A Taskforce will roll out its “optimal pathway” in March 2023
The AUKUS trilateral pact has been in the news of late. It involves Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States and focuses on security for the Indo-Pacific region. At the core of the AUKUS agreement is a plan to provide Australia with the capability and technology to deploy conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines.[1]
Australia established a Nuclear-Powered Submarine Taskforce in September 2021. The mission of this “whole of government” effort is to work closely with the two partners — United Kingdom and the United States — to identify the “optimal pathway” to acquire a fleet of eight conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines for the Royal Australian Navy.[2]
These are momentous developments, and it is understandable that they have been the subject of much media excitement. What has often been missing in media reports, however, are basic facts regarding realistic options and resource constraints. What follows is an analysis of what I think is plausible with respect to Australia’s desire to obtain a nuclear submarine capability.
[1] See, for example, Alessio Patalano, ‘Understanding AUKUS’, ASPI: The Strategist, 19 September 2022 < https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/understanding-aukus/>
[2] ‘AUKUS: Trilateral Security Partnership’, Factsheet, Department of Defence < https://www.defence.gov.au/about/taskforces/nuclear-powered-submarine-task-force/australian-uk-and-us-partnership>
The full paper is available here
