By John Coyne*
AUKUS is reshaping the development of HMAS Stirling in Western Australia to facilitate hosting of allied nuclear-powered submarines. Such efforts shouldn’t end there. Certifying facilities in Darwin Harbour for nuclear-powered warships would deliver redundancy, strengthen Australia’s northern force posture and reinforce our commitment to allies. (From: The Strategist. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute.)
This distinction matters. Darwin already has a validated port safety plan, a prerequisite under Defence’s Operational Safety Management Manual No. 1—the Australian Defence Force’s regulatory manual that governs the arrangements for the entry of foreign warships into Australian ports, including those that are nuclear-powered or carry nuclear weapons. That validation was why the USS Minnesota, a United States Navy nuclear-powered vessel, was able to berth in Darwin earlier this year.
But validation is not certification. Validation allows for occasional visits, on a case-by-case basis, with reimbursement of the Northern Territory’s costs. Certification would establish a standing capability and safety framework, positioning Darwin as a reliable and regular destination for allied nuclear-powered warships.
It’s true that Darwin has never been considered suitable for submarine basing. The tidal range and distance from deep water make it less practical than HMAS Stirling for home-porting or sustainment, especially during wartime, but access to the port could nonetheless facilitate peacetime operations by US, British and French nuclear submarines.
Darwin could also be used by US aircraft carriers, which are all nuclear, though a little dredging might also be needed for accepting them. France also has a nuclear aircraft carrier.
A port in northern Australian certified for nuclear-powered vessels would provide a reliable option for safe, routine visits and, in a crisis, greater redundancy. Certification would not transform Darwin into a submarine base—nor should it—but it would signal that Australia could routinely host nuclear and well as conventionally powered vessels.
Darwin’s proximity to Southeast Asia makes it the most convenient and practical port for allied naval forces transiting to and from the South China Sea, the Pacific and the eastern Indian Ocean. Its location offers a natural staging point, closer to key operational areas than most Australian capitals, providing both efficiency and strategic advantage. It’s also the logical port for supporting the US Marine Rotational Force and for hosting broader allied exercises that will increasingly involve nuclear-powered vessels under AUKUS.
Critics will point to costs. Certification requires investments in safety systems, emergency response capabilities, radiation monitoring and personnel training. These are not minor outlays and, in a constrained budget environment, the federal government would be cautious about spending. But costs are already being incurred, whether by Australia or the owner of the visiting nuclear vessel. Every time a nuclear-powered warship visits Darwin under validation, the Northern Territory government must be reimbursed for safety arrangements, planning and emergency preparedness. Certification would require upfront investment, but it’d also provide long-term efficiencies, predictability and strategic reassurance.
Certification would even bring economic benefits. Defence-related activity in northern Australia is one of the few areas where small increases in workforce or infrastructure generate disproportionately large benefits. So Darwin’s hosting of just a small number of visits by nuclear-powered ships each year would have outsized impacts on the local economy. Ship visits bring spending on logistics, supplies, services and accommodation. They also reinforce Darwin’s identity as a strategic hub. For the NT, even two or three guaranteed nuclear-ship visits a year would justify the costs of certification.
AUKUS is also shifting the demand signal, as nuclear-powered submarines will be not just occasional visitors but part of regular rotations through Australian waters. The US and Britain will require more ports of call. Concentrating all nuclear-sustainment activity at HMAS Stirling is neither practicable nor resilient. Darwin provides redundancy and flexibility, strengthening deterrence by demonstrating that allied submarines and ships can operate from multiple points in Australia.
The real question, then, isn’t whether Darwin should be certified, but when. The incremental approach—validation first, certification later—is prudent. It allows the NT government and federal agencies to build confidence and capability step by step. Validation has already proven successful, showing that Darwin can safely host nuclear-powered vessels. Certification would formalise that capacity and provide greater strategic certainty.
The decision will come down to political will. Defence will hesitate to spend without predictable demand—at least two ship visits annually. Such demand is already emerging. Allied naval forces are operating in the region with greater frequency, and Darwin’s geography makes it a natural stop. Moreover, Australia’s ability to safely and regularly host nuclear-powered warships in the north will promote AUKUS’s credibility in Washington and London.
Darwin has always carried symbolic weight in Australian defence planning. Too often it has been seen as an outpost rather than a centre of strategy. The nuclear certification decision is a test of Canberra’s willingness to elevate Darwin from a convenient waypoint to a strategic asset.
The choice is straightforward. If Australia wants to show its full commitment to AUKUS, resilience in its northern posture and burden-sharing with allies, it must certify Darwin for nuclear-powered warships. The costs will be real, but they’re manageable and ultimately outweighed by the benefits. A certified Darwin, alongside HMAS Stirling, would demonstrate that Australia isn’t only hosting allied forces but actively shaping the Indo-Pacific’s security architecture.
Failing to act would imply that Australia is content to keep its north on the margins of strategy, even as the balance of power shifts in the Indo-Pacific. AUKUS’s lesson is that capability and credibility must go hand in hand. Certification of Darwin is the next logical step.
