On 14 March 14, 2025 the G7 Foreign Ministers released the following statement from Charlevoix in Quebec.
1. We, the Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union, reaffirm the unwavering commitment of the G7 to contribute to a free, open, secure and law-based maritime domain that strengthens international security, promotes economic prosperity and ensures the sustainable use of marine resources.
2. Just as maritime security and prosperity are essential to global stability, economic resilience, and the well-being of all nations, the conservation and sustainable use of ocean ecosystems are essential to all life on Earth. More than 80% of the world’s goods are transported by sea, and 97% of the world’s data travels via undersea cables. Disruptions to maritime routes directly threaten global food security, critical minerals, energy security, global supply chains, and economic stability. We are deeply concerned about the growing risks to maritime security, including strategic contestation, threats to freedom of navigation and overflight, and illicit maritime activities. The behavior of some States in these areas increases the risk of conflict and environmental damage, and jeopardizes the prosperity and living standards of all nations around the world, particularly the poorest.
3. We recognize the role of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the legal framework governing all activities in the oceans and seas.
4. We recall the G7 Declarations on Maritime Security adopted in Lübeck (2015) and Hiroshima (2016). We welcome the related ongoing work in other G7 ministerial tracks and working groups on various issues, including securing submarine cable networks and addressing abandoned fishing gear. We also welcome the G7 work on transnational organized crime and terrorism as it relates to the maritime domain, including those related to combating piracy, armed robbery at sea and trafficking in persons, as well as strengthening the capacity of coastal States to enforce maritime law. We recognize the importance of regional maritime security frameworks in assisting coastal States to address collective threats to their maritime security. We welcome existing initiatives, such as the G7 Group of Friends of the Gulf of Guinea (G7++ FOGG, which Canada chairs this year), which provides the primary forum for discussion on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea for G7 members and partners.
Emerging threat to maritime security and freedom of navigation and overflight
5. Strengthening Stability : We underline the importance of freedom of navigation and overflight, other internationally lawful uses of the high seas and exclusive economic zones, and related rights and freedoms in other maritime areas, including the right of innocent passage, the right of transit passage, and the right of passage through archipelagic seaways, as provided for in international law. We are increasingly concerned about recent and unjustifiable efforts to restrict this freedom and expand the limits of jurisdiction through the use of force and other forms of coercion, including in the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, the Red Sea, and the Black Sea. We condemn the illicit, provocative, coercive and dangerous actions by which China seeks to unilaterally change the status quo in a manner that may jeopardize the stability of certain regions, including through territorial claims, the construction of outposts, as well as the use of these maritime zones for military purposes. In areas pending final delimitation, we emphasize the importance of coastal States refraining from unilateral actions that would result in permanent physical changes to the marine environment, to the extent that they jeopardize or impede the conclusion of a final agreement, and the importance of making every effort to conclude interim arrangements of a practical nature in these areas. We also condemn dangerous maneuvers by vessels, indiscriminate attacks on commercial vessels and other activities that undermine the maritime order based on international law and the rule of law. We recall that the decision of the Arbitral Tribunal of 12 July 2016 represents an important milestone, is legally binding on the parties to these proceedings, and provides a useful basis for future efforts to peacefully resolve the parties’ disputes. We also reaffirm that our general guidelines on Taiwan remain unchanged and emphasize that maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait is essential to international security and prosperity. We welcome the resumption of exports from Ukrainian Black Sea ports. Commercial vessels must maintain their freedom of navigation in the Black Sea.
6. Attempts to change the status quo by force : We oppose any unilateral attempts to change the status quo, in particular by force or coercion, including in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. We commit to establishing means to systematically monitor and report attempts to change the status quo by force and the establishment of new geographical facts through, inter alia, coercive and dangerous maritime activities that could threaten regional and international peace and security.
7. Protection of critical maritime and subsea infrastructure : We recognize that the seabed contains vital energy and telecommunications infrastructure that connects our economies and is essential to our prosperity. We recall the G7 Joint Declaration on Cable Connectivity for Secure and Resilient Digital Communications Networks (2024) and the New York Joint Declaration on the Security and Resilience of Subsea Cables in a Fully Digitalized World (2024). We are increasingly concerned that critical subsea infrastructure (communications cables, interconnectors, and others) has been significantly damaged by sabotage, navigational errors, or irresponsible behavior, resulting in internet outages or power outages in some regions, delays in global data transmission, or the compromise of confidential information. We will intensify our cooperation with industry to mitigate risks, reduce bottlenecks in operational tasks and strengthen repair capabilities, so as to improve the overall resilience of critical subsea and maritime infrastructure. In this regard, we welcome the adoption in February 2025 of the EU Cable Safety Action Plan by the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
8. Maritime Crime : Maritime crime—including piracy, armed robbery at sea, arms trafficking, sanctions evasion, human trafficking, drug trafficking, and illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing—continues to undermine maritime security, freedom of navigation, our economy, and our prosperity. Despite our shared efforts to combat such crimes, illegal maritime activities have spread to new areas and have become an urgent problem to address. We welcome the G7 Action Plan to Combat Migrant Smuggling, adopted under Italy’s G7 Presidency in 2024.
9. Protecting freedom of trade : Over the past year, indiscriminate Houthi attacks in the Red Sea have compromised the maritime security of vessels and their crews, disrupted international trade, and exposed neighboring countries to environmental risks. Enabled by Iranian military, financial, and intelligence support, these unlawful attacks have also contributed to heightened tensions in the Middle East and Yemen, severely impacting the Yemeni peace process. The Galaxy Leader vessel seized by the Houthis must be released immediately. We welcome the efforts of all countries committed to ensuring freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, protecting critical shipping lanes, and restoring the flow of goods through the Suez Canal, which connects the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian and Pacific Oceans. In this regard, we commend the efforts of the EU maritime Operation Aspides and the US Operation Prosperity Guardian.
Maritime transport security and supply chain security
10. Combating dangerous and illicit maritime transport practices: The rise of unsafe and illicit maritime practices, including fraudulent registrations and registries, poses a significant threat to global trade and environmental sustainability. We are concerned that unsafe and illicit shipping practices impose high costs on industry, governments, and citizens. Russia has been able to continue to generate oil revenues by making significant efforts to circumvent the G7+ Coalition’s oil price cap policy with a ghost fleet of often antiquated, underinsured, and poorly maintained vessels that routinely disable or tamper with their automatic identification systems to avoid detection and circumvent international safety, environmental, and liability rules and standards. North Korea continues its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs and evades sanctions, including by engaging in illicit maritime activities such as the ship-to-ship transfer of oil and other UN-prohibited goods. Through G7 coordination, we have uncovered North Korea’s use of vessels engaged in illicit activities to circumvent UN Security Council sanctions. Russia and North Korea are strengthening their economic ties, including through maritime routes, as evidenced by the reported transfer of petroleum products from Russia to North Korea. Ghost ships engage in IUU fishing, destroying marine habitats and depleting fish stocks, thereby harming biodiversity and food security. Unregulated and poorly insured ghost ships also pose a high risk of maritime accidents, including in fragile ecosystems such as the Arctic and Antarctic. We commit to strengthening our coordination within the G7 and with other partners to prevent the use of unregistered or fraudulently registered, uninsured, and substandard vessels for sanctions evasion, arms transfers, and illegal fishing and trade. We encourage relevant international organizations to improve maritime situational awareness by expanding satellite vessel tracking and establishing comprehensive data registries on maritime traffic and vessel-to-vessel transhipments to identify and track illicit maritime activity. We are also committed to strengthening maritime domain awareness and law enforcement capabilities in countries in the region.
11. Ghost Fleet Working Group : We invite the Nordic-Baltic 8 countries [Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden] and other interested countries to join the G7 members in establishing a Ghost Fleet Working Group to improve the monitoring and detection of unregistered vessels and otherwise limit the illegal and dangerous activities of these vessels that pose a risk to the environment. This group will build on the work undertaken by other stakeholders active in this area. The States participating in this working group will thus respond to the request of the International Maritime Organization which, in its resolution A.1192(33) adopted on 6 December 2023, urged Member States and all relevant stakeholders to promote measures to prevent illegal operations carried out in the maritime sector by ghost ships and their flag States with a view to circumventing sanctions, evading safety or environmental regulations, avoiding insurance costs or engaging in other illegal activities.
12. Strengthening the resilience of maritime supply chains and energy and food security : Maritime supply chains will continue to support the global economy, but they are exposed to various threats arising from geopolitical tensions and environmental factors. Disruptions to maritime transport increase costs for consumers and travel times, and can reduce demand in importing countries, resulting in reduced income and competitiveness for producers in exporting countries. Such vulnerabilities in maritime transport can undermine energy and food security, particularly for developing countries that rely on stable shipping lanes, including Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and Least Developed Countries (LDCs). We welcome maritime initiatives supported by G7 partners that aim to promote energy and food security, such as the Grain from Ukraine program and the ASEAN Perspective on the Indo-Pacific. We promote cooperation with the African Union (in line with the Integrated African Strategy for Seas and Oceans – Horizon 2050) and other relevant international organizations to identify best practices to increase the resilience of maritime supply chains and ensure energy and food security, including in times of geopolitical crisis.
13. Security and resilience of strategic ports and waterways : The ownership and operational control of ports are particularly important from a national security perspective, as foreign influence and control over critical port infrastructure can create vulnerabilities in the trade, defense, and security sectors, and impact economic stability. Port resilience is also essential for economic stability and global trade. However, ports are increasingly threatened by environmental degradation, extreme weather, and geopolitical conflicts. Strengthening port security and modernizing infrastructure is critical to ensuring the safety and efficiency of maritime trade. Ensuring that the ownership and management of strategic waterways and chokepoints are not vulnerable to undue influence from potential adversaries is also essential to national security. We emphasize the importance of scrutinizing the ownership structures, management, and resilience of ports within our national administrations, including information and communications technology (ICT) systems, to prevent adversaries from leveraging supply chains, military operations, or the movement of strategic resources. We will work with our partners and relevant international organizations to encourage the application of rigorous cybersecurity standards to port ICT infrastructure, to increase resilience to malicious cyber incidents targeting maritime logistics networks, to weaken monopolies over key links in supply chains, to promote security and transparency regarding port ownership, to limit unsolicited or undue foreign influence over critical infrastructure and strategic waterways, and to otherwise focus attention on these potential vulnerabilities.
14. Unexploded ordnance (UXO) at sea poses a significant threat to the maritime environment, the safety of fishermen and other users of maritime space, and various economic activities related to the marine environment. We commit to increasing diplomatic efforts and fostering the exchange of best practices among national authorities, appropriate international and regional organizations, and relevant industry sectors to accelerate the removal of UXO from the seas and oceans.
Sustainable management of maritime resources
15. Strengthening enforcement measures to combat illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing : Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, which may account for one-third of all fishing activity worldwide, is a major contributor to the decline of fish stocks and the destruction of marine habitats. It costs the global economy more than US$23 billion annually and undermines the sustainability of fisheries as an economic asset, including for developing countries. We welcome the implementation of the Canadian-led Ghost Vessel Detection System in Ecuador, Peru, Costa Rica, the Philippines, and the Pacific Islands Forum countries, and believe it would be highly appropriate to replicate this model to support other partners whose fisheries are threatened by IUU fishing. We recognize that data sharing and transparency play a key role in this fight, exposing bad actors, and that technological advances can support the establishment of robust monitoring, control, surveillance, and enforcement measures. We encourage States to advance the fight against IUU fishing by working with relevant international organizations to establish rules for the sustainable management of fish stocks on the high seas, strengthen existing rules, and improve enforcement of existing measures, including by developing detection technologies, conducting aerial patrols, and conducting vessel boarding and inspection operations on the high seas, building on the 2022 G7 Oceans Compact.
16. We look forward to the Third United Nations Ocean Conference, which will take place in Nice, France, from 9 to 13 June 2025.
Partnerships
17. This G7 Declaration on Maritime Security and Prosperity provides a framework for cooperation with non-G7 partners, including countries that host major ports, large merchant fleets, or large numbers of vessels, as well as relevant regional and international organizations, such as the International Maritime Organization and ASEAN. We look forward to continued engagement with our partners to achieve the objectives set out in this Declaration, in accordance with the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity and as part of the efforts of G7 countries, including to foster a free, open, prosperous, and secure Indo-Pacific region, to create a free and open maritime order based on the rule of law and a commitment to the sustainable development of the world’s maritime spaces.
18. We welcome cooperation within individual coast guards, including through the Global Coast Guard Forum hosted by Italy in 2025 and the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, which could also support the achievement of the objectives set out in this Declaration.
Source: Global Affairs Canada
