The world is in a difficult stage of its recent history, and the new United States administration’s change of tack is undeniably jarring, Jennifer Parker writes in The Sydney Morning Herald.
President Trump has re-litigated America’s relationship with Europe through NATO, applied maximum pressure on Ukraine to push it towards negotiations, and said precious little about Russia. Meanwhile, a trade war has kicked off, and Australia’s now facing tariffs on steel and aluminium and maybe more from our closest ally. Does any of this put our alliance with the United States under threat? Absolutely not. Does it change Australia’s plans to acquire nuclear-powered submarines? Again, no. Here’s why.
Australia’s defence strategy since World War II has been anchored in its alliance with the United States, formalised in the 1951 ANZUS Treaty. This treaty obliges both nations to “act to meet the common danger” if either is attacked, and it has weathered many tests over the decades – we are, after all, very different countries. Like all critical defence frameworks, it’s rightly attracted public debate about its precise scope. Alliances are built on relationships, history, reliability and trust – not just treaties. Reassessing our strategic underpinnings is healthy, but any review should rest on facts.
At this point, there’s no sign the US is an unreliable ally of Australia. In the first 50 days of Trump’s term, senior officials – from the secretary of state to the president himself – have repeatedly underscored Australia’s importance to US security. While the current administration does not necessarily have a consistent view across key players, the endorsement should be comforting to Australia. Some have pointed to diverging US-Europe relations as a red flag, but the US has long urged Europeans to invest more in their own defence – this is hardly new. We may dislike the tone of the current demands, yet they don’t signal unreliability when it comes to the Indo-Pacific.
In fact, US officials openly acknowledge that encouraging Europe to handle its own conventional defence allows the US to refocus on deterring conflict with China. That’s where Australia comes in. A century of mateship is a lovely phrase – but that’s not why countries work together. Throughout our alliance, we haven’t agreed on everything, but it’s been rooted in shared strategic interests rather than purely shared values. Those interests are more aligned now than at any time since World War II, given China’s increasingly assertive stance.
As for tariffs on Australian steel and aluminium, they’re unwelcome – even unreasonable – but they affect only a small fraction of our exports. This disagreement doesn’t equate to a shaky foundation in our overall defence relationship. The Australia-US alliance extends far beyond economic tiffs or even AUKUS – our plan to acquire nuclear-powered submarines. It supports vital intelligence-sharing and extended nuclear deterrence, critical as China rapidly expands its nuclear arsenal. North Korea has already demonstrated nuclear capabilities.
When it comes to AUKUS, calls for a “Plan B” seem off-base. Contingency planning is prudent, of course, but there’s no evidence that AUKUS is going off track. Like any major defence acquisition, it’s complex, and the nuclear dimension adds to the challenge. It will not always go to plan. But the pertinent question isn’t “is it risky?” but “are we managing the risks effectively?”
Critics highlight the US submarine industrial base as a weak link. True, America has struggled to meet production targets for Virginia-class subs, and broader shipbuilding delays persist. Yet Australia’s recent $800 million contributionaims to help strengthen that base. The US administration has also proposed an overhaul of maritime industries. Even if progress is slower than planned, there’s little indication that Australia won’t receive three Virginia-class submarines from 2032. All the attention on building two US attack submarines a year is really about meeting the goal of 59 submarines by 2054, not the rate itself.Access to Australian bases outside the range of many Chinese missiles may be the more critical determinant in any Indo-Pacific conflict.
Additionally, there’s plenty in AUKUS for the US. Beyond funding and industrial support, having a robust ally in Australia and the geographical access that affords is pivotal to Washington’s strategic aims in the Pacific. If the current US administration is seen as more transactional, it only underscores Australia’s growing strategic value. We should affirm our importance in every discussion with Washington, ensuring mutual benefit remains clear.
A final point often overlooked in “Plan B” debates is Australia’s own reliability as a defence partner. We’ve cancelled or scaled back several major projects in recent years – scrapping the French attack sub deal in 2021, reducing Hunter-class frigates, and halving the Arafura Offshore Patrol Vessel program. If we were to walk away from our most important defence project with our most important security partner – absent a major project failure – it would send a strong message that Australia can’t be counted on. That reputation would harm our ability to secure advanced capabilities in our most serious strategic circumstances since World War II.
Continuously questioning our strategic foundations is wise, and planning for contingencies is part of good governance. But none of that implies the alliance is unstable or that AUKUS is doomed. So far, the evidence suggests both remain strong. As global stability erodes, a measure of stoicism will serve us better than alarmism. Healthy scepticism is prudent, but catastrophising every US move only casts doubt on our own reliability as an ally and capability partner.
Jennifer Parker is a defence and national security expert associate at ANU’s National Security College. She has served for more than 20 years as a warfare officer in the Royal Australian Navy.
