Operation Kitay – a story of what might have happened

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By Tim Coyle

The military component commanders, senior staff officers, together with a select group of defence civilians and foreign affairs representatives settled into their seats in the Joint Operations Command headquarters. They were gathering to formulate a plan to manage a response to the unprecedented deployment of a People’s Republic of China (PRC) People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) force – comprising a destroyer, a frigate, and an underway replenishment ship headed into the nation’s exclusive economic zone.

JOC had tracked the flotilla as it approached the Northern Access Strait and intelligence agencies had assessed a probable passage by the flotilla along the country’s east coast and possibly extending to a circumnavigation of the continent.

The JOC commander, a three-star admiral, welcomed the attendees, and outlined the background to the potential incursion into regional waters:

As you all are aware, we have been watching the PLAN force for some time. Defence Intelligence Division (DIV) have assessed as probable a foray along the east coast to ‘show the flag’ as a statement of the PLAN’s long-range deployment capability and the ability to sustain it. At the same time, it’s a likely reaction to our continued maritime and air presence in waters they claim as their own.

We’re not here to debate the legal niceties of our ‘rules-based’ adherence to international best practice; the fact is the PLAN is now a serious blue water player and, a ‘peer’ opponent to our main Ally. And they don’t care a hoot about legal pontifications.

The PRC has, since 2010, demonstrated an unparalleled innovative adaptation of sea power using ‘grey’ maritime tactics through a three-tiered strategy. At the lower scale it’s the People’s Armed Police Maritime Militia of thousands of fishing craft available for tasking to interfere in neighbouring countries’ otherwise legitimate maritime commerce and constabulary activities. The China Coast Guard, the world’s biggest, is a master of intimidation by water cannoning and ramming their hapless opposite numbers. Finally, the formidable grey ships of the PLAN, modern and menacing, sit “over the horizon” as the enforcer should things not go in accordance with the hegemon’s plan (pun intended). They have built on the philosophies of the great 19th century maritime sages, Mahan and Corbett, and brought sea power into the 21st century – with Chinese characteristics!

So, what do we do about this deployment if they do come south? DIV further assesses there’s a possibility the force will circumnavigate the continent. That makes sense; they’ve done this to Taiwan and Japan while routinely penetrating their ADIZs and maritime boundaries. Why not our vast continent? Think of the possibilities: three highly capable combatants parading thousands of nautical miles around our coasts – it’s a wonderful opportunity to cause consternation in our political-military establishment and the media and frighten the horses. The PRC knows we are vulnerable to provocation; I won’t go over the over-reaction to PRC pinpricks during the former government’s tenure. This time we must forthrightly stand our ground in a whole-of-government response to this unprecedented incursion, to buttress our national standing with strength of purpose.

Cutting to the chase, we are here to formulate an intelligence collection program against the PLAN incursion. We have first class intelligence collection capabilities and an excellent analytical staff to use this deployment as an opportunity to gain high level product which, if carried out successfully, will gain us plaudits in the international intelligence community and show what a medium-sized, well-run defence force can do against an emergent and autocratic world power. It will also signal to the PRC that we can stand up to them.

Our modus operandi is to take a lead from the PLAN itself; they are provocative, posturing and persistent; so shall we be. We have had plenty of engagements with them on their unilaterally claimed patch. We’ll aim to be present and persistent but not provocative. Are they simply going to stooge around our coasts or are they planning something more spectacular? Any thoughts from DIV?’

The senior DIV maritime section analyst – a Principal Warfare Officer – responded: ‘If it was me, I’d do a live fire with little notice in a heavily air trafficked area, such as under the eastern international air routes. It’d be confined to surface gunfire, but it would set the cat among the canaries.’

 ‘Splendid thought Guns; Fleet Commander what can you give us?’

‘We can sail three frigates, one with an ELINT team. There might be a SSN with them so our focus would be ASW-themed – make a show of streaming passive arrays and exercise the embarked MR-60R helos’ Low Frequency Sonars. Any submarine won’t necessarily be in close company with the surface ships so we can explore further afield. Even if there’s no sub, it’ll show them we’re aware of them trying it in the future. I’d also really like to sail an AOR but, as we all know to our chagrin, our lovely new ships are laid up pending warranty repairs. If we had a tanker with the frigates, they might think we’re going to accompany them on their homeward passage…’  At least we’ll get ACINT on the ships and show them we’re to be taken seriously.  Data on their sensor emissions routines will be useful as they’re operating in a totally new area.

I’m sure they’re going to pay particular attention to Fleet Base West and it’s going to be interesting to see how they behave in that vicinity. Will they “walk on by or stand on the corner” – as old song goes (maybe you younger folk don’t remember it). Either way it’ll tell us something. If they sail past it shows they don’t want to provoke us too far or, more unlikely, they haven’t got the technical intelligence collection skills; if they loiter, we want to know what sensors they’re using to collect intel. We’ll deploy a submarine to covertly meet them. If there’s a sub that goes in closer – so much the better. It’d be a great opportunity to have a sub-on-sub encounter’.

‘Sounds good. On the matter of a live fire at short notice we need to word up Air Services confidentially so they can react on the day to plan aircraft diversions around the area. They probably won’t have time to send out NOTAMS but at least they won’t be taken by surprise. This is important as the media will have a field day if Air Traffic Control hears about it from an aircraft guarding VHF121.5.

‘OK; Air Commander it’s your turn’.

 ‘Air Force can deploy a mix of flights comprising F-35 and Super Hornets, supported by KC-30A tankers. The jets will pop up at random intervals along the coastal length and will give us a good feel for their reaction times. There’ll also be P-8As linking with Navy assets for overall surveillance. A Wedgetail will coordinate the show and to give our visitors a taste of our air component capabilities in monitoring their movements. We could rotate our newly operational Triton remotely piloted aircraft with the P-8s’.

‘Splendid. Now, turning to soft power – Foreign Affairs, what’s your input?’

‘The PRC will probably be quite exercised over any overt military activity directed at their ships. Under normal circumstances their MFA would play the usual dead bat in the face of diplomatic protests regarding military encounters – as we have repeatedly seen. However, as this activity will occur out of their area, they will be proffering a “wounded’ tone”: “why were you so mean to us when all we were doing was undertaking a professional and legitimate deployment in international waters”. It will be our turn to play a dead bat. We will devise appropriate language,  advise the Beijing Post and incorporate Head of Mission comments before briefing our minister.

We seem to have passed the PRC “wolf warrior” diplomatic brick wall of a few years ago – it didn’t work for them and put off most regional countries. However, we are very conscious of the tenuous balance between the renewed “stabilised” economic relationship between our two countries and the confrontational military posturing. So, we expect a considerable arcing up by the PRC MFA response to this operation as opposed to the previous bland reactions to our formal protests.’

‘Thank you. That wraps up this initial scoping meeting for Operation Kitay. We’ll now go away and refine the operational and tactical aspects. Are there any last questions?’

A JOC staff squadron leader raised her hand: ’Sir, the name of the Operation – “Kitay”; it’s out of the normal nomenclature’.

‘It’s the Russian name for China’.

‘I’m not sure I get the connection.’

‘Putin has trumpeted a “no limits partnership”. Who knows, we might even see some Russian ships join a future deployment with the PLAN. Regardless, people can make of it what they will. Got to keep them guessing, Jan!’.

‘Thanks for coming – ‘Fair winds and following seas and, for our Air Force colleagues – happy landings!’

Tim Coyle is a former Intelligence analyst

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