By Raelene Lockhorst*
The Royal Australian Navy needs missile reloading facilities in the north of the country, most obviously at Darwin and Cairns. The southern ports where Australian warships now take on munitions are too far from where the fleet is most likely to fight, though their reloading capabilities must also be retained. (The Australian Strategic Policy Institute. The Strategist.)
The rising threat from China is shifting the geopolitical focus northwards, to chokepoints between archipelagic islands and to flashpoints in the Western Pacific. Australia must ensure its naval support infrastructure responds.
The lack of northern reloading facilities diminishes the navy’s combat capability by throttling its operational tempo.
Warships in action can quickly empty their magazines of air-defence or strike missiles. They might take three days to sail from an operations area north of Australia to Darwin, if they could replenish there; to reach HMAS Stirling, near Perth, they might need seven days. Then just as much time is spent in returning to the area of operations.
Similar calculations apply for operating in the Southwest Pacific. For that theatre, Cairns would be a far closer location for reloading than Eden, the New South Wales port where the process is currently done for ships using Fleet Base East in Sydney.
Intense, high-tempo operations in the north are just not possible when tied to the more southerly facilities.
Darwin and Cairns are prime candidates for northern missile reloading facilities because each has a deep port and is already equipped with substantial defence infrastructure. To the extent that they must already be protected against air and missile attack, there would be no further burden in protecting new facilities.
Both cities also play key roles in Australia’s strategic partnerships, particularly with the United States, which regularly conducts joint operations and training in the region. So building missile reloading facilities at these locations would enhance interoperability with allied forces, particularly under the AUKUS framework.
Indeed, it is quite likely that the US Navy would want to use northern Australian missile reloading facilities in the event of war, if Australia had any.
Australia should also keep its southern installations, however, because the ships are mainly based in the south. In war, the southern facilities would offer redundancy in case of damage or destruction of the better-placed northern ones.
The specific infrastructure needed for reloading at Darwin and Cairns would mainly be the specialised storage buildings that are needed for missiles. For security, those buildings would be at nearby defence base, not alongside wharves.
Sending munitions north by truck or train when they’re needed is not a suitable alternative. The process could impose delays, and roads and rail lines can be vulnerable.
Developing missile loading installations in the north would significantly improve Australia’s deterrence posture and enhance operational flexibility.
The Australian government must take immediate action to address this pressing need. It should look at whether a quick enhancement of current facilities can provide a stop-gap solution.
Then Defence must secure funding to fast-track construction of permanent facilities in the north. Because of the value to the US Navy of missile reloading in northern Australia, the government must involve it in the effort. For example, the US Navy may have special requirements.
This collaboration will not only enhance our operational capabilities but also strengthen our alliance.
