The Brunei operation was conducted from 8 to 23 December, 1962. It also extended to North Borneo (Sarawak). It was an internal revolt against the inclusion of Brunei in the (projected) Malaysia of September, 1963. Indonesia was supportive of this insurrection. Brunei declined any prospective augmentation. Singapore joined it on its formation but ceded from Malaysia in August, 1965 to claim its own independence. Whitehall recognised the hardships and dangers which accompanied this service. The Royal Marines did most of the initial fighting ashore, being the first to engage the rebels, suffering several casualties.
There is no scope here to relay an exhaustive narrative on the Royal Navy and how it responded promptly to a developing local crisis within its station. Suffice it to say, those HM ships which participated included: Albion, Tiger, Woodbridge Haven, Loch Killisport, Blackpool, Barossa, Cavalier, Alert, Chawton, Fiskerton, Wilkieston, Wollaston, Brighton, Houghton, and three RFA ships; Wave Sovereign, Gold Ranger and Fort Charlotte. The Royal Marines deployed 40 and 42 Commando to the area of operations. The FAA also assisted by providing 845 and 846 squadrons (among others) in the fighting.
For the Royal Australian Navy, with its ships and crews, the 1962 rebellion in Brunei remains an unfought war. There are many reasons for their absence, which will be detailed below. Those reasons include: operational, diplomatic and political. However, Australia had a small role and some of our soldiers and airmen participated in that military campaign, and were awarded the General Service Medal (1915-1962) clasp Brunei, the last to be awarded before the introduction of the tri-service Campaign General Service Medal (1962). Few people would know of this minor conflict, in relative terms, but it should be acknowledged. Some recipients may have been awarded the GSM for previous service in Malaya to 1960. It is also possible some were awarded the CGSM for service in Confrontation until 11 August, 1966.
Firstly, operational reasons denied the RAN a part in this brief skirmish. The Royal Navy assumed the major ambit role in this combat mission and was, as always, ably supported by the British army and the Royal Air Force. At the time, Brunei was a British protectorate and existing Defence treaty agreements meant that it needed to remain sovereign to their shared British interests. Independence would come later, in 1984. Our troops participated vicariously if only through the secondment and thus attachment of some Australian soldiers to British army units who were serving in proximity, if not landed from Singapore or Malaya. The extent of military involvement by New Zealand, Singapore, Malaya or Brunei is not under discussion.
Secondly, a scheduled diplomatic port visit from Singapore to India in early December 1962 was underway and could not be cancelled. HMA ships Queenborough and Quiberon were tasked to visit Calcutta. Much planning had gone into this significant imperative to “show the flag”, which was accepted as a subsidiary function of operational service in the Far East Strategic Reserve (FESR), from 1955-71. Furthermore, it was in support of the then Department of External Affairs. These “shop window” initiatives were designed to reach out into South-East Asia and beyond to project good will and contacts with foreign governments. Moreover, the RAN advertised for recruits and offered them the opportunity to visit foreign ports during their sea-going service “up top.” It was meant to bolster morale and give officers and men a much-needed respite from the tedious rigours of exercises and patrols. The ships had a hectic and highly entertaining six days in Calcutta, a “city of contrasts.” There followed brief visits to Pulau Langkawi and Penang on their return to Singapore. The last passage of 1962 saw both ships in Hong Kong where the RAN received the acclaim of the World’s press, following a successful rescue of the crew of S.S. Tuscany, which had run aground. Christmas and New Year were spent in the delights of Hong Kong, where the ship underwent much-needed maintenance.
Thirdly, it was fortuitous that the two Q ships were not deployed to Brunei. The Far East Command in Singapore had a surfeit of assets and the quick despatch of a task force to an incipient insurgency in Brunei was within their contingency planning. Australia had ongoing tensions with Indonesia over the former Dutch New Guinea (Irian Jaya). However, when Confrontation with Indonesia escalated, from early 1964, Australia graduated an incremental deployment of elements from the army, the RAAF and, increasingly, the RAN. HMAS Sydney (Captain John Stevenson) assumed a major logistical role in ferrying our troops and their equipment to Borneo in mid-1964. While our two HMA ships in the FESR would have been capable of an adequate contribution, the RN had enough warships and did not need to divert RAN ships from their diplomatic obligations.
However, Canberra was not hesitant in its response to the aggression which Jakarta sympathised with, as if events were a spontaneous response to British “perfidy” in the region, seeking to thwart their natural development in a form inimical to Indonesia’s own revanchist claims on its neighbours. In a 1962 press release, the Minister for External affairs, Sir Garfield Barwick, condemned the revolt and acted quickly to provide an RAAF aircraft, in support, as a sign of Australia’s concern.
The author is under no compulsion to mindlessly replicate the full story of Brunei, 1962. It has been extensively covered elsewhere by many authoritative sources. Indeed, it is hardly appropriate to account for the RAN in a campaign which it played no part in. The main focus is to discuss the circumstances which led to their non-participation. Queenborough (Captain Brian Murray) and Quiberon (Commander Vernon Parker) had an eventful rotation to the FESR in 1962-1963. Notwithstanding, whilst Murray initially commanded Queenborough on its deployment, he was transferred to command HMAS Parramatta in early 1963. He was succeeded by Lieutenant Commander Frank Woods. Both ships in January, 1963 made a diplomatic visit to South Vietnam (Nha Trang and Saigon) and furthered government objectives in the region, as they would do in other foreign ports on a veritable “Cook’s tour”, as a reward for long and arduous service. Indeed, those on board, by virtue of their early 1963 visit to Saigon, later qualified for repatriation coverage, acknowledging that the crews were exposed to “war-like” conditions therein.
To repeat, some Australian soldiers were “in-country”, or supporting in and from Borneo, but not in unit strength, serving with British formations. While this article is written for a non-official journal, it should be left to our army to honour its own. One creditable source notes them. Lieutenant-Colonel Neil Smith, AM, Rtd has authored Nothing Short of War, With the Australian Army in Borneo, 1962-1966. His book covers Brunei and in Appendix B he lists 37 soldiers, of whom 6 qualified for the clasp Brunei. The clasp Brunei was officially recognised for repatriation benefits and entitlements. It is an award the RAN escaped from. Confrontation soon loomed. By mid-1965, the RAN was at war, operating on two fronts, Malaysia and Vietnam.
The RAAF had a small yet significant logistical transport role with 16 of its aircrew participating in 24 sorties flown. It assisted in countering the uprising by providing one Hercules C-130 from 36 Squadron based in Singapore. In comparison, the RNZAF provided two Bristol freighters (or “frighteners” as termed), from their 41 Squadron. Our one aircraft operated from Changi to Brunei, Labuan and Kuching. Its roles were mostly trooping, para-trooping, medical evacuation, carrying vehicles, ammunition, equipment and military stores. Its contribution is identifiable by sorties flown, date ranges, missions, locations and those aircrew who participated. For a list of personnel involved, refer to NAA CRS A1946/15 file 67/1350. This item number may be top-numbered from Defence file 167/1/40 and 642/1/42 (91).
The RAN did not have to wait long. In January, 1963 Malaysia’s Tunku (PM) reported that Indonesian activity against North Borneo was imminent, Australian and New Zealand Governments have been asked by the British Government whether (their) naval forces in the Far East would be available: “To help patrol territorial waters off the North Borneo coast or on the high seas.” Ministers have agreed to (the) use of Australian ships for this purpose. Clearly, the Brunei episode was a precursor to what our armed services would soon face in the theatre. By early 1963, approval was given for the employment of HMA ships in operations in Borneo, if required. Next year, Canberra had removed any ambiguous restrictions. In August, 1964 the Naval Board advised CINFE and COMFEF that it agreed to the employment of RAN escorts on patrol duties in the Tawau area in accordance with (the) directive for the attachment of HMA ships to the Far East Fleet for service with the Strategic Reserve. Once again, it signalled that HMA ships, as allocated and allotted, were on active service again.
* Mike Fogarty is a former RAN officer (lieutenant) who served in Singapore (1967) and later with the Australian High Commission, Singapore from 1974-1976.
