By Paul Viscovich*
Which part of a spear makes it lethal? The shaft. Without its alignment of all vectors behind the tip, a spear is no more deadly than a stone. Likewise, unless the Foundry and Fleet behave like a shaft, focusing all their energy toward delivering ordnance on target, the warfighting leg of the triad is compromised. (From: Center for International Maritime Security.)
Fleet readiness consists of the manning, training, maintenance, and security programs that underpin it. But not only do these programs often fail to support one another, they are usually in direct competition for limited resources. Achieving effective balance and coordination will require an inexorable focus on warfighting that only the CNO can provide.
A model for this already exists in the Naval Special Warfare community. They recognize that to prioritize one thing – warfighting – it is necessary to reject all conflicting priorities. Whatever does not contribute directly to combat readiness they eliminate. Two things allow the SEALs to achieve this. First, their entire culture is dedicated exclusively to the mission. Second, the NAVSPECWAR chain of command is uncompromising in removing anything that distracts from this priority. It deliberately insulates the Teams from administrative interferences that bedevil the traditional warfighting communities.
By contrast, the warrior ethos of Naval Air, Submarine, and Surface leadership has been eroded by an eight-decade absence of deadly conflict with a peer adversary. It has been replaced by an administratively-obsessed culture that defines excellence in terms of passing rote inspections and scripted drills that often mask warfighting deficits but enable positive reporting. Our focus has shifted from “Rising Suns” along the cockpit to “Es” on the bridgewings.
Though individual commanding officers may strive mightily to create a warfighting focus within their units, the broader chain of command’s overriding insistence that they check all the administrative boxes will suffocate their efforts. At best, they can only put warfighting on the margins of an already thinly-stretched crew and demanding schedule. U.S. Navy flag officers are now mostly trained, groomed, and selected to perpetuate this bureaucracy which is top-heavy with administration.
Personnel is policy. If restoring a serious warfighting culture throughout the fleet is to be the CNO’s legacy, they will need like-minded subordinates now and successors in the future. The CNO must deliberately cultivate a critical mass of reformers that can sustain change at the working level and beyond the tenure of the CNO themself. Start by identifying promising, independent-thinking junior admirals and captains for promotion. A reputation for being “difficult” might be an attribute to look for, if it means they can be constructive change agents that are unafraid to challenge calcified orthodoxy. Then lobby influential Congressional leaders to champion the candidacies of these officers when they are poised to ascend to higher command.
An independent perspective that is not beholden to active-duty career influences and incentives could be useful. In guiding cultural overhaul, consider appointing a blue ribbon panel of retired officers to recommend programs and policies to cut for the non-essential time and financial burdens they place on the fleet. The composition of this board should include several SEALs, as they are the experts on eliminating bloat.
The CNO has inherited a fleet that has suffered creeping administrative overload for years. Unless the CNO can put an end to the suffocating administrative accretions from decades of poorly prioritized requirements, our next war may feature more “victory marks” on the enemy’s bridgewings and fighter cockpits than on ours.
*Paul Viscovich is a retired Surface Warfare Officer with 20 years’ service, twelve of that on sea duty. He is a frequent contributor to CIMSEC.
