By Professor Rob McLaughlin*
This article was first published in the Australian Naval Review, 2021, Issue 1, in June 2021.
Introduction
In 2020-2021, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) celebrated the 100th anniversary of its founding.[1] The 100th anniversary of the CCP’s victory in the Chinese Civil War will follow in 2049. The CCP – and, perhaps more significantly, ‘President for life’ Xi Jinping[2] – have hinted at their expectation that those components of (their vision of) greater China that are still adrift, most particularly Taiwan, will be fully reintegrated by that anniversary.[3] Speculation as to earlier ‘deadlines’ – such as 2024[4] – is also in circulation.
As Linda Jakobson recently observed:
How often over the past decades have we been warned that the Taiwan Strait is a potentially explosive flashpoint? Often enough to numb the mind. So why should we pay attention this time? Because the pivotal reason that peace has endured for 70 years has disappeared. Unlike his predecessors, Xi Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), is no longer prepared to leave unification of the mainland and Taiwan to future generations.[5]
Such assessments are based on a wide range of (not always mutually coherent) evaluations as to likely thresholds and triggers, including the effects of the COVID pandemic on strategic timing and opportunity,[6]estimates as to the point at which PRC naval power,[7] anti access/area denial (A2/AD)[8] and broader ‘unrestricted warfare’ capabilities[9] will be sufficient to deter a US military response, and evidence of increased provocations such as aircraft incursions and targeted exercises.[10] However, a key underpinning, albeit sometimes unstated, assumption of many of these strategic assessments is that we ought to listen to what the CCP is saying about its intentions and – minus the rhetorical bluster – take them at face value. As The Economist has reported:
The world should take seriously Mr Xi’s talk of China ‘becoming strong’, after a period of ‘standing up’… In China, leaders’ speeches are not mere words. They are political marching orders.[11]
That is, if the CCP’s leadership is saying that it intends to reunify China, and that, whilst it will seek to do so by persuasion rather than coercion, it has not ruled out use of force, then that is probably what it is actually seeking to do. We need to listen and accept that this is not mere posturing. There are (at least) three reasons for this.
First, the CCP has watched and learned from ‘Western’ responses to – amongst other incidents – the Russian annexation of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014.[12] Despite rhetoric and sanctions, exercises and military demonstrations, and an increased military presence nearer to Russia,[13] the EU-NATO-Western response has been ineffective in actually reversing the facts on the ground. Russia successfully employed a wide range of the levers available to it – including economic dependencies on Russian gas and other business interests, disinformation, use of proxies, and exploiting internal EU and NATO fault lines[14] – in order to defuse the cohesion and force of (in particular) the EU and NATO response. This would not have been lost on China. It is now 2021, Crimea is still occupied by Russia, and that occupation is looking increasingly like a fait accompli. This, also, will not have been lost on the PRC’s leadership. China’s use of trade as an economic weapon against Australia,[15] its development and deployment (including in the South China Sea) of the ‘Three Warfares’ (legal, public opinion, psychological)[16] and its persistent sectoral norm-altering conduct[17] are neither accidental nor independent of each other. Russia has been a good teacher, albeit of dangerous and confrontational lessons.
Second, China is a greater power than Russia, and thus likely calculates that it is equally capable of successfully converting irredentist action into a new status quo. Of course, China is not as militarily experienced as Russia, and some of the targets of its irredentism – notably Taiwan – would certainly deliver a stinging bloody nose (if not a defeat). But China’s military power is rapidly growing and integrating.[18]Chinese strategic imperatives around pushing the US Navy back beyond the Second Island Chain, in order to enhance China’s manoeuvrability around the First Island Chain, appear to be matched by the rapidly expanding capability facts on the ground.[19] As the 2020 Defence Strategic Update diplomatically observed:
Since 2016, major powers have become more assertive in advancing their strategic preferences and seeking to exert influence, including China’s active pursuit of greater influence in the Indo-Pacific. Australia is concerned by the potential for actions, such as the establishment of military bases, which could undermine stability in the Indo-Pacific and our immediate region.[20]
If we think this, then we ought to acknowledge that China’s actions probably do actually indicate its commitment to this broader irredentist strategy; we ought not assume it is all a massively expensive, decades-in-development bluff.
Third, it appears from a range of actual territorial and political actions thus far that China is already steering this course. The accelerated reintegration indicators from Hong Kong are unmistakable.[21] Activity in the South China Sea and around the Senkaku Islands in the Sea of Japan is clearly on an irredentist trajectory. It is this latter facet – maritime indicators of PRC activity towards completed reintegration by 2049 – that is the focus of this article.
Outline
My aim in this short article is to describe how one possible Chinese maritime strategy in support of this 2049 objective might unfold, and to identify future ‘milestones’ that might tend to affirm or disprove this forecast. This is not a novel project,[22] and of course remains a risky and likely unrewarding endeavour given that strategic prediction has a notoriously fickle reputation. This means that I make no claim to prediction as to what willhappen; I am simply setting out one assessment of what might happen. And I do so only as a means of contributing to a discussion the naval and maritime strategy community is engaged in.
To this end, this piece will begin with a general proposition as to a possible PRC maritime campaign in support of the reunification strategy. I will then look to see if there are any elements already in place that might indicate the validity of this assessment as to a possible course of conduct – noting, of course, that any such analysis will to some extent be an exercise in scenario fulfilment. Amongst the many challenges that confront such endeavours is the possibility of accelerated indicators and warnings as a consequence of ‘favourable’ strategic timing – for example, if the US were to become strategically distracted, or Taiwan were to declare independence. However, this does not mean that such an analytical process is either irrelevant or hopelessly compromised from the outset, although one may well conclude that this particular assessment is. But even if that is the outcome, then this is a step forward as debate will help sharpen thinking on this prediction and planning challenge. Finally, I will briefly ask what this assessment might mean for Australian contributions to (potentially US-led) pre-emptive activity and dissuasion.
A Possible PRC Maritime Operational Plan?
The following assessment sets out one possible sequence of maritime operations aimed at seizing territory in support of a ‘by 2049’ reunification with Taiwan objective. However, this assessment is beholden to three significant – and eminently rebuttable – assumptions.
Assumptions
The first key assumption is that China will ultimately employ force to achieve the reintegration of claimed territories – these being, in a maritime sense, primarily the Spratlys in the South China Sea, the Senkakus in the East China Sea, and Taiwan. The validity of this threshold assumption hinges to a great extent upon one’s view of whether China intends to actually do what it says it wants to do. As noted above, I begin from this proposition but accept that this is of course contingent on future strategic circumstances persuading the CCP that this course of action remains, or (within the 2049 timeframe) will become, viable. I also recognise that this first key assumption is susceptible to rebuttal by more informed, more nuanced, and perhaps less alarmed assessments of China’s intentions and capabilities. Finally, it is important to note that there are other Taiwanese maritime features which China claims and which it might also seek to recover before turning to the main island of Taiwan – such as Pratas Island in the northern part of the South China Sea, and the Taiwanese islands of the Kinmen and Matsu groups, which are located close to the PRC mainland.
The second assumption is that reintegration of Taiwan is the strategic culminating point. The fragility of this assumption is that strategic opportunity and timing may provide for a pre-emptive escalation such that an operation in relation to Taiwan becomes the first or second territorial step, rather than the final territorial step. For example, a change of political dynamics in Taiwan may open the way to an earlier persuaded, vice later coerced, reintegration. Similarly, a signalled US retreat from its current implied position on the defence of Taiwan might escalate a cross-strait operation in order to fully exploit a favourable and potentially fleeting strategic opportunity. Likewise, China may seek to do the biggest and hardest thing first in order to demonstrate its resolve, thus cowing potential adversaries in relation to the smaller territories (the Spratlys and Senkakus in particular) and ensuring that these operations are militarily unchallenged when eventually executed.
The third assumption which underpins this assessment is that China will seek to test and adjust – ‘prove’ – its operational capabilities, coordination, and approach in relation to taking claimed maritime territories by starting with smaller and less militarily challenging operations, before graduating to more challenging operations. This assumption drives the sequencing built into this assessment: start with features in the Spratlys, where the military challenge presented by the likely adversaries (such as Vietnam and the Philippines) are less significant and the likelihood of a US military response less certain when compared to the capabilities and US alliance leverage of Japan in relation to the distant and uninhabited Senkakus, and the likely requirements of an operation against a densely inhabited, very militarily capable, existentially threatened and potentially US-supported Taiwan. Similarly, other strategic needs may elevate a Senkakus operation up the timeline. For example, China might conclude that it needs to control the Senkakus sooner rather than later, in order to ensure contiguous sea denial to US and Japanese forces, and to facilitate People’s Liberation Army – Navy (PLA-N) submarine egress beyond the First Island Chain if transits via the Miyako Strait become untenable.[23] Each element in any assumption as to sequence is readily challengeable in terms of both internal strategic coherence and external ‘uber’ strategic pressures and timings. However, prediction without specificity is unlikely to offer a sound point of departure for iterative discussion. Thus, whilst nailing my colours to the mast in terms of this assumption as to sequencing is risky, and my assumptions are certainly disprovable, it is nevertheless necessary to offer a degree of granularity as a marker for further discussion.
Sequence
As indicated just above, one possible maritime operational plan that China may adopt as a component of its longer-term strategy to recover Taiwan is to sequence a series of territorial occupations to both prove its operational system and dispel any doubts as to ultimate intent. Phase one in this sequence would be to take one or more South China Sea Spratly features. Within this broad phase of the campaign, several lines of operation might prove attractive to China. One may be to start with Itu Aba, the largest feature in the Spratlys.[24] This option may prove attractive as Itu Aba is held by – but distant from – Taiwan, and thus its seizure would demonstrate early resolve in relation to China’s key objective. Internationally, China may assess that this would in fact be the least contentious territorial action to take, given that the PRC has always maintained that Taiwan-held territory is PRC territory, and noting that Taiwan is diplomatically less secure (given the One China policy adopted by many states) than other South China Sea claimant states. Another Taiwan-focused option might be to first target Pratas Island, noting that it is in the northern and less feature-congested part of the South China Sea – but is also, consequently, much closer to Taiwan’s main island and thus to significant military support.[25]
An alternative line of operation might be to leave Itu Aba until later, and to initially target Spratly features held by the Philippines or Vietnam. This option may be attractive for a range of reasons. First, the PRC has successfully fought and defeated Vietnamese forces twice in relation to features in the South China Sea. On 19 January 1974, a PRC force of ‘small, second-hand combatants armed with outdated weaponry’ evicted South Vietnamese forces from the Paracel Islands in the northern part of the South China Sea.[26] On 14 March 1988, PRC forces took several features in the Johnson Reef area of the Spratlys from Vietnamese garrisons.[27] Second, PRC calculations that they might be able to take Vietnam-held South China Sea features with little military backlash are likely to be even stronger now than in 1974 or 1988, given the military disparity between China Coast Guard (CCG), PLA-N and (more generally) PLA capabilities, and the significantly more limited capacities of parallel Vietnamese forces. Additionally, China could leverage the support available from newly expanded and highly militarised outposts on nearby features, although it has been reported that Vietnam is strengthening its defences on several of the features it occupies: the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative has recently noted ‘Hanoi’s continuing focus on making its bases more resilient to invasion or blockade and strengthening deterrence by ensuring it can strike Chinese facilities’. Defensive works on West Reef and Sin Cowe Island, for example, have involved extensive reclamation and construction, and new ‘pillbox’ and anti-air defences on other features have hardened these Vietnamese facilities.[28] However, as a matter of strategic geography, it is an inescapable fact that the Vietnam-held Sin Cowe East feature is just a few nautical miles from – and thus readily accessible from – PRC-held Hughes Reef. China-held Johnson Reef (which China seized from Vietnam in 1988) is likewise close to Vietnam-held Collins Reef and Lansdown Reef.[29] Finally, Vietnam has no defensive arrangements with the US, as distinct from the other probable initial target state, the Philippines, which has an often ambiguous, highly politicised but nevertheless operative relationship and agreements with the US in terms of defensive arrangements.[30]
Nevertheless, an alternative to operations against Vietnam-held features could indeed be operations against Philippines-held features. Chinese forces have a recent history of interacting with and testing the political will and military capability of the Philippines in relation to, for example, the Philippine garrison at Second Thomas Shoal.[31] China has also established a significant presence on features located in close proximity to Philippines-held features. An operation against Philippines-held Thitu Island, for example, would be readily supportable from China-held Subi Reef, only 12 to 14 nautical miles distant.[32] This option would once have been far too risky for China, but the end of the permanent (and thus quickly deployable) US presence at Subic and Clark in the Philippines can only have reduced China’s perception of risk, given that increased PRC military capabilities have been paralleled by reduced US immediate response capacities.
Could Malaysian or Indonesian held features be targeted instead? Clearly yes, but history; political, military and diplomatic considerations; and the proximity of features to PRC-occupied features perhaps indicate that Philippine and Vietnamese features might offer more likely initial targets.
Phase two in this sequenced set of maritime operations could be to occupy the Senkakus. These uninhabited islands are claimed by both the PRC and Japan,[33] but are administered by Japan and are the site of regular Japan Coast Guard operations against encroaching Chinese fishing vessels. Indeed, the 2010 arrest of a Chinese fishing vessel by the Japan Coast Guard (which caused a significant diplomatic incident between the PRC and Japan[34]), and ongoing (and escalating) interactions between Japan Coast Guard vessels and Chinese fishing and CCG vessels in the vicinity of the Senkakus,[35] indicate the level of heightened tension that already exists near these islands.
However, a military operation against the Senkakus would carry much greater political and military risk than an operation in the Spratlys. The Senkakus are considered by the US to be Japanese territory, and are covered by longstanding US-Japan alliance and defensive arrangements – a point clearly and overtly made by US Secretary of Defence Austin in his first counterpart phone call with Japanese Defence Minister Kishi in January 2021.[36] This may mean that the PRC adopts a less overtly military approach to any annexation of the Senkakus – perhaps beginning with a further increased fishing presence in the Senkaku Territorial Sea, followed by landings by Chinese fishermen, who would then be protected by PRC forces when the Japan Coast Guard seeks to evict them. Chinese information operations could seek to characterise the issue as one of fishing rights and harassment, and perhaps seek to tie Japan to a lengthy and diverting international dispute resolution process (such as under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention). In doing so, the PRC might seek to delay and ultimately forestall any Japanese military response, allowing China to create a new set of facts on the ground in respect of actual physical control of the Senkakus. That is, whilst a more overtly military or aggressive approach to territorial operations in the South China Sea might be within the PRC’s risk tolerance, it is likely that the need to avert a direct, immediate confrontation with a significantly more capable Japanese Coast Guard and Self Defence Force, and to defer and ultimately dissuade US military intervention on behalf of Japan, will manifest in a more indirect approach being taken in the Senkakus.
Phase three in this sequenced plan would be operations against Taiwan. Much has been written on how such an operation might unfold if China is required to resort to coercive, and then military, means;[37] this brief article is not the place to reiterate that rich and diverse set of analyses. For the purposes of this assessment, it is sufficient to note that this would be the culminating point in the maritime operations sequence described above.
What Enablers Might Indicate That This Plan Is Already Underway?
What enablers and preconditions might indicate that a sequenced maritime operational plan such as this could be something the PRC is considering? Three sets of indicators might be relevant: experience; general strategic approach; and specific maritime capability enablers.
Two sets of experience could be directly relevant to such a plan. The first is the operational experience garnered from maritime combat operations against Vietnam in 1974 and 1988, coupled with the even greater relative strength the PRC can now deploy in comparison to Vietnam and the Philippines in particular. This calculus would likely be encouraging to China and deeply concerning to Vietnam and the Philippines. The second body of useful experience which China has more recently built is in China Coast Guard maritime militia, and non-military proxy and presence operations. China has become very adept at employing fishing vessels – accompanied where necessary by CCG vessels as opposed to PLA-N warships – as proxies. These vessels have interfered with Philippines garrison resupply operations (as noted above), conducted mass presence operations to exclude other fishing vessels from an area,[38] operated as the first line of defence for PRC exploration vessels when confronted by Vietnam Coast Guard vessels,[39] and acted as the primary instruments of harassment against US hydrographic and oceanographic survey vessels.[40] This use of proxies obfuscates official PRC responsibility and creates operational time and space – through, for example, exploiting the concern of others to avoid being seen as using force against fishing vessels and fisherpeople. Should a military confrontation arise, the time and space afforded to China by the hesitancy of warships in relation to these proxies would very likely dissipate quickly – in an armed conflict, maritime militia vessels would likely be targetable as auxiliaries.[41] However, in situations short of rapid militarisation and escalation, the utility of the China’s unparalleled experience in maritime proxy operations should not be underestimated in terms of deployability against Japan in relation to the Senkakus.
In terms of the stage-setting facilitated by general strategic approaches, the PRC’s semi-official – but, it is believed, quite influential – strategies of ‘unrestricted warfare’ and ‘the three warfares’ (as noted above) clearly anticipate the coordinated military-diplomatic-economic information campaigns that would be required in any irredentist strategy seeking to reduce the risk of provoking an early US military response. For example, in order to create time and space to alter the facts on the ground in the Senkakus, and to create US hesitancy in terms of military support to Japan, it is only to be expected that China would seek to argue that the situation is one of fishing rights and Japanese harassment of fisherpeople, and that the matter should be brought before international dispute resolution mechanisms, in order to delay a military response by Japan and the US (employing legal warfare and public opinion warfare). After a period of delay, any resort to military force by Japan and the US might begin to seem belligerent rather than defensive – and thus ever more unpalatable – leaving China in de facto possession of the Senkakus, regardless of any clear view as to Japanese sovereignty.
Finally, there are two specific maritime capability enablers that tend to point towards the potential for this sequenced set of operations in relation to the Spratlys and the Senkakus in particular. First, the reorganisation of the ‘five dragons stirring up the sea’ Chinese maritime law enforcement agencies[42] into a single coordinated, and now very capable, CCG[43] appears to have generated improved coherence and effectiveness in China’s day-to-day maritime operations in the vicinity of these claimed areas. The employment of maritime militias has likewise enabled much more consistent and mutually supported presence and proxy operations across a wider geographic ambit than was hitherto the case.
Second, the recent adoption by the PRC of a new Coast Guard Law clearly signals a more assertive and robust approach to operations in the South China Sea and in the vicinity of the Senkakus. For example, Article 20 of the law provides the following authorisation to the CCG:
Without the approval of the competent authority of [the PRC], if foreign organizations and individuals construct buildings, structures, and install various fixed or floating devices in the sea areas and islands under [PRC] jurisdiction, the maritime police agency has the right to order them to stop the above illegal acts or [face] demolition within a time limit; for those who refuse to stop illegal activities or do not demolish within the time limit, the maritime police agency has the right to stop or force the demolition.[44]
Coupled with the expansive approach to ‘jurisdiction’ encompassed within this law – that is, jurisdiction is asserted wherever China claims features, not just where it holds features – this new power effectively sanctions a more militarised CCG to land on disputed features held by other states and to demolish structures and detain people found on those features. This is exactly the conduct one could anticipate in any operation to seize, for example, features in the Spratly Islands, and could offer a pretext for CCG personnel to land on the Senkakus.
Possible Dissuasive Responses?
What might be done to dissuade China from such a course of action? As a recent Council on Foreign Relations report has observed:
We do not believe such U.S. strategy as it exists is adequately coordinated with, at a minimum, Taiwan and Japan. We do not think it is politically or militarily realistic to count on a U.S. military defeat of various kinds of Chinese assaults on Taiwan, uncoordinated with allies. Nor is it realistic to presume that, after such a frustrating clash, the United States would or should simply escalate to some sort of wide-scale war against China with comprehensive blockades or strikes against targets on the Chinese mainland.[45]
Apart from general coordinated diplomatic measures (such as Australia’s recent note verbale to the UN Secretary General regarding China’s excessive South China Sea claims[46]), continued freedom of navigation assertion operations,[47] and planning for the employment of ‘geo-economic’ (as opposed to purely military) deterrence,[48] two specific responses might be useful. First, continued reaffirmation by the US of its security and defence obligations and partnerships with some of the likely target states is essential. The US Secretary of Defense’s clear and targeted reaffirmation with the Japanese government that the Senkakus are covered by the US-Japan defence arrangements is as much about China as it is about Japan. Similar recent reports regarding US defence and security arrangements with Taiwan – albeit more opaque – are of the same ilk.[49]Attendant upon this, it is possible that the Philippines may also seek to clarify and settle its cyclically difficult relationship with the US[50] – not least to give pause to China should China be looking to Philippines-held Spratly features as the next step in its irredentist strategy. Unfortunately, the likelihood that the South China Sea littoral states might also be convinced to collectively and more effectively address the challenge posed by China’s stated policy of territorial integration is probably more distant.
The second potential short-term response might be for concerned peripheral states to agree on a set of indicators and warnings that might trigger them to take dissuasive action in advance of a Chinese operation. These indicators and warnings could be designed to facilitate early and pre-emptive diplomatic and political responses to any anticipated Chinese territorial seizure operation in the Spratlys area or of the Senkakus. Additionally, such indicators and warnings might also trigger the pre-planned deployment of a continuous and coordinated presence in the South China Sea or east China Sea, ready to close in upon the anticipated vicinity of any such operation in the hope of dissuading Chinese action. However, the intelligence requirements for, and escalatory potential of, any such pre-emption and response plan would be very significant indeed.
Conclusion
If we are to take the PRC leadership’s consistently signalled intentions as regards reintegration of claimed maritime territories by 2049 at face value – as perhaps we ought to at this stage – then it is useful to think about how those intentions might unfold. In terms of China’s ‘recovery’ of claimed maritime territories in the South China Sea and East China Sea, and ultimately of Taiwan, one possible future is a sequenced and iterative campaign of escalated seizure operations. This campaign could begin with smaller features held by less capable challengers (the Spratlys), graduating to larger, albeit uninhabited, features held by more capable and US-leveraged challengers (the Senkakus), and culminating with the recovery of Taiwan (which, if done coercively, would constitute a very significant and costly undertaking). Thinking about how China might seek to achieve its stated territorial objectives by 2049 does not commit those concerned about China’s maritime conduct and strategy to any particular response or course of action; but it does offer a framework for more granular debate and dialogue and – ultimately – against which to plan.
* I would like to thank Michael Kilham for his valuable comments on an earlier draft of this article. All errors remain mine alone.
[1] James Miles, ‘The Chinese Communist Party turns 100’, The Economist, 17 November 2020, <https://www.economist.com/the-world-ahead/2020/11/17/the-chinese-communist-party-turns-100>.[2] BBC News, ‘China’s Xi allowed to remain “president for life” as term limits removed, BBC News [website], 11 March 2018, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-43361276>.
[3] ‘Full text of Xi Jinping’s report at 19th CPC National Congress’, China Daily, 2017: ‘We stand firm in safeguarding China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and will never allow the historical tragedy of national division to repeat itself. Any separatist activity is certain to meet with the resolute opposition of the Chinese people. We have the resolve, the confidence, and the ability to defeat separatist attempts for “Taiwan independence” in any form. We will never allow anyone, any organization, or any political party, at any time or in any form, to separate any part of Chinese territory from China!’, <https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcnationalcongress/2017-11/04/content_34115212.htm>; Graham Allison, ‘What Xi Jinping wants’, The Atlantic, 1 June 2017,
<https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/05/what-china-wants/528561/>; Richard Bush, ‘From persuasion to coercion: Beijing’s approach to Taiwan and Taiwan’s response’, Global China (Brookings Institution), November 2019, p. 7, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/from-persuasion-to-coercion-beijings-approach-to-taiwan-and-taiwans-response/>.
[4] Will Glasgow, ‘Takeover of Taiwan by China “likely”’, The Australian, 9 February 2021, p. 2.
[5] Linda Jakobson, ‘Why should Australia be concerned about … rising tensions in the Taiwan Straits?’, China Matters Explores, February 2021, <https://chinamatters.org.au/policy-brief/policy-brief-february-2021/>.
[6] See, for example, Neil Munro, ‘China and the strategic implications of the COVID-19 pandemic’, The Asia Dialogue, 7 April 2020, <https://theasiadialogue.com/2020/04/07/china-and-the-strategic-implications-of-the-covid-19-pandemic/>; Benjamin Tze Ern Ho, ‘China’s strategic objectives in a post-Covid-19 world’, Prism, vol. 9(1), 2020, p. 89.
[7] ‘AI, Captain’, The Economist, 26 September 2020, p. 32. Between 2015 and 2019, China launched more warship tonnage (600 000) than the US Pacific, South Korean, Japanese, Australian, Indian and Philippines fleets combined (450 000).
[8] Stephen Biddle & Ivan Oelrich, ‘Future warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese anti access/area denial, U.S. air sea battle, and command of the commons in East Asia’, International Security, vol. 41(1), 2016, p. 7; Malcolm Davis, ‘Towards China’s A2AD 2.0’, The Strategist (ASPI), 24 November 2017: ‘Such “anti-access and area denial” (A2AD) capabilities are designed either to prevent an adversary’s access to a particular region (anti-access) or to contest its freedom of movement within that theatre (area denial)’ <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/towards-chinas-a2ad-2-0/>.
[9] Qiao Liang & Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted warfare, PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, Beijing, 1999, p. 7: ‘… the new principles of war are no longer “using armed force to compel the enemy to submit to one’s will,” but rather are “using all means, including armed force or nonarmed force, military and non-military, and lethal and non-lethal means to compel the enemy to accept one’s interests”’, <https://www.c4i.org/unrestricted.pdf>.
[10] Bang Xiao & Michael Walsh, ‘Could China invade Taiwan under President Xi Jinping, and would they win?’, ABC News [website], 10 October 2020, <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-10-10/could-china-invade-taiwan-under-president-xi-jinping/12743106>; ‘Could China seize and occupy Taiwan militarily?’, China Power (CSIS), 26 August 2020, <https://chinapower.csis.org/can-china-invade-taiwan/>; ‘Taiwan reports “large incursion” by Chinese warplanes for second day’, BBC News [website], 25 January 2021, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-55788359>.
[11] ‘Seizing the moment, cautiously’, The Economist, 23 January 2021, p. 24.
[12] F Stephen Larrabee et al., Russia and the West after the Ukrainian crisis: European vulnerabilities to Russian pressures, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2017 (which assesses ‘Four areas of European vulnerability … : military, trade and investment, energy, and political’), <https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1300/RR1305/RAND_RR1305.pdf>; Taras Kuzio, ‘Six years of war fail to cure Putin’s Ukraine delusions’, Atlantic Council [website], 13 March 2020, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/six-years-of-war-fail-to-cure-putins-ukraine-delusions/>.
[13] Michael Birnbaum, ‘For Putin, a year of successes and failures – on Ukraine, NATO and the West’, Washington Post, 20 December 2014, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/for-putin-a-year-of-successes-and-failures–on-ukraine-nato-and-the-west/2014/12/20/a816efc2-87a8-11e4-b9b7-b8632ae73d25_story.html>.
[14] ‘They told you so’, The Economist, 13 February 2021, p. 13.
[15] Michael Shoebridge, ‘Iron or? Getting energised about reducing Australia’s trade dependence on China’, The Strategist (ASPI), 17 December 2020, <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/iron-or-getting-energised-about-reducing-australias-trade-dependence-on-china/>.
[16] Michael Raska, ‘China and the “Three Warfares” – Beijing is increasingly exploiting information operations for influence in areas of strategic competition’, The Diplomat, 18 December 2015, <https://thediplomat.com/2015/12/hybrid-warfare-with-chinese-characteristics-2/>; Michael Clarke, ‘China’s application of the “Three Warfares” in the South China Sea and Xinjiang’, Orbis, vol. 63, 2019, p. 187; Elsa Kania, ‘The PLA’s latest strategic thinking on the Three Warfares’, China Brief (The Jamestown Foundation), vol. 16(13), 2016, <https://jamestown.org/program/the-plas-latest-strategic-thinking-on-the-three-warfares/>; Doug Livermore, ‘China’s “Three Warfares” in theory and practice in the South China Sea’, Georgetown Security Studies Review, 25 March 2018, <https://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2018/03/25/chinas-three-warfares-in-theory-and-practice-in-the-south-china-sea/>.
[17] See, for example, Nicola Contessi, ‘Multilateralism, intervention and norm contestation: China’s stance on Darfur in the UN Security Council’, Security Dialogue, vol. 41(3), 2010, p. 323: ‘… by emphasizing the need to respect Sudan’s sovereignty and the requirement that Sudan consent to an international intervention, China has sought to promote a return to more traditional forms of peacekeeping, as a way to oppose emerging interpretations of the norm of intervention, which it sees as a threat to its own security’; Michael Mazarr et al., China and the international order, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2018, p. 48: ‘Like all aspects of its engagement with the post-war order, China’s approach to the norms of human rights, non-proliferation, and nonaggression has reflected a complex tension between its determination to promote its own self-defined interests and a growing desire to cultivate a reputation as a responsible and helpful member of the multilateral order’, <https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2400/RR2423/RAND_RR2423.pdf>.
[18] US Secretary of Defence, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020: Annual Report to Congress, 2020: ‘The PRC pursues its MCF Development Strategy to “fuse” its economic and social development strategies with its security strategies to build an integrated national strategic system and capabilities in support of China’s national rejuvenation goals’ (p. v), ‘The PRC’s strategy includes advancing a comprehensive military modernization program that aims to “basically” complete military modernization by 2035 and transform the PLA into a “worldclass” military by the end of 2049’ (p. vi), <https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF>.
[19] Toshi Yoshihara, ‘China’s vision of its seascape: The First Island Chain and Chinese seapower’, Asian Politics and Policy, vol. 4(3), 2012, p. 293; Andrew Erickson & Joel Wuthnow, ‘Barriers, springboards and benchmarks: China conceptualizes the Pacific “Island Chains”’, The China Quarterly vol. 1, 2016, p. 225; Derek Grossman, ‘America is betting big on the Second Island Chain’, The Diplomat, 5 September 2020, <https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/america-is-betting-big-on-the-second-island-chain/>; Thomas Mahnken et al., Tightening the chain: Implementing a strategy of maritime pressure in the Western Pacific, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2019, p. 15: ‘The PLA seeks to dictate military operations within this First Island Chain, a geographic area that holds deep symbolic value for Chinese leaders. The Chinese leadership has wagered that air and sea power combined with ample land-based missiles will prevent encirclement’, <https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/implementing-a-strategy-of-maritime-pressure-in-the-western-pacific>.
[20] Australian Government, 2020 Defence Strategic Update, Canberra, 2020, para 1.3, <https://www1.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-11/2020_Defence_Strategic_Update.pdf>.
[21] Lindsay Maizland & Eleanor Albert, ‘Hong Kong’s freedoms: What China promised and how it’s cracking down’, Council on Foreign Relations [website], 17 February 2021, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/hong-kong-freedoms-democracy-protests-china-crackdown>; Greg Torode & James Pomfret, ‘Explainer: Hong Kong’s “borrowed time” – worry about 2047 hangs over protests’, Reuters, 23 August 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-protests-explainer-idUSKCN1VD0S6>.
[22] See, for example, Michael Peck, ‘Slaughter in the East China Sea: What happens if China fights the United States and Japan? A mutual disaster, wargame predicts’, Foreign Policy, 7 August 2020, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/07/slaughter-in-the-east-china-sea/>.
[23] Felix Chang, ‘The Ryukyu defense line: Japan’s response to China’s naval push into the Pacific Ocean’, Foreign Policy Research Institute [website], 8 February 2021, <https://www.fpri.org/article/2021/02/the-ryukyu-defense-line-japans-response-to-chinas-naval-push-into-the-pacific-ocean/>.
[24] Itu Aba is being transformed, according to Taiwan, into ‘a base for humanitarian aid and international shipping, as well as a scientific research station’: Hu Wen-Chi, ‘Itu Aba plan vital to nation’s sovereignty’, Taipei Times, 7 November 2019, <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2019/11/07/2003725386>.
[25] Zachary Haver, ‘Chinese Drones Fly Near Taiwan-held Island in South China Sea’, Radio Free Asia, 7 April 2021, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/taiwan-drones-04072021180138.html>.
[26] Toshi Yoshihara, ‘The 1974 Paracels sea battle: A campaign appraisal’ Naval War College Review, vol. 69(2), 2016, p. 41.
[27] Koh Swee Lean Collin & Ngo Minh Tri, ‘Learning from the battle of the Spratly Islands: Vietnam fought China in the South China Sea before and it should be ready to do so again’, The Diplomat, 20 March 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/learning-from-the-battle-of-the-spratly-islands/>; Greg Torode, ‘Spratly Islands dispute defines China-Vietnam relations 25 years after naval clash: 25 years after China’s naval clash with Vietnam at Johnson Reef, a second military battle is seen as unlikely – but Beijing’s ambitions are growing’, South China Morning Post, 17 March 2013, <https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1192472/spratly-islands-dispute-defines-china-vietnam-relations-25-years-after>; ‘Timeline: Disputes in the South China Sea’, Washington Post, 8 June 2012, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/special/south-china-sea-timeline/index.html>.
[28] ‘Vietnam shores up its Spratly defences’, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 19 February 2021, <https://amti.csis.org/vietnam-shores-up-its-spratly-defenses/>.
[29] ‘Island features of the South China Sea’ [chart], Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, <https://amti.csis.org/scs-features-map/>.
[30] Malcolm Cook, ‘A reprieve for the US–Philippines military alliance’, The Strategist (ASPI), 16 June 2020, <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/a-reprieve-for-the-us-philippines-military-alliance/>.
[31] Republic of the Philippines v People’s Republic of China, Permanent Court of Arbitration, arbitral award of 16 July 2016, para. 1161, <https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2086>.
[32] Euan Graham, ‘South China Sea: Beijing raises the temperature again’, The Interpreter (Lowy Institute), 18 August 2017, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/china-raises-temperature-again-south-china-sea>; Rob McLaughlin, ‘An incident in the South China Sea’, International Law Studies, vol. 96, 2020, p. 505.
[33] Hitoshi Nasu & Donald Rothwell, ‘Re-evaluating the role of international law in territorial and maritime disputes in East Asia’, Asian Journal of International Law, vol. 4(1), 2014, p. 55.
[34] Justin McCurry, ‘Japan-China row escalates over fishing boat collision’, The Guardian, 9 September 2010, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/09/japan-china-fishing-boat-collision>; ‘Counter-coercion series: Senkaku Islands trawler collision’, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 18 May 2017, <https://amti.csis.org/counter-co-trawler-collision/>.
[35] According to Japanese sources, in the first two months of 2021, there have been 14 incursions into the Territorial Sea around the Senkakus, and 92 incursions into the Contiguous Zone around the Senkakus. See Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Trends in Chinese government and other vessels in the waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands, and Japan’s response – Records of intrusions of Chinese government and other vessels into Japan’s Territorial Sea’, 3 March 2021, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page23e_000021.html; Ankit Panda, ‘Japan protests China Coast Guard harassment of fishing vessel near Senkaku Islands: China Coast Guard ships chased a Japanese fishing vessel, Japanese authorities said’, The Diplomat, 11 May 2020, <https://thediplomat.com/2020/05/japan-protests-china-coast-guard-harassment-of-fishing-vessel-near-senkaku-islands/>.
[36] Department of Defense, ‘Readout of Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s call with Japanese Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi’, US Department of Defense [website], 23 January 2021: ‘Secretary Austin further affirmed that the Senkaku islands are covered by Article V of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and that the United States remains opposed to any unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the East China Sea’, <https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2480919/readout-of-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-austins-call-with-japanese-defense-minist/>.
[37] For example, Michael O’Hanlon, ‘Can China conquer Taiwan?’, Brookings [website], July 2000 (ultimately concluding ‘no’, p. 18), <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/can-china-conquer-taiwan/>; Ben Westcott, ‘A Chinese invasion of Taiwan would be a bloody, logistical nightmare’, CNN [website], 24 June 2019 (assessing that any invasion might be successful long term, but would be a very costly endeavour), <https://edition.cnn.com/2019/06/23/asia/taiwan-china-invasion-intl-hnk/index.html>; Kris Osborn, ‘Would China really invade Taiwan? Maybe, but the costs would be nuts’, The National Interest, 20 November 2020, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/would-china-really-invade-taiwan-maybe-costs-would-be-nuts-173022>; ‘How to kill a democracy’, The Economist, 20 February 2021, p. 24.
[38] Manuel Mogato and Julian Elona, ‘Philippines says fishermen still blocked from Scarborough Shoal’, Reuters, 15 July 2016, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-ruling-philippines-idUSKCN0ZV183>.
[39] Mike Yeo, ‘Testing the waters: China’s maritime militia challenges foreign forces at sea’, Defense News, 31 May 2019, <https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2019/05/31/testing-the-waters-chinas-maritime-militia-challenges-foreign-forces-at-sea/>; Nguyen Thanh Trung, ‘Vietnam’s uphill battle in the South China Sea: A need for more international actors’, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 23 August 2019, <https://amti.csis.org/vietnams-uphill-battle-in-the-south-china-sea-a-need-for-more-international-actors/>.
[40] For example, harassment of USNS Impeccable: ‘United States protests Chinese interference with U.S. Naval vessel, vows continued operations’, American Journal of International Law, vol. 103(2), 2009, p. 349; Pete Pedrozo, ‘Close encounters at sea: The USNS Impeccable incident’, Naval War College Review, vol. 62(3), 2009, p. 101.
[41] Rob McLaughlin, ‘The legal status and characterisation of maritime militia vessels’, EJIL Talk!, 18 June 2019, <https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-legal-status-and-characterisation-of-maritime-militia-vessels/>.
[42] Lyle Goldstein, Five dragons stirring up the sea: Challenge and opportunity in China’s improving maritime enforcement capabilities, China Maritime Studies Institute, US Naval War College, Newport, RI, 2010, <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-red-books/5/>.
[43] Lyle Morris, ‘Taming the five dragons? China consolidates its maritime law enforcement agencies’, China Brief, vol. 13(7), 2013, <https://jamestown.org/program/taming-the-five-dragons-china-consolidates-its-maritime-law-enforcement-agencies/>; Eli Huang, ‘New law expands Chinese coastguard’s jurisdiction to at least the first island chain’, The Strategist (ASPI), 16 February 2021, <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/new-law-expands-chinese-coastguards-jurisdiction-to-at-least-the-first-island-chain/>; ‘Are maritime law enforcement forces destabilizing Asia?’, China Power (CSIS), 2020, <https://chinapower.csis.org/maritime-forces-destabilizing-asia/>.
[44] Maritime Police Law of the People’s Republic of China (Adopted at the 25th meeting of the Standing Committee of the 13th National People’s Congress on 22 January 2021), sourced from Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, 22 January 2021; see also Shigeki Sakamoto, ‘China’s new Coast Guard Law and implications for maritime security in the East and South China Seas’, Lawfare, 16 February 2021, <https://www.lawfareblog.com/chinas-new-coast-guard-law-and-implications-maritime-security-east-and-south-china-seas>; Pete Pedrozo, ‘Maritime Police Law of the People’s Republic of China’, International Law Studies, vol. 97, 2021, p. 465.
[45] Robert D Blackwill & Philip Zelikow, The United States, China, and Taiwan: A strategy to prevent war, Council Special Report No. 90, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 2021, p. 2, <https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/csr90_1.pdf>.
[46] No. CML/14/2019, 23 July 2020, <https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mys_12_12_2019/2020_07_23_AUS_NV_UN_001_OLA-2020-00373.pdf>; Bec Strating, ‘Australia lays down the law in the South China Sea dispute’, The Interpreter (Lowy Institute), 25 July 2020, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/australia-lays-down-law-south-china-sea-dispute>.
[47] David Larter, ‘In challenging China’s claims in the South China Sea, the US Navy is getting more assertive’, Defense News, 5 February 2020, <https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/02/05/in-challenging-chinas-claims-in-the-south-china-sea-the-us-navy-is-getting-more-assertive/>.
[48] Blackwill & Zelikow, p. 65.
[49] Kenji Minemura, ‘Declassified note shows U.S. intent to defend Taiwan against China’, Asahi Shimbun, 26 February 2021, <http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/14128288>; ‘How to kill a democracy’, The Economist, p. 24.
[50] ‘South China scene’, The Economist, 25 July 2020, p. 20.
*Rob McLaughlin is Professor of Law at the Australian National Centre for Oceans Resources and Security, Honorary Professor at the Australian National University, and Senior Fellow at the Stockton Centre for International Law at the US Naval War College. He researches, publishes, and teaches in the areas of Law of Armed Conflict, Law of the Sea, Maritime Security Law and Maritime Law Enforcement, and Military Law.
Rob came to academia after a career in the Royal Australian Navy as a Seaman Officer and a Legal Officer, and was the Head of the UNODC Maritime Crime Program from 2012-2014. His legal roles in the Navy included as the Fleet Legal Officer, the Strategic Legal Adviser, Director Operations and International Law, Director Naval Legal Service, and Assistant Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force.
