This week, the second paper to be reproduced from the ANI’s Seapower Conference 1987 is by the Chief of Naval Staff, Vice Admiral Michael Hudson.
The Maritime Defence Requirement
Noting that I was first on after lunch, I gave some thought to my introduction, and it crossed my mind that I should present you with some outrageous shopping list which is way in extreme of that that is already contained in the Defence Programme. But then noting the audience, not least CDF and the Acting Secretary, I felt their nerves could not quite stand that; therefore I won’t do it and you’ll be hearing nothing from me about half a dozen battleships or whatever.
But I emphasise that I see this opportunity as a sounding board for ideas and possibilities rather than any concrete predictions. It’s an opportunity that I welcome because the quality of our reaction to the challenge of the future will depend directly on the imagination and the original thinking of our people both within and outside Navy and Defence.
Let me first refresh your memory of the projects now in hand or planned. They include six submarines to be built in South Australia, with the first completing in 1994. There are the two FFG-7 frigates now building at Williamstown, and they are expected to compete in 1991 and 1993. There is the Anzac Ship Project, which will consist of eight light patrol frigates for Australia, together with four for New Zealand. And they will be built at an Australian site or sites to be determined. And, as most of you will be aware, the selection process is in an advanced stage. Then, subject to successful completion of trials of the two MHI “cats” that have been completed, at least another four more will be built in Australia. There are four survey motor launches that are to be built in Australia, and there are sixteen Sikorsky Seahawk helicopters now on order. They will be carried in the FFGs and provision will be made for them to be carried in our new light patrol frigates.
In addition to those projects which are well on track, Naval Staff Requirements are being developed for a second underway replenishment ship – simpler and smaller than the Success – and minesweepers, for coastal and offshore work, to provide an MCM capability, complementary to the inshore units. There is also the conversion of the Seaking helicopters to mine counter measures roles. And then there will be the future third tier, surface units for the role presently filled by the Fremantle class.
It will not have escaped your notice that there is almost total emphasis on Australian build. And those projects mean that we have a good idea now of the strength of the RAN in the year 2001. But I think there are several points that you should note. The first is that the DDGs, to date our most capable first tier combatants, will be gone or going, the second thing is that the earlier FFGs will be reaching their life of type at some stage in the first decade. The Naval aim is also to replace them with appropriate units built in Australia. We will therefore have to make some very critical decisions as to the future composition of our force, and if there is one point which I want engraved on the heart of every long range planner, it is “avoid the replacement syndrome”. We must be imaginative and creative in our thinking. Today’s solutions will not suffice to meet tomorrow’s problems. We have a responsibility to ensure that our requirements and our plans match the needs of Australian defence and of national security. And this, I believe, calls, as it always has, for close analysis of all the elements – strategic, political, economic, social and technological – which contribute to defence policy. And it calls for a very cold and realistic assessment of where our interests really lie, and the courage to take risks in the decisions we make.
What I want to do is to sketch the major issues in areas of strategy, our domestic situation and in technology which I see bearing on the ‘Maritime Defence’ requirements for the next century. But let me emphasise again that I am not attempting hard and fast predictions, but a survey of possibilities, and if it helps you all to give some thought to broader issues during the course of this symposium, then I will have at least partly achieved my aim.
Dr Bell has given us an excellent summary of the strategic setting. I think you’ll all agree that the evidence goes to show that maritime forces will be more important in matters of regional security and not less. And, as a corollary, the problems with which maritime forces will be faced will become more complex at every level.
I’d like to give you some examples. If there is now a technological margin favouring the Australian Defence Force over other nations in our region, this will have reduced to insignificance in the first decade of the next century, and I point to the growth of surface to surface and air to surface missiles, which even now pose a very significant air defence threat.
We will be more concerned than ever before with the provision of energy. We may be in a period of low oil and coal prices at present but there is no guarantee and little reason that this will last indefinitely. There are some indications that alternative energy sources such as solar power will be of increasing importance, and I don’t think we can discount nuclear power, despite the very significant environmental problems involved. Nevertheless, short of some extraordinary breakthrough, the demand for oil will continue and this will affect our maritime position in two ways. The first is that offshore exploration and drilling will become even more important than they are in 1987, and if recent trends continue much of that activity will be centred on the North West Shelf. The second aspect is that the prognosis for domestic production is that it will be increasingly insufficient to cover all our requirements, and that means that oil will have to be imported.
The sea will remain the medium for the passage of our trade. And my belief is that the constraints and the costs of energy will force a renewed emphasis on shipping over the more energy intensive aircraft, and I think the figures for international trade in recent years are very telling: 86% of the value of cargoes coming in and out of Australia and 99% of their tonnage have been moved in ships. My estimate is that further development in our export capacity, not only from a revival of the commodities market, but the development of processing and part processing and manufacturing capabilities, will sustain the percentage of tonnage and increase the value of seaborne cargoes. We now depend and will continue to depend on that trade, and we have to have the capabilities to prevent interference with it.
An associated question is the future of the merchant marine. I do not believe that the current surplus of merchant shipping will continue indefinitely. Tankers, container ships and freighters all have relatively limited lives and laying up a merchant ship does not, because of the general inadequacy of the preservation measures, generally extend its life.
I think we may have to wait till after the turn of the century, but I believe we will see a renewed burst of activity brought on by shipping shortages, and Australia, Australian industry and Australian shipbuilders must be willing to make what use we can of such opportunities to develop our own flag shipping. If we do not do that we face the risk of effectively being held to ransom by shipping cartels in a position to set the rates they want. I think it should be remembered and certainly never forgotten that an element of a country’s seapower is its merchant marine in all its aspects.
Even if the energy area is disregarded, northern Australia will in the next century be ever more important to the well being of the nation as a whole. The growth rate of the Northern Territory’s population is staggering, as are those for the north of Western Australia and Queensland, and we cannot, if indeed we ever could, think of an Australian heartland triangulated on Sydney, Melbourne and Adelaide.
I believe we will also have to possess a capability to assert our interests in the Antarctic. Now whether such a capability will be military or not will depend on the future of the Antarctic Treaty which has provision for review in 1991.
The South West Pacific will also become increasingly important. The rate of economic progress for the region is very difficult to forecast, because the present bases of development are so limited and the financial resources so dependent on commodity prices and external aid. Nevertheless, again I believe that Australia’s maritime forces will be increasingly involved in what will have become a far more developed network of surveillance and patrol. The Pacific Patrol Boat Project is but the first stop in that process, and the health of such a network will be of continuing importance to Australia’s overall security posture.
Well, if you have received the impression that my view of our strategic situation after the year 2000 is a “continuing on of the same”, you are largely right. The problems which we will face will not have altered in their nature but certainly they will have altered in their complexity.
I have two principal observations I want to make concerning our domestic situation: these were referred to earlier this morning. The first concerns the ageing of Australia. The fact is that not enough children were born in 1984 to provide us with a recruiting base for the year 2001 of the size we have traditionally required. The competition for the available young men and young women with the capability which the Navy needs will be intense. We have to face the prospect of continuing pressure on our manning levels, pressures that cannot be satisfied by budgetary measures, even if such are possible. We will certainly have to be more efficient in the use of our personnel, in assuring that the teeth to tail ratio is as favourable as possible. And this is an area where we have to be wary of continuing with traditional methods just because we have always done it that way. We must be strict in allocating priorities to everything that we do. and we must keep to those priorities.
That brings me to my next point. The considerable effort on Defence Policy over the last few years, culminating in the Defence White Paper of 1987, has created a situation in which there is almost universal consensus on the defence position and the direction we should be taking. But, short of highly undesirable strategic developments that would act as frighteners for the electorate. I don’t see any foreseeable major increase in the percentage of the GNP and the federal budget devoted to defence. We will have to manage with what we have and of course there is a major challenge for us here. And the challenge is that we cannot afford to let the efforts that have gone into increasing public awareness flag. Defence no longer has the popular sympathy that it had as a result of the First and Second World Wars. By the year 2010 the youngest man who could have possibly served in Vietnam will be 58 and the youngest operational veteran of the Second World War will be 83. So, as our efforts at defence continue, as I think we all hope, to be successful, the difficulty of keeping the public attuned to the problem is going to increase, and so must our effort.
Turning now to technology, the RAN is the navy of a medium power facing a funding dilemma, which has been very cheerfully described by the Naval cost analyst Phillip Pugh as “stop the world I want to get off”.
Now I offer the following as premises. First, it is an historical fact that technological costs increase in real terms over time. And, as this increase has been pretty consistent over the last few decades and over different types of ships, that trend shows little sign of changing either now or in the future. It is a problem that small and medium sized navies have had to deal with for years, and even the super powers are finding that their options are limited by sheer cost.
Maritime defence costs cannot be reduced without reducing capabilities – that is a simple of fact of life that we have to face. But I do admit that the validity of this proposition depends upon the already efficient matching of resources to capabilities. There is always a point, however, when any reduction in budget, however small, has a direct effect on a Navy’s ability to do its job.
I also want to emphasise to you that holding your level of spending is no solution because the problems with which maritime forces have to deal become progressively more complex and difficult over time. Capability in the maritime environment is a relative sub]ect, not an absolute one. That relativity is changing all the time.
It Is also true that technological alternatives short-circuit the costing process for only so long as no response has been developed. That means that, however attractive some solution may be. it will not be a permanent answer to your problems. If you have discovered the ultimate weapon you can be certain that your enemies are not going to rest until they have one as well. There is no example in history of a technological lead being sustained indefinitely between rivals. And I think the best recent example of this concerns the apparent extraordinary success that the Soviets have had in reducing the noise levels of their nuclear submarines. That in itself is forcing enormous changes in the United States and NATO methods and equipment earlier than the Allies had expected that this would be necessary. And where low frequency passive techniques were once viewed as the universal solution, now much more attention is being paid to low frequency active sonars. That is not to say that the alternatives are not valid or even desirable in the short term. They can, of course, be very useful; the point is that they certainly won’t be permanent solutions.
Small is not beautiful. For a nation like Australia with very limited resources there always has to be a trade off between the requirement for capability and the need for numbers. We must also realise that there are inherent efficiencies associated with greater size. And to support that statement let me mention Phillip Pugh’s estimate of the unit production cost elements for ships configured at 28 knots and 6000 mile range, both of which are highly relevant to our circumstances, and the characteristics we have set for the light patrol frigate. There is no doubt that there is a dramatic reduction in relative move costs between 750 and 3000 tons from 29% to 18%.
In my view there can be no doubt that our future as a maritime force will depend upon the use we make of emerging and continuing technologies, and there can also be little doubt that we face a continuing risk of being rules by the technology which we think we control. History is littered with examples of over-confidence in equipment and methods. Sophistication does not and never will carry any guarantee of effectiveness – rather the reverse. Working at the leading edge of development carries with it very significant technical and cost risks, even if there is no other way to go.
And again I’ll give you a couple of examples. With the sole exception of the Japanese, every major power in the Second World War found that their highly sophisticated torpedoes failed to work correctly. The British and the Germans had problems with magnetic pistols and one poor U-boat commander even had the frustrating experience of hearing a full salvo strike the hull of the battleship Nelson without exploding. American torpedoes not only did not explode for much the same reason but they could not guarantee that they would keep their depth.
And there is a second case, perhaps closer to home. Many of you would remember the destroyers – and perhaps would have served in them – Anzac and Tobruk. When they were commissioned in 1950 and 1951, these ships carried what was one of the most advanced anti-aircraft weapons in the world, the 40mm stabilised, tachymetric, anti-aircraft gun or STAAG. as it was known at the time. Radar controlled, automatic and accurate, it answered its staff requirement very well, with one exception. When taken to sea in an operational ship it rarely worked. The electrics and hydraulics of the gun were so susceptible to salt water that the first burst of spray short circuited the system. The fault was that the designers, in their enthusiasm for a weapon which was a quantum jump in performance over previous AA guns, had failed to account for the severely practical.
Well, you may ask, why did such technological failures occur? There were two reasons as I saw them. First, design and development was being pressed ahead all the time, so that no one had the time or was allowed to accumulate the experience with the systems necessary to de-bug them. The second, in the case of the torpedoes, was that they were so expensive that the navies concerned did not feel they could afford to conduct extensive tests under operational conditions, particularly tests to destruction, during the lean years of the 20s and 30s.
Those are not problems that are going to leave us. As weapons and sensors become steadily more complex and capable, the difficulties of devising and affording adequate testing methods are going to become more acute. Computer control, brilliant systems, are only as good as the software that has been written for them; programmers, no matter how clever, are as fallible and as prone to omit some vital element in their calculation as the rest of us.
So we have to make use of what analysis and testing capabilities we have and we have to improve upon them. We have to devise methods which will allow us to prove and check new technology as cheaply as possible. Our resources are and will continue to be so limited that we have to make every effort to ensure that whatever solution we arrive at is the right one for us here in Australia. And we must accept, as we have already accepted, that some technological capabilities are beyond our needs. We cannot engage in the process of “keeping up with the Joneses” in the acquisition of equipment.
On the other hand there is another side to the equation. The cost problem involves everybody, and thus every navy within and without our region. And the question comes down to one of how great an increase countries are willing and in a position to sustain. That of course is where innovative and lateral thinking will come in, and it leads to a number of questions; what developments can we afford; how can we substitute for some expensive capability; what technology can we leap frog, moving straight from a first generation to a third generation system, and at what risk in the intervening period? We have to keep a close watch on developments that offer significant operational advantages, and we are monitoring. for example, the progress of closed cycle submarine propulsion systems. There is no system available in the world in a sufficiently proven state for us – yet. The important thing is we must keep an open mind and open eyes.
And there are other developments which have potential. I have already mentioned low frequency passive and active sonars. Over the horizon radars may one day become seaborne; phased array radars are already at sea. They’re expensive, but development work on units for smaller ships is under way all round the world. Smart missiles of course are available, and they will soon be even more clever, faster and with longer ranges. But the defensive technologies are proceeding apace, and the new active off board decoys are, for example, one of the lines of development in electronic counter-measures.
And we may in the future see lasers as close in defensive weapons. Some of you will be aware that the Americans have recently been accusing the Soviets of using light weapons against their pilots. My estimate in fact is that defensive technologies in all environments are slowly redressing the balance, but the cost is increasing as well.
Helicopters will become more important and useful, and the Seahawk of course has been a major step there. The VTOL Osprey has a lot of potential, as do AEW airships. People ask, “Why not a small airship with each surface combatant?” Why not indeed? Let’s look at it. It would certainly be a very potent combination. Airships might also find a role in mine counter-measures, similar to that being taken up by helicopters, and they could also once more become anti-submarine platforms.
Small waterplane area, twin hull vessels and surface effect ships will also bear watching with their promise of improved sea keeping capabilities for reduced dimensions, but possibly not reduced costs.
There are other questions we should ask. Should we continue with as rigorous an application of military specification standards as has generally been the case in the past? Are there not likely to be substantial cost savings inherent in purchase of off the shelf commercial equipment? Can we afford the reduction in reliability and survivability which this might imply? And are specifications developed overseas necessarily applicable to Australian conditions? What alternative technologies will be available?
We in the RAN are already making a lot of progress with mine counter-measures and I expect that role will have continuing importance for some time, but there is evidence that developments in mines themselves will have much to offer Australia in the area of strike and interdiction. Mines certainly are becoming much smarter and, more importantly, more selective. We are not in the business of interfering with innocent neutrals. We have to look for weapons which are not only cost effective in military terms but selective in their targeting, or “responsible”.
Again, more questions. With whom can we co-operate to reduce unit costs? Will Australian designed and produced equipment be available to nations with which we should be co-operating? The Anzac Project with New Zealand for the New Surface Combatant is an excellent start in that direction and possibly long overdue. I would hope there will be future opportunities, and I suggest that the cost of research and development of future major weapon and sensor systems will force greater co-operative effort between the Western Nations. It’s already happening – the cost imperative seems to be driving us even faster.
Well, I think I have thrown up enough ideas and asked enough questions to show you where I think the future will lie. I would like to summarise the principal points that I have made to date.
Firstly, the Navy’s job will remain very much the same in principle but will be even more complex in practice. The basic elements of maritime power, the need (or presence, the protection of trade, and the ability to support land forces will remain.
Funds and people will continue to be limited, and it may be the latter which constrain us most. Costs will continue to increase. This challenge can only be met by the rigorous assessment of the priorities that we have, by the best possible use of technology, and by a recognition that there are some things that we cannot do, and some developments which we will not be able to use ourselves.
The possibilities of developing technology are of course absolutely immense, and such developments are likely to favour the defensive and thus the multi role – surface combatants that are capable of deploying such defensive measures in all environments – but the submarine will continue as the Navy’s major offensive weapon platform.
I think we can save money and increase our effectiveness by the use of developing alternatives, but there can be no expectation that such alternatives will hold cost down indefinitely.
I don’t want to pre-empt the presentations which follow, but I do want to conclude my discussion with some comment on the challenge which industry will face in the next century and that of course is what this seminar is all about. If the programmes already in hand have been successful, and I think that this in itself is an extraordinary challenge, Australian industry will be in an excellent position to meet the Navy’s continuing requirements, but I don’t think that any of us here can be complacent now, in the year 2001 or the year 2015.
I do see industry as having several particular problems to deal with, the first of which will be the need to improve logistic support capabilities. Building our own ships, to our own designs, means that we in Australia will have to be responsible for their support; there will be no lead country to which we can turn for advice or that quick fix. And if Australian firms tender for equipment they must have made allowance for through life support elements and be prepared to provide them.
Industry must be ready to identify and propose alternative technologies which result in real reductions in cost. That is the only way in which long term commercial profits could be assured. And, as a corollary of that last point, industry must assist in the acquisition process, by ensuring that it understands what the Defence Force wants; equally it must be willing to recognise that the buyer may be mistaken and to point that out as well. And there I return to the element of long term innovative thinking being the only key to success.
But, for its part, the Defence Force, Navy in this case, must explain to industry what the requirements are and we must stick to them. I think that industry must become more competitive in international terms. And I do accept that there is a point past which Australian industry cannot go, but acknowledging our commitment to the high wages which maintain our standard of living is not an acceptance of feather bedding, nor is there any reason why Australia should not be able to match overseas building rates and levels of Quality.
At the end of it all is that my view is that the challenge to industry mirrors that which faces the Defence Force. Innovative thinking, alternative approaches, a commitment to quality and the timely completion of contracts. All are necessary if Australia is to support effective maritime forces into the next century.
And finally I would just say this. As far as the naval programme is concerned today and looking to the future, for me personally it is a very exciting time which I share with my staff in Canberra. I hope that industry itself will see ft through the same eyes. The challenge is there, the challenge is for both of us, that to be successful and to reach the other end we are going to have to do it together.
Thank you very much.
About the Author
Admiral Michael ‘Mike’ Hudson AC RAN was born in Taree in 1933 and grew up in Sydney. He briefly attended North Sydney Boys High School before joining the Royal Australian Naval College at Flinders Naval Depot as a 13 year old cadet midshipman in 1947. Amongst the class were Ian Knox, who rose to vice admiral and vice chief of Defence Force, and David Martin, later a rear admiral and governor of New South Wales. Mike Hudson graduated from the Naval College as the King’s Gold Medallist for his class.
As a midshipman he saw war service in the aircraft carrier HMAS Sydney during its deployment to Korea in 1951-1952. He went on to specialise in navigation and subsequently qualified as a ‘dagger’ (specialist) navigator with the RN in 1963. Shortly after promotion to lieutenant commander he saw service with the US Navy in 1962-63 during the summer season in the Antarctic on Operation Deep Freeze.
Mike Hudson spent two years as the executive officer of the destroyer HMAS Vendetta including being deployed to south east Asia during the Confrontation with Indonesia. In 1970 he returned to Vendetta, this time in command. He later commanded the destroyer HMAS Brisbane, the maintenance ship HMAS Stalwart and the flagship, the aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne.
Ashore he attended both the US Armed Forces Staff College and the National Defence College of Canada. Promoted to rear admiral in 1982, he served as Fleet Commander and then Assistant Chief of Defence Force Staff (Policy).
In 1985 Mike Hudson was promoted to vice admiral and appointed Chief of Naval Staff (CNS). This was in the wake of the 1983 decision to abolish the fixed wing component of the Fleet Air Arm and not to replace the aircraft carrier Melbourne. Mike Hudson was the third longest serving CNS, retiring in 1991. His tenure was marked by immense and largely positive changes in the Navy and he is widely regarded as one of the most consequential professional heads of the RAN in its history. In recognition of this he was promoted to Admiral by Prime Minister Bob Hawke as he retired.
After his naval service Mike Hudson occupied himself at various times as a grazier, leading the Naval Association and being the chair of the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Cooperative Research Centre. Admiral Michael Hudson passed away on 27 February 2005 at the age of 71 after contracting lymphatic cancer.
