The ANI at 50: the RAN & the JMSDF

As the Department of Defence weighs up either a German and a Japanese frigate design for the RAN’s general purpose frigate, 45 years ago there were calls closer Australian-Japanese naval relations. The thirteenth article from Davey Jones’ locker comes from the May 1980 edition of the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute, titled “The RAN and the JMSDF – Pacific Partners?” Written by Lieutenant Kerry Clancy.

The announcement by the Japanese Government in October 1979 of its decision to send two destroyers and eight aircraft to the recent RIMPAC exercise off Hawaii was of great significance. It signalled a new interpretation of the Japanese Constitution in a politically sensitive area and heralded the emergence of a new government defence policy. Thus it is now time for the RAN to seriously consider the possibility of an increasingly active role by Japan in the defence of its interests in the Asian region and the Indian Ocean. The purpose of this article therefore is to examine the areas of mutual defence interest between Australia and Japan, and to consider ways in which the RAN and the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Forces (JMSDF) might benefit by developing a closer working relationship with each other.

The Changing Environment

Firstly, what pressures forced the ruling Liberal Democratic Party to initiate a change which might have destabilised the Japanese political system? The military buildup by the Soviets in the area surrounding Japan is a grim reminder to the Japanese that they are living in the neighbourhood of a superpower. The Soviets have expanded their naval presence to a point where the US no longer has a decided military advantage, and this has had far-reaching strategic implications. The arrival of the Minsk, a Kiev class aircraft carrier, the Petropavlosk, a Kara class guided missile cruiser and the Ivan Rogov, an amphibious assault transport dock at Vladivostok has also posed new problems for Japan’s defence planners.’These new ships have reinforced the Soviet Pacific Fleet qualitatively as well as quantitively, giving the Russians for the first time sea-based air cover and the ability to project their sea power beyond coastal areas. The Soviet Pacific Fleet which includes another 10 cruisers, 80 destroyers and 125 submarines, has now increased its naval tonnage to approximately 1,200,000 tons — six times that of the JMSDF.

Further, the recent construction by the Soviets of military bases on the Kunashiri and Entorofu Islands, islands claimed by Japan as being Japanese territory, and the stationing of Backfire bombers on Kamchatka have highlighted Japan’s military weaknesses. It is now clear that in a general war the Russians have the ability to deny Japan military reinforcement, as well as strategic supplies of resources, and could successfully invade Hokkaido where a large part of Japan’s Ground Self Defence Force is stationed.

The cornerstone of Japan’s defence continues to be the US-Japan Security Treaty, yet the shape of this alliance is changing. Over the last few years the US has been urging Japan to do more for its own defence, and to relieve the US of some of its burdens in the north-west Pacific region. Naturally, these demands would eventually lead to a greater defence effort from the Japanese, but the visible decline of US power in the region as a whole has speeded up Japan’s response.

This decline is evidenced in a number of ways. Most importantly there have been serious cutbacks in naval building by the US government, and the brunt of these cutbacks has been borne by ships essential for prolonged operations over great distances ie aircraft carriers, guided missile destroyers and support ships. Naturally this deeply concerns both the RAN and the JMSDF, for the loss of such ships is most strongly felt in the Pacific Ocean. There has also been a serious decline in US personnel stationed in Asia – in 1964 there were 250,000 men stationed there, 800,000 in 1968 and in 1979 130,000, nearly a 50% decline over the 1964 pre-Vietnam figure. This reduction would have been even greater had President Carter continued with his withdrawal of troops from Korea. Further, since last year there have been a number of US government statements to the effect that in a crisis or a general war, the NATO area would have a higher defence priority than the Asian theatre. Accordingly units of the US Seventh Fleet would be used to meet European contingencies with the result that there would be a reduced number or no carrier based aircraft in the Pacific.⁵

A corollary of this decline in the US Asian presence is that there is a proportionate increase in the vulnerability of Japan, the world’s second biggest trading country and third largest economy, to an economic blockade. Freedom of the seas is vital, and any interruption to Japanese trade on any one of Japan’s three main sea links could be catastrophic. The Japanese, of course, are particularly sensitive to the threat which the submarines of the Russian Pacific Fleet pose to their sea-lanes and being a pragmatic people, should they consider that the US can no longer protect their interests then they can be expected to gradually build up their military strength.

Expense, as well as changes in US defence thinking, has reduced the US military presence around Japan. As the Japanese yen appreciated against the US dollar, the US commitment to Japan cost more. The Japanese government, however, in order to alleviate some of the increased financial burden, has taken over a greater proportion of the costs involved, acknowledging thai the stationing of US forces in Japan is the core of the Japan-US security system.⁶

The final factor to be mentioned is the political instability now present in Northern Asia. In 1978/79 there were a number of political events of great international significance which must have profoundly affected regional defence thinking. These events were the signing of the Japan-China Treaty of Peace and Friendship, the conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and Vietnam, the normalisation of diplomatic relations between China and the USA, the denouncement of the Mutual Defence Treaty between the USA and Taiwan, China’s giving notice of the non-extension of the Treaty of Friendship. Alliance and Mutual Assistance between itself and the USSR, the border war between China and Vietnam, the war in Cambodia and finally the assassination of President Park of South Korea. The eventual ramifications and repercussions of these events can only be conjectural, but they would certainly give every Japanese, as well as every government in the region, a great deal to ponder.

Coinciding Interests

The interests of the RAN and the JMSDF coincide in many ways, not only in regard to military matters but also in the area of general naval management. Many of the geographical problems which the RAN confronts daily, resulting from Australia being an island with an immense coastline having long lines of communication and trade, confront the Japanese as well. Thus the way in which both navies perceive their basic maritime defence situation and the way in which each navy attempts to work within the constraints imposed by defence budgets and limited resources is of mutual interest.

However it is in regard to the preservation of seaborne trade that the two navies’ objectives actually coincide. At present trade between the two countries is worth nearly A$8,000 million per annum, and 35% of Australia’s exports are carried in Japanese ships. Australia’s shipping involvement is practically negligible.⁷ Trade with Japan and the percentage of Australia’s trade carried in Japanese ships will increase even more as Japan looks to Australia for energy supplies, and the increasing price of fuel oil gives the exporters of Australia’s resources a further cost advantage over other nations.⁸

The Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf is another area of vital concern to both Australia and Japan. Recent events in Afghanistan have highlighted the importance of this region to both countries and each may be expected to be affected by the element of uncertainty injected by the USSR into the Middle East. Russia’s military and political activity around the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf clearly indicates a desire for a strong presence there, note the USSR’s 1972 Treaty of Friendship with Iraq, support for the communist government in South Yemen and Soviet intervention in the Horn of Africa on the sides of both Somalia and Ethiopia. Should Russia eventually gain direct access to a warm water port in the Indian Ocean the effects would be far-reaching, for the Soviets would then be able to service and operate more ships for longer periods along the oil tanker routes radiating from this region.

The protection of this trade is an immense task, and the problems it would pose for the RAN alone would prove insurmountable. Accordingly, Australia must investigate ways of involving Japan in the forward defence of that part of its own shipping which is on the southern Asian sea lanes. Australian strategists cannot presume that Japan will continue to be unwilling to undertake such a role, remembering that Japan has learned a great deal from World War II. when it paid dearly, militarily and economically, for leaving unescorted merchantmen to their own devices. Japan realises that in any conflict or time of tension adequate supplies of iron ore, coal, non-ferrous metals and wool, as well as oil, are essential.

The RAN’s interest in the Indian Ocean stems from the fact that a very substantial part of Australia’s trade and nearly all of Australia’s imported oil passes through it and a great part of Australia’s off-shore resources lies under it. However, given the present state of our forces, the RAN cannot be anything more than a spectator in this arena. Should the RAN wish to play a role of some importance in the Indian Ocean, it could only be as part of a collective force, for it does not have the ships to enable it to station anything more than a token force in Western Australia. The interest of Japan in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf is another thing altogether. 80% of Japan’s oil comes from the Middle East, and 72% of all Japan’s oil is consumed by industry. It is only too evident that Japan’s economic might can be nullified and its military capability made ineffectual by cutting this liquid lifeline; considering the volume of oil involved. Japan would be unable to obtain alternative supplies in an emergency.⁹ This being the case, the opinion of Admiral S.N. Kohli, former CNS Indian Navy, is worth noting. He has stated “The use of (Japan’s) ‘self-defence’ maritime forces to protect her vital ocean interests is a distinct possibility. This could lead to the urge for an Indian Ocean presence.”¹⁰

The natural question to ask is how could Japan do this? It is submitted that it would require a more elastic legal interpretation by Japanese courts of what is meant by the terms ‘self-defence’. Should they accept the doctrine of the territoriality of a ship, which was accepted by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the case of The Lotusand hold that the JMSDF acts in Japan’s self defence whenever it acts in defence of the nation’s merchant shipping, then the way would be open for a Japanese naval presence in the Indian Ocean.¹¹ In such an event Japan, for logistic reasons and in order to avoid widespread political repercussions at home and throughout Asia, would probably wish to be part of a collective naval force.

The ASEAN region is another which concerns both the JMSDF and the RAN. The RAN’s concern stems from propinquity – there are 240 million people living within a few hundred miles of Australia’s northern coast and Australia shares a common sea with Indonesia. Out of necessity the RAN must show its neighbours that Australia has the ability to defend itself and protect its friends as well as the power to ensure that its interests are not ignored.

Further, both navies are aware of the strategic position of the ASEAN countries which adjoin or lie astride the principal sea routes linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans, Indonesia’s position being of singular importance as it can control the Malacca Strait and alternative sea routes between the two oceans. These countries by virtue of their location can hinder direct trade between Australia and Japan and force Japan to alter its principle trade routes to the Middle East, Europe and Africa and could conceivably limit the access of both Australia and Japan to the region’s valuable resources, particularly oil, tin, rubber and timber.

The Japanese navy has had a strong interest in South East Asia for most of this century. The naval faction in Japanese politics prior to World War II fully realised the strategic importance of Singapore and the region’s resources, control of which would lessen Japanese dependence on the US and free them from any possible trade restrictions.¹² During the war itself, the Malacca, Sunda and Luzon Straits acted as bottlenecks for Japanese merchantmen, and the resultant concentration of Japanese ships in their vicinity enabled American submarines to wreak havoc among them.¹³

Nowadays Japan underpins the economic stability and progress of all the ASEAN nations, being a source of capital, technology and industrial goods as well as a huge market. Indonesia has the greatest dependence on Japan as Japan takes nearly half its exports and has invested over US$6,000 million there.¹⁴ This economic involvement in ASEAN helps to promote the internal security of Australia’s nearest neighbours, and has also provided Australia with the possibility of linking trade with the Japanese with their influencing events in the region.

Australia and Japan also have a common ally in the USA. A comparison of the ANZUS treaty with the Security Treaty between the USA and Japan establishes a number of similarities and leads to the conclusion that Australia and Japan, along with Korea and the Philippines, each form a link in a treaty network establishing a defence system in Asia centred on the USA. The United States’ major contribution to this defence system is the Seventh Fleet, which is the most powerful naval force in the world. Its responsibilities extend over thirty million square miles of sea, and its main objective is to maintain its ability to destroy the combat forces of any enemy. Since it is a strike force, its convoying and ASW roles are subordinate, and accordingly US policy has been to encourage America’s allies to develop an ASW capability which can complement the USA’s own defence of key lines of communication.¹⁵ The JMSDF’S ASW orientation is partially a result of this.

The JMSDF’s acceptance of the role of a junior partner to the Seventh Fleet is evidenced by its force structure, which is dependent upon US air superiority because its ships have on the whole a limited surface-to-air missile capability. Further the equipment and supplies it uses (eg fuel oil, RAS lines and ammunition) are compatible with those of the USN, while, a great deal of Japanese military hardware is of American design manufactured in Japan, eg DDGs, F15s, P3Cs. The conclusion to be drawn from such facts is that the JMSDF and the USN each have a need for the other, and that interoperability has given both greater flexibility plus the means to overcome in part many of the logistic problems created by the enormous distances in the Pacific.

The RAN, like the JMSDF, acknowledges the importance of having a strong relationship with the USN. As an ally, the RAN accepts responsibility for those areas which it considers to be of primary strategic concern around Australia and in this way contributes to the US global naval defence effort. In return the RAN receives many important practical advantages in the areas of intelligence, defence technology and science, naval staff contacts, the latest operational and tactical procedures, as well as the opportunity to exercise with modern and powerful naval forces. Yet the RAN does suffer from the fact that a good part of its equipment is made in America, thereby creating a dependence upon the USA for certain types of ammunition, weapons and spares. However, putting aside the strategic and financial costs, purchases of such equipment as DDGs, P3Cs etc have enabled the RAN to maintain professional and technological standards at least equal to those in the JMSDF.

Developing Closer Links

Japan is a maritime nation in the true meaning of the term, and the way in which it has developed its sea power by exploiting the world’s oceans could be a worthy precedent for Australia. Japan has built up a merchant fleet of 33 million tons, its fishing fleets roam the globe and even now it possesses a large navy. Japan’s shipbuilding capacity is huge, and Australians might well be ashamed that their main shipyards are now located outside Tokyo. Accepting these facts and considering the issues raised in the preceding sections, can the RAN continue to ignore the maritime might of Japan into the 1980s? It is the opinion of the author that it cannot, and that the RAN must begin now to examine ways of forging closer links with the JMSDF. Accordingly the proposals below are offered for consideration.

Initially, the Japanese language would present a real barrier to the development of any meaningful relationship between the two navies as it is one of the most difficult in the world to learn. However, as Japan has throughout this century developed its own naval doctrines and tactics, and produced such naval thinkers as Akiyama Saneyuki, Suzuki Kantaro and Sato Tetsutaro – the Asian counterparts of Mahan, Makarov and Corbett – the RAN cannot afford not to have some officers and sailors with a working knowledge of Japanese.

An exchange of personnel might formally begin a working relationship, providing both Australian and Japanese members with language practice and the opportunity to witness the day to day operating procedures in each navy. Considering as well the quality of the work the Japanese have already done in marine and electrical engineering, ship designing, hydrography and oceanography, it is clear that many members of the RAN could gain immeasurable benefit from a period of study in Japan. An exchange of personnel would also promote personal contacts, which the Japanese place great store on. The Japanese Government could well agree to such an exchange, as a recent high level report commissioned by the Japanese government, the Saito Report, envisaged in its first part some cooperation “for peace and safety” between Australia and Japan during the 1980s.¹⁷

The exchanging of intelligence and limited military exercises would also be practical ways of developing close military ties between Australia and Japan. Australia is in a position to obtain accurate intelligence in the Indian Ocean, Papua New Guinea and the ASEAN region, whereas Japan is closer to China and the USSR. Further, the RAN could be expected to gain great benefit from regular exercises with the JMSDF Exercises concentrating on ASW, AAW, naval control of shipping and the development of interoperability in the communications field would increase the protection available for ships trading between the two countries and enable both navies to play a stronger supporting role to the USN’s Seventh Fleet.

Another matter to consider is the possibility of negotiating an agreement between the two navies for the standardisation of equipment, ammunition and stores. It should be realized that Japan has for the last two years been equipping its surface combatant ships with the Harpoon missile and soon it will be fitted on all destroyer escorts, guided missile destroyers and a few submarines. Some of the 45 P3Cs being built under licence will also carry two Harpoon missiles. Further the JMSDF, like the RAN, operates DDGs and is introducing helicopters on its modern ships for ASW. Similar high technology defence equipment thus already exists in the two forces, and since this compatibility in hardware will obviously continue for some years, the operational advantages to be gained from a standardisation agreement should be investigated.

The most tangible benefits for the RAN resulting from a closer relationship with the JMSDF however, would arise from joint participation in various research and development projects. At present the Japanese government is committed to the development of several new naval weapons systems which would be of interest to the RAN:

• laser and microwave radar systems,
• a new torpedo for the P3C,
• an acoustic sensor for ASW, and
• ECM systems and counter-countermeasure systems.¹⁸

The desire on the part of the Japanese to undertake more of their own military research and development stems from a number of factors. Firstly, it is a hangover from World War II when Japan was easily defeated by a scientific and technological superpower. “Never again must Japan go to war with a bamboo lance”, was a comment made by Hashimoto Mochitsura, a former submarine commander.¹⁹ Also, Japan as a result of its dependence on the USA for advanced military hardware has hitherto excluded itself from one of the most important frontiers of science. The industrial spin-offs from the American space and defence research and development programmes have given US industry the premier position in the areas of computers, communications, nuclear and deep sea technology. Japan can no longer allow this situation to continue if it wishes to retain its powerful economic position in the 21st century.

Given the commercial strength of the Japanese electronics industry and Japan’s growing computer technology, the RAN could expect the Japanese to do excellent research work in the areas of communications, acoustics and guided weapons. Participation in such research and the later joint production of the end product would also provide the RAN and Australia’s defence industries with current technology. Australia as a matter of urgency must look at such schemes, for the local electronics industry does little more than assemble component parts while the maintenance base for so much other equipment is too narrow.²⁰

Overview

The issues raised in this article concern RAN policy, yet they are just one aspect of an important political question. Is Australia developing a real modus vivendi with its Asian neighbours? Asia is slowly but surely becoming the issue that will deeply affect every Australian. Perhaps inexorable historical forces are at work as the question of whether Caucasians can continue to live in safety and peace in regions peopled by other races is still to be answered. However, it is clear looking at Asia’s problems that Australia and the will of its people is to be tested in the coming decades – could it be otherwise, living so close to over 2,000 million people?

The present leaders of the RAN can remember when our defence policies centred on those of Great Britain, and they are aware of the price we nearly paid for it. They have seen circumstances demand change. Now the time for change has come again as there is a need for Australia to play the active role in the development of friendship and cooperation throughout Asia. The possibility of the RAN and the JMSDF working together should be reviewed in such terms.

Notes

1. Summary of Defence of Japan, Japanese Defence Agency, July 24, 1979, pp.1-5.
2. Japanese White Paper on Defence 1978. p.60.
3. Osamu Kaihara, “Japan’s Military Capabilities, Realities and Limitations”, Pacific Community, January 1978. p.132.
4. Grazebrook, A.W., “Failing US Naval Strength”, Pacific Defence Reporter, July 1979. p.19.
5. Pillsbury, M., “A Japanese Card?”, Foreign Policy, No.33, p.28, also Aviation Weekly, 14 January 1980, p.36.
6. Summary of Defence of Japan, supra p.24.
7. Report from the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, 1973, p.56.
8. Paper, “Bulk Shipping between Australia and Japan”, delivered to the Australia-Japan Businessmen’s Committees at Osaka 1978.
9. Makoto Momoi, Foreign Policy of Modern Japan, University of California Press, 1977, p,349.
10. Kohli, S.N., Sea Power and the Indian Ocean, Tata McGraw Hill, New Delhi, 1978, p.132.
11. Permanent Court of International Justice Series A, No. 10, 1927. also see Tsunoda Jun “Is Japan’s defence posture adequate?”, Asian Affairs, March 1978, p.208.
12. D’albas, Andrieu, Death of a Navy — Japanese See Power in World War II, Robert Hale Ltd, London, 1957, p.12.
13. Silent Victory – US Submarine War Against Japan, J P. Lypencott & Co., New York, 1975, 2 vols.
14. ASEAN Report, Vol. II, 1979, p. 103.
15. General George S Brown, Chairman of US Joint Chiefs of Staff. Asian Defence Journal, October-December 1978. p.415.
16. Sakanaka Tomokisa, ‘Japan’s Military Capability’. Japan Quarterly, October-December. 1978, p.415.
17. Saito Report, “Australia/Japan relations in the 80s”, p.45 (in Japanese). Mr Saito was a former ambassador to Australia.
18. Aviation Weekly, 28 January 1980. p.45.
19. Hashimoto Mochikura, Sunk – the story of the Japanese Submarine Fleet 1942-45, Cassell and Co., London, 1954. p.1.
20. Comments by Sir Mark Oliphant reported in The Canberra Times, 27 February 1980.

The Author

Lieutenant Kerry Clancy was admitted as a barrister and solicitor in Victoria in March 1976. Between August 1976 and March 1979 he studied Japanese and Japanese Civil Law at Kyoto University on a Japanese Monbusho scholarship. He was trained in the practical aspects of Japanese maritime law and marine insurance at the Showa Law Office, Osaka. He joined the RAN as a legal officer in mid-1979, and served in the Defence Force Legal Section of the Department of Defence in Canberra.