In the years between Australia’s Federation in 1901 and the royal proclamation of the title ‘Royal Australian Navy’ in 1911, the nation’s navy was known as the Commonwealth Naval Force (CNF). In the Summer 2000-2001 edition of the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute, Dr David Stevens contributed an article on this least well known chapter in Australia’s naval history. As the RAN approaches its 125th anniversary it makes for timely reading.
The Commonwealth Naval Forces Australia’s Navy -100 Years of Service to the Nation
Although some might point to 10 July 1911, and the Sovereign’s granting of the title ‘Royal Australian Navy’ as the birth of Australia’s Navy as a more recognisable landmark, the truth remains that Australia had already possessed a unified naval force for more than a decade.
The legal basis for the creation of the first two national armed services came from Section 51 of the Australian Constitution, which gave the new Parliament the power to make laws with respect to the naval and military defence of the Commonwealth. At Federation, the Governor-General, the Earl of Hopetoun, became Commander-in-Chief, and on 1 March 1901 the states transferred their naval and military forces and everyone employed in their connection to the Federal Government. However, until Parliament could create the necessary legislative and administrative machinery, the various forces continued to be controlled under the existing Colonial Acts and regulations. The four states that had maintained maritime forces through to 1901 – Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia – each possessed a Naval Commandant who reported individually to the Minister of Defence. For the first year all military and naval units retained their old colonial titles, but by May 1902 the Federal bureaucracy had adopted the collective names Commonwealth Naval Forces (CNF) and Commonwealth Military Forces (later Australian Military Forces) to distinguish the two arms of Australian defence.
The pre-Federation naval forces were intended solely for local defence, and were prohibited from operating outside the three-mile limit. But even functioning within these constraints the colonial governments had soon found that the responsibility of maintaining, repairing and operating warships was an expensive business. In an age of technological transition few authorities could afford the commitment of scarce industrial, financial and human resources required to keep their vessels in continuous and efficient commission. As a result, the ships inherited by the CNF were tired, old and inadequate even for training. They included the ironclad monitor Cerberus and four torpedo boats from Victoria, the gunboats Gayundah and Paluma and two torpedo boats from Queensland, and the gunboat Protector from South Australia. The oldest vessel, Cerberus, had already seen thirty years of service. The youngest, the first-class torpedo boat Countess of Hopetoun, had been completed in 1891. Permanent personnel strength totalled only 239 officers and men, while another 1659 served with the part-time naval brigades. Like their ships, many of these men were overage, and one suspects that security of employment often ranked above a real desire to serve.
The early federal administrations were too busy to be overmuch troubled with naval defence and, with the ongoing war in South Africa, public attention was concentrated far more on military matters. The CNF’s budgetary allocation in 1901/1902 was just £67,000. In contrast, the 16,874 men belonging to the various military forces were allocated £638,000. Despite the disparity, a dilapidated CNF was not a major national concern if the Royal Navy (RN) could continue to be relied upon to provide maritime protection. Successive British commanders of the Australia Station provided this reassurance, and the Commonwealth’s payment of a subsidy towards maintaining a RN Squadron in Australia, reinforced the idea that issues of naval policy were best left with the Admiralty in London.
Concerned by the rapid growth of Japanese and German naval power in the Pacific, the State naval commandants were less confident. Led by the Queensland commandant, Captain (later Vice Admiral Sir) William Rooke Creswell, they feared the withdrawal of British forces under the exigencies of war. Australia, they argued, lying at the extreme end of the world’s sea routes and possessing no land frontier was open to attack only by sea. Unprotected, Australian floating trade would be at the mercy of even a small enemy force, and soon be either sunk or forced to seek refuge. With communications cut, industrial paralysis and economic devastation would follow.
Creswell consistently objected to the far higher proportion of Commonwealth funds expended on the Australian Army’s field force, “that branch of the forces that cannot see. much less come into contact with, an enemy, until the Empire is crushed at sea”. As he observed sharply in a 1902 parliamentary report: “The spectacle of some 5,000,000 Anglo-Australians, with an Army splendidly equipped, unable to prevent the burning of a cargo of wool in sight of Sydney Heads, is only the ordinary consequence of a policy of naval impotence.”
Deep issues of naval defence exercised only a handful of Australian minds. Nevertheless, the idea of a more capable Australian navy, locally manned, and under the Commonwealth’s executive direction, gradually gathered support. The process was assisted by further progress towards setting up the machinery to impose federal control over all defence matters. The proclamation of the Commonwealth Defence Act in 1904 led to the simultaneous creation of both a Director of Naval Forces and an Inspector-General of the Military Forces. The constitution of Boards of Administration for the two services likewise occurred together in January 1905. Prime Minister George Reid deliberately chose Australia’s best known navalist Captain Creswell, as the first Director of Naval Forces.
While admitting that his service was “practically on the verge of collapse”, and that only two of his lieutenants were fit for active service, Creswell embarked on a program designed to breathe new life into the CNF’s operations. Despite a restricted budget he managed to bring several of the gunboats and torpedo boats back into commission and renewed regular training exercises in Port Phillip to improve combat readiness. These exercises soon grew into substantial events with the torpedo boats commonly called upon to demonstrate flotilla tactics against an approaching ‘enemy’ cruiser. The part of the latter was normally played by one of the Queensland gunboats. The naval commandants of Victoria and South Australia alternated in command afloat. No longer confined to service in their own State waters, Creswell also ordered selected vessels to undertake flag showing cruises along the southern and eastern coasts and down to Tasmania. Public lectures, illustrated by lantern slides, further helped to push Creswell’s message.
The greater visibility and renewed activity of the CNF proved the quality of Australian naval men and managed to excite public interest, but the service could not long survive without the replacement of its ancient vessels. Fortunately, Creswell found an ally in the new prime minister, Alfred Deakin, who, like his Naval Director, preferred active cooperation to subsidies. In September 1906, Deakin announced an initial three-year program of eight coastal destroyers and four torpedo boats, but deferred appropriating funds until after the general election scheduled for early the next year.
Subject to political calculation as much as strategic perception, Deakin’s naval scheme made slow progress. In December 1907, following discussions at the Imperial Conference in London and Admiralty advice, he announced that the CNF’s force structure had been modified to include nine small submarines and a flotilla of six coastal destroyers. Meanwhile, the Government had sent two senior CNF officers on a mission to the UK where they were directed to obtain plans, specifications, and cost estimates for the construction of various warships. On 6 February 1909, Australia’s naval representative in London requested tenders for the first three vessels, the River Class torpedo boat destroyers Parramatta, Yarra, and Warrego. Already in place were measures to build up a local defence industry. The successful yards were each required to employ at least a dozen Australian workmen to help build Yarra and Parramatta. This allowed Warrego to be taken to pieces and shipped to Australia, where it was re-erected at Cockatoo Island Dockyard. Three subsequent destroyers were built entirely in Australia.
Australian authorities intended the CNF’s destroyer flotilla to take on full responsibility for coastal defence, leaving the RN to deal with more distant operations. However, by the time Parramatta and Yarra arrived in local waters in December 1910, Australian naval policy had made an even greater advance. Finding itself hard pressed to maintain its global naval supremacy the RN had already decided to support a more substantial Australian contribution towards defence in the Pacific.
At the 1909 Imperial Conference the Admiralty’s First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir John Fisher, suggested that the CNF expand from the planned local defence flotilla to include a self-contained ‘fleet unit ‘ based around his revolutionary battle cruiser and several light cruisers. The combined package, argued Fisher, represented an ideal force structure; small enough to be managed by Australia in times of peace but, in war, capable of effective action with the RN. Federal Cabinet gave provisional endorsement in September 1909 and orders were placed in the UK for the additional ships.
Just as important was the passing of the Australian Naval Defence Act 1910, which provided the clear legislative authority for a navy that would no longer be limited to Australian territorial waters. The difference between the naval and military forces of the Commonwealth was now striking. With an Army compelled by law to serve only on local soil, Australia had to raise a separate volunteer expeditionary force to serve overseas in 1914.
Since 1904 CNF warships had been designated His Majesty’s Australian Ship (HMAS), but this had never received the King’s sanction. During their visit to London for the coronation of King George V, Australian ministers made known their desire to have the prefix ‘Royal’ attached to the Australian Navy’s title. On 10 July 1911 King George approved the request ‘with great satisfaction’. The decision was promulgated to the CNF on 5 October. Thereafter the Permanent CNF officially became the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), and the Citizen Naval Forces the Royal Australian Naval Reserve. At the stern of Australian ships, the White Ensign replaced the Australian Blue Ensign. The Australian Commonwealth flag took the place of the Union flag at the bow.
The RAN did not just happen in 1911. The bestowal of the title ‘Royal’ reflected the progress made in the previous ten years in turning a motley collection of obsolescent vessels into a true fighting service. Perhaps more significant in hindsight, however, was that the revitalisation of the CNF marked Australia’s first major step towards nationhood. Arising from a deeper recognition that Australia’s defence interests could no longer be consigned to others, the decision to acquire a sea-going navy represented an assumption of national obligation of momentous proportion.
The foresight of men like Creswell and Deakin was amply rewarded just a few years later when in 1914 the German East Asiatic Squadron was decisively deterred from carrying out its plans for cruiser warfare in the Pacific. But for the navy, wartime Prime Minister W.M. ‘Billy’ Hughes later declared, “the great cities of Australia would have been reduced to ruins, coastwise shipping sunk, and communications with the outside world cut off.” One would be hard pressed to find a more appropriate sentiment to mark the Australian Navy’s first centenary of service to the nation.
About the Author
Dr David Stevens AM joined the Royal Australian Naval College in 1974 as a 16 year old cadet midshipmen. He became a Principal Warfare Officer specialising in ASW and later served on the RAN CTG staff during the Gulf War. After twenty years service he retired from full time service and became Director of Naval Historical Studies at the Seapower Centre. During the course of his time there he wrote or edited numerous books including U-Boat Far From Home: The Epic Voyage of the U-862 to Australia and New Zealand, In All Respects Ready: Australia’s Navy in World War One and The Royal Australian Navy. He also deployed to the RAN task group as a naval historian during the Iraq War.
