At the recent 2023 Indo-Pacific Conference the Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Mark Hammond launched the book Australian Maritime Strategic Thought 2013–2023 which was edited by Rear Admiral Justin Jones. The Seapower Centre Australia has now posted it on their website for free downloading.
In his Foreword Vice Admiral Hammond said, “Our minds are our sharpest weapons. Reading and critical thinking provides ammunition for our minds. Thus, it gives me great pleasure to introduce this volume on Australian maritime strategic thought covering the last decade.
“Ten years ago, a series of seminars around Australia provided the basis for a book titled A Maritime School of Strategic Thought for Australia: Perspectives. This collection of papers did indeed become a ‘rich vein on which to draw our collective understanding of maritime strategic thought from a whole-of-nation perspective’, as the editor had hoped. This book commemorates the tenth anniversary of that publication, and several of the original authors have contributed reflections on their thoughts.
“Readers will notice themes of both change and continuity: the more things change, the more they stay the same. Our backyard, the Indo-Pacific, highlights this. The strategic environment has changed, but our commitment to a rules-based order and to our partners and allies, and our geography, has not. As Peter Jones reminds us, Australia is a maritime nation; we are the fifth largest user of shipping services in the world, with maritime trade accounting for over 99 per cent of our imports and exports by volume. Under the sea are the seabed cables that enable our communications, financial transactions and access to trading markets. Our economic wellbeing and our national power is derived from the sea. Thus, national power is synonymous with sea power.
“I am pleased that a set of fresh perspectives is included in this volume. The essay topics are diverse and include: critical seabed infrastructure, nuclear stewardship for nuclear submarines, and Australia’s southern flank: Antarctica. All of these topics are compelling for maritime strategists and readers as we look toward our future.
“In his thoughtful Introduction which gives a good overview of the book and the work of the nineteen contributors, Rear Admiral Justin Jones wrote that, “I pondered whether 2012–2013 might come to be seen as a watershed period for maritime strategy in Australian strategic thought. The arrival of the tenth anniversary of the book seemed an appropriate moment to explore that question. This revisit did not involve a seminar series. Instead, a smaller group of the original authors was called upon to reflect on their original contributions. The authors were asked to consider what assumptions and arguments held true. Where did their assessments diverge? What are the implications of shifts in Australian thought? What are the key themes today, looking into the future? Before coming to the contributions to those answers, it is useful to recap briefly the evolution of maritime strategic thought over the ensuing period.
“Over the last decade, there has been a series of high-level documents published that contribute to the evolving strategic narrative in Australia. Three years after the 2013 Defence White Paper’s inaugural application of the term ‘Indo Pacific’, the 2016 Defence White Paper placed Indo Pacific economic transformation, the nature of the US–China relationship, and the stability of the rules based global order at the centre of its strategic outlook. The associated Defence strategic interests were familiar: a secure, resilient Australia; a secure nearer region, encompassing maritime South-East Asia and the South Pacific; and a stable Indo-Pacific region and rules-based global order which supports our interests. Note the emphasis on ‘maritime’ South–East Asia and the South Pacific, rather than a simple geographic delineation. The following year’s foreign policy white paper continued the maritime theme.
“In 2017, the government published a rare foreign policy white paper, describing its purpose as ‘to chart a clear course for Australia at a time of rapid change’. Maritime underpinnings were evident, the word itself appearing 34 times in the paper, along with a dedicated section on safeguarding maritime security, from which the opening quote is drawn. Peter Dean’s contribution unpacks in more detail the maritime aspects of the foreign policy white paper. A time of rapid change was a prescient assessment, as only three years later, and four years on from the last defence white paper, the government determined the need for a defence strategic update.
“The 2020 Defence Strategic Update was promulgated under the rationale of a significant deterioration in Australia’s strategic environment. It noted accelerated military modernisation, expanded cyber capabilities, major power competition, decreasing confidence in the rules based global order, and expansion of grey-zone activities amongst the reasons for such a degraded environment. Its new policy framework directed that Defence be able to ‘deploy military power to shape our environment, deter actions against our interests and, when required, respond with military force’. Concurrently, it tightened the focus for planning onto the ‘immediate region: ranging from the north-eastern Indian Ocean, through maritime and mainland South East Asia to Papua New Guinea and the South West Pacific’. Maritime remained an emphasis, with Defence directed to expand its regional cooperation in maritime security. Most significantly, the 2020 Defence Strategic Update terminated the long-held expectation in Australian defence planning of 10 years’ strategic warning time. A change of government in 2022, with attendant electoral promises, necessitated another defence paper, this time in the form of a strategic review.
“The Labor government’s National Defence: Defence Strategic Review 2023 outlined a regional balancing strategy, retaining the focus on Australia’s immediate maritime approaches, underpinned by the need to ‘focus its force’ and move to a strategy of denial. This may prompt a reappraisal of longstanding Australian maritime doctrine, given the Navy’s assessment in 2010 that:
“Because Australia is an island continent fundamentally dependent upon the sea for communications, and because it exists within a region equally dependent upon the sea, it is control rather than denial which more closely bears upon our national situation. Denial retains a place, but sea control operations ensure that Australian response options are not constrained and will be required whenever our national freedom of action is threatened.
“Noting Peter Dean’s analysis of the Defence Strategic Review within, no further comment will be made here. In terms of maritime strategy, one paper stands out. The Australian Government Civil Maritime Security Strategy was published in April 2022. It is a comprehensive document, covering the ‘problem set’ of Australia’s maritime domain, vision, interests, and strategic drivers. It defines civil maritime security as:
advance[ing] and protect[ing] Australia’s interests by actively managing non-military risk to Australia and Australia’s maritime domain. Effective civil maritime security ensures Australia’s ongoing ability to exercise its sovereign rights and obligations across all activities that occur within or affect our maritime domain.
“The strategy deliberately draws a distinction between civil and military maritime security and, by inference, strategy. This is the document’s drawback. The delineation between peace, competition, crisis and conflict involves grey areas. In the Australian context in particular, Maritime Border Command is the multi-agency taskforce charged with civil maritime security, yet it is regularly involved in harder-edged national security activities, noting the RAN and broader Australian Defence Force’s contributions to the mission. As Geoffrey Till has noted, ‘these good order tasks are rising both in relative importance and in scope and difficulty’. With that in mind, we can turn to our examination of a maritime school of thought over the last decade.
“Professor Michael Wesley’s full Vernon Parker Oration from 2012 opens Part I: Setting the Scene in this edition. In 2012, Michael had recorded his surprise at the lack of maritime imagination in Australia and, therefore, the substantive speech—with a good number of prescient observations— is included here. Following is a paper on the evolution of Australia’s maritime strategic thought since Federation by Vice Admiral Peter Jones AO DSC RAN (Retd). While this book is focused on the last ten years, it is helpful to understand the preceding history of our nation’s maritime thought. Vice Admiral Ray Griggs AO CSC RAN (Retd), the instigator of the ‘third way’ as chief of Navy in 2012, then reflects upon his original speeches and the maritime school of thought. The final paper for Part I provides the current view from the top. Vice Admiral Mark Hammond AO RAN, Chief of Navy, outlines his direction for the Navy, framed by the Defence Strategic Review. Familiar themes emerge in ‘diplomacy, deterrence and defence’—missions that have occupied navies for centuries and show no signs of fading.
“In Part II: Reflections, a series of the original authors tackle the questions described above. Professor Michael Evans leads with another sophisticated appraisal of the state of maritime strategic thinking in Australia. He is ‘less confident that Australia will embrace a genuine maritime strategy’. Geoffrey Till writes through the lens of ‘future proofing’ the RAN, noting that ‘meeting the requirements of both soft and hard maritime security will remain a particular challenge for the RAN, given the sheer size and complexity of its maritime domain and the manifold threats it faces’. Dr Peter Layton examines the two strategies Australia has recently adopted, the strategy not chosen, the implications that arise from this shift in Australian strategic thought, and the two key contemporary trends that might inform a 2033 successor to this chapter. Dr Chris Rahman returns to his theme of the ‘inescapable ocean’, concluding that in ‘designing policy and strategy for Australia’s geopolitical environment, the maritime context literally is inescapable’. Dr Alexey Muraviev takes a broader approach to assessing our progress, in particular proposing a national maritime Culture strategy. Dr Peter Dean provides incisive insight into the Defence Strategic Review from the inner sanctum of the advising and writing team, highlighting that ‘the security of Australia’s maritime approaches is essential to its national survival, peace, and prosperity’. A view from the cockpit was unable to be replicated for this book, however Brigadier Ian Langford DSC and Bars (Retd) reviews his original perspective of land forces in a maritime strategy, concluding that our ‘amphibious forces now need further evolution; future capabilities must include an ability for other domain forces, to include the land force, to contribute beyond the amphibious system only and deeper into the DSR-inspired ADF future maritime strategy’. Professor David Letts rounds out Part II with a review of the legal standpoint, noting that, if anything, the legal dimension has become more clouded.
“Part III: Fresh Perspectives incorporates a range of new authors. Some review the original book; many tackle new topics. Angela Gillham opens Part III with an industry view. She draws attention to the influence of climate change since 2013, and reinforces the importance of the role of merchant maritime industry for Australia. Dr David Brewster and Sam Bashfield explore the prominent absence from A Maritime School of Thought for Australia: Perspectives – critical seabed infrastructure. They argue that it is time for this topic to receive sustained attention. Dr Euan Graham reviews the original book papers, suggesting that Australia may not need a maritime strategy as much as a ‘national maritime narrative, at the political level, that can serve to educate and persuade the Australian public of the links between national prosperity and the integrity of the international maritime system’. Dr Liz Buchanan provides another perspective missing from the 2013 book: Antarctica and our southern flank. In the wake of the AUKUS announcements and, in particular, the government’s decision to acquire nuclear-propelled, but not armed, submarines, Associate Professor Maria Rost Rublee provides an important examination of nuclear stewardship. The final paper amongst our fresh perspectives is from Professor Bec Strating, who explores broader Australian maritime security strategy. In her view, explaining the importance of the maritime domain to Australia’s national interests is an essential project.
“Amongst the contributors to this book, views on Australia’s successful adoption of a maritime school of thought range from the enthusiastic to the pessimistic. One aspect is immutable, as highlighted by Peter Jones: ‘since Federation, Australia’s maritime strategy has been the product of competing demands and tensions’. This remains evident today, given the aspirations of the Defence Strategic Review and the modest resources at the disposal of the Department of Defence. The one paper in Part IV: Conclusion is by Captain Alastair Cooper RAN, Director of the Sea Power Centre – Australia. He attempts to summarise the arguments contained herein. In his own words ‘the most significant challenge for an Australian Maritime School of Strategic Thought will be to most closely match and represent Australian national interest’. He concludes that the Maritime School of Strategic Thought has had a good start, but will require an enduring commitment and development.
“Perhaps the reader can determine whether 2012–2013 might come to be seen as a watershed period for maritime strategy in Australian strategic thought.”
The link to download Australian Maritime Strategic Thought 2013–2023 is at:
https://www.navy.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/Australian%20Maritime%20Strategic%20Thought%202013-2023_complete_20231110_updated%20for%20digital%20publication.pdf
