By Alex Bristow*
Announcing the decision to acquire frigates of Japan’s upgraded Mogami class, Defence Minister Richard Marles and Minister for Defence Industry Pat Conroy said on Tuesday that it was the design better able to quickly meet the capability requirements and strategic needs of the Australian Defence Force. (From: The Strategist. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute.)
Without mentioning China in his remarks, Marles seemed to tacitly acknowledge the importance of Japan’s geography for securing Australia’s maritime security and northern approaches.
If conflict hampered trade though the South China Sea, the north-south sea lane connecting the east coast of Australia and Japan, which passes close to Papua New Guinea and several Pacific island countries, could become a major waterway for liquid fuels and other critical supplies to Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Beijing has noticed this, as a Chinese naval flotilla’s circumnavigation of Australia in February was intended to show.
Short of war, the acquisition of upgraded Mogami frigates strengthens the quasi-alliancethat Australia and Japan have developed in recent years, included a hastening tempo of reciprocal deployments and joint operations. These frigates will support further maritime security coordination with Pacific countries, which is just one facet of the work that Canberra and Tokyo are doing to support regional resilience against a range of hybrid threats.
The acquisition of an upgraded version of the in-service Mogami class should also prime much wider economic collaboration between Australia and Japan, in defence industries and beyond. Indeed, this argument was prominent in the case put forward by the all-Japan consortium—including Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, other Japanese industries and the Japanese government—that drove the successful bid.
Australia’s decision comes after years of groundwork in Japan to update laws and regulations, including those related to technology transfer, security clearances and the stewardship of secret information. These measures were necessary for Japan’s security but have also contributed to growing confidence in Japan’s reliability as a security partner in Australia and other countries.
A strategic thread also connects Japan’s ambition to become a major defence exporter, as South Korea is, and the 2022 Economic Security Promotion Act, which set a new benchmark for the protection of critical supply chains against coercion.
Viewed as a whole, these initiatives show that Japan is moving towards a whole-of-nation approach to deterrence and economic resilience. They also reveal Tokyo’s desire for partners, such as Australia, that are willing to step up to the regional challenge posed by China.
This approach is encapsulated in Japan’s 2022 National Security Strategy, which was directed largely by former prime minister Shinzo Abe. As well as committing to new capabilities and historic levels of investment in the Japan Self-Defense Forces, the strategy gave due prominence to economic security and countering hybrid threats. As ASPI staff have argued, Australia needs a similar approach to national security.
Speaking at the ASPI Defence Conference in June, Osamu Nishiwaki, one of the senior Japanese officials at the heart of the all-Japan consortium, explained how government policy could galvanise industry by setting direction and a demand signal. Nishiwaki is positioned to deliver that in his new role as director general for economic security policy at Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry.
Japan and Australia need to do more in areas such as visa regimes to capitalise on the full potential of today’s decision. Economic opportunities should not be viewed solely through the lens of defence industry, and the burden of delivery should not be heaped solely on Australia’s overstretched Department of Defence. In line with the Australian government’s vision for national defence, it needs to involve the many departments, industries and institutions with a stake in the country’s security, prosperity and education.
The nascent Australia-Japan Economic Security Dialogue, which met for the first time in March, is a step in the right direction. But this closed-door dialogue—led by senior officials from Australia’s Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet and Japan’s National Security Secretariat—cannot hope to reach the range of stakeholders required. To bridge that gap, organisations such as the Australia Japan Business Co-operation Committee are well-placed to convene representatives from government, the private sector and non-governmental organisations in Australia and Japan.
ASPI is looking forward to playing its part. The Sydney Dialogue in December is an unrivalled opportunity to mull these issues. ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker also reveals where the greatest opportunities for cooperation lie by identifying which Australian and Japanese research institutions are leading in key sectors, including advanced technologies relevant to AUKUS Pillar Two, which Japan seems poised to become more involved in.
The prize from today’s announcement is not just an excellent capability for the Royal Australian Navy; it is delivery of a secure ecosystem for innovation and manufacturing among friendly and reliable countries, including Japan.
