By Mihai Sora*
Australia should lead the creation of a formal intelligence-sharing framework — a “Pacific Eyes agreement” — initially involving Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, and Fiji, the four most closely aligned countries in the region. Conceptually akin to Five Eyes but adapted for Pacific Island realities, such an arrangement would move ad hoc bilateral exchanges into a structured, multi-country mechanism for systematic and continuous intelligence collaboration. (From: The Lowy Institute.)
The framework would strengthen capabilities by embedding intelligence training and operational security support in PNG and Fiji, backed by targeted investments in intelligence architecture. Transparent governance and incremental sharing protocols would build trust, ensuring the arrangement is both credible and politically sustainable.
A phased rollout should begin with less sensitive but high-priority areas: maritime domain awareness, transnational crime, illegal fishing, disaster response, climate-related security, and cybersecurity. Expansion into politically sensitive domains would be conditional on proven trust and operational success.
This incremental model mitigates risk while maximising early benefits. It delivers immediate gains in security coordination while establishing the foundations for deeper regional integration. Over time, “Pacific Eyes” would generate a more resilient, capable, and strategically aligned Pacific security community — one better equipped to manage geopolitical competition and transnational threats alike.
When a delegation of Pacific Island ministers toured a Chinese coastguard mega-vessel in May 2025, it was a telling sign of the times. [1] The Pacific Islands have become an arena for intensifying geopolitical competition, with Beijing making unprecedented security inroads in recent years. [2]
In 2022, China stunned the region by signing a secretive security pact with Solomon Islands — the first such arrangement in the Pacific — raising the prospect of Chinese forces deployed in Australia’s immediate neighbourhood. [3] Police advisers have been dispatched to Solomon Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Vanuatu, and beyond, [4] an action plan for a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership was inked with Cook Islands in early 2025, [5] and Chinese naval [6] and coastguard [7] vessels are appearing more frequently in Pacific Island waters. In late 2024, China conducted its first intercontinental ballistic missile test in the Pacific Ocean since 1980, in an unmistakeable display of military reach. [8]
Australia has responded by pursuing closer integration with Pacific Island countries, across security, economic, and community ties. Deals with Tuvalu, [9] Nauru, [10] and PNG [11] will bring tighter bilateral security integration. A mutual defence treaty with PNG will mark that country’s first alliance with any country, if ratified. [12] Ties with Fiji were upgraded in July 2025, embedding Australian Federal Police officers alongside local counterparts. [13]
At a regional level, Canberra has championed the Pacific Policing Initiative [14] (for law enforcement cooperation) and the Pacific Response Group [15] (for defence humanitarian deployments).
These initiatives are part of record Pacific Islands aid spending by the Australian government of $2.157 billion in 2025 [16] — clear evidence of Canberra’s growing commitment to the region, as well as its increasing strategic anxiety. Despite rising costs, closer economic and security integration remains Australia’s best option to address regional security threats, ensure stability, and preserve influence.
Yet gaps persist. Pacific Island countries face daunting challenges, from illegal fishing and transnational crime to cyber threats and natural disasters. [17]
They lack a mechanism to systematically share intelligence and coordinate responses. The Pacific Fusion Centre, [18] established in 2019 as a hub for open-source analysis, is useful but insufficient; [19] it lacks a mandate for classified intelligence, leaving blind spots on issues like transnational crime and cyber threats.
Effective responses require robust intelligence cooperation. While intelligence diplomacy already features in Australia’s [20] and New Zealand’s [21] relationships with Pacific Island countries, exchanges are not systematic, and not always effective, [22]particularly in the absence of already established relationships of strategic trust.
This fractured approach is untenable in the face of mounting security challenges and increasing stakes. Beyond crime, climate, and cyber threats, the deeper risk is that these vulnerabilities create space for external actors — above all China — to gain leverage in the Pacific Islands. That is likely to be corrosive to regional governance and stability, and comes at the expense of the influence Australia and New Zealand can exercise.
A Pacific intelligence-sharing arrangement involving Australia, New Zealand, PNG, Fiji, and other willing Pacific Island countries would help to close those gaps and provide regional partners with the shared awareness needed to anticipate and blunt geopolitical coercion.
PNG [23] and Fiji, [24] both reforming and modernising their national security systems, are especially well-placed to act as regional intelligence providers, and are growing more strategically aligned with Australia and New Zealand.
Establishing systematic intelligence cooperation among these four actors would vividly demonstrate reciprocal trust and genuine security partnership at a time of great need. It would strengthen regional resilience, pool resources against common threats, and help plug gaps that external powers are eager to exploit.
From transnational threats to strategic openings
The turquoise waters of the Pacific Islands belie a growing array of security threats that no country in the region, not even Australia or New Zealand, can fully address alone. PNG and Fiji have strong incentives to join an intelligence-sharing framework to strengthen their own security.
TRANSNATIONAL CRIME
Transnational crime has surged across the Pacific Islands, exploiting weak governance and vast geography. [25] Drug cartels with connections to mainland China increasingly use remote routes to smuggle methamphetamine and cocaine to Australia, sowing crime and corruption along the way. In one recent case, Fijian police, aided by Australia and regional partners, seized more than four tonnes of methamphetamine near Nadi, one of the largest busts in Pacific Islands history. [26]
While the Pacific Transnational Crime Network [27] links 21 countries, and Samoa hosts a Transnational Crime Coordination Centre, cooperation remains sporadic. [28]Organised crime groups continue to exploit jurisdictional gaps, trafficking people, guns, and illicit goods, and engaging in online child exploitation.
As the 2025 Pacific Security Outlook notes, “underreporting … coupled with limited information sharing, means that the scope and scale of transnational organised crime in the region largely remains an intelligence gap”. [29] Here, the Australian Federal Police’s Intelligence Branch and the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission could play prominent roles, helping facilitate more robust criminal intelligence policing work.
ILLEGAL FISHING
Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing is another major threat, depleting fisheries vital for Pacific Island livelihoods. [30] Distant-water fleets, notably from China and Taiwan, are the most frequent offenders. Small island states, often with only one or two patrol boats, struggle to monitor vast exclusive economic zones.
The Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency coordinates enforcement exercises with Australian, American, French, and New Zealand support, but resources remain stretched. [31] The 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent [32] emphasises protecting sovereignty over maritime resources, yet enforcement capacity is thin. [33]Without sufficient intelligence-sharing, Pacific Island countries often detect incursions only after the damage is done.
POLITICAL INSTABILITY
Fragile domestic security and under-performing governance mechanisms (including legal, audit, inspection, and law enforcement entities) compound these external threats. Riots, unrest, and violent crime have rocked countries such as Tonga, New Caledonia, Solomon Islands, and PNG, and appear to be happening more frequently. Honiara’s 2021 riots, fuelled by social grievances and geopolitical tensions, triggered a regional intervention. [34] PNG experienced deadly riots in January 2024 that devastated parts of Port Moresby, [35] while tribal conflict continues in the Highlands. [36]
In contexts already marked by unemployment, crime, and local tensions, instability quickly escalates. Timely sharing of intelligence on emerging unrest or organised violence could help prevent or mitigate the risks arising from flashpoints. Yet no regional system exists to pool political or law-enforcement intelligence in real time.
CLIMATE CHANGE
Pacific leaders consistently identify climate change as the “single greatest threat” to security. [37] Cyclones, king tides, droughts, and floods are striking with greater frequency and intensity.
In 2015, Cyclone Pam levelled villages in Vanuatu. [38] In 2020, Cyclone Harold roared across four Pacific Island countries. [39] Such disasters devastate economies, displace communities, and inflame unrest.
Intelligence-sharing on climate, while less intuitive than on crime or espionage, is critical for climate resilience. Shared satellite data, early warning systems, and regional assessments could help Pacific governments anticipate and mitigate risks. Here, Headquarters Joint Operations Command’s military intelligence branch (J2), Australian Border Force, and the Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation could help. At present, however, regional capacity for climate-related intelligence remains limited.
CYBERATTACKS
The Pacific Islands’ rapid digital transition has exposed governments and infrastructure to cyberattacks. [40] In 2022, a ransomware attack paralysed Vanuatu’s government for weeks, crippling basic services and even hospitals. [41] In 2024, Chinese state-backed hackers infiltrated Pacific Islands Forum IT systems, targeting confidential leader communications. [42] Many incidents remain unreported for political and reputational reasons.
Despite accelerating digitalisation, cyber defences lag dangerously. As the 2025 Pacific Security Outlook observes, “national and regional data on cyber incidents and crimes in the Pacific remains an ongoing intelligence gap”. [43] Without robust sharing of threat intelligence such as emerging malware, tactics, and capabilities of hostile actors, Pacific Island governments remain perilously exposed.
The Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) has developed a public-facing outreach program covering the “Essential Eight” cyber security steps to protect devices and has opened offices in state capitals. The Australian Signals Directorate and the ACSC could play a leading role in helping to educate and mitigate the risks faced by Pacific Island communities.
INTERCONNECTED THREATS, SILOED EFFORTS
Transnational crime, resource theft, internal unrest, cyber intrusions, foreign interference, and climate disasters are interconnected and feed off limited local capacity. Leaders have repeatedly acknowledged them in declarations from Honiara to Boe. [44] Yet vital information remains siloed in national agencies or goes uncollected.
These vulnerabilities are simultaneously acute domestic pressures for Pacific Island countries and strategic openings that external powers can exploit, as Beijing’s growing role in Pacific Islands policing and digital systems demonstrates.
The absence of regional intelligence architecture leaves the Pacific Islands unable to aggregate data, identify patterns, and push timely warnings to those who need them. A “Pacific Eyes” initiative would aim to close this gap, creating a trusted circle of partners dedicated to intelligence-sharing for collective security.
A patchwork of security initiatives
Given the array of transnational threats, one might expect robust security cooperation in the Pacific Islands. In reality, current arrangements form a loose patchwork of bilateral and multilateral deals. [45] Useful in parts, but lacking cohesion and depth.
AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND REMAIN KEY PACIFIC SECURITY PARTNERS
Australia and New Zealand, as traditional allies and aid donors, have signed a flurry of agreements with Pacific Island countries in recent years. Australia remains the dominant security partner, accounting for more than half of the region’s defence and policing deals. [46]
These range from broad bilateral agreements, such as the Fiji–Australia Vuvale Partnership [47] and the New Zealand–Fiji Duavata Partnership, [48] covering development, security, and economic cooperation, to sector-specific programs like the Pacific Maritime Security Program, which supplies patrol boats and training. [49]
Canberra has police cooperation programs in almost every Pacific Islands Forum country. [50] Its agreements with Nauru and Tuvalu introduced firm defence and security consultation obligations in exchange for tailored development assistance. [51]
A mutual defence treaty signed with PNG in October 2025 will introduce closer military integration, if ratified. [52] Regionally, Australia has promoted programs such as the Pacific Policing Initiative and Pacific Response Group, focusing on law enforcement and defence humanitarian deployments, though both remain at early stages. [53]
The United States has also consolidated its security role. A 2023 Defence Cooperation Agreement with PNG granted US forces unimpeded access to six strategic locations. [54] Washington simultaneously renewed its Compacts of Free Association with Marshall Islands, Palau, and Federated States of Micronesia, under which the United States remains responsible for defence. [55]
REGIONAL OPERATIONAL AGREEMENT LACKING
Despite this activity, major gaps remain. Most Australian and New Zealand agreements stop short of binding defence guarantees or deep intelligence-sharing. They allow for training, joint exercises, and some intelligence cooperation, but do not equate to a regional coalition.
At the regional level, the Pacific Islands Forum has endorsed the 2000 Biketawa Declaration, the 2018 Boe Declaration, and the September 2025 Blue Pacific Ocean of Peace Declaration, which encourage collective crisis responses and broaden the definition of security. [56] Yet these remain political commitments rather than operational mechanisms.
The intelligence dimension is particularly underdeveloped. The Pacific Fusion Centre produces assessments on non-traditional threats such as climate and health security using unclassified data. But as analysts stress, it is not a true “fusion centre”: it lacks access to classified inputs from major powers or even Pacific police databases. [57]
Other networks exist — the Pacific Transnational Crime Network and the newer Pacific Cyber Security Operational Network — but these rely on trust and informal protocols rather than binding agreements. Intelligence cooperation typically occurs bilaterally within established comfort zones (e.g. PNG police with the Australian Federal Police, Fiji’s military with New Zealand’s). There is no regional equivalent of Five Eyes: no Pacific intelligence “club” pooling analysis on strategic threats.
CHINA’S GROWING PRESENCE
China has been quick to exploit these gaps. In 2022, Foreign Minister Wang Yi attempted to push a sweeping multilateral security pact with ten Pacific Island states covering policing and cyber cooperation. [58] Though Pacific Island leaders rebuffed it, the episode highlighted the absence of a comparable Western-supported alternative — a void Beijing is eager to fill.
Wang Yi concluded more than 50 bilateral agreements during his eight-country Pacific Islands tour in 2022. [59]
Beijing has identified policing as a soft entry point. Most Pacific Island countries lack militaries, leaving police forces as the primary security actors, often underfunded. China has provided vehicles, riot gear, drones, radios, and replica weapons, and regularly hosts Pacific Island officers for training. It has stationed police liaison officers in embassies and, since 2021, deployed advisory teams in Solomon Islands. By 2025, Chinese police trainers were active in at least four countries: Kiribati, [60]Vanuatu, [61] Fiji, [62] and Solomon Islands, [63] and Beijing funded Samoa’s first dedicated police academy. [64]
These efforts serve practical purposes, protecting Chinese nationals and investments during unrest, but also strategic ones: embedding influence within Pacific Island security institutions and potentially gaining access to sensitive information.
Pacific Island leaders are wary, yet see value in selective cooperation. Fiji suspended its police cooperation with China in 2022 over concerns about authoritarian methods, repatriating embedded Chinese officers, but it ultimately retained its agreement. [65]
As one PNG police official noted, “international partners are keen and coming in” to help with emerging crimes, and PNG is open to targeted engagement with China where it fills gaps, such as tackling money laundering. [66]
BALANCING SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITY
Pacific Island nations value multiple partnerships and insist on maintaining sovereignty. Memories of colonial history and fears of becoming arenas for proxy rivalry run deep. For small states, hedging between partners is rational. But the effect is a fragmented system.
All this points to the need for a new cooperative framework — one that respects Pacific Island sensitivities about sovereignty and transparency, but substantially boosts the capacity of key actors to manage threats.
The foundations are already there: shared concerns about transnational crime and foreign interference, a common interest in safeguarding maritime boundaries, and significant Australian and New Zealand investment in capacity-building.
What is missing is the connective tissue: a mechanism for sustained intelligence cooperation and operational coordination that would knit the patchwork into a more resilient security fabric.
Towards a “Pacific Eyes” intelligence alliance
The proposed “Pacific Eyes” arrangement draws conceptual inspiration from the Five Eyes intelligence alliance. Born out of wartime signals intelligence cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom, the Five Eyes gradually expanded to include Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Over seven decades, it has evolved into the world’s most sophisticated and durable intelligence-sharing framework.
Its defining characteristics are:
- Tightly codified rules for handling classified material, with reciprocal access rights.
- Interoperable IT systems and secure facilities accredited to shared standards.
- Liaison officers placed inside partner agencies to facilitate daily exchanges.
- Asymmetric origins, with US/UK dominance, only deepening as smaller partners built capability and trust.
The lesson for the Pacific Islands is that enduring intelligence cooperation is possible even among partners of vastly different capacity, provided there are clear rules, sustained investment, and a commitment to shared situational awareness.
A “Pacific Eyes” intelligence-sharing agreement would be more modest in scope. It could start with Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, and Fiji as founding members, forming a compact circle for exchanging intelligence.
WHY THESE FOUR?
Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, and Fiji are the largest and most capable South Pacific states, with an existing degree of trust and alignment. Australia and New Zealand bring formidable intelligence capabilities honed through decades in the Five Eyes alliance. Papua New Guinea and Fiji are central Pacific Island countries with growing security ambitions, now overhauling their national security frameworks and receptive to closer cooperation.
In 2024, PNG launched a draft National Security Policy 2024–2029, and is establishing a National Security Agency to coordinate across its National Intelligence Organisation and other security bodies. [67] PNG is also reviewing that organisation’s establishing legislation, the PNGNIO Act 1984, and Port Moresby is seeking international partnerships to build its analytic, secure communications, and surveillance capabilities.
Fiji completed a comprehensive National Security and Defence Review in 2024, which urged standing regional operational commitments with partners rather than reactive arrangements. [68]
In 2025, Fiji announced the creation of an Office of National Security Assessments and the appointment of its first National Security Adviser, highlighting the absence of a formal intelligence service as a major capability gap. [69]
The Fiji Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigration is the lead civilian national security agency. [70] While Fiji’s police and military collect intelligence, the government wants stronger capacities in maritime security, counter-narcotics, cybercrime, and monitoring foreign interference.
Both PNG and Fiji already receive extensive Australian and New Zealand support, but they also want recognition as regional security providers. A “Pacific Eyes” framework would meet that aspiration with systematic intelligence-sharing on priority threats, while tailoring scope to Pacific Island realities.
PRACTICAL STARTING POINTS
The arrangement would focus initially on less politically sensitive domains, where mutual benefit is clear:
- Maritime domain awareness — pooling coastal radar data, ship tracking, and aerial surveillance to detect illegal fishing, smuggling, and unauthorised vessels.
- Transnational crime intelligence — secure sharing of police and customs intelligence on drug, human trafficking, and money laundering networks.
- Disaster and climate security — sharing satellite imagery, hazard data, and forecasts for early warning and relief coordination.
- Cybersecurity threat intelligence — information exchange on malware, cyber intrusions, and resilience practices. Australia already deploys Cyber RAPID [71]teams and enlists the Australian Signals Directorate to assist Pacific Island countries with incident response; a formal alliance could institutionalise this. Australia and New Zealand could also share assessments on global technology actors such as Huawei, guiding Pacific Island partners’ digital projects.
- Economic security assessments —sharing intelligence to support PNG and Fiji’s foreign investment screening regimes.
- International security assessments — sharing assessments on regional security, such as the South China Sea, Taiwan, or China’s naval build-up, providing visibility of shifting dynamics.
The arrangement would take an incremental approach, building trust and cooperative habits before expanding into more sensitive areas. The Office of National Intelligence could take lead responsibility for coordinating, but there would be consequential roles to be played by a range of Australian national intelligence community agencies and their New Zealand counterparts.
For Australia, these could include: the Defence Intelligence Organisation, Headquarters Joint Operations Command, Australian Border Force, Australian Federal Police, Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC), Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation, Australian Cyber Security Centre, and the Australian Signals Directorate.
BENEFITS
A key benefit would be the modernisation of intelligence systems in PNG and Fiji, funded and equipped with secure communications, encrypted databases, and surveillance tools, ensuring complementarity with Australian, New Zealand, and broader regional security interests.
Another advantage would be closer strategic alignment. Despite shared concerns, Australia, New Zealand, and Pacific Island countries often diverge in how they perceive threats such as a Taiwan crisis or China’s regional ambitions. A dedicated intelligence club would compel national security officials from the four largest countries in the South Pacific to sit together and look at the same facts, generating common situational awareness.
New Zealand’s intelligence chief has noted that sharing intelligence with Pacific Island partners yields two-way benefits. [72] A formalised arrangement would normalise that flow, making it routine rather than exceptional.
CHALLENGES TO OVERCOME
Trust and security. Integral to the Five Eyes model is a set of mechanisms for trusted collaboration. This is built around personnel, systems, and facilities security. That includes personnel security vetting, trusted and protected IT infrastructure, and buildings that can be secured on a continuous basis. Sharing intelligence requires confidence that secrets will be protected. Australia and New Zealand would be wary of leaks from partners with weaker IT security, lax control over access to the facilities where it is stored, and patchy personnel vetting standards.
For the “Pacific Eyes” arrangement to work, Australia and New Zealand would need to liaise closely with their Pacific Island partners to ensure, with a high degree of confidence, that the mechanisms in place to share sensitive information would be immune to external interference or compromise. This again points to the need for upfront investment in infrastructure and personnel screening. Initial sharing could focus on sanitised assessments and move towards higher classifications as trust builds.
Pacific concerns. Historical memories of colonial-era manipulation and more recent frustrations (e.g. inadequate consultation around AUKUS) make some Pacific Island leaders cautious of Australia’s own strategic intent. A “Pacific Eyes” pact would include governance mechanisms, perhaps in the form of an oversight board with representatives from all members, to monitor handling of intelligence and address breaches. Members would retain discretion over contributions, with protocols clarifying access and usage. The aim would be to reassure smaller states that participation enhances sovereignty and control rather than undermines them.
Capability asymmetries. Australia and New Zealand operate world-class intelligence systems, while PNG and Fiji are still building theirs. Such asymmetry risks creating a patron-client dynamic. To mitigate this, the pact should embed mentoring, training, and joint projects, building ownership and parity over time.
The China factor. Any intelligence club will inevitably be seen by Beijing, and some in the region, as countering China. While strengthening resilience against coercion is a goal, framing must avoid presenting the group as an “anti-China spy alliance”. The narrative should focus on shared interests: combatting crime, protecting resources, and responding to disasters. Intelligence on Chinese influence operations or maritime activities can be handled discreetly within the group, without undue public emphasis.
LESSONS FROM ELSEWHERE
Other regions illustrate both the challenges and the possibilities. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, despite disparities and mistrust among its members, has begun to explore intelligence-sharing arrangements. [73] The Five Eyes itself began asymmetrically, with the United States and the United Kingdom dominating, but grew durable through clear rules and cultural integration. “Pacific Eyes” could follow a similar trajectory, starting modestly, expanding gradually, and embedding habits of cooperation.
Recommendations
To turn the “Pacific Eyes” concept into reality, Australia and its Pacific Island partners should pursue a staged, practical plan:
- Start small with a core group: Launch “Pacific Eyes” with four countries already linked by strong security ties: Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, and Fiji. These countries share strategic alignment and established working relationships.
- Focus on common threats: In the first phase, limit intelligence-sharing to areas of clear mutual benefit and low political sensitivity. Prioritise maritime surveillance, transnational crime, cybersecurity, disaster and climate security, and regional threat assessments.
- Invest in Pacific Islands intelligence capacity: Australia and New Zealand should resource upgrades for PNG and Fiji so they can participate as equal partners. This means ensuring the supply of secure communications networks, facilities for classified material, and strengthened personnel vetting and protective security frameworks.
- Build transparent governance: Establish an oversight mechanism that safeguards sovereignty and prevents perceptions of outside interference. A governance board with representatives from all members should set protocols and review operations. Lessons can be drawn from the existing functions and capabilities of the Office of National Intelligence, Independent National Security Legislation Monitor, Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, and the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security.
- Plan for expansion: Once trust and results are evident, such as better interdictions and early warnings, membership could be offered to other Pacific Island countries that build baseline capability and commit to shared principles (e.g. secure handling of intelligence, strategic alignment, and democratic oversight).
- Align diplomacy: Roll out “Pacific Eyes” alongside a diplomatic effort emphasising Pacific Islands leadership and sovereignty and shared governance arrangements. Brief key partners such as the United States and France to secure their support, or consider inviting observer status for them, while underscoring that the initiative reflects Pacific Island priorities.
A “Pacific Eyes” partnership would not emerge overnight. It would require careful negotiation, resources, and trust-building. But success would mark a transformative step in regional security cooperation: a home-grown capability empowering Pacific Island states to anticipate and counter threats together, with eyes wide open.
Acknowledgements
This research was produced as part of the Lowy Institute’s Pacific Islands Program, supported by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
The author thanks all those who generously gave their time for consultations, as well as the peer reviewers for their valuable feedback. Particular thanks go to Ian Bruce, Clare Caldwell, Oliver Nobetau, Sam Roggeveen, and Hervé Lemahieu of the Lowy Institute for their invaluable contributions to the paper.
