By Edward Sing Yue Chan*
Australia should respond to China’s growing naval presence with a measured approach, focusing on clear communication with security allies rather than framing it as an immediate threat, East Asia Forum reports.
In February 2025, the Australian Defence Force had multiple encounters with the Chinese military. Three Chinese naval vessels sailing about 150 nautical miles from Sydney were sighted on 19 February. These vessels later conducted live-fire drills in international waters in the Tasman Sea and navigated around the Australian continent.
This unprecedented incident follows an encounter on 11 February between the Royal Australian Air Force and a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force aircraft over the South China Sea. Some observers have interpreted China’s moves as a direct response to Australia’s advocacy for freedom of navigation.
But this interpretation overlooks the broader strategic context. The Chinese naval presence near Australian waters was part of a pre-planned exercise — an otherwise routine operation that has been underway since the beginning of 2025. Chinese vessels have long used Hobart as a key mounting base for Antarctic operations, so the transit of Chinese ships through Australian waters is not new.
Still, it is unusual for the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to travel to the South Pacific for naval exercises. But the journey to Australian waters takes time. The same naval group, which belongs to the South Sea Fleet, was first spottednortheast of Australia on 13 February, two days after the incident in the South China Sea.
Notably, Australia and China held their 23rd Defence Strategic Dialogue in Beijing on 17 February. According to the Australian Defence statement, the discussions included ‘bilateral, global and regional security issues, as well as military transparency and communication’. This suggests that tensions remain manageable, at least on the official level. But even though Canberra acknowledged the legitimacy of Chinese actions in international waters, a Chinese Ministry of National Defence spokesperson said that ‘despite being fully aware of the fact, Australia has unjustly criticised China’.
Some analysts view China’s naval presence as a coercive response to Australia’s activities in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. While the Taiwan issue remains a core interest, China’s military expansion has been unfolding for over a decade and the PLAN has long sought blue-water capabilities.
Beijing first declared its ambition to become a strong maritime power in 2012. The Renhai-class cruiser, which was part of the naval group exercising in the Tasman Sea, was first built in 2017, with eight currently in service. In recent years, Chinese cruisers have routinely operated in the Western Pacific, including joint exercises with Russia in the East Sea.
The message from Beijing is clear. A well-known Chinese PLA analyst suggested that the international community should remain calm and unfussed about these exercises. From Beijing’s perspective, these exercises are part of China’s evolving naval posture globally, not an act of direct intimidation against Australia or New Zealand, as has been perceived in the Australian media.
From China’s perspective, its relationship with Australia is primarily economic. Security issues were notably absent from the meeting between Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Chinese President Xi Jinping in November 2024, reinforcing Beijing’s view that Australia does not currently have a direct conflict of interest in security and military terms with China.
That said, Australia’s concerns about China’s growing presence are understandable given the asymmetric nature of their bilateral relationship. The domestic pushback in Australia speaks to the growing concern over perceived Chinese assertiveness and interference in domestic security matters. But as a rising maritime power, Beijing remains acutely aware that an increased presence in the Tasman Sea and South Pacific risks triggering a US naval response.
China appears to be employing salami-slicing tactics, involving the slow accumulation of small changes. Establishing a military base in the South Pacific remains a long-term goal, which China is making incremental progress towards in the Solomon Islands and the Cook Islands. But fears of a Chinese military base in the South Pacific at this point in time are likely overstated.
Given this strategic dynamic, Australia would be wise to pay closer attention to how its security allies, particularly the United States, respond to China’s moves, rather than reflexively framing China as an imminent threat in the upcoming election. A ‘China threat’ narrative is neither helpful in advancing stable Australia–China relations, nor to understanding China’s growing presence in the Indo-Pacific.
With Trump returning to the US presidency for a second term, uncertainty looms over US geopolitical commitments within the Indo-Pacific. If Washington’s engagement wanes, Australia and its regional partners must consider how to best position themselves in response to China’s expanding influence while collectively upholding interests and values without the United States.
These are questions that Canberra should have addressed a decade ago. And now, alongside its regional partners within the Indo-Pacific, Australia must respond with clarity to China’s growing naval capabilities and take control of the region’s strategic future.
Edward Sing Yue Chan is Postdoctoral Fellow at the Australian Centre of China in the World, The Australian National University.
