By Joshua Huminski*
In July 2024, the newly elected Labour government announced that it would undertake a ‘root and branch’ review of the United Kingdom’s (UK) Armed Forces. Headed by Lord Robertson, the former Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Dr Fiona Hill, foreign policy expert, and General Sir Richard Barrons, former Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) is an opportunity for Sir Keir Starmer, Prime Minister, to put his stamp on Britain’s defence priorities. (Britain’s World.)
When the Ministry of Defence (MOD) releases the review – sometime next spring – policymakers in Washington, DC will intently analyse the SDR, as a new administration in the United States (US) seeks to understand where its closest ally will place its resources and what threats it will prioritise. While the SDR is not fundamentally about America, the US and its orientation is inescapably intertwined with the outcomes of the SDR.
The decision to publish yet another strategic review so soon after the 2021Integrated Review, and 2023’s Integrated Review Refresh and Defence Command Paper should not come as a surprise to Washington, DC. While the geopolitical landscape which informed the 2023 documents has, arguably, not materially changed, it is the new government’s chance to articulate its own defence policy vision, akin to a new White House’s national security and defence strategies.
John Healey, Defence Secretary, argued that ‘at the start of a new era for Britain, we need a new era for defence.’ If anything, Washington, DC is looking not a new era, but a consistent era, a credible era, and more importantly, a well-funded era. Indeed, this last point is of particular importance.
Central to both American interests in the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific is the robustness of the British Armed Forces. Indeed, Healey suggested as much, saying that ‘hollowed-out armed forces, procurement waste and neglected morale cannot continue.’ Whether Labour reaffirms the commitment laid out by the previous Conservative government to spend 2.5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence by 2030 will send a clear signal about the direction of the UK’s security priorities. Equally, if the commitment to spend 2.5% is upheld by the new government, how the MOD allocates its spending across the breadth of the individual services’ requirements, including nuclear modernisation, will be of keen interest to the US Government. Indeed, the delta between His Majesty’s (HM) Government’s ambitions and the Treasury’s willingness to support said ambitions could be where the greatest friction arises, both in London and Washington, DC.
Another question will be how the SDR will fit into the Labour government’s view of the broader tools of national power. One key strength of the previous review and its refresh was the inclusion of all elements of British power, including science and technology, diplomacy, and economics. With other, parallel reviews (such as one on AUKUS and the China ‘audit’) ongoing, the new government may find it challenging to align competing interests and trade-offs without as concerted and focused a guiding document as its Conservative predecessors produced.
Beyond the politics of Downing Street and Whitehall, the new SDR will arrive in a Washington, DC governed by one of two markedly distinct administrations – a second Donald Trump presidency or a Kamala Harris White House. Despite their differences, the respective administrations will, arguably, look to London for similar things, albeit for different reasons.
There are two key geopolitical issues which will animate either administration in Washington, DC. These are Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine and countering growing Chinese influence. On Ukraine, the likelihood of change is almost certain under a Trump presidency, while a Harris administration is likely to continue with the policy initiative laid out by the current White House. On the People’s Republic of China (PRC), both potential administrations agree on the strategic threat which Beijing poses to American interests in the Indo-Pacific and more broadly around the world. How the respective governments pursue competition or confrontation with the PRC is where they will certainly differ.
In both cases, the US will look at the SDR to see where the UK stands and where the country fits into America’s defence calculus. Here, Britain is, perhaps counterintuitively, in a strong position.
Labour’s clear prioritisation of Europe and its ‘NATO-first’ policy serves both potential administrations well. Each will look keenly at the SDR to identify what ‘NATO-first’ means in theory and in practice. In the event of a Trump presidency, a forward-leaning UK which is exceeding its NATO spending obligations and continues to promote supporting Ukraine will set an example for the rest of Europe. If Britain can meet the 2.5% of GDP spending target announced under the previous government by 2030, it would send a powerful message to other NATO allies to increase their own defence spending, while also undercutting a potential Trump administration’s criticisms of insufficient burden sharing in NATO..
The former president has made no secret of his frustration with NATO allies who fail to meet their spending commitments, threatening to make Article 5 contingent on meeting those targets. Whether a hyperbolic negotiating position or an alarming statement of potential policy, it is regardless an animating feature of a Trump presidency. Sir Keir may well find London in the driver’s seat, providing long-term aid to Ukraine, a development which would suit Trump and both the ‘America First’ and ‘Beijing watcher’ cliques well.
On the PRC and the Indo-Pacific – the long-term strategic driver of American foreign and defence policy – the Labour government’s position is still evolving. While in opposition, Healey and David Lammy, then shadow Foreign Secretary, respectively downplayed the Indo-Pacific in pre-election comments in Washington, DC and the announcement of the ‘root and branch’ review omitted references to either PRC or Asia, this does not necessarily mean a decline in attendant influence in Washington, DC.
The centrality of the Euro-Atlantic in Labour’s calculus could – in theory – enable a reduced (though far from eliminated) requirement for American involvement on the European continent. Indeed, even members of the Biden administration have suggested that the UK could play a greater role nearer to its shores. While Washington, DC will remain vital to ensuring continental security, having London place more attention on the Euro-Atlantic could allow the US Government to allocate greater time, attention, and resources towards its main strategic adversary, the PRC.
This is not to say that Britain does not have interests in the Indo-Pacific and is without tools to pursue these interests. The UK’s membership in the Five Eyes intelligence sharing network holds immense importance, and its participation in the AUKUS partnership demonstrates a long-term commitment to regional security. Additionally, the Labour government willsend a carrier strike group to the region in 2025.
The ability of Britain to project maritime power into the Indo-Pacific has grown in recent years, but the fact remains that the UK’s geostrategic priority is the Euro-Atlantic. In some ways, a Britain focused on doing more, more effectively, closer to home, consequently securing America’s strategic flank in Europe would be more useful and more beneficial to Washington, DC in the near-term than an overstretched Britain in the Indo-Pacific. Ultimately, however, the SDR will reflect the UK’s priorities and attendant trade-offs. Nonetheless, it will shape American perspectives of its closest ally and the strategic direction of the partnership between Washington, DC and London at a time of growing geopolitical tension.
Joshua C. Huminski is the Senior Vice President for National Security and Intelligence Programmes, and the Director of the Mike Rogers Centre for Intelligence and Global Affairs at the Centre for the Study of the Presidency and Congress.
