On 25 January, China’s People’s Liberation Army announced that Central Military Commission Vice-Chair Zhang Youxia and Chief of the Joint Staff Department General Liu Zhenli were under investigation for “suspected serious violations of discipline and law”. The removal of China’s top general – thought to be Xi Jinping’s most trusted ally inside the Chinese military – and the PLA’s senior operational commander is shocking. (From: The Interpreter. The Lowy Institute.)
Xi Jinping personally selected six CMC members in November 2022. He has now purged five of them.
Five specific accusations have been listed against Zhang and Liu, including that they had betrayed the trust placed in them by the party, undermined Xi’s authority as CMC Chair, and fostered political and corruption problems that undermined the Party’s absolute leadership over the military. Zhang and Liu are said to have “caused immense damage to the military’s political building, political ecology, and combat effectiveness, and had an extremely negative impact on the Party, the country, and the military”.
The removal of Zhang and Liu follows earlier military purges. The first wave in 2023 came after investigations of equipment problems in the PLA Rocket Force (which operates China’s nuclear missiles) resulted in removal of its top leaders. The second wave in 2025 targeted the leadership of the PLA political work system and the second ranking PLA officer, CMC Vice-Chair General He Weidong.
What explains Xi Jinping’s decision to purge the senior PLA leadership? What does this reveal about the party-army relationship? What impact will it have on military readiness and the potential for a conflict over Taiwan?
The current purges differ from Xi’s efforts to clean house in the PLA in 2013-15. In addition to targeting rampant corruption, those purges sought to remove generals loyal to Xi’s political rivals, assert control over the PLA, and reduce resistance to ambitious military reform plans.
Yet there were limits on how far Xi could go. Those purges left most senior PLA leaders and operational commanders in place, despite their complicity in corruption. The PLA kept much of its autonomy over military issues and maintained the existing political work system, meaning that the PLA was essentially monitoring itself.
Xi used 2016 military reforms to strengthen political work inside the PLA to ensure military loyalty to the party and created new monitoring mechanisms to deter corruption. Yet the reformed system still relied on PLA officers to monitor their peers, counting on political commissars to place party loyalty above else.
While Xi insisted on the final word on major military decisions, in practice he relied on trusted allies for day-to-day supervision of PLA affairs. Zhang was the most important of these allies; Xi promoted him to CMC Vice-Chair in 2017 and kept him on after retirement age by reappointing him in 2022.
Xi’s ability to purge the entire PLA senior leadership shows his political strength but will have significant political and operational consequences.
Some have speculated that Zhang and Xi may have disagreedabout modernisation priorities or that Zhang may have been becoming too powerful and posed a threat to Xi. However, the most likely explanation is that Xi was disappointed in Zhang’s performance in fighting corruption and producing a PLA capable of fighting and winning wars, including being ready for a potential invasion of Taiwan. The core issue is whether Xi could rely on Zhang to manage the PLA and ensure its political reliability. Commentary in PLA Daily following the purges has described success in the battle against corruption as necessary for achieving the PLA’s modernisation goals and called for obedience to the centre “in thought, politics, and action”.
The PLA has made considerable progress in modernisation, but the Rocket Force procurement scandals showed that corruption was rampant in the PLA and was affecting the performance of advanced weapon systems, including nuclear systems. Reports that senior officers had paid for their promotions also undermined Xi’s authority and party control. The scandals almost certainly prompted Xi to take a hard look at why the PLA’s top leaders and political work system recommended officers who proved so untrustworthy. He likely discovered that the officers he trusted to monitor their peers had become complicit in their corruption.
This may have led Xi to lose confidence in Zhang and other senior officers and conclude they all had to go. The decision to purge others first was a tactical choice; there is evidence that Zhang was under investigation by September 2023.
Xi’s ability to purge the entire PLA senior leadership shows his political strength but will have significant political and operational consequences. The loss of experienced generals and continuing investigations in the theatres and services will make it hard for the PLA to focus on operational training.
Executing a Taiwan campaign plan would require close cooperation between the Eastern Theatre Command (which has primary responsibility for the invasion) and the Joint Staff Department (which would control critical national-level assets and coordinate supporting actions by other theatres). Those generals are gone. Their replacements will have less experience and will need to learn their new responsibilities and build relationships with their counterparts. The turmoil will have a negative near-term effect on PLA combat readiness.
The purges will also aggravate existing strains in party-army relations. Xi’s confidence in the less experienced leaders running the PLA will be limited, and he is well aware that his generals may be reluctant to offer honest assessments of PLA readiness for war. These factors decrease the likelihood that Xi will be willing to roll the dice on a Taiwan invasion.
