter build had been cancelled a few years earlier.
For Air Force, the projects were acquisition associated with the Boeing 737 AEW&C Wedgetail and assessment of the F/A-18F Super Hornet as a replacement capability for the aging F-111. Army had no specific acquisition plans underway in the US at that time but had significant numbers embedded across US Army units and training facilities.
From a Navy perspective, most of the Collins’ issues involved trialling of superstructure water flow and propellor cavitation issues at CARDEROCK. This was a high priority from an operational perspective and had received a lot of negative press in Australia. There was a relatively small team located in the US and most of the arrangements associated with this program were co-ordinated through DSTO staff.
The Sea Sprite program was largely centred at Bridgeport, Connecticut and had a small project team of engineers and test aircrew embedded in Kaman facilities. In 2001, the aircraft was experiencing the early stages of systems’ integration issues, which developed into significant safety problems. These eventually led to program cancellation in March 2008.
Separately, Navy was also seriously engaged with the USN in developing higher levels of data transfer and weapons co-ordination between ship-borne systems. This integration would also enable real-time training and tactical development between USN and RAN units regardless of location.
Fleet Air Arm Implications
Besides the NA and SOAV positions in the Embassy and the SH-2G(A) team in Connecticut, the Fleet Air Arm had personnel embedded at Patuxent River, Maryland for aviation engineering and spares support in PMA 299 and in HSL 41 Squadron at San Diego, California as an instructor on SH-60B helicopters. In other years, there were personnel also undergoing specialist training as test pilots or at higher education facilities but this was not the case in 2001.
Almost immediately following PM Howard’s commitment to support the US actions after the 9/11 attacks, the principal new aviation-related equipment requests centred on personal protective equipment for aircrew, access to night vision googles and forward-looking infra-red and fitment of Hawk Link in RAN ships so that they could operate with USN SH-60R helicopters if necessary. These activities involved working with and through our colleagues in Defence Materiel and with the USN and associated suppliers.
Notwithstanding the exceptional goodwill, we were in many cases competing with the USN for such equipment or services and they, naturally, had priority. But the answers were never a direct no and despite their best efforts none of these programs came to fruition by the time Operation Enduring Freedom commenced.
The US military were also heavily involved in co-ordinating the operation of Army and Air Force helicopters from USN ships under a project called Joint Ship Helicopter Integration Program (JSHIP). The ADF was also pursuing similar aspirations understanding that our newly formed amphibious capabilities in the Landing Platform Amphibious (LPA) vessels HMA Ships Kanimbla and Manoora, would likely deploy with Army Aviation helicopters for littoral or humanitarian operations. As such, this remained a priority post-9/11.
Similarly, Air 9000 ADF Helicopter Program also remained a high-profile project throughout the early 2000’s including after 9/11. This program sought to rationalise the different types of helicopters being operated by the ADF across the missions required of the three Services. The Super Seasprite was somewhat of an outlier but had been approved prior to Air 9000. But there was an increasing interest in the replacement programs for the Seahawk and Blackhawk helicopters, which were the centre-of-gravity of the ADF’s helicopter fleets. The competition was narrowing between the European MRH-90/NH-90 and the upgraded US Sikorsky H60/SH-60R.
The RAN had been operating the S-70B-2 variant of the Seahawk from our FFGs effectively since their rapid embarkation for Operation Desert Shield/Storm in 1990 – even before the commissioning of their parent Squadron HS 816 in July 1992. Ongoing spares support and technical liaison with the Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) and the USN through our Australian agent in PMA 299, also attracted an enormous amount of work in normal course before and after 9/11. Indeed, senior FAA leadership had just visited the USA in August 2001 and the Sea Sprite Project Team from Canberra visited in November of that year.
While of less direct interest than the aforementioned projects, there were several other aviation developments that we in Washington were required to keep a weather eye on and report back to Australia. These included the development of the MH-60S, a marinized Blackhawk used by the USN for embarked utility and SAR tasking; the MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft that was undergoing developmental trials for the USMC; comparative capabilities of the USN Helicopter Long Range Active Sonar (HELRAS) and the European Airborne Low Frequency Sonar systems (ALFS); and finally the developmental progression in shipborne helicopter recovery and securing systems from RAST (Recovery Assist, Secure, Traverse System) to ASIST (Aircraft Ship Integrated Secure and Traverse System).
The political realm also continued to be an important driver in workload priorities of the Naval Aviation staff in the USA beyond that immediately associated with the commitment to the Wars on Terror and, initially, Afghanistan. The Australian Opposition was running a pre-election platform advocating the introduction of an Australian Coast Guard. As such, there were several visits by senior politicians and bureaucrats in 2001 and 2002 to confer with the Department of Homeland Security and with the US Coast Guard leadership. And finally, even greater liaison and engagement occurred throughout 2002 leading up to the commitment of de-nuclearizing Iraq with war commencing on 20 March 2003 as Operation Iraqi Freedom.
A strong emphasis for this latest commitment by Australia and its Navy to Middle East conflict, manifested itself in ensuring the appropriate issue and spares support for Night Vision Devices including FLIR for the aircraft, NVGs for aircrew, anti-laser googles for aircrew and missile detection and counter-measures. As previously, liaison and engagement with US military and suppliers were well supported but were also in direct competition with US military requirements. This time though, and indicative of earlier commitment in support of the US, we enjoyed a much more equitable consideration. This was especially so in the areas of shared intelligence or developmental support.
US Domestic Terror Continues
Immediately following the attacks in New York City and Washington DC, life in the USA was not normal in any way, shape or form. Everything was about the attacks; who had perpetrated these, and what retribution against whom was the USA going to direct its anger?
The damages to these two proud cities both physically and mentally, was unimaginable. Photos of the ruins, witness statements, the airing of the final phone calls of those in the aircraft or the doomed towers and the confused and, at times undisciplined media analysis, all combined to leave a frustrated or non-believing population seeking answers, especially to the question, why? The military and intelligence services pretty much understood; the US political leadership were also across the reasons behind the attacks, but the American population by and large took much longer to understand.
Into this environment, on 18 September 2001, the first casualty of enveloped anthrax mailed to politicians and senior bureaucrats in Washington, occurred. Over the following three weeks through to 9 October, 20 personnel were injured and five killed.
On the 2 October 2002, an uncle and nephew sniper team that had entered Washington from the west coast of USA, claimed their first local victim. Over the following three weeks, 10 people were killed and a further three, including children, were seriously injured. These shootings were totally random in terms of victim, time and place. This led to further anxiety across the population of the city and its outlying suburbs until the perpetrators were captured, sleeping in their car at a parking lot, on 24 October 2002.
Normality
For most of us at the Australian Embassy and for our families, normality (if that’s what you could describe it) didn’t return until the Christmas – New Year break at the end of 2001. This was when the perfect weather of September was replaced with the winter of December and the challenges of snow and ice storms started dictating one’s ability to work or play. And for most, it seemed like we’d been through enough and deserved the break we were getting. Simple pleasures of family and community seemed sufficient until we were required to get back to work. And that’s when most of us realised just what we’d been through and the changes we were going to witness, at least for the next few years.
The change-over of personnel was part of this normality and we saw Rear Admiral Simon Harrington hand over duties as HADS Washington to Major General Simon Willis, CSC in February 2002. In December of that year, Commodore Jack McCaffrie returned to Australia and was relieved by Commodore Jim Stapleton, AM. I was relieved as SOAV by Commander Geoff Fiedler in December 2003, having spent three and a half life-changing years in that position, and returned to Australia proudly promoted to Captain.
The Experience of USA
While the memories and experiences of living and working in a foreign country will be different for everyone, those of us who experienced Washington over the period of 9/11 will share many common themes, probably for the remainder of our lives. It was a seminal experience. The horror, the destruction, the desperation of those jumping from the burning towers, the heroics of the first responders, the shock, and the initial periods of unknowing, affected us and our families. We saw the best of America, and experienced the worst in America.
Our Prime Minister experienced it first-hand and he reacted courageously. While uncertainty swirled around us in the immediate aftermath, PM Howard’s declaration that we would stand with the USA in renouncing and responding to these attacks, paid huge dividends resulting in the elevation and status of Australians, particularly for those of us in America. We were immensely proud and privileged, and this generosity by Americans continues to this day.
On 13 June 2002, a mere nine months after visiting Washington on that fateful day, PM Howard returned and reminded President Bush and the US Congress that “the USA has no greater friend than Australia.” All American Presidents since, have reiterated the same feelings of the USA for Australia. We were, and remain, indeed privileged.
*Joining the RANC HMAS Creswell as a 15-year-old, Brett served as a Seaman and Aviation Officer (Pilot) for 51 years before retiring as 2020 dawned. His career included command of a RAAF Marine SAR Section, two patrol boats (HMA Ships Buccaneer and Gladstone), HS 816 Squadron (Seahawk S-70B-2) and HMAS Stirling (Fleet Base West). He has seen service in NHQ, MHQ and DoD along with postings in Washington DC, Republic of Korea (and Mongolia) and UK. RAN Staff Course and Joint Services Staff Courses were completed and Brett served on the staff at the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies. Five helicopter types were flown over his career including in counterterrorism operations, survey support and in establishing embarked Flights in FFG/FFH class frigates. Promoted to Commodore in 2017, Brett’s final posting was as Senior Officer WA. He and his family reside in Perth, WA where Brett is heavily engaged in community and veteran support organisations.
POSTSCRIPT
The memory of events in the Embassy in Washington DC on 11 September 2001 varies amongst those personnel present that day. There is scant, actual evidence upon which this account has been developed some 20 years later. Its construct has relied on some personal diary entries and emails, the official programs of senior officers, PM Howard’s autobiography “Lazarus Rising”, news reports from accompanying journalists, and the accounts or advice from the following:
Vice Admiral David Shackleton, AO, RAN (Retired)
Rear Admiral Simon Harrington, AM, RAN (Retired)
Commodore Jack McCaffrie, AM, RAN (Retired)
Captain Howard Furness, CSC, RAN (Retired)
Captain Brian Delamont, RAN (Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Jan Hyde (Retired)
Ms Edeena Cross (née Hay)
Wing Commander Barbara Wells (Retired)
Dr David Stevens
Captain Michael Galvin, Qantas
Commander Heidi Rossendell, RAN
