The chronological trawl through the Journal of Australian Naval Institute has reached 2003 and this March is the 23rd anniversary of the commencement of the Iraq War. As with the Journal coverage of the Gulf War, ANI members who played key roles in the conflicts provided the publication with first-hand accounts for its readers.
This week From the ANI Archive reproduces the then Captain Peter Jones’s first of two edited articles he wrote on his experiences as the commander of the Maritime Interception Force during Operation Slipper.
His second article next week covers being the coalition Maritime Interception Operations Screen Commander during Operation Bastille and the combat phase (Operation Falconer).
In subsequent weeks will be articles by the Lieutenant Commander Scott Craig, Commander of the Australian Clearance Diving Team 3 and Lieutenant Commander Ivan Ingham, the gunnery officer of HMAS Anzac.
Maritime Interception Operations Screen Commander in the Gulf Part 1
Operation Slipper
On 30 October 2002 I joined the Arleigh Burke class destroyer USS Paul Hamilton with a staff of fifteen officers and sailors to take over from Captain Peter Sinclair and his hard-worked team as Maritime Interception Operations (MIO) Commander in the North Arabian Gulf (NAG). Within 20 miles of Paul Hamilton were half a dozen Australian, British, US and Polish warships in some meaningful formation that was as yet indecipherable to me. While months of preparation and planning had been involved in our arrival I still felt daunted by this assignment. My first reaction to Peter’s thorough handover was surprise at the amazing command task the RAN had garnered. This was mixed with the realisation that it was a job of unremitting pressure. Just as the all too brief but none the less thorough handover was completed, and Peter and his team were whisked off by the ubiquitous Desert Duck helicopter all hell started to break loose with the sortie of an Iraqi patrol boat into our area.
Like many incidents I had been involved in my naval career, the training of all involved kicked in. After a few hours we had dealt with our first ‘crisis’. In taking stock of the situation it was clear we had a lot to learn. There were more acronyms and procedures that you could poke a stick at. The concept of a battle rhythm for the staff had to be gripped as did the novel means of command and control called ‘chat’.
Chat involved ships using commercial software with all my ships joining in a meeting room with the CTG where reports would be made and orders given. Chat is great for shared situational awareness but there are complications. The staff of the next two levels in my command chain were also in the meeting room. In order not to encourage too much higher level scrutiny of the Task Group goings-on, one-on-one whisper boxes would be used between MIO Commander and individual ships. Finally, chat can be a bit of a vortex that draws eyes away from radar screens.
In initially taking stock of my new position as MIO Commander I was conscious that I had experienced similar feelings of when I took command of HMAS Melbourne back in 1998 – and things had worked out. In addition I had done MIO twice before, albeit in less demanding capacities. The other issue was that I was the Commander and so I better just get on with it.
While the first week proceeded at breakneck speed with Iraqi patrol boat activity in our area becoming daily fare and mass dhow breakouts to contend with at night, my primary aim was to get to know the key players. First, there was the captain of Paul Hamilton. He was the thoughtful and most gracious Commander Fred Pffermann. He was much respected by his crew and was at the time demonstrating commendable leadership in the wake of the recent suicide of his Executive Officer. For all my team Paul Hamilton holds a special place, it was a terrific ship and our time in her was all too short.
In the carrier USS Abraham Lincoln resided my immediate superior Rear Admiral James Kelly, Commander Cruiser Destroyer Group Three, who was supported by Commander Destroyer Squadron (COMDESRON) 31 Commodore ‘Buzz’ Busby, USN. Buzz had the look of an old sea dog and was loved by all in his squadron. Among other things we had a nightly chat by keyboard on the daily events. These became important introductions for me into the USN command system.
The USN command philosophy is quite different to the Australian. It is much more serious, focused, unremitting and with a no stuff-ups approach to operations. It was therefore important to get attuned to this. The one thing that I did not change was applying our philosophy of delegation. It is too ingrained in our ways and it works well. My relationship with Admiral Kelly would develop primarily through discussions on a secure voice circuit.
They would invariably revolve around the tactical assessment of the commander on the scene of ‘incidents’. In the early weeks there were many – the attempted import of a Chinese-built patrol boat into Iraq, the removal of Indian sailors from a smuggler because they feared physical violence from their Master, and the ramming of our beloved Paul Hamilton by a smuggler. The most common incident though, was Iraqi naval activity. These sorties were unprecedented and their intent was unclear. As such, all precautions were taken including missile-armed helicopters shadowing their every move. During all this one thing became clear. That to the USN, a new RAN command team was a completely unknown quantity. Only through your actions could confidence be built up with you and your team.
The other key players in the NAG were the ships of the Maritime Interception Force (MIF). We were blessed by having the well seasoned Melbourne (Captain Steve McDowell) and Arunta (Commander Ray Griggs) still in theatre. Both ships were to complete over 300 boardings and were quite brilliant. They were soon joined by the oldest ship in the Royal Navy, the destroyer HMS Cardiff (Captain Tim Fraser, RN). Cardiff with her Royal Marine boarding parties and a capable operations team quickly gained a reputation for being a very smart outfit. I was to give Tim some potentially awkward tasks and his ship carried them out with style.
At the southern end of my patch was the UN holding area COMISKEY where merchant ships would be inspected. This was usually the preserve of a USN FFG. We initially had the USS Reuben James under Commander Ed Lester. We called him the ‘Professor’ and his ship the COMISKEY university. The Reuben James team knew their way around every false bottom in the regular smuggler fleet, and we had them introduce new MIF ships to the delights of boardings. Ed was also quite astute and a fine seaman. He could be relied on to judge which ships had to be moved on before foul weather blew through, and what ships were trying on some scheme to be let go. Early in our time the tug Gardennia sank in very poor weather and his boat’s crew did a fine job taking off Gardennia’s sailors while they still could. Fortunately for me, Gardennia sank just before it drifted down onto the Sirius oil field.
The other players on the team were the Polish support ship ORP Kontradmirał Xawery Czenicki and the shore-based SEALs and Polish GROM Special Forces who would come out on assigned evenings from Kuwait and conduct boardings. Czernicki had been in the Gulf for a year to support the War on Terrorism and had acted as a mothership for SEAL teams. We refined her role to include assisting the COMISKEY Guard ship. A USN boarding team from one of the larger US ships stationed down the Gulf would embark in Czernicki and this worked extremely well.
The ships in the MIF were therefore a polished group, with not one weak link among them. I was to learn that one of the strengths of a multinational force was that it was rare to be sent a dud ship. It was important, however, to work out their particular strengths.
For my command team the learning curve was steep indeed and they stuck to their tasks admirably. Very early in our tenure it became clear that we were going to be at sea for an awfully long time. Our rotational relief was Commodore John Peterson and his DESRON 50 staff, but they were hunkered down in Bahrain planning for the possible war against Iraq. It was only the first week of November and the earliest we could expect to get some shore time was in January. This meant that my team members had to go to Bahrain by helicopter for a weekend break every now and again. Unfortunately this did not extend to me, since it did not fit in with the USN view of command. Instead the issue had to be managed in other ways, such as occasionally having a ‘free’ day onboard and letting my deputy, Commander Mark Mclntosh, run the show. I watched with considerable pride as my scratch team, which included junior officers and junior sailors as my watch-keepers, gained confidence in employing multiple ships, aircraft and seven different types of boarding teams to counter mass dhow breakouts. In a slightly surreal touch, from my cabin I could watch the boardings of smugglers at sea or the movements of trucks on the roads of the Al Faw Peninsula from a helicopter-borne video camera.
Within a few weeks the first of the many changes in the guard took place. I shifted to the destroyer USS Fletcher, while Anzac (Captain Peter Lockwood) and Darwin (Commander Aaron Ingram) replaced Melbourne and Arunta. In early December the carrier battle group changed out and the USS Constellationarrived. In short order I had a new boss, Rear Admiral Barry Costello, assisted by COMDESRON 7, Commodore Mark Balmert. In addition there was a new clutch of ships – Valley Forge, Milius, Thach and Higgins.
It is a naval truism to say that there are always dramatic changes when a new battle group arrives. It is a testing experience, and one I would not like to do often. But on the whole it was an experience that we benefited from. Among other things we ended up with some new procedures and changes to communications. By this stage of course the perception of the MIO Commander was different. He and his team had effectively been in the NAG forever. This brought a bit more freedom to manoeuvre in decision making, something which is always seized upon and jealously guarded.
Operationally, the effect of Ramadan was to dramatically slow the smuggling traffic. In addition, the new carrier group had a more relaxed view of Iraqi patrol boat movements, which now had all the hallmarks of routine sovereignty patrols. This relaxation was just as well, for my team commenced a major leave swap out and multi-skilling became the order of the day. In mid-December we joined Milius as Fletcher finally left the Gulf for Fremantle and a crew swap.
Milius, under Commander Jeff Harley was an eye-opener. She was a reduced manning trials ship and carried 23% less crew. To still achieve operational effectiveness work practices had been reviewed from first principles, while labour intensive equipment had been replaced where possible. Some of the spare space had been turned into additional gyms and an internet cafe. Although the bells and whistles one normally associates with the USN had gone, the ship was the cleanest I have ever seen, with even brass fire nozzles gleaming. This was achieved by everyone from Lieutenant Commander down owning a part of the ship and cleaning it for 30 minutes each morning. The CTG staff got swept up in this and we also had our space to maintain.
Operationally, Milius was important for us. Commodore Balmert was keen to let the USN boarding teams board dhows. Until now this had been the preserve of the US Coast Guard or SEALs. This had been a major limitation and placed a huge burden on the RAN and Royal Marine boarding parties. So began, very slowly, the introduction of USN boarding parties into the front line. Great care was taken not to alarm the more conservative elements in the USN about this development. As time went by we quietly accelerated this process with USN teams operating with RAN teams and they were even hosted in Anzac for a couple of days. This development brought great flexibility. Once, when assets were short and Anzac had an unserviceable radar. I embarked Anzac’s boarding party in Milius, left Milius in the front line and sent Anzacinto COMISKEY.
By mid December it was clear to many in the MIF that war with Iraq was a high probability and we had better start preparing ourselves. In Part 2, I will discuss the MIF’s preparations and our execution of combat operations.
About the Author
Peter Jones served in the RAN for 40 years and retired as a vice admiral. He joined the ANI in 1975 and served as a councillor, journal editor, vice-president and president. Since retiring from the RAN in 2014 he has had published two naval biographies with a third, Salt in His Veins: The life of Vice Admiral Sir Albert Poland due to be released in April 2026.
