By Nick Tate*
The Captain Cook Graving Dock is Australia’s only dry berth for the Navy’s largest ships. At over 80 years old, it is a single point of failure. The auditor-general recently reported more than 200 urgent defects on amphibious ships, with dock access a contributing factor.
This dependency is a structural risk. It constrains scheduling, pressures sustainment cycles and leaves no redundancy if the dock is unavailable due to breakdown, weather or security events. A single failure could delay multiple platforms, undermining availability targets and Australia’s regional presence.
The Henderson Defence Precinct already sustains frigates, patrol vessels and submarines. With industrial depth in place, it is the logical site for a second national dry dock. This reflects the two-ocean Navy vision from the 2016 Defence white paper, which emphasised the need for force structure and basing across both the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
Defence has already signalled its intent to consolidate infrastructure at Henderson, and planning work is progressing for this to include options for a large vessel dry dock. This is a step in the right direction. A west coast facility would:
- Reduce transit times for Indian Ocean operations.
- Provide resilience if Garden Island, NSW, is unavailable.
- Support the basing of future platforms on the west coast.
- Strengthen sovereign sustainment by building large vessel capacity across two oceans.
This is not duplication. It is strategic redundancy, and the fact that it is now part of formal planning should be welcomed and accelerated.
Governance and culture
The challenge is not only the infrastructure itself but also how it is governed. Too often, infrastructure planning is treated as secondary to operations. Immediate tasking, foreign visits or exercises are often prioritised over sustainment windows. Delivery teams operate in project silos that do not reflect the tempo of Navy operations.
The result is misalignment. Critical infrastructure upgrades are delayed, or worse, scheduled against operational surges. Projects focus on individual assets without considering whole precinct needs.
The Naval Shipbuilding and Sustainment Plan has introduced precinct planning and partnerships, but alignment across Defence remains uneven. Availability gaps will persist unless governance shifts from siloed delivery to systems planning.
The AUKUS challenge
AUKUS has rightly driven focus on nuclear infrastructure at HMAS Stirling and Henderson. Security, regulatory and stewardship requirements are pressing and timelines are unforgiving. However, it’s important that this focus does not disproportionately limit broader infrastructure investment.
Amphibious ships, surface combatants and support vessels remain critical to Australia’s maritime posture. Their operational readiness depends on infrastructure: secure ordnance storage, medium-weight berths, modern workshops and upgraded power and waste systems. If these capabilities are deprioritised to meet nuclear sustainment demands, day-to-day readiness will be compromised.
To realise the two-ocean Navy, infrastructure investment needs to consider the operational needs of the full fleet, not just submarines.
Learning from the Navy Capability Infrastructure Subprogram
There are examples where Defence has taken a more integrated and capability-focused approach to infrastructure. The Navy Capability Infrastructure Subprogram (NCIS) has delivered targeted precinct upgrades aligned directly with platform needs, from ordnance handling and explosive storage to training facilities and wharf improvements. Its success shows that readiness outcomes improve when infrastructure is planned as part of the capability package and industry delivery is more predictable.
The LAND 8710 Littoral Manoeuvre Vessel program will bring new requirements for berthing, fuel, maintenance and heavy-vehicle integration. Unlike Army’s standard land assets, these vessels cannot simply be parked until needed. Their seaworthiness must be maintained continuously, with a much more complex sustainment approach that demands purpose-built facilities and infrastructure.
Maintenance will not be an episodic activity but an enduring requirement, critical to ensuring the ships are ready to sail when called upon. Extending the NCIS approach to LAND 8710 would ensure infrastructure delivery keeps pace with the platform’s introduction and avoids the sequencing problems that have hindered earlier projects.
Reframing infrastructure
Enhancing readiness requires investment in infrastructure as a strategic capability. That means:
- Recognising infrastructure as capability, not overhead.
- Holding commanders accountable for infrastructure outcomes.
- Supporting and accelerating plans for a second dry dock at Henderson.
- Aligning precinct planning with operational tempo, not just project milestones.
- Balancing nuclear investment with conventional fleet sustainment.
- Extending the NCIS approach to programs like LAND 8710 to avoid sequencing failures.
Infrastructure is not a support service. It is the condition for readiness. If a ship cannot dock, refuel or be sustained on time, it is not available to government, regardless of its capability on paper.
Australia cannot afford maritime vessels, whether Navy or Army, that look ready in concept but are restricted in practice. Strategic competition is not a future scenario. It is already shaping the fleet’s daily operational tempo. That reality demands a reinvestment in the harbours of readiness that will carry the fleet into its next era.
*Captain (Ret’d) Nick Tate, RAN, served in the Royal Australian Navy for more than 39 years and now leads defence infrastructure engagements for a major delivery partner.
