By Tom Lewis*
The Indonesian Navy – official name “Indonesian National Military-Naval Force” or TNI-AL – is double the size of the Royal Navy in personnel but has one-third of the major combatants. At 70,000 versus 35,000, with 11 major warships versus 31, those numbers sum up what is wrong with a force that has to patrol an enormous area.
Indonesia is a country with a questionable future ahead of it. Its Navy is a maritime force of a huge population with an immense coastline – 276 million with 99,000 kilometres.
Indonesia has had many past difficulties. An internal upheaval in the 1960s, rioting that killed 1,000 in 1998, a tsunami in 2004, and terrorist attacks for several years in the 2000s have all been weathered. But it is still caught in the middle of a question: does it pursue a path to First World modernisation, or does it stay as a fairly disorganised Third World nation with large areas of poverty? How does its Navy fit into this? Who are its allies? In an interesting development, it recently exercised warships with Russia.
Indonesia’s armed forces are of importance in its road ahead. An organisation whose presence is always a looming figure in politics – unlike Western countries – it is largely used as an internal police force rather than a bulwark to external threats. Indonesia has few of those, having little external ambition, although it dislikes its neighbours Malaysia and Singapore; the first for its size and ambitions, and the second for its success.
The Navy in summary
The Indonesian armed force of 400,000 is beset by being too big, and too inefficient, while it loudly proclaims it is neither. The Navy of 70,000 has its own set of problems.
Although modernising in part, the loss in 2021 of one of the submarines while dived has cast a gloom over the Indonesian maritime force.
In April 2024, France’s Naval Group announced that the Indonesian Navy had placed an order for two improved Scorpène-class submarine, which will be built by PT PAL in Indonesia.
This is impossible, unless a brand new Navy yard were to be set up by the French, but more importantly operated by them as well. Otherwise it will be a cycle of “jobs for the boys”, delays, demands for local materials – usually unsuitable – to be used, and quiet corruption on the side.
Defence force politics in Indonesia are usually mired in politics. For example in 2022 Indonesian defence minister Prabowo Subianto proclaimed that by 2024 “we will have up to 50 warships.” It was a curious statement – the fleet could be said to be that big already, but in another way it didn’t have what naval experts would call anywhere near that many “warships”; and in a third possibility the Navy is indeed building more. Then again did it matter? Subianto at the time of writing is now president of the country. Given he is said to be supportive of a more modern military it is to be hoped this translates as a more modern and efficient Navy.
The Navy’s 70,000 personnel unusually use Army ranks. It operates – on paper – 63 fixed wing aircraft and 29 combat and transport helicopters, but less than half are usually operational and the efficiency of the airborne aircraft is questionable. It also operates a Marine force.
Major Fleet Units
One of the latest and loudly proclaimed projects is the building of five Arrowhead 140 frigates through Babcock International. Being built at PT PAL in Surabaya, Indonesia, none are in the water yet. The first steel for the lead ship was cut on 9 December 2022, with a keel laying on 25 August 2023. The second ship’s first steel was cut on 5 June 2024.
The fleet’s major combatants are seven frigates. Two are Sigma-class design guided-missile frigates although the Indonesians call them destroyers. They are armed with Exocet cruise missiles and can carry a helicopter.
Five ex-Van Speijk-class frigates dating back to the 1960s are still in use, although their capabilities are most doubtful. They spend most of their operational life just keeping afloat, and to an outside eye they look good enough – there is usually a fair amount spent on paint.
Minor Combatants
A host of what might be called minor combatants round out the surface fleet. The newest are two newly built OPVs – constructed in a local private shipyard – being proclaimed as light frigates. Two more are being built by Sefine Shipyard in Turkey.
25 corvettes dating back to the 1970s make up a confusing mix of minor warships. 16 are ex-Parchim I-class corvettes, part of a package deal of ships from Germany in 1992. The transfer from the Volksmarine also included 14 Frosch-class landing ships and 9 Kondor-class minesweepers. Although impressive in numbers at the time the ships brought a host of problems – air-conditioning being just one – into a fleet that should have been revised on capability rather than surface numbers.
24 fast attack craft – some new but mostly old – provide a source of pride especially when paraded in numbers. They are often fitted with C-704 Chinese anti-ship missiles, although sometimes launched – several are modern – without. In 2016 the Indonesian president witnessed two failed firings of such missiles during a Navy demonstration. The first failed to fire on command but launched unexpectedly five minutes later. The second missile fired as expected but failed during flight. Neither hit their target.
Around 60 patrol boats are still in operation. Although shallow water patrolling is their forte, it must be asked what they are patrolling against. Indonesia’s own usually uncontrolled fishing is more of a threat to its fish stocks than anyone trying their luck externally. There is indeed a problem with regional piracy but most of the pirates seem to be based on Indonesian soil…
Submarine Force
Three relatively modern submarines have the potential to be a major source of pride for the Indonesian Navy, but only if its flotilla can survive the problems it has experienced in the past. Its submarine force at present consists of four boats, one of which should be scrapped now.
KRI Cakra, a variant of the type 209 diesel-electric attack submarine, dates back to 1981. Her sister vessel Kri Nanggala was the other of a pair. It sank following an implosion north of Bali in April 2021 with the loss of all 53 on board. The wreck has been located but not raised.
The Nanggala had been through a major refit by Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering in 2012 and the Indonesian state-owned shipyard PT PAL in 2020.
The submarine’s commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Heri Oktavian – who died with his command – had previously voiced his frustrations about boat maintenance. He claimed that the workmanship quality and maintenance services performed by PT PAL were unsatisfactory. Two days after the sub had been declared sunk both the commander of the 2nd Fleet Naval Combat Squad – who had given permission for Nanggala to dive – and the commander of the 2nd Fleet were removed from their posts. At 43 years of age Cakra should really be scrapped but seemingly national pride forbids that.
Three variants of the South Korean variant of the Jang Bogo-class make up the rest of the submarine flotilla. These are relatively modern at around 10 years old. They are quite small coastal boats with a crew of around 40, and armed with 21-inch torpedoes.
Incidentally the planned Scorpenes are likely motivated by jealously of the Malaysian Navy which acquired two – built in France – some years ago, and which has operated them very cautiously but without incident since 2009.
30 landing ships
The Navy operate a fleet of 30 landing ships, headed by some relatively modern Landing Ships (Dock). However the rest of these vessels – used primarily to move the Army around postings in the 17,000 island archipelago – are old and in some cases obsolete. Around 25 minesweeping, hydrographic, and support vessels are rounded out by six hovercraft; two presidential yachts and even some sail-training ships which contribute to a fleet that is at least as colourful as it is varied.
A Fighting Force?
As a brown-water constabulary naval force the TNI-AL has had no experience over the past decades in actual naval work. It has no history of sending units well offshore; maintaining a flotilla at a distance, combat operations, or even policing work – they have taken little part in the decades-long international fight against piracy in the SE Asian area. (Rather, Indonesia has sometimes arrested foreign ship captains for “illegal anchoring”, only releasing them after a large “fine” is paid.)
In summary the Indonesian Navy needs a top-down approach which should be as simple as defining what it needs to do, and selecting from its fleet anything younger than 20 years which can do it. But instead there is a rationale that there is pride in numbers – the TNI, as does its companion Army and Air Force – likes large colourful parades. The armed forces are also seen as a major employer too rather than a combat force. This attitude gets in the way along with a cumbersome force structure: the Navy for example is organised around three large overstaffed commands.
Any reform of the three services would be hampered by a mindset that spends 0.6% of GDP on the requirement while expecting a lot. One recent development signals that the Navy might be reaching out for help – three Russian corvettes exercised with some Indonesian vessels in early November. It might possibly be a sign the massive South-East Asian country will move to purchase ships from Russia – and that Putin’s nation might be seeking to extend their Pacific reach.
*Dr Tom Lewis is a military historian. His latest works are The Secret Submarine, about the sinking of the Japanese I-178 by two RAAF bombers; and Cyclone Warriors – the Armed Forces in Cyclone Tracy.
Indonesia’s planned new submarine (projected) characteristics:
Scorpène Evolved:
Surfaced displacement: 1,600 – 2,000 tons
Length, overall: 72 m
Submerged speed: >20 knots
Diving depth: >300 m
Autonomy: >78 days on a 80 days mission
Submerged autonomy: >12 days
Crew: 31
Weapons total payload: 18
Weapon tubes: 6
SUBTICS combat management system
Operational availability at sea: >240 days per year
