By Henry Yep*
It’s the mid-2030s, and China’s growing network of dual-use ports and airfields has reshaped the South Pacific’s security landscape. Ostensibly, civilian projects now dot the region – but behind the guise of commerce, they threaten vital sea lanes, constrain US and allied military manoeuvrability, and tilt the balance of power towards Beijing. (From The Interpreter. The Lowy Institute.)
Any Pacific crisis in such a circumstance would find the United States and its allies at a severe disadvantage.
This scenario mirrors a US Marine Corps War College wargame this past academic year, where China gained regional dual-use access before Washington could respond – posing serious challenges if war had erupted.
The United States and its allies should strengthen their collective military posture across the Pacific by expanding access to bases and airfields and deepening defence ties with Pacific Island nations.
These hypothetical Chinese outposts pose a strategic dilemma. Any US strike on a Chinese-controlled port risks dangerous escalation, yet inaction would leave allied forces hemmed in and critical supply lines exposed. Beijing can covertly deploy military assets under civilian cover. Some ports might even hide long-range missiles in shipping containers, turning commercial facilities into launchpads for surprise attacks. They also double as intelligence hubs, allowing China to monitor regional military movements and communications. Even short of open war, Beijing could use its port access for “grey-zone” operations – for instance, sending maritime militia vessels disguised as civilian traffic to spy on and interfere with allied activities.
To avoid letting this scenario become reality, Washington and its partners must act on multiple fronts. First, they should craft a multi-domain strategy to deter or neutralise Chinese dual-use ports in a crisis by preparing both overt military options and covert cyber and electronic measures to undermine Beijing’s footholds. If conflict looms, US forces should be ready to disable or seize those ports at the outset; in peacetime, they can quietly sabotage the ports’ control systems to blunt their value long before shots are fired. The United States should also pre-position forces and supplies on Pacific Islands now to ensure it can respond swiftly without weakening other theatres.
Second, the United States and its allies should strengthen their collective military posture across the Pacific by expanding access to bases and airfields and deepening defence ties with Pacific Island nations. Recent moves offer a template: in 2023, the United States signed a defence pact with Papua New Guinea, and in 2024, it renewed long-term security agreements with Palau, the Marshall Islands, and Micronesia – preserving key US basing rights in the region. The United States is also investing in new infrastructure, including an over-the-horizon radar in Palau and upgrades to an airfield on the Micronesian island of Yap, signalling a lasting commitment. Each additional logistics hub makes it harder for Beijing to dominate the region, and allies can help expand this dispersed network to further complicate China’s plans. Regular joint and combined military exercises in less sensitive locations such as northern Australia or Guam will bolster readiness for Pacific operations without inflaming local opposition.
Third, the United States should ramp up diplomatic and economic engagement to strengthen Pacific Island countries and blunt China’s influence. Many of the region’s small states are reluctant to side against Beijing – fearing economic retaliation. Washington must address their urgent needs, from climate resilience to basic infrastructure and trade access, to prove that a US partnership yields tangible benefits. That means offering more development aid, weather-resilient infrastructure, and credible alternatives to Beijing’s loans and construction deals. For example, US Navy Seabees could deploy to build local schools, clinics, and roads – a visible sign of American support. By helping Pacific nations meet their needs without becoming beholden to China, the United States undermines Beijing’s leverage and encourages regional leaders to stick with Washington or at least remain neutral.
The South Pacific can no longer be treated as a strategic afterthought.
Fourth, a concerted effort should be made to expose Beijing’s covert and coercive activities in the Pacific while waging a unified information campaign. Chinese distant-water fishing fleets have depleted regional fisheries, and criminal networks linked to China have used remote islands for drug trafficking and other illicit pursuits. Shining light on such malign behaviour – through media, international forums, and diplomatic pressure – will tarnish Beijing’s reputation and raise Pacific governments’ wariness, all without military confrontation. At the same time, Washington and its partners must counter Beijing’s attempts to divide them with propaganda and economic coercion. Allies should collectively debunk false Chinese narratives, highlight positive initiatives such as the Pacific Partnership humanitarian mission, and coordinate their public outreach so Beijing cannot easily pit one Pacific country against another.
The South Pacific can no longer be treated as a strategic afterthought. A Chinese stronghold in this region would put US supply lines at risk and threaten the flank of any conflict in East Asia. Because Beijing’s outposts may be nominally civilian, they could become politically off-limits in a crisis – making it all the more critical to counter them before a showdown erupts.
The United States and its allies now face a choice. By bolstering their deterrence, investing in regional partnerships, and pushing back against Beijing’s presence, they can ensure China does not dominate this critical part of the Indo-Pacific. But failing to act will cement China’s influence and make any future crisis far more costly – limiting US freedom of action in its own backyard. If Washington and its partners move decisively now, the dangerous scenario outlined above need never materialise. If they hesitate, the United States could be left facing a lasting strategic disadvantage – forced to respond to a Chinese foothold that should have been prevented.
*Henry Yep is a China specialist with 19 years of experience at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). In June 2025, he began serving as a branch chief in DIA’s China Mission Group (CMG), where he leads a team of civilian analysts, military officers, and contractors. Prior to this role, he was a deputy defense intelligence officer for China, responsible for orchestrating DIA support to the Secretary of Defense on China-related initiatives, engaging foreign partners and academia, contributing to wargames, and serving as a key node across the intelligence community.
