For much of the 20th Century, Australia’s broad approach to its maritime security was to align with, and support the preeminant naval power, first Great Britain and then the United States. But one of the most consequential times for Australia was in the wake of the co-ordinated Japanese attacks at Pearl Harbor and across south east Asia. Commander Dick Sherwood provided an illuminating article in the February 1992 edition of the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute on the efforts of Prime Minister John Curtin to reshape Australia’s maritime strategy at that time. It highlights what a good ‘feel’ John Curtin had for maritime issues and it provides an interesting case study that is relevant in 2025.
John Curtin And A Maritime Strategy Circa 1941
“…there was no greater figure in Australian public life in my lifetime than Curtin, I admired him both as a man and as a statesman…As Prime Minister he worked unceasingly for Australia and suffered much personally over the wartime decisions he was obliged to make… “
Sir Arthur Fadden
Introduction
Did the above accolade penned by Sir Arthur Fadden go far enough in describing John Curtin? Was John Curtin not only a much respected political leader, who guided his country through perhaps it’s most threatened years, but perhaps also a shrewd strategist, who at a time of a changing international strategic power base, ensured Australia’s sovereignty and voice on the world stage?
As one historian, E.M. Andrews, has suggested; Australians have tended to look for a strong and powerful protector to oversee their security interests in the broader international strategic arena. This because of a combination of; the vastness of the island continent it comprises, it’s seemingly remoteness from the main strategic centres of the world and it’s desire to allocate a primacy of resources towards economic development and social welfare.
Prior to the Japanese entry into World War II, the reliance was primarily on the UK and post 1941 on the US. Although these have been fairly broad trends, they cannot be seen as being an immutable base on which the nation’s foreign and defence policies have been formulated. Alfred Deakin as early as 1907 mooted the idea of greater American involvement in the Pacific, no doubt as a means of ensuring a broader protective umbrella to Australia’s interests. From time to time between the wars, it was again raised, as various political and military figures expressed doubts over the strength of the UK’s conviction to fully protect Australia’s interests or if not conviction then at least that nation’s ability to do so.
Since 1941, questions have also been raised about the strength of the relationship with the USA. As Andrews so rightly points out, the policy of relying on alliances with great powers leads to serious external weaknesses, especially if that great power’s interests are not fully strategically aligned with those of Australia. History now suggests that this existed in 1941, whereby the UK’s strategic priorities were at odds with Australia’s and placed Australia in a position of having to go it alone in the world strategic arena. This coupled with events that were beyond the nation’s control, raised the real possibility of Australia’s sovereignty being imperiled.
In more recent times another historian has suggested that this danger didn’t exist because the UK and the US virtually negotiated between themselves Australia’s transfer to an American security sphere. This however may be an oversimplification of what was an important milestone in Australia’s history, and especially that of her foreign and defence policies. Perhaps for the first time Australia was able to play a more mature role, in making sure her interests were noted by her great and powerful friends. The question is; how important was the part played by Australia’s politicians, diplomats and defence representatives, and more importantly the role of John Curtin as the guiding strategist.
Australia’s War Strategy
At the outbreak of war in 1939 Australia’s traditional ties with Great Britain through her cultural, social, polttical: economic and more importantly defence links were still extremely strong. If is only understandable then, that Australia’s considerable commitment (although criticised as insufficient in some quarters) was aimed towards supporting the defence of the Empire as it did in 1914. Nevertheless, the government of the day did recognise that the strategic problems facing Australia were quite different from those of 1914 because of doubts over Japan’s intentions.
As the fighting in Europe and the Middle East increased in tempo so did Australia’s commitment in support of Great Britain. This was a commitment generally decided on by the Advisory War Council (AWC) of which by October 1940, Curtin was a member, and with the general support of all political parties. Commitment to Europe – or specifically in this instance to the Middle East – was Australia’s historic commitment, stemming from it’s membership of the Commonwealth and it’s close ties with the UK. As time passed and war in the Pacific became an imminent possibility, Australians found themselves so heavily committed in the Middle East that very little of their armed strength-in-being was available for use in the Pacific, or for defence of the home country. This had been a natural policy to follow and was in part due to a belief in the ability of the British Fleet, based on Singapore, to halt any Japanese expansionism the island chain to the north.
This perception, was towards the end of 1940 beginning to change. Australia was represented at a Far Eastern Defence Conference held in Singapore from 22-31 October 1940 and although the general outcome was one supporting earlier British appreciations; that Singapore was the key to the British Commonwealth’s defensive position in the event of war with Japan, it had highlighted to Menzies and through him the AWC “the alarming position in regard to the defence of Singapore”, and of a need for closer consultation with British authorities. This was to take Menzies out of the country in early 1941 and leave Arthur Eadden as the Acting Prime Minister.
John Curtin & a Maritime Strategy
Remarkably, in what appears to be have been a policy independent of this assessment. John Curtin was embracing a new strategy based on the need for greater Australian naval strength, not only to the north but also in Australian waters. Thus at the AWC meeting of 5 February 1941. Curtin expressed the view:
“that the danger to Australia would come in the first place from the sea and, secondly from the air, while the army would only be brought into full action if both the navy and the air force failed”.
Paul Hasluck has dismissed this as Curtin’s private brooding over the war rather than the receipt of new information. Perhaps it may have been a greater willingness on Curtin’s part to note the advice of senior Australian military officers, rather than be mesmerised by that coming from London. That gave him a keener appreciation of the true situation. It is of significance that although Lieutenant General Sturdee was the only Australian among the Chiefs of Staff, all three deputy/assistants were Australian officers, and who had been the Australian delegates at the October Singapore Conference.
More importantly Curtin was able to win the support of Fadden, and on 12 February 1941 a cable was despatched to the Dominions Office requesting a clarification of the naval defence situation in the Indian and Pacific Oceans and recommending the return of all Australian and New Zealand “naval” forces now serving overseas. These concerns expressed by Curtin and accepted by the AWC were further exasperated by concern over where America stood in relation to a southward thrust by Japan as reinforced by a cable from the Dominions Office of 7 February 1941, and read to the AWC by Fadden on 12 February. As Fadden has subsequently pointed out in writing about the CounciI‘s deliberations:
“We were most concerned and very disturbed about what we could expect America to do in the event of a southward thrust by an increasingly aggressive and pro-axis Japan. America had not committed itself to a firm course of action and showed extreme reluctance to do so.”
Additionally, at the 12 February meeting, Curtin stated that he thought that if the war was going against the Allies, the US might concentrate in the first instance on strengthening Great Britain in the Atlantic and leave until later ‘to get back the outposts of the Empire.’ Once again Hasluck expresses doubt about Curtin’s knowledge of conversations along those lines, being pursued in Washington at the time, between President Roosevelt and the British Ambassador, Lord Halifax. Contemporary documentation shows that this possibility was raised by the Australian representative (Commander Henry Burrell) in Washington, in a cable to the Chief of Naval Staff on 7 February and shown to Fadden on 13 February 1941. Fadden further postulates that the message referred to earlier from the Dominions Office:
“…advised that President Roosevelt felt serious doubt as to whether the United States would enter the war if Japan attacked only British or Dutch possessions and that the President had also indicated that even if America were involved in a war with Japan, he felt that to fight an active war in the Pacific would be a dangerous diversion of forces from the main theatre of operations – Europe and the Atlantic.”
This again raises the question of whether the AWC and or Curtin had access to information either not kept as a public record or not yet found. Of further significance is that in his statement to the AWC on 12 February, Curtin also raised concerns over the possible transfer of American Naval Forces from the Pacific to the Atlantic. This is noteworthy in that it was an American proposal not formally made known to Australia until 3 May by the Dominion’s Office, although the new Australian Naval Attache to Washington (Commander David Harries) had cabled an outline of such a proposal to the Chief of Naval Staff on 1 May. It was a proposal that had been in the planning stage within the US for some time.
American Strategic Planning
Whilst during the period from 1921 to 1930 American national policy had been profoundly influenced by an ideology that the US should not enter into military alliances or maintain an offensive capability, the exchange of ideas between military staff of the US and the UK had commenced in the early I930’s. In fact US and British Staff had been discussing in quite definitive terms the possibility of war with Germany, Italy and Japan and the US Navy’s role in such an eventuality since 1934. The outcome of these discussions was a staff presentation to the Joint Board (the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations [CNO]), of the Rainbow series of Plans on 30 June 1939, which were based on the assumption of the US not supporting a war in Europe but carrying out allied democratic power tasks in the Pacific.
It would appear that this strategic plan did not have the full support of the CNO, Admiral Leahy, who was reluctant to commit the US Pacific Fleet west of Pearl Harbor. As 1940 progressed, US military planners certainly became concerned with what they saw as two underlying assumptions in British strategy; that Great Britain was a country relying on rapidly increasing material aid from the US and that British naval planners were hoping to rely on a token commitment of American naval forces to the South West Pacific. In September 1940 the First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, remarked:
“that it was very much in the British interest, that the United States Fleet should stay in the Pacific”.
At about the same time use of the Singapore base was offered to the US Navy. However, the US had other interests, or at least saw the strategic situation slightly differently. In October, 1940 the new CNO, Admiral Harold Stark, working on the premise that the defeat of Great Britain and consequent disruption to the British Empire would greatly weaken the military position of the US not only directly, by exposing the Western Hemisphere to attack, but also indirectly, by its constricting effect on the American economy, proposed a new strategic plan. Known as Plan Dog it in essence called for a limited war with Japan (in the eventuality of one occurring) and was essentially the precursor to the Adantic first strategy. All this occurring at a time, when those already at war, were attempting to get the US involved in military talks not only in Singapore but also in either London or Washington. Richard Casey, as Australia’s representative in Washington, was aware of this and arranged for a naval officer, Commander Burrell to be sent to Washington. Unfortunately domestic political considerations in Washington had prevented or at least put on hold talks in that city and US naval officers attended the Singapore conference as observers only.
A Naval Attache In Washington
The arrival of Commander Burrell at least gave Australia first hand contact with US naval authorities, most notably the Director of Plans USN, who gave him some hint as to US naval plans to reinforce forces in the Far East in the event of hostilities. Barclay argues that neither Burred nor Casey were shown Plan Dog and were thus unaware of the proposed Atlantic first strategy. It is of note that the official US war historian notes that this plan had not been endorsed by Roosevelt at this stage, the President having only authorised the conduct of bilateral military discussions with the UK which were to take place in January 1941. Vice Admiral Burrell in his autobiography highlights that he also had discussions with the head of naval intelligence and accompanied Casey for talks with the Secretary of the Navy (Knox) and the CNO.
As both the official cable from Casey highlights and Vice Admiral Burrell alludes to, his final day of this visit to Washington was spent at the US Navy Department being briefed on American strategic proposals in the Pacific area. In December, Burrell, on the recommendation of Casey, was appointed as the Naval Attache in Washington to whence he returned, to take up this post, in January 1941. One of his first tasks was at the end of January, along with the Canadian Naval Attache, to be present at discussions held between senior US and UK military staff. Burrell reported by cable to Australia and New Zealand in nine progress reports the general thrust of these discussions. As he points out, his first cable of 7 February noted that some portion of the US Pacific Fleet, based on Pearl Harbor would be transferred for operations in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas. The latter part strongly suggesting that there would be agreement over the ‘beat Hitler first’ strategy.
This period highlights that Australia was not completely left in the dark as to the higher strategic planning being undertaken by her great and powerful friends. In all probability due to the foresight of Casey. Most importantly, the consequences on America resulting from her participation in these conferences, noting that she wasn’t at war, were both practical and moral:
“To give effect to the jointly approved strategic conception, warships were moved over the seven seas, planes were shifted between combat points. Scare fighting units and weapons of other countries were distributed in accordance with its term. Had the American government refused to play its part in their execution, loss and trouble would have followed. The British and the Dutch would have felt themselves wronged. The problem is not peculiar to this instance. If a nation (or individual) enters deeply, as adviser or sharer, into the troubles or dangers of others, it must accept the duties of partner or the name of shirker. Public figures in their public statements and memoirs do not usually enter into subtleties such as this. But the President and Secretary of State were perceptive men and I think it safe to conclude that they appreciated this point.”
By early 1941, Australia if still dealing through her traditional links with London, at least now had both diplomatic and military representation in Washington. Both BurreIl and Harries dealt through diplomatic communications channels and there is enough evidence to suggest that at least the acting Prime Minister Fadden was seeing some of the information being passed back on future allied strategic directions and appropriate military staff appreciations. As could be expected it was mostly highly classified, undoubtedly limited in distribution and probably much of it destroyed after dissemination. P.G. Edwards has aptly highlighted the problems faced by historians attempting to collect the records of the period, and authors who have looked at the period, in time since, can be excused for having made some assumptions based on either incomplete records or through inadequate access to records.
Internal Influences
If political considerations were a feature of how public statements and professed policy were not perhaps a true reflection of reality in America, then in all probability the same was applicable in the Australian context. Menzies on his return from the UK in May 1941 found himself increasingly under attack from both the opposition and within the government parties for the way he had handled Australia’s war involvement to that date. Curtin himself was under pressure from within his own party, with views ranging from those of Eddie Ward, who desired stronger action against the government, to those of Evatt, who was advocating acceptance of a Menzies proposal for a national government. Curtin’s political shrewdness is shown in these circumstances by advocating a long term view that Labor would govern, and there would be no need to misjudge the dynamics of history by debate. Perhaps also from the knowledge he had gained as a member of the AWC, and perhaps elsewhere, (reflected in his statements of 12 February and 8 May) he was taking a long term strategic view of Australia’s circumstances. It may well have been something more than Hasluck postulates: that Curtin, in the face of an actual threat, was coming round to accept the proposition which he and his party had been denying for twenty years,
“British sea strength was still of vital importance…and similarly sea strength was the only force on which Japan could rely if she entered the war. From this aspect we should be in a position to counter at sea any action which Japan might take.”
This was not just a greater understanding of the dynamics of global strategy, and the deterrent value of sea power, but a realisation that the only real avenue left for Australia was a hope that the US Pacific Fleet, elements of which visited Australia in early 1941 would assume the role of the Royal Navy in protecting Australia’s approaches. Sworn to secrecy as to the proceedings of the AWC, Curtin would have been forced to play his cards close to his chest.
If one assumes that the government shared the same knowledge as Curtin, then the key difference is in the way they continued to pursue the country’s diplomacy and defence policy. Notwithstanding the separate entity of Australia’s diplomatic and military representatives in Washington, they continued to essentially deal through London, seeking British government and military staff appreciations. In dealing with the problem of Japan, Australia did not seek to bring it’s influence to bear directly, but in concert with British diplomats in Washington. The Bntish for their part, after Churchill came to power, left the diplomacy largely in the hands of the US, so that Australia suffered the disadvantage of acting with a party taking a more passive role. This in an area which was of vital strategic interest to Australia. Additionally, throughout 1941 the government continued to commit forces to the Middle East and Europe, despite their concerns over what appeared to be a noncommittal approach from US leaders to the defence of Australia’s northern approaches and the lack of adequate Bntish naval and air forces to defend Singapore.
The dynamics of the domestic political situation was undoubtedly a constraint felt by some in power as to what could become public consumption. The Australian population through their government had from 1939 focused their attention on events occurring half way round the world. Their relatives and or neighbours were fighting alongside their forebears in the Middle East and Europe. As one commentator has put it, the foreign policy was Menzies’, and what the foreign policy of Australia addressed itself to was the image of the world in the mind of its maker. He had committed Australians to their British heritage and to faith in the RN to defend their interests. For reasons of his own, but perhaps driven by the economics of the time, he had failed to sufficiently alert them to the dangers faced in their ‘own backyard’ and from the outset had promoted a ‘business as usual’ attitude to the war. He was unwilling to impose a heavy demand on the Australian population and saw the problem as one of time and patience, to educate the Australian public to the demands of war.
In this atmosphere it is not surprising that both Curtin and Fadden were hounded from all sides when they made elements of their War Council deliberations open for public consumption early in February 1941. Curtin and Fadden were both no doubt perturbed by briefings given by the Chiefs of Staff and the developing industrial troubles in defence related industries. Although the statement released did no more than highlight correctly the gravity of the situation facing Australia and call for greater efforts in preparedness, it was perhaps the shock needed to head off any apathy among the population in general with respect to possible situations facing the nation. Curtin was the author and instigator of the statement and once again, may have here taken the opportunity, to ease some of the burden be would have to deal with as Prime Minister and foresaw as facing Australia in the not to distant future.
Menzies, on the other hand, continued an adherence to the British view, one that the threat of Japan could be neutralised by victory over the axis powers in Europe. A view, in light of Australia’s interests, far too narrow in strategic outlook and one that led him not to make the demands he should have made and did not help to foster his countrymen’s confidence. As Hasluck has put it:
“Perhaps the one quality that was lacking was demand – a hard strong, unrelenting demand for sacrifice – a demand that was itself the voice of mutual confidence – a confidence of a leader in his people and an expectation of their confidence in him.”
It was to ultimately lead to his downfall and within a short period thereafter the ascension of John Curtin to the position of Prime Minister of Australia.
John Curtin as Wartime Leader
The assumption of this mantle of leadership in early October 1941 was in all probability made easier for Curtin by his prior membership of the AWC and his awareness of the dangers lying ahead. Yet he did not radically overturn the policies of the previous government, not only implementing the best of Menzies policies but enforcing them quickly, ruthlessly and continuously. Domestically, they were policies implemented by Menzies in July 1941 to increase Australia’s war effort and required by now little if any fine tuning.
In the area of strategic policy Curtin continued to support the policy of reinforcing the Middle East and as late as November 1941, considered the movement of the 8th Division and the newly formed 1st Armoured Division to there as well. Perhaps the continued support of these policies may have been the result of more favourable strategic advice been received from both London and Washington. In early September, the Dominions Office had cabled Fadden that the situation with regard to Japan was not only more favourable but as less tense. A view interestingly not shared by Australia’s High Commissioner to London, Stanley Bruce, who regarded these views as somewhat over optimistic. It was however supported in a cable from Casey reporting discussions with the Director of Naval Plans, US Navy, who suggested that Japan was unlikely to be able to take aggressive action for three months and in all likelihood would focus her attention on Russia. This of course did not mean that he gave in to Churchill over the relief of the Australian garrison at Tobruk, which had been ongoing since July nor the provision of capital ships to the defence of Singapore. On both instances he received Churchill’s assurances on the 27 October.
An Independent Stance
What Curtin did attempt to do was to take a more independent stance for Australia, with the view to greater cooperation with nations outside the Anglo-Australian-American link. Not only diplomatic representation to China set in place by his predecessors, but also an unsuccessful attempt in November to set up a series of quasi alliances involving the Netherlands, British Commonwealth, America, China and Russia as a means of deterring further Japanese aggression. His views on what he saw as Australia’s right to have a say in all decisions affecting her own interests were reflected in a speech made to members of his party, in Melbourne, shortly alter assuming the role of Australia’s leader:
“the real issue at stake in this war. What this country does; must be done by its own consent. We shall nor suffer from dictation from without. And to resist it we must have greater strength within. Only by standing together with those who are with us and for us can victory he won.”
Through both Casey in Washington and Bruce in London, Curtin attempted to ensure that Australia played a role in strategic developments and that she had her say in the strategy being planned for deterring Japanese aggression. In respect to Casey it was an attempt by him in late November, with the government’s approval, to try and play the role of intermediary between the Japanese and the US. At the same time Curtin was giving the UK a chance to provide some direction, questioning Churchill with regard to what policy was been pursued. Churchill’s response, that it was the UK’s policy “to march in time with the United States”, led Curtin once again to propose an Australian strategy for deterring Japanese expansion. Although it involved close collaboration with ihc US, it was not dependent on war between the US and Japan, before the British Empire should take action. Proposing the fullest support for China, occupation of the Kra Isthmus (strategically important for the defence of Malaya) it included a policy of providing assurances to the Russians, Dutch and Portuguese that any attack by Japan on their territories would automatically bring the British Empire to war with Japan or invoke armed assistance. From the Australian perspective it was making sure that Churchill’s mind remained focused on not only the Empire’s interests but most importantly Australia’s.
We now know of the rapid pace at which global events were moving, a pace perhaps because of the communication technology of the period, that was not readily apparent to all players. Yet Curtin showed a good appreciation of the deterrent policies required, and more importantly he was not afraid to be heard on issues vital to the defence of Australian interests. While it can be argued that Churchill did not reply directly to Curtin’s proposals, he did move towards a military understanding with the Dutch and on 5 December informed Australia of an assurance of US armed support in the event of a Japanese southward thrust. The War Cabinet had on 4 December recognised that the primary requirement was to prevent an enemy from reaching Australia and had instigated a review as to whether the navy and the air force could be strengthened by the militia. Although they had access to some degree of intelligence, which was enough to keep Curtin in Melbourne during early December, the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and the swiftness of the Japanese advance southward, no doubt came as shock to Australia’s leaders. What it had done was to get the US into the war, the only ally by 1941 with the necessary resources to defend Australia’s maritime approaches.
At War With Japan
It provided the catalyst to bring Australians to action. Curtin’s declaration of war, unlike that made by Mennes in 1939 was made independent of the UK and in a national address he made clear his government’s strategy:
“We Australians have imperishable traditions. We shall maintain them. We shall vindicate them. We shall hold this country and keep it a citadel for the British speaking race; and as a place where civilisation will persist.“
The loss of HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse on 10 December was not lost on Curtin, nor the fact that the allies had temporarily lost command of the sea in the Indian and Pacific Ocean regions, or that the strategy of the US was of vital importance to Australia. On 13 December he cabled Roosevelt with assurances that Australia, already playing her part in the defence of Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies as well as in Europe and the Middle East, warmly welcomed the opportunity of cooperating with US forces in the provision of a naval base at Rabaul and aerodrome facilities in territories under the control of the Commonwealth and in New Caledonia.
It would appear that Curtin was showing shrewd judgement in his recognition of the importance of the north east approaches to Australia through the Coral Sea and the need to keep the minds of US strategic planners focused on their importance. Earlier events no doubt had highlighted to him the fact that in Washington, Australia only enjoyed at best a low visibility, and that she was now competing with the ‘mother country’ for the resources of the ‘older cousin’. Perhaps also known to Curtin, was that at this time American Army planners were beginning to recognise Australia’s importance as a base from which to consolidate allied defences and ultimately launch the counter-offensive. On 12 December, the Pensacola convoy bound for Manila, was re-routed to Brisbane and on 17 December, General Marshall (Chief of Staff) approved General Eisenhower’s plan for the establishment of a base in Australia.
The Arcadia Conference
Of more importance was that Australia had learned through Casey of an indication from Roosevelt of high level staff discussions between the Americans and the British, to formulate a generally acceptable strategic plan for the conduct of war in the Pacific and Far East. This provoked immediate Australian concern over separate representation, recognising that British and Australian interests were not necessarily the same and that the Government was far from satisfied with the results of the policy of subordinating it’s requirements to those of others. Australia was however denied representation at what was to be known as the Arcadia talks, and which commenced in Washington on 22 December. Curtin cabled his strategic concerns to both Churchill and Roosevelt on 23 December and again highlighted Australia’s commitment to global strategy and her fears about her own interests.
Certainly the Dominions Office cable of the same date, outlining future British naval strategy would have been of grave concern to Australia. It highlighted an Atlantic first strategy, with a second priority of holding the Indian Ocean. It is with these events in mind, that one must look at Curtin’s so called “plea to America” published in the Melbourne Herald on 27 December. Notwithstanding the key lines: “without any inhibitions of any kind I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America free of any pangs as to our traditional links of kinship with the United Kingdom”, it went further and clearly enunciated Australia’s position, and highlighted to both “mother and cousin” that Australia in playing her part did not intend to be servile to either and expected to have a voice in strategic decision making.
It is of note that the official US War historian points out that American army planners at Arcadia were surprised at the lack of Australian representation, among others, and it may only be coincidental that following the publishing of comments on the points explored in Curtin’s article that the British and American staffs focused some of their attention onto the security of Australia and New Zealand. As since revealed by the drafter of the article it had been framed in light of efforts to secure additional US assistance and public apprehension in Australia that the UK Government believed that Australia might be lost and recovered later.
Conclusion
By the outbreak of war with Japan, John Curun had only participated in the strategic decision making process for a little over twelve months. Yet during that time he had increasingly exhibited a breadth of vision, perhaps not seen and certainly not articulated by his predecessors. It is perhaps unfortunate that his early death has denied historians the chance to establish the full basis on which his strategic outlook was formulated. Perhaps it may have been just the private brooding of a brilliant man.
Despite its comparatively small size, Australia did have a body of men, both civilian and military, in a position to provide strategic appreciations to their leaders, and Curtin’s access to information may have been more then official records now show us. What he most certainly did do, was to develop a more uniquely Australian view, one with a sense of independence, which while not denying the need for strong and powerful friends, made it quite clear that in playing her part Australia also expected to be heard. While history has already shown him to be a shrewd politician perhaps he should also be given more recognition as a shrewd strategist. Despite Australia’s low visibility from a political point of view, the campaign waged from 1941 onwards for recognition and acceptance, led to that recognition as a leading small, or middle power, with a primary interest in Pacific affairs and a significant stake in global affairs.
It was a campaign orchestrated by John Curtin. In 1941 he had been quick to recognise the critical importance of defending Australia’s maritime approaches by whatever means. A fact borne out in that the crucial operation in the Pacific War, in so far as the safety of Australia was concerned, was the Battle of the Coral Sea.
He had also recognised that Japan’s strength could only lie in her sea and air power and once again history has shown us that Japan’s defeat was inevitable once she lost control of the sea and the air.
About the Author
Commander Richard Sherwood RAN joined the Royal Australian Naval College in 1969 as junior entry cadet midshipman. He would go on to specialise in navigation. After an extensive sea going career he served as the Director of the Maritime Studies within the Maritime Studies Program (the forerunner to the Seapower Centre Australia). In that role he wrote and edited a number of books on Australian maritime strategy. He was the inaugural visiting Naval Fellow at the Centre for Maritime Policy (later the Australian National Centre for Oceans Research and Security) at the University of Wollongong.
