By Jennifer Parker*
Last weekend, Israel struck back at the Houthis in Yemen after a fatal Houthi drone attack on Tel Aviv. But it is the Houthi’s persistent and indiscriminate targeting of merchant ships in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean that Australia should be most concerned about. It hurts Australia’s national interests, and it’s time to do something about it.
Seven months ago, the Houthis, a terrorist organisation based in Yemen, commenced an illegal blockade on the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, a strategic waterway connecting Europe and Asia.
Australia’s continued refusal to contribute a ship to protect shipping in this area or interdict weapons from Iran supporting the Houthis sends a concerning signal to state and non-state actors who seek to interfere with maritime trade. It’s a dangerous message to send by a maritime nation dependent on maritime trade.
Over the past seven days, Houthi attacks on shipping have intensified with three vessels hit by a combination of explosive uncrewed surface vessels, uncrewed aerial vehicles and ballistic missiles. It is time for Australia to send a ship to the Red Sea and a message that in an increasingly contested maritime domain, it intends to defend the maritime trade and innocent seafarers that keep economies such as its own functioning.
The Houthis initially claimed that their attacks were directed only towards ships linked to Israel, or en route to Israel. That category was later expanded to the United States and the United Kingdom. However, in practice, their attacks have been indiscriminate, at times even attacking vessels en route to their backer, Iran.
In the initial months of the attacks, many nations scrambled to provide support to the vessels transiting through this strategic waterway.
The United States, Australia’s closest ally, requested that Australia send a support ship. The Australian government declined, stating that it preferred to focus on its immediate region. Ships from the Netherlands, Greece, and Germany among others flocked to the region to protect shipping. Ships from Japan, South Korea and India maintained their continued presence in the region to support counter-piracy operations.
It is clear the Australian navy has capability problems decades in the making.
Australia has increased its Defence Force personnel in the region to support the operations protecting ships in the area and has nominally supported US and UK strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen, although the exact nature of this support is unclear.
But the lack of a Royal Australian Navy ship is a glaring omission.
It is clear the Navy has capability problems decades in the making. Despite a recent independent review team recommending that it needed to expand, the Navy has shrunk this year with the decommissioning of HMAS ANZAC, one of its 11 surface combatants and its two replenishment vessels seemingly out of action.
The diminished fleet is further pressured by the need to upgrade its surface combatants – pressures further compounded by the need for a presence in South-East Asia and support to Operation Sovereign Borders, which detects and intercepts irregular migrants en route to Australia.
These challenges will plague the Royal Australian Navy for years to come, but even without these problems, governments need to make decisions about scarce resources.
Australia should prioritise the deployment of a Navy ship to the Red Sea for three key reasons.
These waterways matter to Australian trade. There have been reports of Australian exports of livestock being stranded at sea, imports of consumer goods from Europe being delayed by the extended trip, and further delays due to increased congestion in Singapore. After all, the European Union is Australia’s third-largest trading partner.
Second, and more important than the disruption of trade is the message Australia’s absence sends to state and non-state actors in an increasingly contested maritime domain. Australia’s stated strategy is one of deterrence by denial, that is deterring would-be adversaries from interfering with its national interests. Deterrence requires three elements: capability, intent and credibility. The freedom of international maritime trade is at the core of Australia’s national interests, and failing to send a ship fundamentally undermines a deterrence strategy, bringing into question Australia’s capability and credibility in the maritime domain.
Thirdly, as well as the strategic justification for sending a ship, such a deployment would also provide unrivalled benefits to Royal Australian Navy personnel in understanding how their untested systems, weapons, tactics and procedures perform against the Houthis’ missiles and drones. Countries that have deployed vessels to the region have gained invaluable information on how their systems, tactics and procedures will fare in an operational environment, including a Danish frigate, which reportedly experienced critical failures with its radar and combat management systems and had to return home.
It is better to gain this experience and understanding now against the Houthis, than in a conflict involving a much more competent and credible adversary. And let’s not forget, we no longer have strategic warning time – the chances of the ADF’s women and men having to defend against these threats on a greater scale are increasing.
When Australia declined to send a ship to the Red Sea in December last year, the government probably thought the Houthi attacks on shipping would be a short-term phenomenon. But despite international condemnation and strikes from the US and the UK on targets, the Houthis have displayed an unexpected persistence and resilience to hold international shipping at risk.
This strategic waterway is an area that matters to Australia, as does the country’s credibility and capability when it comes to protecting maritime trade. It’s time for Australia to send a ship to the Red Sea.
*Jennifer Parker is an expert associate at the National Security College, Australian National University, with more than 20 years’ experience in the Australian Department of Defence.
