By Gregory P. Gilbert
‘Admiral Beatty sent a signal to the Grand Fleet to splice the main brace. A tot of rum was served out to the ship’s company, the first time since the ship commissioned. Fireworks display and all kinds of whistles – in fact, anything that a sound could be got out of was under way.’ (1)
This record of the celebrations on board HMAS Sydney when they found out about the Armistice were typical of the experience for many Australian sailors. The Great War was at an end, the British and their Allies had achieved victory and they had survived to live another day. For them it was as much an end to the war at sea as it was an end to the fighting on land, but the average sailor knew very little about how close lack of agreement on the naval terms of the Armistice had come to throwing away that hard won victory at sea.(2)
By early October the German leadership realised that their armies had been severely defeated and that the Western Front was collapsing. On 5 October 1918 a new German Government approached the President Wilson of the United States to discuss an armistice that would generally meet the US war aims as set down in Wilson’s Fourteen Points. (3) The major naval point, Point 2 calling for ‘absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas’, although it was longstanding US naval policy clearly conflicted with British naval policy which recognised trade embargoes and blockades as important operations in peace as well as in war. Indeed the British Government and its naval advisors rightly believed that it was the effective execution of the blockade against Germany that had significantly contributed to its current decisive defeat. (4) This remained a significant difference in war aims between the US and the British, French and other European Nations (the Allies). The Allied leaders believed they needed to form a common front, alongside the Americans, during negotiations with Germany. The Allied political leaders ordered their military and naval representatives to prepare armistice conditions for Germany under a number of political guiding principles. The only guidance given on naval terms was the immediate cessation of submarine warfare and continuation of the Allied blockade.
Marshal Ferdinand Foch, the French military leader who was also Supreme Commander of the Allied Armies in 1918, worked with his headquarters staff to prepare a draft armistice for Germany, including naval terms, and presented this to the Allied political leadership. The naval terms presented by Marshal Foch, in line with the political directions, included the surrender of German submarines and the continuation of the Blockade. It did not deal with the German High Sea Fleet. Foch suggested that it would be sufficient to send the German battleships to the Baltic and to occupy Heligoland and Cuxhaven in order to secure the exits from the German coast into the North Sea.
This was strongly rejected by the First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir Eric Geddes, who pointed out that the High Sea Fleet had not influenced events ashore because it had been bottled up by the British Grand Fleet for four years. To leave the German battlefleet in existence would only force the British battlefleet to keep watch in a high state of readiness in an indefinite state of undeclared war. ‘In fact, if the Marshal’s proposal were adopted, the British and German fleets would be in the same state of tension as two armies that face one another fully armed and ready for battle, in lines of trenches’.(5)
One of the problems arising from Marshal Foch’s command methods was that although Permanent Military Representatives of the Allied Powers had been established at Versailles in mid-1918, essentially to perform similar functions to that of a modern combined coalition headquarters, he did not use them effectively. Foch preferred to tackle most problems within his personal headquarters, which was dominated by French army personnel. With the rapidly approaching armistice in their sights the Allied naval staff did not sit around waiting for events. An Allied Naval Council developed what it considered to be the naval terms of the armistice with Germany. There was some disagreement between the French and the British naval representatives over whether the armistice should require the internment or the surrender of the German battlefleet. The British believed that they had fought and won the war at sea and hence the German fleet must surrender, however the French thought that terms requiring the surrender of their ships would only lead to further German resistance and the unnecessary death of many French and Allied soldiers. Following the British advice the Allied Naval Council identified the surrender of German battlefleet in their draft terms for the armistice. The British First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemymss RN, had warned that ‘a cessation of hostilities at sea’ was not enough for a final peace but they ‘would have to deal with the German fleet as an instrument of high policy; not merely as a combative force’.(6)
The Allied Naval Council forwarded their version of the naval terms of the armistice to the Allied political leaders for consideration. They found out that Foch had already submitted his version to the Allied politicians separately. In the meantime the principle of the freedom of the seas remained a major sticking point between the US and the British. The US delegate Colonel House, realising that the threat of the American Government making a separate armistice and even a separate peace with Germany was politically unworkable, managed to convince the British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, to further discuss the freedom of the seas through an exchange of notes, ‘in light of the experiences of the present war’. In truth the British post-war economy would find it difficult to fund the Royal Navy sufficiently to continue to rule the waves as it had before 1914, and the rise of the US Navy would soon inevitably change such longstanding British naval policies.
On 4 November 1918 the Allied political leaders accepted the draft of the Allied Naval Council although they replaced the requirement to surrender the German battlefleet with the requirement that they ‘be disarmed and thereafter interned in neutral ports or, failing them, Allied ports’. The politicians did not wish armistice negotiations to breakdown and they believed internment would be sufficient until the peace negotiations were conducted. The Text of Naval Armistice Conditions finally approved by the Supreme War Council, consisting of Clauses XX to XXXV, have been repeated below for convenience.
The terms of the Armistice were finally accepted at 05:00 am on the morning of 11 November 1918. The guns stopped at 11:00 am that same day. On that day the Allied Naval Council was in an emergency meeting discussing how the Naval Armistice was to be enforced. There had already been some discussion on the politicians’ belief that the German fleet could be interned in neutral ports and the representatives of Allied navies had already agreed that such a policy was unworkable. What neutral port would take on such a responsibility and what arrangements could be made for Allied naval forces to supervise the interment of the German forces within a neutral port? It had clearly not been thought through. At the Allied Naval Council meeting on 13 November, Admiral Wemyss recommended that the German battleships, cruisers and destroyers be interned in Scapa Flow until the Peace Conference decided what to do with them. The German submarines were to surrender at Harwich. The Allied naval representatives agreed. On 21 November the German High Sea Fleet, disarmed and with skeleton crews, surrendered to the British Grand Fleet in the Firth of Forth. HMAS Australia, as flagship of the 2nd Battlecruiser Squadron, proudly led the capital ships of the port line at the surrender. Two Australian cruisers, HMAS Melbourne and Sydney also witnessed the surrender of the German battlefleet.
The naval victory of 1918 was complete even though there was no decisive naval battle. There was no Trafalgar. There had not been a major fleet battle for more than two years. Thousands of sailors did not have to die horrible deaths, and large numbers of expensive warships did not have to sink in violent death throes into their watery graves for the Allies to claim victory. The British Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet, Admiral David Beatty, RN, gave a speech on that memorable November day: ‘My congratulations on the victory which has been gained over the sea power of our enemy. The greatest of this achievement is in no way lessened by the fact that the final episode did not take the form of a fleet action.’
The crew of HMAS Sydney celebrated this victory along with the crews of the many thousand other Allied naval vessels, however there would have been very little celebration if the German battlefleet had been left intact by the Armistice agreement. It is worthwhile remembering that the Armistice with Germany could have easily thrown away the naval victory of 1918.
______________________________________________________________________
The following extract is taken from Henry Newbury, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Vol. V, Naval Operations, Appendix D2, pp 416-8.
Text of Naval Armistice Conditions finally approved by the Supreme War Council
(Clauses I-XIX relate to the military conditions.)
XX. – Immediate cessation of all hostilities at sea and definite information to be given as to the location and movements of all German ships.
Notification to be given to neutrals that freedom of navigation in all territorial waters is given to the naval and mercantile marines of the Allied and Associated Powers, all questions of neutrality being waived.
XXI. – All naval and mercantile marine prisoners of war of the Allied and Associated Powers in German hands to be returned, without reciprocity.
XXII. – Surrender to the Allies and the United States of America of 160 German Submarines (including all Submarine Cruisers and Minelaying Submarines), with their complete armament and equipment, in ports which will be specified by the Allies and the United States of America. All other Submarines to be paid off and completely disarmed and placed under the supervision of the Allies and the United States of America. [Note: This clause was amended to read ‘all German Submarines’ in place of just 160.]
XXIII. – The following German Surface Warships, which shall be designated by the Allies and the United States of America, shall forthwith be disarmed and thereafter interned in neutral ports or, failing them, Allied ports, to be designated by the Allies and the United States of America, and placed under the surveillance of the Allies and the United States of America, only caretakers being left on board, namely:
6 Battle Cruisers.
10 Battleships.
8 Light Cruisers, including 2 Minelayers.
50 Destroyers of the most modern types.
All other Surface Warships (including River Craft) are to be concentrated in German Naval Bases to be designated by the Allies and the United States of America, and are to be paid off and completely disarmed and placed under the supervision of the Allies and the United States of America. All vessels of the Auxiliary Fleet (Trawlers, Motor Vessels, etc.) are to be disarmed.
XXIV. – The Allies and the United States of America shall have the right to sweep up all minefields and obstructions laid by Germany outside German territorial waters, and the positions of these are to be indicated.
XXV. – Freedom of access to and from the Baltic to be given to the naval and mercantile marines of the Allied and Associated Powers. To secure this, the Allies and the United States of America shall be empowered to occupy all German forts, fortifications, batteries, and defence works of all kinds in all the entrances from the Cattegat into the Baltic, and to sweep up all mines and obstructions within and without German territorial waters without any questions of neutrality being raised, and the positions of all such mines and obstructions are to be indicated.
XXVI. – The existing Blockade conditions set up by the Allied and Associated Powers are to remain unchanged, and all German merchant ships found at sea are to remain liable to capture.
XXVII. – All Naval Aircraft are to be concentrated and immobilised in German Bases to be specified by the Allies and the United States of America.
XXVIII. – In evacuating the Belgian coasts and ports Germany shall abandon all merchant ships, tugs, lighters, cranes, and all other harbour materials, all materials for inland navigation, all aircraft and air materials and stores, all arms and armaments, and all stores and apparatus of all kinds.
XXIX. – All Black Sea ports are to be evacuated by Germany; all Russian warships of all descriptions seized by Germany in the Black Sea are to be handed over to the Allies and the United States of America; all neutral merchant ships seized are to be released; all warlike and other materials of all kinds seized in those ports are to be returned, and German materials, as specified in Clause XXVIII, are to be abandoned.
XXX. – All merchant ships in German hands belonging to the Allied and Associated Powers are to be restored in ports to be specified by the Allies and the United States of America, without reciprocity.
XXXI. – No destruction of ships or of materials to be permitted before evacuation, surrender, or restoration.
XXXII. – The German Government shall formally notify the Neutral Governments of the world, and particularly the Governments of Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Holland, that all restrictions placed on the trading of their vessels with the Allied and Associated countries, whether by the German Government or by private German interests, and whether in return for specific concessions, such as the export of shipbuilding materials or not, are immediately cancelled.
XXXIII. – No transfers of German merchant shipping of any description to any Neutral flag are to take place after signature of the Armistice.
XXXIV. – The duration of the Armistice is to be thirty days, with option to extend. During this period, on failure of execution of any of the above clauses, the Armistice may be denounced by one of the contracting parties on forty-eight hours’ previous notice.
XXXV. – This Armistice to be accepted or refused by Germany within seventy-two hours of notification.
_______________________________________________________________________
Footnotes
1. Arthur W. Jose, Official History of Australia in War of 1914-18, Vol. IX, The Royal Australian Navy, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1941, p. 308, available online at www.awm.gov.au.
2. The best sources for the Naval Armistice are Arthur J. Marder, From Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Vol. V, Victory and Aftermath: 1918-1919, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1970, Chapter VII.2, pp. 175-96; and Henry Newbury, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Vol. V, Naval Operations, Longmans, Green & Co., London, 1931, Chapter XII and Appendix D.
3. President Wilson’s Speech of 8 January 1918 is available at wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/President_ Wilson’s_Fourteen_Points.
4. Chapter 7 in Hew Strachan, The First World War: A New Illustrated History, Simon & Schuster, London, 2003. Also see David Stevens and James Goldrick, ‘Victory at Sea, 1918’, in Ashley Ekins (ed.), 1918: Year of Victory, Exisle, 2010, pp. 182-98.
5. Newbury, Naval Operations, Vol. V, p. 372.
6, Newbury, Naval Operations, Vol. V, p. 366.
