By Emanuel Cohen*
The Pentagon’s review of the AUKUS defence partnership has surely generated anxiety in Canberra. But the Trump administration’s goal of verifying the program’s alignment with the ‘America First’ agenda presents Australia’s leadership with an opportunity. (From The Strategist, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.)
While Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has promoted AUKUS as a significant domestic economic and industrial boon, he has done far less to publicly promote AUKUS’s national security benefits. That’s problematic, as the Trump administration generally approaches alliances with scepticism, judging them not by what the US can offer, but what it stands to gain.
Albanese in April reiterated the deterrence value of AUKUS Pillar One, which commits the transfer of US Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines to Australia. But these comments came only after reports of US concerns over Australia’s reluctance to discuss using those submarines against China. That reluctance is risky. If Australia wants to keep AUKUS alive under Trump, it must make its strategic value unmistakable.
Albanese may be hesitant to make any firm commitments to a Taiwan contingency, especially given Australia and China’s strong economic relationship. But demonstrating a willingness to discuss, even negotiate, future bilateral (or multilateral) use of Australia’s Virginia-class submarine fleet could put Australia ahead of a potential concern for Trump administration officials.
Just this month, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth demanded that Australia immediately boost its defence spending. Actively engaging the administration by jumpstarting these discussions, while AUKUS remains in the administration’s good graces, could have immense short-term payoffs for Australia.
But before Australia can successfully make its case in Washington, it must shore up support at home. Domestically, many Australians have yet to connect the dots between China’s imposing geopolitical threat and their country’s great defense initiative that aims to address it. For example, University of Technology Sydney polls show that 71 percent of Australians see China as a security threat, and 64 percent of Australians think the government should increase defence spending ‘to balance China’s growing military might.’ Yet only 53 percent of Australians support defence spending increases by making budget cuts elsewhere, while Lowy Institute polling reveals only 46 percent believe that AUKUS is making the region safer.
Australians do not need to look far to recognise the threat China poses. In March, China irresponsibly conducted live-fire military exercises in the Tasman Sea, just a few hundred kilometres off Australia’s coastline. It later sent a research vessel into Australia’s exclusive economic zone, close to critical Australian subsea communications cables. Despite these provocations, Canberra meekly responded by stressing the legality of China’s actions and reiterating the importance of Australia-China trade.
The US AUKUS review, revealed this month, gives Australia an opportunity to link Chinese aggression in Australia’s backyard to AUKUS’s unmistakable deterrent value against that threat. Threading the AUKUS narrative through its domestic and international dimensions could be Australia’s only chance to address the Trump administration’s concerns while ensuring that the Australian public grasps AUKUS’s role in maintaining the region’s geopolitical balance.
An effective, two-pronged campaign is needed. It must highlight the threat that Chinese aggression poses at home, while underscoring Australia’s commitment to working with the US to counter that threat. Such a message would be well received in Washington and could also help win over an Australian public that remains confused about how AUKUS relates to China.
To ensure AUKUS’s survival, Australia may have to commit to using its nuclear submarines to support US regional activities. If so, the government will have to justify that decision domestically. If the Trump administration remains supportive of AUKUS, even short of such a commitment, Albanese will have likely succeeded in keeping a crucial bilateral relationship close and improving the Australian public’s understanding of the country’s strategic direction. He’d be wise to start now rather than risk a two-front fight later: against Trump officials and an unconvinced public.
