The chronological trawl through the Journal of Australian Naval Institute has reached 2003 and this March is the 23rd anniversary of the commencement of the Iraq War. As with the Journal coverage of the Gulf War, ANI members who played key roles in the conflicts provided the magazine with first-hand accounts for its readers.
This week From the ANI Archive reproduces an edited version of the then Captain Peter Jones’ second article which covers his experiences as the coalition Maritime Interception Operations Screen Commander during the combat phase.
Next week will be an article by the Lieutenant Commander Scott Craig, Commander of the Australian Clearance Diving Team 3. The following week will be one by Lieutenant Commander Ivan Ingham, the gunnery officer of HMAS Anzac.
Maritime Interception Operations Screen Commander in the Gulf Part II
Operations Bastille and Falconer
As Christmas 2002 approached, the Maritime Interception Force (MIF) maintained its unremitting presence both in the entrance to the Khor Abd Allah (KAA) waterway and further south in the UN holding ground COMISKEY. The MIF consisted at the time of the cruiser USS Valley Forge, destroyers USS Milius (MIF command ship), HMS Cardiff, USS Higgins and the frigates HMAS Anzac, USS Thach, HMAS Darwin and the Polish support ship ORP Kontradmirał Xawery Czenicki. In addition, we had boarding teams from the US Coast Guard, US Navy SEALS, the Royal Marines and the Polish GROM Special Forces.
After the pre-Ramadan rush of date smugglers, the illegal traffic coming out of the KAA had reduced dramatically. Occasionally, a small dhow rush of 10-20 vessels would try their hand but with one or two MIF ships in the approaches it was rare for any vessels to leak through the cordon. Indeed if they did, we made a point of intercepting them further down the Gulf.
The weather was quite cool and the risk of hypothermia awaited the unprepared; this was particularly the case at night. I had immense respect for the boarding parties and boats crews that maintained the presence on the water. Supporting them were the line handlers, maintainers and cooks who were always there for the boats return. The other teams to bear in mind were the Captains and their bridge and operations room teams. The demands on the navigation teams, which operated close offshore in Operating Area MA-1 were significant. Where possible, ships were rotated out of MA-1 after a couple of days. This was not always possible and Anzac and Darwin bore the brunt of this burden. Indeed the Marine Engineering Officer ofAnzac referred to the more open MA-2, where engineering drills and maintenance were possible, as the ‘promised land’.
While the sanction work ticked on, the political situation seemed to be heading inevitably towards conflict with Iraq. Within the MIF we had set in train some important procedural measures to improve our cohesion. These include improved merchant ship, aircraft and boat reporting/tracking procedures. The MIF Commander was now also the Local Surface Warfare Commander and moves were underway to establish a Local Air Warfare Commander. All these small but important steps were to ensure that not only the MIF could operate in a broader warfare context, but that when the inevitable force build-up occurred, the much enlarged Coalition force could operate safely in this relatively confined area. It was slow incremental work with various workshops held in different host ships. There was considerable goodwill and the growing integration of the MIF was great to see.
On the larger canvas it became clear that should war transpire, the MIF would be involved in a littoral sea control mission. It would include countering the Iraqi Navy, supporting amphibious and mine warfare forces, and possibly conducting naval gunfire support (NGS) in support of the Royal Marines. There were inherent risks in this mission. The Iraqi mine threat loomed largest as did some form of asymmetric attack.
It was at this time that the close links forged between successive RAN CTGs and the US COMDESRON 50 (based in Bahrain) and their staffs became of crucial importance. The incumbent COMDESRON 50, Commodore John Peterson was working on key aspects of the planned maritime campaign against Iraq. It was an enormous undertaking for his small staff. Both the RAN CTG staff and our liaison officers ashore were ideally placed to help in this work. So began two months of planning and consultation. The key ingredient we were providing was a very good knowledge of the North Arabian Gulf (NAG). All through this process we back-briefed the Commander Australian Theatre, Rear Admiral Mark Bonser and the Australian National Commander in theatre, Brigadier Maurie McNarn.
By the end of this involved process, we had fleshed out the draft plan for operations in the NAG. In addition, both US and Australian political and military command chains had agreed that the RAN Task Group would be part of the operation and my RAN command element would be CTU 55.1.1 (the Maritime Interception Operations Screen Commander). The notion of the screen in this context was the furthest up-threat units of the Coalition naval force.
While the planning proceeded, MIO continued unabated. The other relentless activity was the naval build-up in the Gulf. The almost daily arrivals of new ships left little doubt in the minds of most sailors that there would be a war. Among the arrivals were the RN frigates Marlborough, Chatham and Richmond. On a rotational basis these ships were assigned to the MIF. Sadly we were to lose our old friend Cardiff who had done so much work on the improved warfare procedures which were now part of our operations. The British frigate trio quickly settled into the MIF; due in no small measure to their being in our MIO Chat Room watching our conduct of operations, since they had been sailing down the English Channel. On a personal level, I found the three commanding officers keen to integrate into the MIF.
Also now at sea was Commodore Peterson in the Valley Forge. Instead of being the alternate MIO Commander he was now my immediate superior as the NAG Commander (CTG 55.1). At first glance this extra layer of command was a cumbersome arrangement, but his purview was large indeed and included co-ordination with the Kuwaiti-Bahraini-Emirati Defence of Kuwait Task Group, (operating to the south-west of the MIF), the mine countermeasures (MCM) forces, the UK amphibious task group, US coast guard cutter Boutwell operating off the Shatt Al Arab (SAA), as well as supporting Special Forces operations.
The key to the CTG 55.1-CTU 55.1.1 relationship was our friendship. Even with good communications friction between our hard-worked staffs was inevitable. At least weekly visits between us were fundamental to the planning and execution of MIO and the KAA clearance operation. A key aspect in our approach was to move ships freely between our two commands depending on the operational requirement.
Commodore Peterson rightly observed that the KAA clearance operation involved a plan of many parts but none of which were in themselves complex. The MIF though had to be able to deal with a possible mass breakout of 150 merchant ships and 300 dhows. In doing so the MIF had to search for mines and any embarked Iraqi military personnel. The cleared ships had then to be tracked down the western side of the Gulf, clear of Coalition and merchant shipping.
Possibly at the same time the MIF had to support the Royal Marines assault on the Al Faw Peninsula. This would involve protecting landing craft and conducting indirect bombardment. The MIF would also have to escort the MCM force up the KAA and conduct ongoing riverine patrols to ensure unfettered access of the waterway for humanitarian aid shipping.
The riverine patrol element was new to many of us. Fortunately, on my staff was Lieutenant Commander Fred Ross RAN, who had joined the RN at the tender age of 13, and was an invaluable source of knowledge. He had participated in the Borneo operation of the 1960s and remembered some very useful procedures that we could adapt.
Equally important to me was the positioning of additional RAN Liaison Officers into the new the command chain. Lieutenant Commander Dom McNamarra, formerly in Bahrain was in Valley Forge and my old deputy Commander Mark Mclntosh, was now in Constellation. Already in Bahrain were the very experienced trio of Commanders Chris Percival and Phil Spedding, and Lieutenant Dave Hughes. The crucial job of the liaison officers can be thankless. They were however, the glue that kept the MIF best engaged in the operation. As a result of their efforts I was kept better informed than most in the Gulf and warned of looming problems.
Commander Chris Percival was also commanding the RAN Logistic Element. The efforts of this small team in supporting the growing RAN TG were nothing short of inspirational. In particular his efforts to help improve RHIB serviceability were notable. I have no doubt that their efforts will go down as one of the great logistic achievements in our Navy’s operational history.
In January-February 2003 there were three noteworthy events: the anthrax vaccination program, the arrival of HMAS Kanimbla and the deployment of the Australian Clearance Diving Team Three (AUSCDT 3).
Anthrax Vaccinations
It is difficult to encapsulate the anthrax saga in the Journal. It is also impossible to capture the emotion and heat it generated. The implementation of a voluntary policy that required compulsory compliance to deployed personnel was inevitably difficult in already deployed units. The implementation was aggravated by a combination of unreliable communications and an incomplete education program.
I know many at home thought the sailors who refused the vaccination were a bit soft. While a very few may have used the situation to get home early, the vast majority of those who refused to be injected were sincere in their conviction. This issue highlighted our sailors’ great strength, that is, that they are intelligent and questioning people.
In dealing with the anthrax program the efforts of many personnel both in theatre and back in Australia to help bring the ships up to strength were impressive indeed. I was very proud of the tremendous effort of the Task Group personnel, led by the Commanding Officers and medical staffs in dealing with this issue.
HMAS Kanimbla
The arrival of HMAS Kanimbla into theatre was much anticipated. Initially, she was viewed as providing important strategic lift and was to be assigned to the Coalition naval logistics commander. While she would have been excellent in that role, she also had a proven track record in Maritime Interception Operations (MIO) from 2002. Significantly for me her Commanding Officer (Commander Dave McCourt) had sent me an excellent brief on her command and control capabilities. We quickly realised she was a perfect match for the command ship for KAA clearance operation. She had the unique combination of shallow draft, huge communications bandwidth, planning space and accommodation for Coalition boarding parties. Fortunately, I was able to have her assigned to the MIF. So on Kanimbla‘s arrival in Bahrain, my staff and I shifted from Milius to Kanimbla.
Importantly for my team, waiting for us in Kanimbla were six members of the RN battle watch who would augment my staff. They were part of a RN CTG staff that was to have relieved us as to command the MIF in the normal course of events. Leading the RN staff were a very capable PWO, Lieutenant Commander Andrew Stacey. He became my new Operations Officer and daytime battle watch captain, while Lieutenant Commander Peter Arnold would become my nighttime battle watch captain. It was a model I was copying from Vice Admiral Sandy Woodward. He had two Captains in this role during the Falklands War because he believed you needed experienced officers who would be confident to make decisions and, when to and when not call you. This enabled the commander to be in the operations room at the right time, get rest and to be able to also think about longer term issues affecting the task group. This and some other astute remarks he made in his memoirs One Hundred Days proved invaluable to me. (Fortuitously, the book had been on the Milius wardroom bookshelf). Probably the other keen observation he made was that every headquarters only possesses part of the picture. Armed with this fragment they can be frustrating to deal with. Despite this they are generally trying to do the right thing. This I found to be very true and this notion tempered all my dealings with my two command chains (Coalition and National).
In the last week of February Kanimbla joined the MIF and my staff and I resumed the MIF command duties. The impact of Kanimbla’s presence was immediate. Her planning and briefing spaces were the centre of activity for the KAA clearance operation planning. Rarely a day went by without either a meeting or a combined planning session. My new deputy, Commander Peter Leavy brought his considerable energy, and ability to get on with people, to bear in coordinating this effort. The two major events were a two-day planning session involving first the ships’ warfare teams and then commanding officers. This was followed by one involving Rear Admiral Costello. Deliberately there was no powerpoint, rather a large chart on the table and unit markers. We stepped through the planned operation. The role of the commanding officers was crucial in the briefing of the Admiral. They combined both a broader perspective and a good grasp of the practical and of risk. In the briefing with Admiral Costello, I noted that Commanding Officers have a credibility all their own. Their input, ownership and support of the plan were vital. This was particularly the case with NGS, where I had given Commanding Officer of Marlborough, Captain Mark Anderson, the lead in advocating the use of the ships in this role despite some initial concern within the USN.
From a national perspective Kanimbla gave the RAN TG a national flagship and sense of independence. The range of support facilities and accommodation space she provided were extremely useful. For example, she could embark the growing international media contingent and I could insert them into the rest of the MIF for short periods. Importantly, she had a Sea King helicopter that proved an essential enabler in the build-up phase. Amongst other tasks every Monday this helicopter joined in the straining USN Desert Duck logistic runs supporting all NAG units.
AUSCDT3
The arrival of the diving team in theatre brought another dimension to the RAN CTG duties. Led by Lieutenant Commander Scott Craig, they had come fresh from an exercise with the USN. Initially, they faced a complicated reconstitution through Bahrain and Kuwait. They would enter Iraq via road convoy. The diving team was a mix of first Gulf War veterans and young sailors straight out of the box. They impressed me straight away with their enthusiasm and operational focus. I saw my responsibility was to both ensure they were employed in accordance with higher level guidance, but also help them maximise their contribution to the operation. I enjoyed working with Scott and his team both in Kuwait and Umm Qasr.
The War
In the week or so preceding the war there was one event after another to attract our attention. Most important to me was that the Iraqis were on the move in our operating area. The last of the Iraqi large naval or government ships had sailed down the KAA and round into the SAA and Al Basra. Our contacts among the merchant shipping were telling us of Iraqi military on tugs and that explosives were to be laid on the off-shore oil terminals (MABOT and KAAOT) and on navigation marks. Rumours of mines abounded and the Kuwaitis had impressed upon me the Iraqi proficiency in the area. While we strongly doubted mines had been laid so far, we closely shadowed all Iraqi vessels. Equally important was maintaining our overt presence to deter any mine laying.
In preparation for the conflict, additional Coalition boarding parties and their support elements were embarked in Kanimbla. The ship’s smooth integration of these teams and their refinement of boat recognition procedures to prevent fratricide reflected highly on Kanimbla and helped contribute to the MIF esprit de corps.
Two days before the war a mass breakout of dhows occurred. The crews had heard of the impeding start of the war on an erroneous news report. In their desperation they started to jettison cargo. The last thing we needed was flotsam and jetsam floating down the Gulf. After a hasty series of conference calls, Commander 5th Fleet, Vice Admiral Timothy Keating approved our recommendation to clear the KAA rather than turn the dhows around in accordance with the UN Sanctions. It was a historic moment because it was the effective end of the 12 year embargo. Our well-developed plan was activated, but because it was happening two days early, the force disposition was different. After a few minutes of assigning units to task on a white-board, my Operations Officer, executed the revised plan on a voice circuit. Darwin was made Scene of Action Commander and took on the detailed execution. It worked amazingly well. For their part, once the dhows crews understood what was happening they were very compliant. For some boarding teams and dhow crews it was a poignant moment. After months of being boarding and being turned back up the KAA this was to be their last meeting. Among those vessels cleared was an Indian dhow that had tried to break the embargo two nights earlier and tragically lost a crewmember shot dead by a stray warning shot from a Kuwaiti patrol boat.
As expected, the word of the clearance quickly spread up the KAA and the following day the large steel hulls made their outbound passage. In all 56 dhows and 47 merchant ships were inspected and cleared in about three days. This early clearance was a bonus for us because it emptied the waterway in preparation for combat operations.
On the early morning of 19 March, the patrol boat USS Chinook, with my forward liaison team embarked, was ordered to intercept an Iraqi tug heading from an offshore oil terminal to Al Basrah. Onboard were a handful of UN workers potentially destined to be held hostage as ‘human shields’. In some minor brinkmanship, the UN workers were removed and the tug allowed to proceed on its way. As feared, the UN workers reported Iraqi military were present on the two offshore oil terminals with some suspicious equipment.
That afternoon, on the eve of the war another dust storm blew up. In Kanimbla, and I suspect in the other MIF ships, an eerie calm had descended. Kanimbla‘s ships company went down to the tank deck to draw the last of the individual chemical and biological protection equipment. The suits were removed from protective bags. People quietly went about their spaces and sorted their personal affairs. Beards were shaved off and close haircuts were de rigour; both produced some horrendous sights that served to relieve some of the tension. That evening our friends in the US and Polish Special Forces, who we saw a couple of nights a week in the MIO days, landed on MABOT and KAAOT. Anzac was ordered close in for support. Within the hour all was secured and fortunately the Iraqi explosives had not been set. So far, so good.
At the same time as the oil terminal operation, SEALS were securing the two related shore oil installations. Within two hours the artillery and air bombardment of the Al Faw Peninsula would commence, as would the Royal Marines assault. Most of the MIF units were close inshore and so although visibility was poor, the sound and shock waves of the artillery and B-52 strikes were strongly felt. At the same time USN cruisers and destroyers were announcing one by one that their Tomahawk firing zones were activated. Although some of the ships were just a couple of miles distant, no missiles were seen through the gloom.
At around 0300 Marlborough, Anzac, Chatham and Richmond were detached for their bombardment. At approximately 0600 Anzac commenced the first fire mission. We monitored the progress in a NGS chat room and on the NGS coordination circuit. I was struck by the calmness of the voice of the young Anzac sailor as she communicated with the spotter ashore with the attendant background noise of gunfire. From the results coming in it became clear they were conducting probably the most accurate NGS engagement in naval history.
During the night another aspect of the operation was executed. This was the protection of an amphibious transit lane for the fast LCACC hovercraft to take equipment from Bubyan Island across the KAA to the Al Faw Peninsula. USS Firebolt and a clutch of US Coast Guard patrol craft reported three Iraqi tugs and a barge coming down the KAA. They boarded the vessels, which proved suspicious only for their large crews. The decision was taken to hold the tugs north of the assault lane and dispatch a Kanimbla boarding party with USN explosive experts at first light. So while the four frigates were just starting their bombardment, Kanimibla‘s boarding team were clambering over the tugs and barge. In the light of day, disguised mines were discovered on one tug. One of the boarding party also noted an electrical cable running from a hut on the barge into the barge pontoon itself. After a short inspection a trap door was found, as were 68 mines.
In another development, the patrol craft Adak picked up three hypothermic Iraqi sailors floating down the KAA. Adak brought them straight to Kanimbla where the Ship’s Army Detachment and medical team swung into action. Another person who swung into action was Major Majed Al Shamari. The Kuwaiti Navy Chief, Major General Ahmad Al-Mulla, who had trained as a junior officer with the RAN, had kindly loaned Majed to us for liaison between the MIF and the Defence of Kuwait Task Group which the General commanded. Majed explained to the scared Iraqis that they were not going to be shot as the Iraqi hierarchy had warned. In the process he also gained their confidence and they told their tale. They were survivors from an Iraqi patrol boat hastily manned by Revolutionary Guards and ordered to sail and attack the MIF. En-route that night they had unwisely engaged a C-130 gunship and were promptly sunk.
With the mouth of the KAA well-guarded by our patrol craft, and Marlborough smoothly running the very active bombardment group, my main focus was the Iraqi tugs and barge. Reports came in bit by bit on the size of the find, including news of five empty mine rail slots. I needed to know if any mines had been laid and therefore whether we were in a minefield. As could be appreciated, my first reports of events had sent shock waves up the command chain and there was much pressing for answers to a myriad of questions. Potentially, this was a turning point of the maritime campaign. I sent Kanimbla‘s XO (and a specialist clearance diver) Lieutenant Commander Mick Edwards up to the tugs to take charge of the scene and give me an accurate assessment of the situation. This he did admirably and when combined with more information volunteered from more captured Iraqis, I was very confident no mines had been laid. This meant the NGS and the entire KAA clearance operation could continue unimpeded. Indeed, we soon learned that the Iraqi plan was to lay mines further south on the following day. The true value of the MIF’s close blockade had effectively maintained for over a year had become abundantly clear.
At this point it is worth mentioning the sterling service provided by Kanimbla‘s two Australian Army LCM-8s. Their tasking included pre-positioning AUSCDT 3 and the Royal Marines equipment into Kuwait, laying dan-buoys to provide shipping transit lanes and logistically supporting the RHIBs. They also proved ideal platforms to relocate Iraqi prisoners away from the action. Indeed the arrival of a prisoner-laden LCM-8s from the tugs to alongside Kanimbla provided a rare glimpse of the enemy for our sailors.
By midnight on Day One events were pretty well under control. (Having said that our bombardment group was still doing a tremendous job for the Royal Marines). It was time to finish off reports to go up the Coalition and Australian command chains. By this stage I was making daily telephone calls to my Australian immediate superior, Rear Admiral Bonser. I found these calls tremendously valuable as mind-ordering exercises. The Admiral was a good sounding board and at times a source of valuable advice without wanting to intrude into the Coalition chain of command. The other opportunity the lull provided was to discuss with my team our next move. This was to prepare to support the mine clearance operations up the KAA.
However, a new Iraqi threat came in an unexpected form. A clutch of zodiacs, reportedly rigged as suicide boats with mines, came out of the SAA heading towards the MIF. These were driven ashore, by of all people, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Navy. As a precaution I ordered Chatham and Darwin to form a surface action group and guard the SAA entrance to prevent any further incursions.
During the next couple of days events moved quickly. Once the Al Faw was secured, the five Coalition mine countermeasures vessels and two helicopter-towed sleds commenced operations. My lead unit to protect the MCM group was Chinook, commanded by the very level headed and brave Lieutenant Colin Hayes. I will always remember his face when I told him I was removing the embarked US Coast Guard boarding party as I wanted any unnecessary personnel off Chinook because she was the first non-MCM vessel proceeding up the channel behind the hunters. He thought for a moment and said it seemed a reasonable call and we moved on to the next subject.
The progress of the MCM force up the KAA was difficult with a large amount of mine-like objects littering the bottom. This was hardly surprising with the waterway being a battle zone on several occasions in the 20th Century. As the minehunters made their way up, our patrol craft and RHIBs commenced ever-lengthening patrols. Kanimbla for her part provided fuel, water and other support for the craft.
Our plan called for sustained riverine patrols. The necessity for such patrols had been the source of debate during the planning phase. But the Al Faw was a sparsely populated area and the Royal Marines were thin on the ground. The prospect of a resown minefield would have further delayed humanitarian aid shipping. In short, it was a vulnerable flank for the Coalition.
One of the biggest difficulties in executing a plan is to know when to deviate from it. This is particularly the case when it has required considerable staffing and extensive buy-in at all levels. An example of this point for us was the RHIB patrols. It became clear early in the war that after the initial mass breakout of shipping, the once congested KAA was now devoid of shipping. All vessels that had not made a break had gone further up the river and many of their crews had gone home. This meant the need to board ships along the river had vanished with only the riverine patrol requirement remaining. Two days into the boat patrols, four crews got into difficulties when a stronger than expected south-westerly change came through with winds exceeding 65 knots. Fortunately all crews found refuge in either our versatile LCM-8s or among the minehunters. The following day, I flew up to Umm Qasr to see for myself the state of the KAA and the visit the divers. During that flight I looked down on a lone RHIB near Warbah Island. The RHIB crew could not see the shore and no one on the Al Faw could see her. The risks I was putting the boarding parties under versus the negligible operational gain came home to me. So after only two days the RHIB riverine patrols were halted on the entry of the first humanitarian aid ship, RFA Sir Galahad. It was not a universally popular decision but the pendulum had swung in the maritime campaign. My priority was now to get those boarding parties safely home. The riverine patrol could be adequately done by the larger patrol craft.
Sir Galahad‘s arrival in Umm Qasr was effectively the end of our mission. We retained command of the riverine patrols because we felt strongly about not taking our eye off the ball. As if to underline this point, the ever-vigilant Chinook scared off a bunch of Iraqis on the shoreline and found a cache of mines, small arms, anti-tank missiles and a partly inflated suicide boat on the shore.
By the beginning of April, the USN and RN were rapidly drawing down their fleets. This did not mean there was inactivity. Even at this late stage the Higgins fired a clutch of Tomahawks at a distant target and one of the missiles flew 500 feet over Kanimbla‘s flight deck. As part of the draw down, Darwin was sent for a well-earned port visit and it was decided Kanimbla would go into port on 6 April. As such, I would handover the MIF to my immediate superior Commodore Peterson in Valley Forge. The time was right to go and my staff and I were a spent force by this stage. After a round of farewells to the divers and our British, US and Kuwaiti comrades, Kanimbla shaped course for Jebel Ali. On arrival, I handed over to Captain Mark Kellam the duties of Commander, RAN Task Group 633.1. I was very proud of the MIF and it was a great honour to serve with a dedicated and talented team.
About the Author
Captain Peter Jones was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his command of the MIF and the US Legion of Merit for his actions as the Maritime Interception Operations Screen Commander. He retired from the RAN in 2014.
