By Tim Coyle*
The smokescreen was a visual shielding tactic carried out, usually by destroyers, to obscure a fleet in combat against the enemy. It might not work today to as technology has moved on; however, it is still figuratively relevant in the stratified realm of international alliance politics – in particular AUKUS Pillar One.
‘Full steam ahead’ has entered the vernacular as an imperative to hasten an aim. So, when President Trump magnanimously uttered these words at the October 2025 meeting with Prime Minister Albanese it led to a collective exhalation of relief from the Australian side that AUKUS Pillar One had been blessed.
The pre-meeting auguries were fraught. Despite claimed enthusiastic support from Congress members, dark mutterings ruminated among the cognoscenti, not least of which was the recently appointed US Navy Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Daryl Caudle. As CNO his responsibility is to his Service and the Nation, and he reiterated his view that the Virginia-class submarine construction rate should double to meet USN requirements before transferring ‘three to five’ Virginias to Australia.
A further influential sceptic was Elbridge Colby, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, who instigated an AUKUS review for which, the longer it dragged on, the higher the nervous flutterings arose in the Australian camp despite government blandishments to a bemused Australian public that all was proceeding swimmingly.
Following the thrashing experienced by the Coalition in the May 2025 election, their immediate line of attack was to pressure the Prime Minister to meet the President as the first order of business. Circumstances delayed the leaders’ meeting to 20 October. By this time the hares were well and truly running among the chattering classes, led by the Fourth Estate. This was grounded in the forthright urging by US Defense/War Secretary Hegseth that Australia increase its defence spending to 3.5% of Gross Domestic Product at the Shangri-La Dialogue earlier in 2025. Australian Defence Minister Marles enthusiastically enjoined with ’we’re up for that’ , only to be mildly deflated by the by the Prime Minister who stated the Government would decide the Defence spend based on what capabilities Australia actually needed and not spend to an arbitrary figure.
Leading up to 20 October, the commentariat were on tenterhooks. The more dismal predicted that Albanese would be ‘Zelenskyed’ , or at least berated over the perceived paucity of Australia’s defence spend. But no! A more magnanimous reception could scarcely be imagined. Fulsome praise from the President squashed the considered reservations of Caudle and Colby. The US had ‘plenty of submarines’ according to the President and he would be unstinting in meeting Australia’s modest request. Whoops of suppressed joy in the Australian ranks; embarrassed silence from the Coalition. Even Ambassador Kevin Rudd, who has worked tirelessly in the US to boost AUKUS was relieved (although he had to endure a mocking abasement by Trump for comments he had reputedly made about the President begore Rudd assumed the ambassadorial post (the last was helpfully communicated to Trump some time previously by fellow-traveller Nigel Farage – previous to this Trump would never have heard of Rudd). Rudd appeared somewhat crestfallen particularly as everyone – including the Prime Minister – had a good laugh at Rudd’s expense (for which Albanese was excoriated by the Coalition).
What was the secret Albanese exuded to attract such Trumpian bonhomie? He couldn’t call up the King (Canada did that), nor could he offer a State Visit with a personal invitation from HM. No, Albo (as he is affectionately known in the Australian idiom) is a relatively mild-mannered reporter on the world stage. But he is a Winner, as witnessed by his thumping majority in the May 2025 election. And Trump loves a Winner. Australia Is pretty inoffensive – not like those grasping Europeans always asking to be propped up by the US – and Australia is handing over $3 billion to help the US submarine construction effort.
So, it’s ‘full steam ahead’ for AUKUS intoned the President. But the camera then panned to the end of the long cabinet table. There sat US Navy Secretary John Phelan who, in a final comment, signalled the Pentagon review could recommend ‘adjustments’ to clarify elements of the AUKUS Pillar One agreement. Was Phelan intervening at the end of the meeting to get the last word in for the US Navy: ‘not so fast there’s a few adjustments to be made…?’
Perhaps, and this might be a loaded bookend to the otherwise grandiose occasion. Was he referring to issues regarding Virginia-class training and maintenance? Possibly, but RAN submariners have been in US Navy Nuclear Power Schools for at least a year and a half, and 200 Australian engineering personnel have been training in the Hawaii submarine base and at HMAS Stirling where the USS Emory S Land submarine tender is currently located. All the Australians will be certified as competent by the US and will, in all respects, be ready for Virginia-class SSN operations by the early 2030s. The Stirling base will have had an $8 billion dollar upgrade and US and British SSNs will operate from the base as Submarine Rotational Force – West (SRF-West) from 2027. So maybe it’s not the training and engineering pipeline Phelan is concerned about.
Could it be the well-advertised submarine construction rate of 1.2 Virginias per year as opposed the US Navy’s requirement of 2.5 boats per year is Phelan’s main concern? ‘ The Navy has an undersea warfighting requirement for 66 attack submarines, Admiral James Kilby, then the acting Chief of Naval Operations, noted in written testimony to Congress. “We are well below our requirement, with 47 currently in inventory. As of April 2025, 24 Virginia-class submarines had been delivered, and 14 are under contract,” (www.19fortyfive.com). Selling three to five of these precious jewels, even to ‘old mates’ is a bit of a stretch which makes those planning US capability subsurface requirements feel uncomfortable – Caudle, Colby et al – who, quite rightly, have a responsibility to call out.
The US Navy might be pacified over this perceived shortfall in SSN capability if the Australian boats were to be subsumed into the US subsurface order-of-battle. In other words, the Australian Virginia’s would constitute an integrated component of that force. Here a problem arises.
Defence Minister Marles has stated that the AUKUS boats will be deployed to defend Australia’s Sea Lines of Communication and that they would be entirely under national command and control. That covers a multitude of possible deployments and operations in peace and war and that’s all the Australian public needs to know. Submarine operations are highly classified so their movements cannot be disclosed. So, the Australian Government has two options: Option One: to grease the ways for a seamless political transfer Australia agrees to integration. Operations in North East Asia in direct support of the US in a highly sensitive operational environment would fit the ‘defence of Australian SLOCS under Australian command’ but at an ingenuous interpretation.
Option Two is where the Australian Government stipulates that the Australian Virginias will operate in cooperation with allied subsurface assets where these operations are directly in support of Australian interests. Numerous examples might include distant patrols in the South Pacific, North-East Indian Ocean and South-East Asia (as identified by the 2023 Defence Strategic Review as Australia’s Primary Region of Military Interest) and kinetically engage hostile forces should Australian Defence Force Command so direct.
This is the option which safeguards Australian national security through maintaining our operational independence while remaining an important regional ally. Having such a powerful subsurface maritime force dedicated to national defence through extensive regional coverage, while cooperating with allies, would both bolster Australia’s standing viz-a-viz allies and, through judicious information release to the Australian public, engender a national support for the SSN capability.
Option Two was likely advanced in discussions with the US. This, of course, fits within the Marles’ assurance the Virginias would be deployed in defence of our SLOCs and will be under total national control. This probably jarred with the US reticence to ‘lose’ three to five SSNs which might not be available for deployment in a China contingency. This may be the ‘adjustment’ Phelan was referring to.
Should Australia have accepted an ‘all-in’ SSN integration with the US Navy, the Australian public would likely be outraged. On the other hand, a robust statement of national independence would be accepted over time – and would not necessarily affect cooperation with the US and other allies.
The December 2025 AUSMIN talks saw Marles, Foreign Minister Wong, Secretary of State Rubio and Hegseth collectively join in the ‘full steam ahead’ chorus. Marles deflected over 12 press questions regarding the outcomes of the US AUKUS review. He quite properly refused to give any details saying it as an internal US document and, although the Australian side had been given a copy of it, he was not about to reveal detail. This was entirely correct as it likely contained reference to Australian support, or otherwise, to any US actions to confront China over Taiwan and beyond. As the US continues to maintain a policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’ regarding Taiwan it would be patently counterproductive and send China apoplexy if the US were to say the Australians will use the SSNs in support of the US in a contingency. Australia equally would be foolish to associate itself in such a statement as it would not only raise a furore in China but would have a similar effect in Australia.
The US is in a genuine bind over the submarine production rate. The Virginia build rate is further jeopardised by the priority given to the Colombia-class nuclear ballistic submarine program. Industry is striving to rectify the shortfalls but whether Australia’s $3 billion donations will help is questionable.
In addition to the build rate, should the US decide to radically modify the program – or indeed pull out – the Australian alliance would be mortally wounded. Pillar One has arguably passed the Point of No Return insofar as the training pipeline is well established, the commitments to upgrade the Stirling base and the spend of up to $12 billon to support Pillar One and the subsequent AUKUS-SSN – the British component – at the West Australian Henderson yard are now all on foot. The US president must decide, by 270 days before transfer, whether the Virginia transfer can go ahead, or whether the decision would degrade US capability. This is an unrealistic artificial bureaucratic marker and far too late to be practical. Suffice to say any US withdrawal from this time onwards would be ruinous for the Australia-US alliance and have direct consequences with the wider Indo-Pacific region security.
We must not disregard British interests in this staggeringly ambitious program. The UK nuclear submarine industry has, rightly or wrongly, attracted much technical criticism – exemplified by the Astute-class delays and costs overruns. Britain has thrown its weight into the second stage of the SSN program to develop the AUKUS-SSN as a joint development with Australia. So much so that King Charles dropped a heavy hint at the State Dinner at Windsor Castle during Trump’s UK visit on 18 September 2025 of the importance of the AUKUS-SSN program.
While Royal Navy involvement in SRF-West is entirely a matter for Britain, one might wonder what level of cooperation British SSNs would provide in a China contingency. Once RAN Virginia-class SSNs are operational would the UK continue in SRF-West and beyond into the future? These may be esoteric concepts at this stage; however, UK authorities are doubtless fully exercised in their formulation.
Conclusion
AUKUS Pillar One has attracted significant well-informed criticism from political, military, academia and strategic think tanks and the public. The Government has steadfastly defended the program against this blizzard of doubt and support is politically bipartisan. Government spokespersons have maintained a solid phalanx against these reasonings and point to the resounding successes of the presidential meeting and the AUSMIN talks.
I have attempted to outline the broad issues that continue to bedevil this enormous challenge. Whether observers like it or not, AUKUS Pillar One and AUKUS-SSN are Australian Government policies and will be with us for at least a generation – either as proven capabilities or as dismal memorials to brave but failed hopes.
Finally, I invite readers to critique my reasoning and respond robustly in the space provided.
*Tim Coyle is a former Intelligence Analyst
