The Navy Chiefs – Australian Navy Leaders 1911-1997. Edited by James Goldrick and Alastair Cooper. Allen and Unwin, Crows Nest, NSW 2024 Price $49.99
Reviewed by John Mortimer
The genesis of this book arose from a meeting between Vice Admiral Tim Barrett and Rear Admiral James Goldrick, wherein the former requested a study of the professional heads of the Royal Australian Navy be undertaken.
The task was given to the Naval Studies Group at the University of New South Wales (Canberra) under James Goldrick’s leadership. Unfortunately, James passed away prior to the book’s publication. The book provides a fitting memory to James and his significant contribution to the Royal Australian Navy and importance of it to Australian security.
Authors of the 24 Chief’s of Navy chapters have an extensive background as either historians, academics, or serving or retired naval officers. Their depth of research and analysis is strengthened by their personal experiences, access to official records, and interviews with some of the chiefs, and supporting staff.
An introductory chapter by Dr John Reeve provides an overview, context and broad analysis of the Chiefs of Navy. This is followed by Dr David Stevens, chapter on the first Chief of Navy, Rear Admiral Sir William Creswell. Creswell was chief from 1 March 1911 until 9 June 1919. Prior to this he had held the position of Naval Officer Commanding Commonwealth Naval Forces. Creswell played a major role in arguing the case for an Australian Navy and its initial development. Chapters on each following Chief of Navy are then analysed.
Individual chapters on the Chiefs outline the persons history and naval career, discuss the political, strategic, economic and financial circumstances, and detail their achievements in terms of force structure developments, management style and challenges dealt with during their tenure.
From its initial conception the Royal Australian Navy had been guided by the requirements for Imperial Defence and its acquisitions reflected this, through until the mid 1930’s when serious consideration started to be given to the direct needs of Australia’s defence. As a result the lead up to and the early stages of the Second World War witnessed decisions to provide for local defence vessels; sloops, the Bathurst class anti-submarine and minesweeping corvettes and small motor launches. Later Bay and River class frigates were locally built to enhance local defence capability. The Second World War witnessed a significant growth in naval shipbuilding and ship repair. Australia provided Bathurst class vessels to the Royal and Indian navies, some of which were manned by Australian crews. Several destroyers were also provided by the Royal Navy to be manned by Australian crews.
During their tenures from July 1941 to June 1945, Admiral Sir Guy Royle, and from June 1945 to February 1948 Admiral Sir Louis Hamilton raised the issue of Australia crewing or acquiring an aircraft carrier capability. This capability was followed through and implemented under the first Australian born Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Sir John Collins. This resulted in the loan of HMAS Vengeance and purchase of the carriers Sydney and Melbourne – the latter incorporated several modifications to operate the latest aircraft types.
Even with the departure of the Royal Navy Chiefs of Navy, the Royal Australian Navy continued to adopt British warship designs. The post war period witnessed the local construction of two Battle class destroyers, three Daring class destroyers, and modernisation of four ex Royal Navy Q class destroyers as fast anti-submarine frigates. Later acquisitions included a Tide class replenishment ship, and Ton class minesweepers. It also saw construction of a ship based on the British Type 12 frigate design, the River class destroyer escorts. These ships introduced the Navy to the missile age and were fitted with the Seacat surface to air missile and later the Australian designed Ikara long range anti-submarine missile.
During Vice Admiral Henry Burrell’s tenure as Chief of Navy the first US designed and built Guided Missile Destroyers were acquired in preference to the British County class design. The introduction of these ships and their involvement in the Vietnam War brought about a major change in the navy’s operational procedures and professionalism. This was complemented with the progressive modernisation of the ships weapon and sensor systems and the fitting of the first computerised combat data system in the Royal Australian Navy and a local software training and support facility at Fyshwick. A similar philosophy was also adopted with the six Oberon class submarines. The subsequent purchase of the two later Adelaide class guided missile frigates, Anzac class frigates and the Collins class submarines continued to build on the tradition of local construction and support.
The period between the 1970s and 1990s witnessed the Navy at the peak of its professionalism. It was able to develop and support its combat data systems, it had good scientific support from Defence Science, as well as the RAN Trials and Assessing Unit and the RAN Research Laboratory, it had an effective ship design and development capability and experienced dockyard construction and repair personnel. Often scientists would participate in exercises and evaluate performance, especially in relation to operations, weapons and sensor performance. HMAS Watson also undertook tactical development, command team and navigation training.
The last Chief, Rod Taylor, faced issues of Navy taking on a parent Navy role with the Anzac, Collins and Huon classes; the Defence Reform Program which impacted his ability to control personnel, logistic, infrastructure and procurement responsibilities; and his desire to repair Navy’s personnel recruitment and retention.
The concluding chapter by Vice Admiral Chris Ritchie provides a reflection on the Chiefs of Navy and contains many observations that should inform the Royal Australian Navy’s future. He identifies the complexity and challenges that defence reorganisations over the past 30 years have posed for the effective management of Navy and its future. The lines of responsibility are now so complex and the teeth to administrative and command overhead tail is placing pressure on crewing operational assets and well as creating funding pressures. This is compounded further by the widespread employment of contractors to provide policy and planning advice as well as services in more traditional areas like ships logistic supply, maintenance and repair. The overall impact has been to deskill naval personnel with its consequent impact on operational performance and impact on recruitment and retention rates.
Defence’s processes are now very complex and lengthy and are not providing coherent, timely, or appropriate capability outcomes. The number of authorities within Defence and the stove piped separation of authority is adding further risk to the overall process. Navy has little control or influence over its own destiny, though it is often held accountable for problems in the capability provided, cost and schedule blowouts etc.
The recent process of the Defence Strategic Review is symptomatic of the dysfunction and paucity of appropriate skills within Defence. The widespread employment of external consultants and contractors implies that Defence does not have the skills or personnel to undertake major strategic policy and planning activities, management of projects, or to make informed decisions on value for money purchases.
The Navy Chiefs is an absorbing and thought-provoking book. It is well written and researched and has considerable relevance to all Defence personnel. Its lessons and considerations are equally relevant to politicians, industry and the wider community especially those involved in managing large organisations.
