As we observe over recent weeks US naval and air forces once more engaged in a war in the Persian Gulf, commentators try and analyse its import and strategic implications. The last time such a conflict occurred in the ‘War on Terror’ similar intellectual exercises took place. In the Winter 2004 edition of the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute, ANI member Sub-Lieutenant Sam Fairall-Lee wrote Sea power, grand strategy and the War on Terror. His analysis resonates today.
Seapower, Grand Strategy & the War on Terror
There has been much debate recently on the roles of military forces in fighting the War on Terror. As military forces continue to face the demands of change forced on them by dramatic shifts in the nature of international relations over the past decade, the prospect of fighting a new enemy has placed even more importance on developing the right capabilities for the future. But what roles can the military play in fighting terrorism? And more importantly, what roles should it play? For navies and sea power, the contribution to the campaign has the potential to be of the utmost significance: not necessarily by changing the capabilities of navies, but by applying the versatile characteristics that are inherent in sea power to the new strategic environment.
Rather than simply defining these relevant capabilities, this article seeks to provide a frame of reference for sea power in the grand scheme of the post-September 11 world. To do this, it is necessary to briefly outline the applicability of military force; and this in turn requires an understanding of the political and grand-strategic approaches and objectives. Only then do we have the necessary perspective to comprehend fully the role of sea power in this new conflict.
The nature of the threat
Terrorism, in various forms, is not a new strategy. The motives, objectives and means of Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda do, however, represent a new and challenging development. Traditionally, terrorist organisations have sought particular and limited objectives. The Irish Republican Army, for example, sought an independent Ireland. The objectives of Al Qaeda, conversely – although linked to the ‘Palestinian question’ – have evolved into far deeper and more ambitious goals. Al Qaeda represents a visceral hatred and contempt for Western civilisation…and [a] resentment at its global ascendancy. This new terrorism seeks the destruction of Western democracy, even Western culture, as we know it – its objectives are on the grand-strategic level: it is a conflict not over territory or politics, but over ideas, values and fundamental power. Whatever the cause, the result is a threat to democratic liberalism the world over.
The response to such a conflict must also reflect this new development. Conventional military responses, in general, are not appropriate. It is not possible to fight a ‘war’ against ideas with ‘overwhelming force’ alone, not overwhelming military force at least. Such action can in fact bolster the ‘enemy’ by reinforcing notions of Western imperialism, and by undermining otherwise friendly Islamic governments. Conventional deterrence has worked against states in the past – and is likely to again in the future – because, in the end, most people do not wish to sacrifice themselves over such extrinsic concepts as the gaining of territory or the spreading of political influence, which they view as outside their daily control. Against this new threat, however, traditional deterrence only inspires further conflict because it is a direct representation of the forces the terrorists seek to defeat, and are even willing to die for. Ideas and emotions are intrinsic and central concerns to many, indeed to most, people.
Notwithstanding the grand-strategic consequences of a conventional military response, the military-strategic impediments would seem to make it unrealistic. As we have seen, the conflict is not fundamentally over territory; and in contrast to the tenets of traditional US military planning, it is not represented by a limited number of large, identifiable ‘fronts’, but instead by small forces – sometimes a single individual – constituting a large number of potential threats over a protracted period of time. Whilst there are exceptions to this principle, which will be outlined below, it is a central theme affecting how sea power should be utilised in the War on Terror and, indeed, why the characteristics of sea power make it perhaps the most important of the military resources available.
What is to be done? The Political and Strategic Responses
Norman Friedman claims that September 11 resulted from a failure of US deterrence. It is more probable, however, that September 11 resulted in part from the ‘success’ of deterrence, from too much deterrence or, in other words, from too much innocent strength. Whilst it is true that there has been no time in history when the dominant power has not provoked envy, fear and dislike, the overwhelming supremacy of the US in world politics and its association with capitalist liberal-democracy, combined with what is perceived as its sometimes outspoken rhetoric, make it an obvious target for Islamic fundamentalists in a war of ideas. In order to reduce the fundamentalist appeal, these causative factors must be minimised whilst simultaneously responding to the specific physical threat. The West must seek to prevent any appearance of a ‘clash of civilisations’ and thus, by making the West appear as non-threatening as possible to the Muslim world, prevent growth in the popular appeal of, and support for Al Qaeda, if not a reduction in their goals or in the core leadership which is fundamentally opposed to Western values.
In order to achieve this on the political level, the West must respond to the threat in the context of a wide and inclusive alliance structure which sends the universal message that such terrorism is an attack on global interests, including Islam, rather than an attack on Western interests alone. Such an alliance structure would also act as a vital enabler to military force in those specific circumstances where it becomes necessary, it would be seen primarily as a fully anticipated, justified and global response to a specific threat, not as the reaction of one side in a battle of ideologies nor as a gratuitous demonstration of Western might and dominance. Such a cooperative response would obviously also aid the operational aspects of the fight against terrorism by increasing the resources available to it. Having said this, and notwithstanding that it is applicable only in specific circumstances, military force is still military force and elicits a certain psychological reaction; as only one of a number of elements in the fight against terrorism, such force should therefore be used only where necessary.
The primary security elements in the ongoing War on Terror should be foreign and domestic intelligence, police and immigration services, and Special Operations forces where necessary. These groups are not only the most adept at the tasks required, but do not carry the same political connotations as conventional military forces. There are, however, certain occasions where such military force is appropriate, and here the focus of this article lies.
According to Sir Michael Howard, military force is necessary when action against terrorist forces is on too large a scale for a police response, when terrorists are established in a ‘no-man’s land’ where they cannot be challenged by civilian security forces, or when terrorists are protected by a sovereign state. The no-man’s land scenario reside in failed states which do not possess the necessary capabilities to prosecute them, whilst the protection by a sovereign state scenario was the basis for the war in Afghanistan. Such wars, however, should be guided by the restraints outlined above – that is, they should have full international support, both politically and militarily; they should have specific strategic goals related directly to countering terrorist activity; and there should be a long-term plan in place for dealing with the consequences of the military action. The unilateral invasion of one state by another without a degree of such internationally recognised legitimacy has the potential to increase the appeal of fundamentalist groups such as Al Qaeda – in such situations the ‘just war’ principle must be applied: if the end result is likely to be worse than the present condition, the war is not justified.
All this produces a conundrum: an overt military presence is politically and ideologically counterproductive – it encourages what is arguably a case study of a clash of civilisations. At the same time, a military response is necessary, sometimes in large concentrations of force, in circumstances which may arise almost anywhere or any time, with little warning. In other words, what is required are forces which are highly ready, mobile, flexible, concealable, sustainable withdrawable, capable of long-range power projection and a highly graduated force. What is required is sea power, especially sea power with organic power-projection-over-land capabilities. The importance of integration here is self-evident; a strategy such as this may demand amphibious operations of an extremely high tempo whilst allowing only minimal preparation and requiring clear C3 I channels between a number of units.
Military responses – The role of Seapower
Following the September 11 attacks on the US, the aircraft carrier George Washington (CVN-73) put to sea to provide combat air patrol over the US mainland. This type of ‘close-in’ homeland-defence role is rare for the US Navy, yet it was one of many such missions which provoked questions about the role of the USN in the changed strategic environment – would the forward presence continue, or was the Navy’s role closer to home? After the initial debate, however, the tradition of forward presence has continued. And it is here that the USN and allied navies, when the situation calls for it, can shape the strategic situation. Most importantly, because they do not necessarily require new land bases to perform their roles, and because of their unique abilities in terms of access and mobility-in-mass, their residual potential to act causes far less alarm in the Muslim world than an overt land or air-basing presence, such as that of the US in Saudi Arabia which arguably is a factor inciting anti-US sentiment in that area. This inherent potential is something Western armies and air forces can rarely, if ever, achieve. Navies, and navies alone, can appear quickly out of international territory with high levels of combat mass, project power ashore to achieve the task, and withdraw almost immediately.
In the War on Terror, sea power can not only achieve these tasks with a high degree of ‘political invisibility’, but when foreign governments are not forced to afford basing-rights to forces fighting terrorism, it is only natural that those governments find it much easier to join an alliance or at least lend diplomatic support to the operation. In these cases the ‘not in my backyard’ philosophy, enabled through sea power, lends confidence and stability to both alliance partners.
Many of the capabilities of sea power in the new strategic environment were proven during the war against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Indeed, that conflict was described by French commentators as the sea attacks the land. With a lack of land-bases, the USN and Coalition allies dispatched several Carrier Battle Groups – complete with aircraft and Tomahawk cruise-missiles – to the area, along with two Amphibious Ready Groups and a further aircraft carrier, Kitty Hawk (CV-63), some of whose air group had been replaced by special operations troops and helicopters. Leaving aside the role of Naval Air Power (NAP), which will be discussed below, the force was able to destroy remote enemy infrastructure with Tomahawk missiles, and airlift ashore a fully-integrated fighting force in the form of the marines of the ARG, complete with their own organic fighter aircraft. It was this force, not army troops, which provided the principle US ground force in southern Afghanistan.
NAP has its critics, for many years, arguments against NA P in the US have focused on expense, lack of combat mass, and duplication of roles with the US Air Force. The utility of NAP – in its ability to project power over land – in the War on Terror, however, was proven during Operation Enduring Freedom; and its critics could not have been proven more incorrect by the Navy aircraft in the skies over Afghanistan. The statistics alone are confronting: 75% of combat sorties over Afghanistan were flown by carrier aircraft, dropping roughly one third of the bombs by number. Some of this was due to the lack of basing-rights ashore for Coalition aircraft, whose bombers had to fly from Diego Garcia and return there in order to reload. Yet putting aside the land-basing issue for a moment, in the recent Iraq War of 2003 carrier aircraft still flew half of all coalition sorties, despite much greater basing rights for Coalition aircraft than in Afghanistan, NAP is clearly up to the task.
The War on Terror is a case study in role duplication. For political reasons discussed above, there are some over-land roles which NAP can achieve which USAF ground-based aircraft either cannot, or preferably should not, carry out. In regard to combat mass, whilst it is impossible for carrier aircraft to carry bomb loads similar to those of ground-based bombers such as the B-1B and B-52, the increased accuracy of precision guided munitions, and their increased availability, is to some extent making up for the difference. Whatever the technical advantages of ground-based aircraft over NAP, they mean very little when those aircraft either cannot obtain the necessary land bases, or in doing so create grand strategic diplomatic costs so high as to potentially nullify the benefits. While the US did see fit to apply diplomatic pressure in order to acquire basing rights for the Afghanistan campaign, it is clear that without carriers in the area, it is difficult to see how success would [have been] achieved.
Coalition navies have also undertaken operations relevant to the War on Terror which are specific to the maritime environment. One example is the leadership interdiction operation undertaken to capture Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders fleeing Afghanistan. From November 2001 until April 2002, the force undertaking these operations was quite sizeable, averaging 25 ships. Perhaps more crucially, considering the threat represented by a number of ‘missing’ cargo freighters reportedly under the control of Al Qaeda, naval forces from a number of nations are being employed to keep watch on shipping in the Straits of Gibraltar, in the Suez Canal, in the Red Sea and Arabian Sea areas.
The ability of naval forces to contribute to the War on Terror is obvious. Indeed, seapower has the potential to form the basis of a grand-strategic response which would be both militarily and politically effective.
Implications for Australia
I will also briefly consider the implications of Australian defence policy for the role of Australian seapower in the War on Terror. Defence 2000 sets out defence policy in terms of five strategic priorities. Geographically centred on Australia and moving outwards into areas portrayed as decreasing in strategic importance, the paper gave first priority to the defence of Australia through the protection of the northern approaches, moved through various regional objectives and finally referred to the objective of support[ing] global security. It did this, however, with the assumption that forces built primarily to defend Australia will be able to undertake a range of operations to promote our wider strategic objectives. This assumption, which dates from the Review of Defence Capabilities of 1986, proved overly optimistic.
Indeed, demands placed on the Australian Defence Force by commitments to the War on Terror required significant additional funding, equipment and training. In the maritime dimension, the ADF simply lacks adequate power-projection capability, which, as has been demonstrated, is essential to the War on Terror. Thus, Australian maritime contributions to the War on Terror have been primarily in supporting roles. Whilst these supporting roles have in themselves been vital in contributing to overall mission success, should Australia in the future wish to respond to terrorism as a primary coalition partner – a possibility with regard to terrorist threats closer to home – our necessary capability would be somewhat lacking.
In terms of these issues, capability development relevant to each strategic objective is required, in effect bringing capability into line with Defence 2000 – an otherwise sound policy. Other commentators, however, have called for more or less of a reversal of strategy, preferring a return to forward defence through land-power and a dependence on alliance structures over what they see as the currently unaffordable strategy of self-reliance. The initial response to these issues: Australia’s National Security: A Defence Update 2003, whilst offering some interim guidance, did not adopt either position. Instead, it confirmed that ‘operations further afield’ are ‘somewhat more likely’ and promised a ‘rebalancing’ around ‘niche’ capabilities. Defence 2000 seems therefore to have been at least temporarily set aside, and replaced with what amounts to a brief outline of near-term funding adjustments. As a result, Australian maritime strategy, along with defence strategy as a whole, has been in something of a strategic ‘no man’s land’. The recently released update to the Defence Capability Plan does, however, offer some solutions to the capability issues, if not necessarily clarification of the strategic approach.
In terms of the War on Terror, the capabilities of the three Air Warfare Destroyers, the acquisition of which has been confirmed, will provide greater ability to gain and maintain sea control – the fundamental starting point in exploiting sea communications and enabling amphibious operations, – greater capacity to secure and protect forces ashore, and provide much greater C3I capabilities. The enhancement of the FFG Upgrade Project and generally the implied retention of fifteen major surface combatants adds to this capability to affect sea control and to protect forces whilst afloat and ashore. The major decision relevant to this study, however, is the acquisition of two ‘larger’ amphibious ships, from which it is hoped to vertically lift a battalion each. Such capability would increase the potential of Australian maritime forces to undertake amphibious operations to that not seen since the early 1980s. This ability, however, must be considered against the need for a ‘fully-integrated fighting force’ deployable from the sea discussed earlier. In that regard, so vital to maritime power projection ashore, this capability falls short through its lack of organic air power, whilst the capabilities of the Air Warfare Destroyers to control the airspace over the landing area and surrounds are invaluable, they do not extend much further than the coastal area; and the ships are limited in their ability to provide direct support to forces ashore.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this paper has argued for the potential of sea power to contribute to the War on Terror within a broader grand-strategic approach. Such an approach can rely upon the ability of maritime forces to affect events on land without leaving a political ‘footprint’ in states not centrally involved, and without being ideologically provocative, thus attacking terrorists and terrorist infrastructure whilst limiting any wider diplomatic consequences which would help to encourage the notion of an ideological war, would increase the emotional appeal of Al Qaeda, and could certainly help to undermine otherwise friendly Islamic governments. Such a strategy would rely upon the reach of maritime forces, their ability to conceal or sanitise their position and operations, their mobility-in-mass, sustainability, flexibility and withdrawability. Such a strategy would also be well matched to the nature of terrorism, where threats and opportunities to respond to it can arise at short notice and in variable ways.
Whatever the wider complexion of the strategy, however, maritime forces have a vital role to play. Whether the strategy is unilateral or multilateral, pre-emptive or reactive, maritime forces can pursue that strategy due to their capacity for adaptability. This is the true nature of sea power.
About the Author
Commander Sam Fairall-Lee is a now reserve naval officer, currently serving as Deputy Director of the Net Assessment Directorate in the Department of Defence. A long time member of the ANI he is the editor of the Australian Naval Review. He has also contributed to a number of books on naval history and maritime strategy.
The fully referenced version of the article can be accessed at:
https://navalinstitute.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Headmark-113-Winter-2004.pdf
