Jellicoe’s War; The U-boat Threat in World War One and the Question of Convoy. By Nicholas Jellicoe. Seaforth Publishing, Barnsley, Yorkshire, 2024
Reviewed by Tim Coyle
Nicholas Jellicoe is Admiral Sir John Jellicoe’s grandson, and this is his third book relating to his grandfather’s prominent record in the First World War. His Jutland: The Unfinished Battle and The Last Days of the High Seas Fleet were both reviewed in these columns with the Jutland book published in the centenary of the mighty Battle of Jutland in which the admiral was Commander-in-Chief Grand Fleet.
The Battle of Jutland and its repercussions caused huge ructions in the Royal Navy and the wider British community, and its effect lasted for the best part of a century. For his part, Jellicoe was replaced as C-in-C and moved to the position of First Sea Lord (1SL) of the Admiralty, from which he was dismissed on 24 December 1917. One of Jellicoe’s main legacies was the perception that, as 1SL, he was too slow to implement convoy to mitigate the critical losses of merchant shipping which threatened Briain’s survival.
Nicholas Jellicoe seeks to place the admiral in the proper order of decision-making in the wartime environment, subject to intense scrutiny and opposition, not only within the Royal Navy but also the allied United States Navy and facing political pressure from Prime Minister Lloyd George, ministers and civil servants. In Jellicoe’s War, the author presents an objective assessment of Admiral Jellicoe’s performance as 1SL while explaining his decision-making methodology. As such, the book is a most comprehensive narrative of the submarine war.
The book’s bibliography lists well over 200 titles related to the submarine war, including two by the admiral himself; the topic has been widely covered in the intervening century. Nicholas Jellicoe has drawn these references into a complete narrative of the battle against the U-Boats. To clarify the complexity of the undersea war, he lists and explains the Phases of the Submarine War in the introductory pages. The Phases are:
- Initial Naval Focus (Aug 1914 – Jan 1915);
- Unrestricted U-Boat Blockade (18 Feb – 18 Sep 1915;
- Mediterranean Commerce War (Oct – Apr 1916);
- Supporting Naval Operations (1916), and
- Full Unrestricted Warfare (01 Feb 1917 – War’s End)
This vast and complicated subject, and Jellicoe’s part in it, comprises nine chapters:
- War in an Industrial Age backgrounds the maritime trade in the context of blockade, the legal framework of war at sea and the protection of trade.
- Fisher’s Apprentice: Crafting the Tactic and Weapons of War in which the introduction and early development of the submarine in the RN is examined, against widespread derision by senior officers steeped in battleship lore.
- Operational Command: Commander-in-Chief Grand Fleet. Despite this chapter’s title, Jellicoe is hardly mentioned. Rather, its 120 pages are devoted to the 1914 – 1917 stages of the maritime war and the emergence of the U-boat against which there was no effective counter at that time.
- Tools and Tactics of the New Submarine War. The ineffective anti-submarine measures and the philosophical clash between the RN tradition of the offensive as opposed to denuding the Grand Fleet of destroyers for anti-submarine work. Mining and the introduction of Q-ships also featured.
- Strategic Command, Part 1: First Sea Lord. Admiral Jellicoe now emerges as the RN’s professional head and details his interactions with the US, particularly Admiral Sims, and the often-fractious dealings with political leaders.
- Strategic Command, Part 2: The Convoy Controversy. Here is the nub of the book, featuring Jellicoe’s cautious approach to the concept of convoy, the complexities of arguments for and against and the enormous administrative and organisational effort required to implement it.
- After Supreme Command: From the Hot Seat to a Cold Shoulder. How Jellicoe fell from political favour and the continuation of the submarine war to the German surrender.
- Measuring Success and Learning Lessons. In in-depth excursion into the economics and effects on the shipping industries and the social effects in Britain and Germany.
- Was Jellicoe the Right Man for the Job? Jellicoe’s contribution to the maritime war and the question: Was the U-Boat defeated in 1918?
Nicholas Jellicoe facilitates the reader’s journey through the complex narrative. The book is equally divided between the operational conduct of the submarine war and Admiral Jellicoe’s strategic role as 1SL. The main text is supported by sidebars amplifying details of commanders, actions and organisations which add value to the chapters’ continuity.
While the ‘action’ chapters are fast paced and dramatic, the author’s analysis ranges from the admiral’s Admiralty management and political-military associations through to the resource implications of convoy and the socio-economic conditions in the two major combatant countries. Examples of the author’s significant summations are page 276: ‘…the fact is that he (Jellicoe) never condemned the use of convoys. He was just not ready to approve it without having done his homework or before having the resources he needed to make it work’. Page 279 – 283 Testing the Convoys and Convoy Organisations, Training and Tactics are also excellent precis of convoy implementation.
The appendices add technical and statistical data to supplement the narrative. Appendix A, German Submarine Types, Tactics and Performance is particularly comprehensive, while Appendices B through J cover shipping losses, attacks, munitions production and other statistics.
Notwithstanding the overall high standard of research and writing Nicholas Jellicoe has shown in the book, there are some minor irritants. For example, on page 212: ’While Jellicoe and Sims were meeting in London, French and British battleships were sailing into Hampton Roads….under the command of Admiral Sir Montague E Browning and Admiral RA Gasset’ – with no further explanation. Those who seek more detail of this visit might have recourse to history,navy.mil where is stated that ‘As a result of a meeting between Chief of Naval Operations Admiral William Benson and British Admiral Sir Montague E Browning (C-in-C North America and the West Indies) and French Admiral RA Gasset, the Navy agreed to send six destroyers to European waters in the immediate future and (for the US Navy to) supervise the west coast of North America’; the reference to ‘battleships arriving’ is irrelevant. A link could have been made to the author’s statement, on page 215, under the sub-heading The First American Naval Units Arrive, that’ The first American ships to arrive in Europe were six destroyers of Division 8 of the US Atlantic Fleet’s Destroyer Force…’ This was presumably the result of Browning’s discussions with Benson and, as such, was an important first stage of the huge reinforcement by the USN to the RN.
Page 229 describes the 07 June 1917 action between UC.29 and the Q-Ship HMS Pargust, commanded by Commander Gordon Campbell. Campbell had been awarded the Victoria Cross for the sinking U.83 on 17 February 1917. The Pargust officers nominated Campbell for a bar to the VC, but he declined. The author, quoting Snelling; VCs of the of the First World War (The History Press 2002) states that Campbell ‘became the first and only naval officer to receive a bar to the Victoria Cross’. This is incorrect as declining a VC nomination is not the same as it being awarded.
Finally, the book’s subtitle ‘The U-Boat Threat…’ would be more appropriately written as ‘The U-Boat War…’ as it was indeed a war to the death rather than a suggestion that ‘something unpleasant or violent will happen, especially if a particular action or order is not followed (Cambridge Dictionary).
These minor reservations aside, Jellicoe’s War is a complete and formidable account of the World War One submarine war and convoy implementation under Admiral Jellicoe. But what, if any, relevance is Jellicoe’s actions after 110 years? Nicholas Jellicoe’s comment on page 342 is as apposite of today’s political/military decision making as it was then: ’One of the institutional challenges any leader must face is the balance between a strong culture – be it a work or fighting culture – and the requirement for speedier innovation’. Learning and adaptability might sum this up. This is as relevant just as much today as it was in 1917.
For those seeking a ‘Deep Dive’ into the U-Boat war of 1914-18, Jellicoe’s War is for you.
