During the late 1970s and 1980s the ‘carrier debate’, ie whether to replace the RAN’s flagship and sole aircraft carrier, HMAS Melbourne, occupied many pages the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute as it did in other publications focussed on defence matters. There were few naval officers, who were as knowledgable on the subject as Admiral Sir Victor Smith. He put pen to paper for the May 1983 edition in of the Journal. Here is his article.
How The Lessons Of Naval History Are Not Learnt
By Admiral Sir Victor Smith AC KBE CB DSC RAN (Ret’d)
Let me begin by saying that the title of this talk is not to claim that all the lessons of naval history are not learnt. Such a claim would be ridiculous. My purpose is to show from the writings and statements of eminent people and by recalling certain events in naval history that some important lessons are not learnt and that these have relevance to Australia particularly in respect of naval aviation. John Frende wrote in 1553:
“Many have written and experience besides declareth how necessary historical knowledge is to all kinds of man. For by comparing things past with things present man may easily gather what is to be followed and what is to be eschewed; by this kind of learning he can have knowledge without experience. There is nothing new under the sun and if is impossible for anything to chance either in war or in common policy but that the like may be found to have chanced in times past.”
A number of people consider that Sir Julian Corbett was comparable in his writings on naval matters to Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan and I make use of several of the points made in Corbett’s Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. One of the reasons he wrote this book was to convince an audience which for the most part believed that technical change had made the study of all past naval warfare irrelevant. Corbett never claimed that historical study could produce detailed rules for the future conduct of battles and campaigns, as the practical experience and personal qualities of commanders and the unique circumstances of every war and battle were of primary significance, but systematic study could help in assessing individual situations. Corbett defines maritime strategy as “The principles which govern a war in which the sea is a substantial factor.”’ Obviously such a strategy must be seen as part of a larger national strategy and directed policy. Again it is obvious that in a successful maritime strategy the relationship between sea and other forces are of paramount importance.
Shortly after World War II ended, a review was prepared by the Operations Division of the US Navy and was based on the files of the Navy Department and the reports of the US Strategic Bombing Survey. Its purpose was to analyse the relationship between air and sea power. The review included the following words:
“The danger inherent in any report confined to one aspect of the war is that it may mislead the reader into forgetting that the conflict was won by a combination of ground, naval and air forces each of which carried its share of the common burden. All operated within the framework of strategic plans.”
These words substantiate those of Corbett and I mention them because cases are not unknown where one Service wittingly or unwittingly makes a false claim regarding the capabilities of its equipment or weapon systems. Adverting to Corbett’s definition I would like to mention some self-evident points.
Firstly, the object of maritime warfare must always be directly or indirectly either to secure command of the sea or to prevent the enemy from securing it. Secondly, command of the sea means nothing but the control of maritime communications whether for commercial or military purposes.
Thirdly, accepting that the objective is to control communications, then the fundamental requirement is the means of exercising that control. Deriving from this, at sea the essence of defence is mobility and this cannot be achieved if a maritime force can only operate within certain restrictive limits.
I would like to give an example of the importance of maritime communications; how a lesson was not learnt and how this led to one of the most costly mistakes ever made in British naval thinking During the second half of 1916, there were more than 100 U-Boats in action and the Allied tonnage being sunk increased to the extent that it was estimated that if the increase continued then the Allies would be forced to sue for peace before November 1917. In May 1917, as an act of desperation, the RN introduced the convoy system and the shipping losses decreased dramatically. The convoy idea was not new. During the early 16th century, the Spanish ships plying to and from the West Indies suffered heavily from marauding French pirates. In 1543. the Spaniards began sailing their ships in escorted convoys and for the next 60 years they operated without loss from enemy action.
The World War I convoy lesson was well remembered when World War II began and convoys were instituted shortly after the outbreak. There were relatively heavy shipping losses at times during this war and one of the causes was an early lack of appreciation of the value of carrier borne aircraft in the protection of convoys. In the summer of 1939, the RN had six operational aircraft carriers; the aircraft embarked comprised a few fighters, some 150 Swordfish and 25 Skua fighter/dive bombers. As a result of the great confidence in the ability of its Asdic equipped destroyers and escorts to deal with every submarine, the RN did not place A/S training high on the list of requirements for its aircrew.
Another instance of this failure to recall the previously demonstrated ability of submarines and the need to use an appropriate variety of weapons to oppose them is to be seen in the USA where, on 7th December 1941, the position was that under the US Army Appropriations Act of 1920 the Army Air corps was charged with the control of land based aviation. Thus there existed a situation where, in the words of the official US Navy historian, “The Army Air Force which controlled almost the entire supply of US military land based planes in 1941 did not expect to include anti-submarine warfare among its duties Army pilots were not trained to fly over water protect shipping or bomb small moving targets like submarines.”
It was not until 1941 that the escort carrier in the form of a converted merchant ship began operating with convoys and at the end of that year Admiral Doenitz noted in his war diary in respect of U-boat losses after the submarines had tried to damage a Gibraltar-UK convoy:
“The worst feature was the presence of the aircraft carrier small fast manoeuvrable aircraft constantly circled the convoy and boats that did make contact had repeatedly to dive or else withdraw. Also, the enemy aircraft prevented any continuous shadowing or homing by our aircraft. The sinking of the aircraft carrier is therefore of great importance in all future convoy actions.”
Looking briefly at Japanese ASW operations in World War II, alone among the Axis Powers, Japan was almost entirely dependent upon raw materials from overseas. In spite of the importance of her merchant fleet, Japan did not have convoys in general use until January 1944. During the first two years of war, the Japanese merchant marine lost 3 million tons – about half its pre-war total. Two thirds of the losses were due to submarine attack. In August 1945, the merchant ship tonnage was only one-eighth of what it had been at the beginning of the war. In November 1943, the Japanese navy in a tardy attempt to lessen the high loss rate, unified its A/S effort with the formulation of a General Escort Command which included four very small escort carriers. The command had little success as there were grave deficiencies in the quality and quantity of both men and equipment. Furthermore cooperation between ships and aircraft was not good.
I mentioned in my opening remarks that some lessons are not learnt and that these have relevance to Australia. Some of these lessons are not or should not be confined to military persons as they should be of interest or concern to a much wider section of the community. For instance, an American Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Robery Carney, wrote the following thirty years ago in an article headed “The Principles of Sea Power”:
“To the island man from his childhood the significance of the sea around him is obvious and understandable. He knows the sea is both a source of life and a cruel sea and his instinct tells him that it is the part of wisdom to know how to use it to his advantage. To those who inhabit very large islands and to those who live upon the continental masses the fundamental advantages and dangers of the sea are not so readily apparent; but to the student of political and economic struggles, to those who analyse the sources of national power and welfare, there is (or should be) an ever recurring appreciation of the importance of the seas.”
I would like to mention two cases in which two noted people of the British Isles stated how the sea could be used to advantage in respect of maritime power. The first is that at a function commemorating Trafalgar Day in 1957, Field Marshal Lord Montgomery had these words to say:
“In recent years there has been a school of thought which considered that there will be no role for the Navy in future war Never was there a greater error. It is clear that the Western Alliance must have free use of the water areas in peace and in war. The teaching of history is that from the days of early Rome the nation which had control of the transit areas and seas in the end prevailed.
Those are the facts. We cannot change facts. We must base our policy and action on them. Whichever way you look at it, the Western Alliance must be able to use the major oceans and seas. Today, control of the seas is a matter for ships and aircraft – all operating under naval direction and control. To carry out this task efficiently, the Navy must have its own aviation. Furthermore, the aircraft carrier of the Navy is the indispensable mobile airfield of modern armed forces. These mobile airfields are greatly valued by the Army.
In the future, air support from mobile airfields on the sea may often be the only support the Army will get in the early stages of those operations which are carried out at a distance from the normal airfield complex. There is, therefore, an Army need for the naval aircraft carrier and a need about which we soldiers feel keenly. It is obvious that in future war sea-power will be a decisive factor. And by sea-power I mean ships and naval aircraft operating from carriers, since the one without the other is useless.
The late war was in essence a struggle for the control of sea communications and until we had won that struggle we were unable to proceed with our plans to win the war. It will be the same in future wars.”
Then in 1968 the well-known historian Sir Arthur Sargeant wrote,
“Today the future of freedom depends on the realisations by the maritime nations of western Europe and their oceanic offspring in America and Australasia that if they can together control the passage of the seas as in the past, their survival – and that of human liberty – is certain but that if they fail to do so their destruction by the forces of despotism is inescapable. Western strategy should be based on absolute domination of the oceans.
To be successful and to be able to bring aid to our friends, sea power must be backed by air power and this cannot be done by land based aircraft Carriers are essential — a carrier is a mobile base of airpower.”
I turn now to the recent report of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence titled An Aircraft Carrier for the Australian Defence Force, but first I would like to quote some words which I think are as valid today as they were 15 years ago when I read them in an authoritative overseas defence publication. They are:
“The threats to our national interests vary from time to time We know or think we know what they are at the moment, we do not know what Ihey will be in ten years time and they certainly differ from the threats of ten years ago Indeed looking back into history, it is remarkable how few of the wars in which we have been engaged could have been foreseen even a short time before the event And it is perhaps a sobering thought tor the military planner that no intelligence forecast of the course of a war has been right yet and there is therefore no particular reason why it should be right in future.”
Under the sub-heading ‘The Potential for Global Conflict’, the Sub-Committee on Defence Matters states:
“1.14. An aircraft carrier capable of mounting and directing ASW operations and conducting anti-shipping strikes could contribute to the protection of the security of Western seaborne trade operating in Australia’s environs. Contributions would also be made by the P3C Orions in both an anti-shipping and anti-submarine role, the frigates, and in an anti-shipping role, the F111s and FA18s. Australia would need to make a contribution irrespective of the nationality of the shipping protected.”
This statement is generally true but it contains the indefinite phrase “operating in Australia’s environs”. In World War II hunter killer groups operated in the Atlantic, carriers escorted convoys cross the Atlantic between the UK and Malta (both east and west) and between the UK and Russia. Then as now carriers were an important part of the various factors which comprise ASW forces. I repeat the remark I made earlier that at sea the essence of defence is mobility and I would also repeat Field Marshal Montgomery’s remark that a carrier is a mobile base of airpower. Furthermore, let me give you an instance of the contribution one aircraft carrier made to anti-shipping strikes over 40 years ago.
Early in November 1940, a RAF reconnaissance aircraft reported that five out of the six battleships of the main Italian Fleet were at Taranto as well as a large force of cruisers and destroyers. The anti-aircraft defences included barrage balloons and torpedo nets. At dusk on 11th November, the carrier ILLUSTRIOUS with a screen of 4 cruisers and 4 destroyers proceeded to the flying off position 170 miles from Taranto. Twelve Swordfish were to drop torpedoes and the remaining nine were to drop flares or carry out dive bombing attacks. The result of the strike was that three battleships were badly damaged, another two had to be beached and severe damage was also inflicted on some otfthe cruisers and destroyers.
In the examples I have mentioned, three points will be obvious. First, that in the Atlantic and Russian convoys losses would have been much greater had it not been for the carriers. Secondly, Mediterranean convoys could not have been mounted had carriers not been available. Thirdly, the attack on Taranto was only possible because of carrier borne aircraft. In passing, no one could claim that these operations were restricted to the environs of the UK. Under the sub-heading ‘Invasion of Australia’, the Sub-Committee states:
“So long as there is no imminent or foreseeable threat, the concept of deterrence should be central to Australia’s defence planning. A highly significant component in the deterrent Australia could offer to a notional invader would be the capability to strike against its home bases (in the case of a regional power) or its forward operational bases with air and seapower.”
I do not think that anyone could disagree with the statement that the concept of deterrence should be central to Australia’s defence planning, but the statement that a highly significant component in the Australian capability would be to strike against an enemy’s home bases or its forward operational bases with air and seapower appears to be incomplete. If it is accepted that seapower would require air cover, then unless that air cover could be provided by carrier or shore based aircraft the seapower would be at risk.
Pursuing this theme in the introduction to its report, the Sub-Committee mentions that it is too early for information concerning the Falklands conflict to be available in sufficient detail for it to be analysed. However it has been generally known that had no RN carriers been available, the Argentine invasion could not have been dealt with. This fact was stated early after the cessation of hostilities and required no detailed analysis.
My final comment concerning the section headed ‘Invasion of Australia’ is the statement:
“1.26. The Committee remains confident that Australia would be able to internationalise the situation should an enemy attempt the sustained disruption of our external sea lines of communication. There would remain however the threat to sea lines of communication supporting Australian defensive operations. This requires that Australia should be seen to have the capability to protect these.”
I have two comments regarding this statement. The first concerns the Committee’s confidence that Australia would be able to internationalise the situation. As I remember, a few years ago it was accepted in Defence circles that despite the ANZUS Treaty there could be situations in which the US may not come or may not be able to come to the assistance of Australia. Again, harking back into history we can recall that it was 26 months before the US openly joined in World War II. My second contention is regarding the statement that Australia should be seen to have the capability to protect the sea lines of communication supporting defensive operations. Without organic naval seapower I do not understand how a realistic capability can be seen to exist. In these remarks I do not underestimate the value of helicopters embarked in frigates, shore-based airpower etc but as we all know they have their limitations. In dealing with intermediate level threats, the Sub-Committee had this to say:
“Warning time for intermediate level threats would be less than for a rnajor invasion but these threats should be considered years away rather than months.”
I will not labour this point, but we will all know about firstly the rise of the Nazi Party and how little notice was taken of that. Also, the warning received by the US of an impending Japanese attack in 1941 and what actually occurred. There is another aspect. Air operations at sea require an expertise which can only be developed over a number of years. It cannot be created or resurrected at the beginning of some warning time. In the final sentence of the section dealing with Intermediate Level Threats it is stated:
“In all cases (this presumably meaning all level of threats) use of an aircraft carrier is substantially dependent on a favourable air and maritime environment.”
I would like to mention briefly Operation Pedestal. The setting was that in the middle of 1942 supplies in Malta had reached such a low state that unless a convoy could arrive by the end of August then all stocks would be exhausted. It was decided that an escorted convoy of 14 specially selected merchant ships should pass through the Straits of Gibraltar on 11th August and arrive at Malta on 13th August. The escort was to comprise 4 carriers, 2 battleships, 12 cruisers and 40 destroyers. The estimate of the enemy was 21 submarines, 23 E-boats. 540 shore based aircraft and the possibility that the Italian Fleet would seek action. This was scarcely a favourable air and maritime environment. In the event, five out of the fourteen ships got through and Malta was saved. One aircraft carrier was sunk and one was damaged.
The importance of Malta in World War II bore out what Nelson had written at the beginning of the 19th century:
“I now declare that I consider Malta as a most important outwork that will ever give us great influence in the Levant and indeed all the southern parts of Italy. I hope we shall never give it up.”
There are other examples which spring readily to mind of carriers not operating in a favourable air or maritime environment, for example in the Mediterranean in 1940-41, the Russian convoys, and in the Pacific. However, I think that I have said enough to make my point.
Under the sub-heading ‘Air Defence’ the Sub-Committee stated:
“2.25. A means of ensuring naval surface unit freedom from air threat would be to use land based strike aircraft to destroy the enemy’s air strike capability before naval forces entered the area. Meanwhile the STOVL capability available in an aircraft carrier could provide some degree of air defence to surface units.”
My comment on this statement will be limited to one word and that is ‘Falklands’.
In dealing with ‘anti-shipping strikes’ the Sub-Committee stated:
“In circumstances where surface units were conducting anti-shipping operations an aircraft carrier would be effective.”
I would like to give you an example of where a carrier was more than effective, she was vital to the success of the operation. In May 1941, it was a RAF Catalina which shadowed the Bismarck in the Atlantic whilst RN ships raced to intercept her. It was torpedoes from Swordfish from the carrier Ark Royal flying in appalling weather which crippled the Bismarck’s steering gear and enabled the RN surface units to close in and sink her. There were no shore based aircraft capable of attacking the German battleship, and had the Fleet Air Arm aircraft not damaged her she may well have reached Brest safely.
One of the Sub-Committees statements concerning surveillance has this to say:
“2.48. Land based aircraft would provide the most effective means of providing surveillance but in areas remote from bases much of their effective time would be taken up in transit to and from the threatened area. In these situations an aircraft carrier could be positioned in the threatened area and a complement of helicopters and STOVL aircraft could provide effective surveillance but the distance to which this could be mounted would be restricted owing to the limited radius of action of embanked aircraft.”
I suggest that this statement is incomplete. To the words “in areas remote from their bases much of their effective time would be taken up in transit to and from the threatened area” could beneficially be added another sentence such as “Beyond their radius of action, unless effective satellite intelligence was available, air surveillance could only be provided by seaborne aircraft.”
In 1940, the German pocket battleship Graf Spee was sinking allied merchant shipping in the South Atlantic and it was necessary to find her. The Ark Royal with the battle cruiser Renown carried out extensive search and although the carrier’s aircraft did not locate the Graf Spee their negative reporting considerably reduced the area in which the German warship could be. This helped greatly in the positioning of British warships to which the conclusion was the Battle of the River Plate.
In one of the paragraphs of the Sub-Committees conclusions it is stated:
“7 The Committee is of the view that many of the functions performed by an aircraft carrier can be performed as effectively, or at least acceptably by other elements of our air and maritime forces.”
I suggest that the examples which I have given you do not endorse this statement. A similar view to that of the Sub-Committee was held in Whitehall in the mid-1960s. Briefly, the RN carrier-borne Phantom aircraft were transferred to the RAF and carriers were to be phased out. Later, the UK Government, presumably convinced of the need for carriers approved the construction of the so-called through deck cruisers out of which evolved the Invincible class. More recently as you know the Russians have apparently been studying the lessons of naval history and have built aircraft carriers.
My action in commenting on several sections of the Committee s report was by using examples to show where the lessons of naval history have seemingly not been learnt. The only point I would make on other aspects of the report is that I firmly believe that the government decision announced on 9th December 1980 by the then Minister for Defence to acquire an aircraft carrier to replace the Melbourne was a correct decision.
I mentioned early in this talk that one of Corbett’s reasons for writing Some Principles of Maritime Strategy was to convince people who believed that technical change had made the study of all past naval warfare irrelevant. However, I believe it is equally important to study the possible effects of technical change on naval warfare. For instance in March 1907, Wilbur and Orville Wright offered to sell the patents of their flying machine to the British Admiralty. The offer was turned down because as a senior officer recorded at the time it was not felt that the employment of flying machines by the Royal Navy would serve any practical purpose during the foreseeable future. However, it was in 1912 that the Royal Naval Air Service was formed. Six years later on 1st April 1918, 2,500 aircraft and 55,000 officers and men transferred to the newly created RAF and thus the RN lost all personnel who were experienced in aviation techniques and also the Admiralty lost control of all aircraft which operated over the sea. The British Government of the day had failed to learn or had ignored the lesson of naval airpower. There could well be a lesson for Australia in this example.
There is some very relevant information in a publication titled US Naval Aviation in the Pacific which was issued by the Office of the US Chief of Naval Operations in 1947. For example, it mentions that a considerable body of opinion between the two World Wars in both the US Army and Navy held that aircraft would quickly master the submarine. While this was ultimately accomplished, it came about rather late in the war after immense effort in research and design of new equipment and in the development of techniques for co-operation of ships and aircraft. Certain improvements in U-boat design and equipment which appeared too late to become operational on a large scale made it extremely doubtful that Allied superiority would have long prevailed. The publication also mentions that those who questioned the importance of aircraft were equally far from the mark. After analysing a considerable amount of evidence, the conclusion is reached that while times do change, revolutions are seldom as complete as the revolutionaries hope.
The publication contains some other interesting points such as that the experiences of warfare are never conclusive. They cannot be controlled like experiments in a laboratory, but must be taken as they occur. The impact of technology on modem warfare is such as to render generalisation and prediction doubly dangerous. Another point is that there exists no single science of war. There are many sciences with which war is concerned but war itself is a practical art and skill. It is impossible ever wholly to anticipate wars’ requirements as the experiences of the Japanese and Germans revealed. Any exclusive adoption of weapons or types of weapons immediately limits freedom of action and greatly simplifies the enemy’s problem of defence. War is a phenomenon of immense complexity whose problems are solved pragmatically by hard experience and clear thinking. There is a danger that investigation of a single aspect of one war may give rise to an unbalanced interpretation. Also limitations are as significant as accomplishment.
The report states that certain features of the war in the Pacific are of such importance that they must be considered in any planning for the future. Features which are germane to this talk are:
- control of the air was a pre-requisite to control of the sea,
- local control of the sea permitted the landing, support and supply of amphibious forces on hostile shores, and
- naval aviation was an integral part of the naval forces and as such possessed the specially designed planes and equipment and employed the special tactics necessary to fulfill its role.
A more general axiom is stated that technology is never static; it produces changes in the methods and tactics of warfare but it does not alter basic concepts of strategy. The experience of nations, besides the US shows, and the lessons of the war confirm, that modern warfare is highly specialised and each phase requires its particular aircraft equipment and tactics. In naval warfare, the necessity for complete integration of naval aviation with the other naval forces was completely demonstrated in the conflict with Japan.
I mentioned Corbett’s view that maritime strategy must be seen as a part of a larger national strategy which in turn derives from national policy. Relating this philosophy to Australia I can do no better than to quote Dr Robert O’Neill. He said:
“Is it the purpose of the Australian Defence Force to be able to influence developments in Australia’s regional environment or is it simply to defend the coastline and immediate approaches thereto? If it is the former, then a Navy without airpower will not meet the requirements. If it is the latter, then Australia must be willing to stay on the sidelines in regional developments which in the past she has found it wise to participate in.”
I have reached the end of my talk and you will have noted that any opinions I have given have been based either on actual events or the views of those who are or were well qualified to state them. My object has been not to live in the past, but to learn from the past.
The Author
Admiral Sir Victor Smith Joined the RAN in 1927 and specialised as a lieutenant in naval aviation by 1937. He was Director of Naval Air Warfare Organisation and Training 1963-55, CO of the RAN Air Station Nowra 1957-59 and CO of HMAS Melbourne 1961-62. He was FOCAF in 1966, DCNS in 1967, CNS in 1968-70 and Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee 1970-75. He died in 1998.
The ANI published his short memoir A Few Memories of Sir Victor Smith and a free e-copy can be downloaded at https://navalinstitute.com.au/wp-content/uploads/A-Few-Memories-of-Sir-Victor-Smith-2-copy.pdf . A biography of Sir Victor was written by former naval aviator Graeme Lunn entitled Admiral VAT Smith: The extraordinary life of the father of Australia’s Fleet Air Arm. The ANI book review is at https://navalinstitute.com.au/admiral-vat-smith-extraordinary-life/
